

As such, "the United States chose a policy in the Northeast of cooperation with regional elites and justified the policy in terms of a communist threat." The United States had "contributed to the retention of power by the traditional oligarchy" and "destroyed" a Brazilian program to modernize the political structure of the Northeast.⁶⁴

The course of United States reform policies in Honduras and Brazil pointed to a tension between the Administration's talk of middle-class revolution and its search for anti-Communist stability. As Assistant Secretary Martin noted to Schlesinger in 1963, the Alliance for Progress contained "major flaws." Its "laudable social goals" encouraged political instability, yet their achievement demanded an 80 percent private investment "which cannot be attracted amid political instability."⁶⁵ President Kennedy recognized the problem, noting near the end of his administration, that the United States would have to learn to live in a "dangerous, untidy world."⁶⁶ But little in the President's action's or his Administration's policies indicated that the United States was prepared to identify with progressive social revolutions. The Administration and the President, Bowles concluded, never "had the real courage to face up to the implications" of the principles of the Alliance for Progress.⁶⁷

That the Alliance for Progress was a Cold War policy was never a subject of dispute. But, in Schlesinger's words, "answering Castro was a byproduct, not the purpose, of the Alliance." What presumably distinguished the Latin American policy of John F. Kennedy was the belief that the key to stability and anti-communism was democracy, economic growth and development, and social change. The Alliance for Progress, as one observer put it, was "enlightened anti-communism."⁶⁸ An examination of the course of inter-American relations between 1961 and 1963 points, however, to the need to separate the President's words from his decisions and his Administration's deeds. Through its recognition policy, internal security initiatives, and military and economic aid programs, the Administration demonstrably bolstered regimes and groups that were undemocratic, conservative, and frequently repressive. The short-term security that anti-Communist elites could provide was purchased at the expense of long-term political and social democracy.

*I believe the beginning of this chapter indicates a point where
I am often left with a strong & correct doubt from the
beginning that the focus of this part is upon the Kennedy
only the last 2 of 6 for this article on events*

5

Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro

THOMAS G. PATTERSON

"My God," muttered Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency, "these Kennedys keep the pressure on about Castro."¹ Another CIA officer heard it straight from the Kennedy brothers: "Get off your ass about Cuba."² About a year after John F. Kennedy's inauguration, a member of Congress applauded "the way you are gradually strangling Castro and Communism in Cuba."³ In 1963 the President still sought to "dig Castro out of there."⁴ Defense Secretary Robert McNamara remembered that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter."⁵ As someone said, Cuba was one of the four-letter words of the 1960s.

President Kennedy spent as much or more time on Cuba as on any other foreign policy problem. Cuba stood at the center of his Administration's admitted greatest failure, the Bay of Pigs, and its alleged greatest success, the missile crisis. A multitude of government agencies enlisted in the crusade against revolutionary Cuba: the Commerce Department administered trade restrictions; the State Department labored to rally the Organization of American States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies against Cuba; the Federal Bureau of Investigation spied on pro- and anti-Castro groups; the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Coast Guard, and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare handled the steady flow of exiles from the turbulent island; and the CIA launched covert operations designed to topple the Cuban government and to assassinate its leader Fidel Castro. Contrary to some Kennedy memoirists and schol-

John Augustin He ordered the inclusion of Tuguey to the Cuban Revolution...
with the intention of the CIA side of the Cuban Revolution...
of the CIA side of the Cuban Revolution...
of the CIA side of the Cuban Revolution...

124 THOMAS G. PATTERSON

ars who have claimed that Kennedy was often trapped by a bureaucracy he could not control and distracted by other time-consuming issues, the President was knowledgeable, engaged, and influential on matters Cuban.⁶

Why did President Kennedy and his chief advisers indulge such a fixation with Cuba and direct so many United States resources to an unremitting campaign to monitor, harass, isolate, and ultimately destroy Havana's radical regime? One answer springs from a candid remark by Robert F. Kennedy. Looking back at the early 1960s, he wondered "if we did not pay a very great price for being more energetic than wise about a lot of things, especially Cuba."⁷ The Kennedy's famed eagerness for action became exaggerated in the case of Cuba. They always wanted to get moving on Cuba, and Castro dared them to try. Some Europeans thought that "we kept slapping at Castro because he'd had the effrontery to thumb his nose at us," recalled one American diplomat.⁸ The popular, intelligent, but erratic Cuban leader, whose *barbudos* (bearded ones) came down from the Sierra Maestra Mountains in January 1959 to overthrow the United States ally Fulgencio Batista, hurled harsh words at Washington and defiantly challenged the Kennedy model of evolutionary, capitalist development so evident in the Alliance for Progress. As charismatic figures charting new frontiers, the President and *Jefe Maximo* often personalized the Cuban-American contest. Kennedy harbored a "deep feeling against Castro," and the Cuban thought the American "an intelligent and able leader of American imperialism," and, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, he branded him a new Hitler.⁹ To Kennedy's great annoyance, Castro could not be wheedled or beaten.

