

1 IN THE USA... 6.6 MILLION READERS D

By Johanna Neuman USA TODAY

the cagey Soviet leader. ban missile crisis show the John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev over the 1962 Cupresident every bit a match for Correspondence between

letters show a "very confident" Kennedy and a "desperate" Khrushchev, says American Declassified Monday, the

University's Philip Brenner, who sought their release.

khrushchev –

differences in personality. Khrushchev's letters were

wiets meant to launch nuclear missiles from Cuba. Why head" for war, he asked choose Cuba as ▶ Rejected the claim the So-

► Claimed the bombers he sent to Cuba were obsolete.

not draw tears from our eyes."

A U.S. blockade and a deal "You man-

Excerpts of letters, 4A

ROAD Q&A: ON THE **FLIERS** BY CITY CONVENTIONS EVENTS, CAR RENTALS, TIPS FOR REPORT 5-12B



blockade; letters were curt. KENNEDY: Ordering Cuban

long and chatty; Kennedy's short and businesslike. In the letters, Khrushchev: They reveal little more than "could carry nuclear weapons for long distances."

▶ Tried to flatter Kennedy by applauding Richard Nixon's 1962 defeat in the California aged to pin your political rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did governor's race. But Kennedy wrote they dy agreed not to invade Cuba.
Khrushchev wrote: "As a result, there has been achieved ended the crisis. Khrushchev withdrew the weapons; Kenne-The letters were released in response to a Freedom of Inons to Cuba — no invasion. the purpose which had been in-tended" by sending the weapformation request.



BEFORE CUBA: President Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev meet in Vienna in 1961.


What was said at height of '62 crisis

Following are excerpts from letters in 1962 between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and President Kennedy during the latter stages of the Cuban missile crisis. The letters, written in the period that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, are among 12 previously classified documents released Monday by the United States and Russia.

Khrushchev to Kennedy, Oct. 30, 1962:

Mr. President, I believe that you as a military man and your military people understand that we were not preparing for war when we delivered means of defense to Cuba.

Do you really think that we are so narrow-minded in our understanding of military matters that in preparing for war against the U.S. we picked up Cuba as a bridgehead for such



And the means there
— a certain number of
missiles. This is foolish.
For Cuba is no good as a
bridgehead for a big war
and it cannot be used for
those purposes and, of
course, nobody ever contemplated that. . . .

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It is our opinion that the crisis has been eliminated on the compromise basis through reciprocal concessions. We are satisfied with it. We also appreciate your cooperation in the elimina-

tion of the crisis and your understanding of the necessity for reciprocal concessions and compromise so that the conflict be prevented from going beyond the limits that might really break into a thermonuclear war....

All the peoples of the world, the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the peoples of all other countries, are interested in eliminating this conflict.

To our mutual satisfaction we may have even sacrificed self-esteem. . . .

Apparently, there will be such scribblers who will engage in hair-splitting over our agreement, will be digging as to who made greater concessions to whom. . . .

As for me, I would say that we both made a concession to reason and found a reasonable solution which enabled us to ensure peace for all.

Kennedy to Khrushchev, Nov. 6, 1962:

Not only did this action threaten the whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the worldwide status quo. . . .

Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument ... your government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing: these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate. ...

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. . . .

If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger—not only for our two countries, but for the whole world.

► Kennedy confident, 1A