Kennedy's ardent war against *Fidelismo* may also have stemmed from his feeling that Castro had double-crossed him. As a senator, Kennedy had initially joined many Americans in welcoming the Cuban Revolution as a decided advancement over the "oppressive" Batista dictatorship. Linking Castro to the legacy of Bolivar, Kennedy urged a "patient attitude" toward the new government, which he did not see as Communist.¹⁰ Denying repeatedly that he was a Communist, Castro had in fact proclaimed his allegiance to democracy and private property. But in the process of legitimizing his revolution and resisting United States pressure, Castro turned more and more radical. Americans grew impatient with the regime's highly charged anti-Yankeeism, postponement of elections, jailing of critics, and nationalization of property. The Cuban police state system reminded many of

Handwritten notes in the left margin, including "Why did President Kennedy..." and "The Cuban police state system..."

Cuba 125

Hitler's and Stalin's dreaded totalitarianism. The President rejected the idea that intense United States hostility to the Cuban Revolution may have contributed to Castro's tightening political grip and flirtation with the Soviet Union. Nor did Kennedy and other Americans wish to acknowledge the measurable benefits of the revolution—improvements in education, medical care, and housing, and the elimination of the island's infamous corruption that once had been the American Mafia's domain. Instead, Kennedy officials concluded that Cuba's was a "betrayed revolution."¹¹

Richard N. Goodwin, the young White House and State Department official with responsibilities for Latin America, provided another explanation for the Kennedy fixation with Cuba. He remarked that "the entire history of the Cold War, its positions and assumptions, converged upon the 'problem of Cuba.'"¹² Indeed, the Cold War dominated international politics, and in the zero-sum accounting of the time, a loss for "us" meant a gain for "them." As Cuban-American relations steadily deteriorated, Cuban-Soviet relations gradually improved. Not only did Americans come to believe that a once-loyal ally had jilted them for the tawdry embrace of the Soviets; they also grew alarmed that Castro sneered at the Monroe Doctrine by inviting the Soviet military to the island. When Castro, in late 1961, declared himself a Marxist-Leninist, Americans who had long denounced him as a Communist then felt vindicated. American leaders began to speak of Cuban membership in the "Sino-Soviet bloc," thus providing Communists with a "spearehead" to penetrate the Western Hemisphere.¹³ From the moment of victory, Castro had called for Cuban-style revolutions throughout Latin America, and Havana had sent agents and arms to other nations to kindle radical fires. Castro's revolutionary mission happened to coincide with Nikita Khrushchev's alarming statement that the Soviet Union supported wars of national liberation worldwide. It mattered little to Americans that the two appeals appeared independently or that Havana and Moscow differed markedly over the best method for promoting revolutionary change—the Soviets insisted on utilizing Communist parties within political systems, whereas the Cubans espoused peoples' rebellions. Cuba came to represent the Cold War in the United States's backyard, and, as such, one senator explained, it became a "target for our national frustration and annoyance with Moscow and the whole Communist conspiracy."¹⁴

In addition to the Kennedy style and the Cold War, American politics influenced the Administration's Cuba policy. In the 1960

The U.S. ...
THOMAS G. PATERSON
126

presidential campaign, Kennedy had seized the Cuban issue to counter Richard Nixon's charge that the inexperienced Democratic candidate would abandon Quemoy and Matsu to Communism and prove no match for the hard-nosed Khrushchev. "In 1952 the Republicans ran on a program of rolling back the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe," Kennedy jabbed. "Today the Iron Curtain is 90 miles off the coast of the United States."¹⁵ Privately he asked, "How would we have saved Cuba if we had [had] the power?" but he nonetheless valued the political payback from his attack. "What the hell," he informed his aides, "they never told us how they would have saved China [in 1949]."¹⁶ He did recommend a controversial method to reclaim Cuba for the American system. Apparently unaware that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had initiated a clandestine CIA program to train Cuban exiles for an invasion of the island, candidate Kennedy bluntly called for just such a project. *by 1952*

After exploiting the Cuban issue, Kennedy, upon becoming President, could not easily have retreated. Partisan politics kept his gaze fixed on the defiant leader in the Caribbean. Hardly a press conference went by without an insistent question about Cuba. Republicans and Democrats alike peppered the White House with demands for action against Castroism. The vocal, burgeoning Cuban exile community in Florida never let the issue rest. Businessmen protested that the Cuban government nationalized American-owned property worth a billion dollars, and they grew apprehensive that the practice would become attractive in the hemisphere. The outgoing Treasury Secretary told Kennedy that "large amounts of capital now planned for investment in Latin America" were being held back, because investors were "waiting to see whether the United States can cope" with Castro's Cuba.¹⁷ George Meany, the cantankerous head of the AFL-CIO, decried the communization of the Cuban labor federation.¹⁸ The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the President to invade Cuba.¹⁹ Everyone seemed eager to know when Kennedy would knock Castro off his perch, and many expected the President to act before the next election.

Overarching all explanations for Kennedy's obsession with Cuba is a major phenomenon of twentieth-century world history: the steady erosion of the authority of imperial powers, which had built systems of dependent, client, and colonial governments. The strong currents of decolonization, anti-imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, and social revolution, sometimes in combination, undermined the instru-

127
...
Cuba

ments the imperial nations had used to maintain control and order. In the 1950s France was driven from Indochina, and Great Britain's position in the Middle East receded dramatically after the Suez crisis, to cite two prominent examples.

The Cuban Revolution exemplified this process of breaking up and breaking away. American leaders reacted so hostilely to this revolution not simply because Castro and his 26th of July Movement taunted them or because domestic politics and the Cold War swayed them, but because Cuba, as symbol and reality, challenged United States hegemony in Latin America. The specter of "another Cuba" haunted President Kennedy, not just because it would hurt him politically, but because "the game would be up through a good deal of Latin America."²⁰ Americans refused to accept a revolution that not only targeted Batista and their island assets but also the Monroe Doctrine and the United States's claim to political, economic, and military leadership in the hemisphere. "The revolution became anti-imperialism and freedom, the overthrow of the monoculture-militarist-dictatorship-dependence structure," remembered Carlos Franqui, a *Fidelista* who later went into exile.²¹ Given this fundamental conflict, a breakdown in Cuban-American relations was inevitable: Cuba sought independence and radical social change which would necessarily come at the expense of the United States, and the latter, not unexpectedly, defended its interests against revolutionary nationalism. As Castro put it, "the United States *had* to fight his revolution."²² Khrushchev, in pondering the American campaign against Cuba, once asked: "Why should an elephant be afraid of a mouse?"²³ The Soviet leader, who certainly knew his own nation's imperial record in suppressing its neighbors when they became too independent-minded, surely knew that the answer to his question could be found in the American fear that the Cuban Revolution would become contagious and further diminish United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

After the United States helped expel Spain from Cuba in 1898 and imposed the Platt Amendment on the island in 1903, Americans gained influence through military interventions, occupations, threats, economic penetration, and political manipulation. By 1959 Americans dominated Cuba's oil, telephone, mining, and electric industries and produced more than a third of its sugar. That year, too, the United States bought 74 percent of Cuba's exports and supplied 65 percent of the island's imports.²⁴ Because the United States had such tremendous economic favors to dispense, (especially a quota system

that guaranteed Cuba sugar sales in the American market), Washington wielded political influence in Havana. The United States also stationed a military mission in Cuba and sent arms to Batista's forces. The CIA infiltrated political groups and helped Batista organize an anti-Communist police unit.

After having underestimated Castro's 26th of July Movement and the depth of the nation's unrest, the Eisenhower Administration tried to manipulate Cuba once again on the very eve of Castro's victory. With the President's blessing and CIA instructions, William D. Pawley, owner of Cuban lands and former Ambassador to Brazil, traveled to Havana to press Batista to resign in favor of a military junta in order to prevent the 26th of July Movement's imminent triumph. The Cuban President balked at this exercise of "Plattism," and Pawley's mission aborted.²⁵ Even after this setback, the United States's continued sense of its strength in Cuba appeared in a CIA report that concluded that "no sane man undertaking to govern and reform Cuba would have chosen to pick a fight with the U.S." Because Castro did not honor traditional United States power in his nation, he must have possessed a "psychotic personality."²⁶ Americans, unable or unwilling to acknowledge that the Cuban Revolution tapped deep nationalistic feelings and that their own interventionism and island interests made the United States a primary target, preferred to depict Fidel Castro as a crazed *guerrillero* whose temporarily frenzied people would toss him out when their rationality returned.

The Eisenhower Administration bequeathed to its successor an unproductive fit-for-fat process of confrontation with Cuba and a legacy of failure.²⁷ In 1959-1960, with Ambassador Philip Bonsal thinking that Castro suffered "mental unbalance at times" and Eisenhower concluding that the Cuban leader "begins to look like a madman," Havana and Washington traded punches for punch.²⁸ In November 1959 the President decided to encourage anti-Castro groups within Cuba to "check" or "replace" the revolutionary regime, and thus end an anti-Americanism that was "having serious adverse effects on the United States position in Latin America and corresponding advantages for international Communism."²⁹ In March of the next year Eisenhower ordered the CIA to train Cuban exiles for an invasion of their homeland—this shortly after Cuba signed a trade treaty with the Soviet Union. The CIA, as well, hatched assassination plots against Castro and staged hit-and-run attacks along the Cuban coast. As Cuba undertook land reform that struck at American interests and nationalized

The party is not being supervised by the CIA for the CIA is not supposed to be involved in the party's internal affairs. The party is a free party and should be free to do as it pleases. The CIA should not be involved in the party's internal affairs. The party is a free party and should be free to do as it pleases. The CIA should not be involved in the party's internal affairs.

American-owned industries, the United States suspended Cuba's sugar quota and forbade American exports to the island, drastically cutting a once-flourishing commerce. On January 3, 1961, fearing an invasion and certain that the American embassy was a "nest of spies" aligned with counter-revolutionaries who were burning cane fields and sabotaging buildings, Castro heatedly demanded that the embassy staff be reduced to the small size of the Cuban delegation in Washington.³⁰ The United States promptly broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Eisenhower failed to topple Castro, but American pressure accelerated the radicalization of the revolution and helped open the door to the Soviets. Moscow bought sugar, supplied technicians, armed the militia, and offered generous trade terms. Although the revolution's radicalization was probably inevitable, it was not inexorable that Cuba would end up in the Soviet camp. Hostile United States policies ensured that outcome. Revolutionary Cuba needed outside assistance to survive. "Russia came to Castro's rescue," Bonsal has concluded, "only after the United States had taken steps designed to overthrow him."³¹

Kennedy's foreign policy troubles have sometimes been explained as inheritances from Eisenhower that shackled the new President with problems not of his own making. To be sure, Kennedy inherited the Cuban problem from Eisenhower. But he did not simply continue his predecessor's anti-Castro policies. Kennedy greatly exaggerated the Cuban threat, attributing to Castro a capability to export revolution that the Cuban leader never had and lavishing on him an attention he did not deserve. Castro was "an affront to our pride" and a "mischief maker." Walter Lippmann wisely wrote, but he was not a "mortal threat" to the United States.³² And because of his obsession with Cuba, Kennedy significantly increased the pressures against the upstart island. He thus helped generate major crises, including the October 1962 missile crisis. Kennedy inherited the Cuban problem—and he made it worse.

The new President actually made his first important policy choice on Cuba before he entered the White House. On the day Cuban-American relations were severed, Secretary of State Christian A. Lehman telephoned Secretary-designate Dean Rusk and asked for his reaction. Rusk talked with Kennedy and reported the election. "I would not associate myself with the Administration," he would not take a position for or against

10/1/61

M. J. J. J.

never made it, because their boats broke apart on razor-sharp coral reefs. In the air, Castro's marauding airplanes shot down two brigade B-26s and, in the water, sank ships carrying essential communications equipment and ammunition. Fighting ferociously, the brigade nonetheless failed to establish a beachhead. Would-Washington try to salvage the mission? Kennedy turned down CIA appeals to dispatch planes from the nearby USS Essex, but he did permit some jets to provide air cover for a new B-26 attack from Nicaragua. Manned this time by American CIA pilots, the B-26s arrived an hour after the jets had come and gone. Cuban aircraft downed the B-26s, killing four Americans. With Castro's boasting that the *mercenarios* had been foiled, the final toll was grim: 114 of the exile brigade dead and 1,189 captured. A pall settled over the White House.

"How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?" Kennedy asked an assistant.³⁸ Stupid or not, Kennedy knew the answers to his own question. First, he dearly sought to oust Castro and score a victory in the Cold War. Second, his personality and style encouraged action. Always driven to win, Kennedy believed "that his disapproval of the plan would be a show of weakness inconsistent with his general stance."³⁹ One foreign policy observer explained "how the President got such bad advice from such good advisers":

The decision on which they were asked to advise was presented as a choice between action and inaction. . . . None of the President's advisers wants it said of him by his colleagues . . . that he . . . loses his nerve when the going gets hot. The Harvard intellectuals are especially vulnerable, the more so from being new on the scene. They are conscious of the fact that the tough-minded military suspect them of being soft-headed. They have to show that they are he-men too, that they can act as well as lecture.⁴⁰

Third, fear of nasty political repercussions influenced the President. Told to disband, brigade members might have refused to give up their arms or even have mutinied. In any case, Republicans would have scorned a weak-kneed Administration.⁴¹ Kennedy approved the operation, finally, because he felt a sense of urgency. CIA analysts advised that time was on Castro's side. Delay would permit the Soviets to strengthen the Cuban military, perhaps with MIG fighters, and the rainy season was about to begin, making military maneuver difficult. The Guatemalan president, facing awkward questions about Cuban trainees in his country, was also beseeching Washington to move the exiles out by late April.⁴²

Failures in intelligence, operations, decision-making, and judgment doomed the Bay of Pigs undertaking. Arrogant CIA architects knew too little and assumed too much about Cuba, particularly about the landing site. Although Bissell and Dulles have staunchly denied that they ever told the President that the invasion would ignite an island-wide rebellion against the Castro regime and thus ensure the ascendancy of Miró's provisional government, Kennedy decision-makers nonetheless believed that the invasion would stimulate a popular revolt against an unpopular government. But the CIA did not coordinate the invasion with the anti-Castro underground in Cuba, because the agency feared leaks and the likely infiltration of opposition groups by Castro's security forces. No rebellion erupted.⁴³ Kennedy and his advisers also assumed that, should the brigade prove incapable of taking territory, it could melt into the mountains and become a guerrilla army. But, because the invasion site had been shifted, the mountains now lay some 80 miles away, with impassable swamps between. Neither Kennedy nor CIA advisers had explored this problem. The guerrilla option, which, like the belief in a rebellion, probably led Kennedy to suppress doubts about the operation, was actually impossible.

CIA planners failed in other ways. If they overestimated Cuban discontent with Castro, they underestimated the effectiveness of his military. They anticipated that he would crack; in fact, he expertly led his forces at the Bay of Pigs, where he had vacationed. CIA analysts had failed to detect the coral reefs. CIA-issued equipment malfunctioned; crucial communications gear was concentrated in one ship that sunk; paratroopers did not drop far enough inland to cut off causeways.⁴⁴ Another operational failure remained a tightly held secret. The CIA had been attempting since 1960 to kill Fidel Castro, even employing Mafia thugs for the task. The CIA activated assassination plots in March and April. It seems likely that assassination was part of the general Bay of Pigs plan. Bissell has admitted that he was hopeful "that Castro would be dead before the landing."⁴⁵

The most controversial operational question remains the cancelled second D-Day air strike. Post-crisis critics have complained that the President lost his nerve and made a decision that condemned the expedition to disaster.⁴⁶ Castro and Bissell have agreed that Cuban air supremacy was important to Cuba's triumph.⁴⁷ But was it decisive? A pre-emptive strike on D-Day against the Cuban air force would not have delivered victory to the invaders. After the first air

Handwritten notes: Cuba, Bay of Pigs, Kennedy, Dulles, Bissell, invasion, intelligence, decision-making, judgment, arrogance, military, terrain, swamps, mountains, guerrilla, rebellion, assassination, operational failure, secret, cancelled, D-Day, air strike, critics, decision, condemned, expedition, disaster, Castro, Bissell, Cuban air supremacy, triumph, D-Day, Cuban air force, victory, invaders, first air

Handwritten notes: Cuba, Bay of Pigs, Kennedy, Dulles, Bissell, invasion, intelligence, decision-making, judgment, arrogance, military, terrain, swamps, mountains, guerrilla, rebellion, assassination, operational failure, secret, cancelled, D-Day, air strike, critics, decision, condemned, expedition, disaster, Castro, Bissell, Cuban air supremacy, triumph, D-Day, Cuban air force, victory, invaders, first air

Handwritten notes: Cuba, Bay of Pigs, Kennedy, Dulles, Bissell, invasion, intelligence, decision-making, judgment, arrogance, military, terrain, swamps, mountains, guerrilla, rebellion, assassination, operational failure, secret, cancelled, D-Day, air strike, critics, decision, condemned, expedition, disaster, Castro, Bissell, Cuban air supremacy, triumph, D-Day, Cuban air force, victory, invaders, first air

attack, Castro had dispersed his planes; the brigade's B-26s would have encountered considerable difficulty in locating and destroying them. And, even if a D-Day assault had disabled all of Castro's planes, then what? *La brigada's* 1400 men would have had to face Castro's army of 25,000 and the nation's 200,000 militia. The commandos most likely would not have survived the overwhelming power of the Cuban military.

A flawed decision-making system also contributed to failure. Bissell and Dulles were too emotionally committed to the project to see the shortcomings in their handiwork. CIA planners were less than candid with the President, for fear that he would terminate the project. Operation Zapata was even kept a secret from many other CIA professionals responsible for intelligence analysis. Had they been asked to assess the chances for national rebellion, for example, they probably would have reported negatively, pointing out Castro's continued popular appeal.⁴⁸ CIA officials also contributed to the President's thinking that American participation could be hidden and plausibly denied. But how could Kennedy ever have thought that secrecy was possible? Wishful thinking provides the best answer.⁴⁹ "Trying to mount an operation of this magnitude from the United States," a CIA official wrote later, "is about as covert as walking nude across Times Square without attracting attention."⁵⁰ Nonetheless, until his decision to cancel the second strike, Kennedy clung to the fiction of deniability.⁵¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State also failed as advisers. Although the generals and admirals had serious reservations, they always evaluated the operation favorably. Sworn to secrecy, they did not seek close staff analysis of the CIA plan. Not "cut in" until the later stages of planning, they hesitated to "pound the desk," because the operation was "not our show."⁵² Nor did Dean Rusk provide rigorous scrutiny or press his case against the invasion. A "good soldier" who went along with the apparent consensus, he seemed to believe that he should preside over debate rather than influence it. Rusk later regretted his restraint:

As a colonel of infantry [in the Second World War], I knew that this brigade didn't have the chance of a "snowball in hell." But I wasn't a colonel of infantry; I was sitting there in a very special cubicle. I failed President Kennedy by not insisting that he ask a question that he did not ask. He should have turned to our Joint Chiefs of Staff and said to them: "Now gentlemen, I may want to do this with U.S. forces, so you tell me what you would need. . . ." By the time the Joint Chiefs had come in with

their sustained and prolonged bombing, their several divisions, a massive fleet, and their big air force, it would have become obvious to the President that that little brigade didn't have a chance at all.⁵³

One wonders, of course, why Kennedy himself did not think to ask the question. Rusk also kept departmental intelligence and Cuban specialists in the dark.⁵⁴ Kennedy encountered a good deal of dissenting opinion and he rejected it. Schlesinger, for example, wrote several memoranda to the President, arguing that time was actually not on Castro's side and that the Cuban leader, at least for the moment, remained popular.⁵⁵ The skeptics included Richard Goodwin, John Kenneth Galbraith, Charles E. Bohlen, Chester Bowles, and Adlai Stevenson. In making his decision, Kennedy also bypassed Congress, further ensuring that he received limited advice. Only Senator J. William Fulbright, Foreign Relations Committee chairman, was let into the inner circle, and, at that, only once. Picking up rumors of a forthcoming invasion of Cuba, Fulbright sent the President a memorandum that strongly disapproved invasion—it was "of a piece with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which the United States is constantly denouncing the Soviet Union. . .," he wrote. Kennedy thereupon invited the Arkansas senator to attend an April 4 meeting. Fulbright spoke forthrightly to the assembled top-level advisers, chiding them for exaggerating the Cuban threat. As he had told the President earlier, the Castro regime "is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart."⁵⁶ No one in the room agreed with Fulbright.

"Mr. President, it could have been worse," remarked a Stevenson assistant. How? "It might have succeeded."⁵⁷ Had all gone well with the chain reaction of beachhead, rebellion, and Castro's death or departure, the victory would only have "exchanged a Castro pest-house for a post-Castro asylum."⁵⁸ Tainted as an American stooge, the head of the new government would have struggled to win public favor. Well-armed Castroites, including Fidel's brother Raúl and Che Guevara, would probably have initiated a protracted guerrilla war against the American-created regime. The Soviets might have helped these rebel forces, and volunteers from around the world might have swelled the resistance—like the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, Schlesinger had warned. The United States would have had to save its puppet government through military aid, advisers, and maybe even troops. To have sustained a successful Bay of Pigs invasion, then, the

Kennedy Administration probably would have had to undertake a prolonged and expensive occupation of the island.⁵⁸

As it was, defeat did not chasten the Administration. While a secret presidential panel investigated the disaster, Kennedy and his advisers huddled. At the April 20 Cabinet meeting, Bowles found his colleagues "almost savage." Robert Kennedy became especially agitated, and "there was an almost frantic reaction for an action program which people would grab onto."⁵⁹ With Republicans belittling the President—Eisenhower said the story ought to be titled "Profile in Timidity and Indecision" and Nixon allowed that Kennedy should have known that "when you commit maximum U.S. prestige you have to commit maximum U.S. power to back it up," Kennedy was not sympathetic to Bowles's call for patience and caution.⁶⁰ The Under Secretary was "yellow-bellied," press secretary Pierre Salinger snorted, and "we're going to get him." White House aide Harris Wofford shot back: "Why don't you get those who got us into this mess?"⁶¹ Kennedy pushed Bowles out of the State Department later in the year.

On April 20 the beleaguered President spoke out. "Let the record show," he boomed, "that our restraint is not inexhaustible." Indeed, the United States intended to defend the Monroe Doctrine and carry on a "relentless" struggle with Communism in "every corner of the globe." In familiar words, Kennedy declared that "the complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong . . . can possibly survive."⁶² That day, too, Kennedy ordered American military advisers in Laos to put on their uniforms to show United States resolution in the face of defeat. "A new urgency" was injected into "Kennedy's concern for counterinsurgency . . .," recalled General Maxwell Taylor, who headed the post-crisis inquiry.⁶³ Although Kennedy privately claimed that the Cuban failure deterred him from military intervention in Laos, the record of the April 22 NSC meeting demonstrates that the President chose an activist policy of confrontation with the "Communist world."⁶⁴ Such a posture was more in line with the advice a Bundy aide offered Robert Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs crisis. When the Attorney General growled that Moscow would now judge America weak, Walt W. Rostow commented that "we would have ample opportunity to prove we were not paper tigers in Berlin, South-east Asia, and elsewhere."⁶⁵ This thinking also resembled the recommendations of the Taylor Study Group, which on June 13 reported

secretly to the President that "we are in a life and death struggle which we may be losing," so henceforth all of the nation's Cold War resources had to be mobilized.⁶⁶

Robert Kennedy told counterinsurgency specialist Colonel Edward Lansdale that the Bay of Pigs "insult needed to be redressed rather quickly."⁶⁷ But that redressing faced some heady obstacles. The anti-Castro underground lay shattered. Cuban security forces, before and after the landing, rounded up, jailed, killed, or converted thousands of anti-regime subversives, most of whom were surprised because the CIA had not forewarned them about D-Day. In the United States the Cuban Revolutionary Council splintered, as the demoralized and angry Cuban community descended once again into fierce factionalism. Castro triumphantly exploited patriotic nationalism to strengthen his regime.⁶⁸ Instead of driving the Soviets out of Cuba, the botched Bay of Pigs operation drew Havana and Moscow closer together. Understandably fearing another invasion, perhaps with American troops, Castro sought Soviet military assistance. The Soviets shipped small arms, machine guns, howitzers, armored personnel carriers, patrol boats, tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and, ultimately, nuclear missiles that could reach into the United States itself.⁶⁹

Persuaded that "there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor," Kennedy officials launched a multi-track program of covert, economic, diplomatic, and propagandistic elements.⁷⁰ Encouraged by the White House, the CIA created a huge operations station in Miami called JMWAWE to recruit and organize Cuban exiles. In Washington, Robert Kennedy became a ramrod for action. At a November 4 White House meeting, the Attorney General made his pitch: "stir things up on the island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder . . ."⁷¹ The President himself asked Colonel Lansdale to direct Operation Mongoose—"to use our available assets . . . to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."⁷²

Operation Mongoose and JMWAWE, although failing to unseat Castro, punished Cubans. CIA-handled saboteurs burned cane fields and blew up factories and oil storage tanks. In a December 1961 raid, for example, a seven-man team blasted a railroad bridge, derailed an approaching train, and torched a sugar warehouse. Myriad exile groups, from Alpha 66 to the Revolutionary Student Directorate, left the Florida Keys to stage hit-and-run attacks along Cuba's coast. CIA agents contaminated goods leaving European ports for Cuba, and they bribed European manufacturers to produce faulty equipment for

Cuba—as when a German industrialist shipped off-center ball bearings. British-made Leland buses were sabotaged too.⁷³ These spilling operations compelled the Castro government to divert scarce resources from economic and social programs to coastal defense and internal surveillance. They also pushed Cuba toward greater dependence upon the Soviet Union.

The CIA devised new plots to kill Castro. Poisonous cigars, pills, and needles were directed Castro's way, but to no avail. Did the Kennedys know about these death schemes? Robert Kennedy learned about them in mid-1962, and his biographer claims that the Attorney General ordered an end to assassination projects. John Kennedy said at the time that in general he disapproved of the killing of foreign leaders.⁷⁴ The President apparently never directly ordered the assassination of Castro—at least no trail of documents leads to the Kennedy White House. But, of course, the word "assassination" was never uttered in the presence of the President or committed to paper, so that he could be protected by the principle of plausible deniability. What was always mentioned was the need to remove Castro. "And if killing him was one of the things that was to be done in this connection," assassination was attempted because "we felt we were acting within the guidelines." So bespoke Bissell's replacement, Richard Helms.⁷⁵ President Kennedy may or may not have known about the assassination plots, but he did set the general guidelines.

Intensified economic coercion joined assassination and sabotage as methods to undermine the Castro government. American officials did not expect the economic denial program alone to force Castro's fall. But they did seek to inhibit the island's economic development, thereby decelerating socialization, spurring Cuban discontent, and diminishing Cuba's appeal as a model for Latin America. In February 1962 Kennedy further tightened the economic screws by banning most imports of Cuban products (especially tobacco). *El blogoque*, as the Cubans called the embargo, hurt. Cuba was forced to pay higher freight costs, enlarge its foreign debt, and suffer innumerable factory shut-downs due to the lack of spare parts once bought in the United States. Cuba's economic woes also stemmed from the flight of technicians and managers, a decline in tourism, high worker absenteeism, the drying up of foreign capital investment, hastily conceived policies to diversify the economy, and suffocating government controls. The overall effect on Cuba of American economic measures was not what Washington intended: greater political centralization,

more state management, closer ties to the Soviet Union. By 1962, 82 percent of Cuba's exports flowed to Communist countries, and 85 percent of its imports came from them. As with military defense, so with the economy, the Soviet Union became Cuba's lifeline.⁷⁶

The Kennedy Administration also lobbied the OAS to isolate Cuba. Eisenhower had grown frustrated with the regional organization's refusal to "do something about Castro."⁷⁷ Secretary Herter explained in March 1960 why the OAS hesitated: "Our own latest National Intelligence Estimate does not find Cuba to be under Communist control or domination, and we lack all of the hard evidence which would be required to convince skeptical Latin American Governments and the public opinion behind them."⁷⁸ But after Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist in late 1961, the United States managed to obtain the votes to oust Cuba from the OAS, even though Mexico voted "nay" and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador abstained.⁷⁹ The expulsion registered loudly in Havana, which interpreted it as "political preparation for an invasion."⁸⁰ By the spring of 1962, moreover, fifteen Latin American states had answered Washington's call to break relations with Cuba.

Diplomatic contact between Cubans and Americans also virtually ceased, with two exceptions. When in May 1961 Castro offered to trade the Bay of Pigs prisoners for American farm tractors, the White House encouraged a private committee of distinguished Americans to negotiate with Cuba. But the Tractors-for-Freedom Committee could not reach terms and disbanded. Then New York lawyer James B. Donovan, working closely with Washington officials, gained Castro's trust and bargained directly with him in Havana. In December 1962, in exchange for food and medicine, Castro released the brigade members. In a celebration at Miami's Orange Bowl, Kennedy received their flag. "I can assure you," an emotional President told the huge crowd, "that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana."⁸¹

Another encounter took place during the August 1961 Punta del Este conference that drafted the Alliance for Progress charter. Che Guevara initiated contact with Richard Goodwin by sending a box of Cuba's finest cigars to the White House assistant. "Since to write to an enemy is difficult, I limit myself to extending my hand," read an attached note.⁸² At a farewell party, the two men held an intense conversation. Che first thanked Goodwin for the Bay of Pigs—it had helped the regime solidify its power. Goodwin remarked that the

Cubans could repay the favor by attacking the American naval base at Guantánamo. In a frank yet reasonable manner Che asked for a *modus vivendi* with Washington and urged talks on trade, compensation for nationalized property, and Guantánamo. Cuba would even be willing to discuss its ties with the Soviets and Cuban activities in the hemisphere. Goodwin carried the promising August 17 overture to Kennedy, who, smoking one of Che's cigars, listened to his aide's appeal for further exploration of the "below ground dialogue" with the Cubans. The President rejected the suggestion: it came too soon after the humiliating Bay of Pigs, would likely disturb some Latin American governments, and would legitimize a Marxist government.⁸³ Che's important initiative died that abruptly—at JFK's desk.

By the spring of 1962 Cuba was losing on several fronts in its contest with the United States: diplomatic isolation in the hemisphere, ouster from the OAS, economic embargo, CIA assistance to anti-Castro rebels in Cuba, exile raids and sabotage, assassination plots, Operation Mongoose, and the successful launching of the anti-Cuban Alliance for Progress. After the American failure at the Bay of Pigs and in the face of the studied American effort to cripple the Cuban Revolution, "were we right or wrong to fear direct invasion" next? Fidel Castro later asked.⁸⁴ Although Kennedy had actually ruled out invasion as a method to overthrow Castro, in large part because Latin American opinion would have been so negative and American casualties would have been so staggering, Castro could only think the worst in 1962. After all, some Washington politicians were shouting for invasion and Kennedy officials spoke frankly about getting rid of Castro.

It may be plausibly argued that, had there been no exile expedition, no destructive covert activities, and no economic and diplomatic boycott—had there been no concerted United States vendetta to quash the Cuban Revolution—there would not have been an October missile crisis. The principal source for that frightening crisis lay in Kennedy's unvarnished hostility toward Cuba and in Castro's understandable apprehension that United States invasion was inevitable.

The origins of the missile crisis, then, derived largely from United States-Cuban tensions. To stress only the global dimension of Soviet-American competition, as is commonly done, is like saying that a basketball game can be played without a court. Cuba was the court. To slight the local or regional sources of the conflict is to miss a central point: Nikita Khrushchev would never have had the opportu-

nity to begin his dangerous missile game if Kennedy had not been attempting to expunge Castro and his revolution from the hemisphere. This interpretation does not dismiss but incorporates the view, predominant in the scholarly literature, that the emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba served the Soviet strategic goal of catching up in the nuclear arms race.⁸⁵ This interpretation emphasizes that both Cuba and the Soviet Union calculated that their interests would be served by putting medium and intermediate-range rockets on the island. Havana hoped to gain deterrent power to thwart an expected American invasion, and Moscow hoped to enhance its deterrent power in the Cold War and save a new ally.⁸⁶ From Castro's perspective, the United States would not start a local, conventional war out of fear that it would then have to risk a nuclear war.⁸⁷ "We'd carried out the Bay of Pigs operation, never intending to use American military force—but the Kremlin didn't know that," Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recalled. "We were running covert operations against Castro" and "people in the Pentagon were even talking about a first strike [nuclear policy].... So the Soviets may well have believed we were seeking Castro's overthrow plus a first strike capability. This may have led them to do what they did in Cuba."⁸⁸

Cuba's eagerness for Soviet military assistance is well documented in the contemporary record. Castro and other Cuban officials made repeated, consistent, and compelling statements that their nation faced an American onslaught. "Cuba took measures to defend its security against a systematic policy of hostility and aggression," Castro privately explained to United Nations Secretary General U Thant during the October crisis.⁸⁹

Contemporary, secret, now declassified United States documents reveal that American decisionmakers knew that the Cuban-Soviet military linkage, which included the June 1962 agreement on nuclear missiles, grew from Cuba's fear of invasion. They did not say so publicly, of course, for such would have acknowledged their own responsibility for generating the fear. In September 1962, CIA analysts concluded that "the main purpose of the present military build-up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it."⁹⁰ In early October the Department of State cabled its diplomatic posts that Castro feared an American invasion and that "the available evidence suggests strongly that this crash build-up of military and economic assis-

tance did not represent a Soviet initiative but rather a response to insistent demands from Castro for help.⁹¹ Early in the crisis, a CIA office issued a secret report that noted Cuba's numerous "invasion scares" in the summer of 1962. But the Cubans "felt progressively more secure as the work [Soviet installation of military equipment] advanced."⁹² Finally, to cite yet another example, a post-crisis State Department study indicated that when Soviet "military equipment began arriving in volume in late summer 1962 the US government realized that these chronic [invasion] fears played a part in Castro's motives."⁹³

Why did the Cubans and Soviets decide upon medium (MRBM) and intermediate (IRBM) missiles, with ranges of 1,020 and 2,200 nautical miles respectively, instead of upon a military pact, non-nuclear, conventional forces, or weapons that could satisfy American tolerance for "defensive" assistance? Perhaps the Cubans were confused about the types of missiles they would receive.⁹⁴ During the 1958 Middle East crisis, when American troops landed in Lebanon, Khrushchev and Gamal Abdul Nasser discussed "rockets" and "missiles" for Egypt. Nasser betrayed considerable ignorance about the details of these weapons—as perhaps Castro did later.⁹⁵ The Cubans may not have paid much attention to missile type, because to them more powerful weapons simply meant more deterrence. Or they may have assumed that impressive surface-to-surface missiles (42 MRBMs arrived; the IRBMs never arrived) were necessary for true deterrence against an aggressive United States. One thinks here of a similar American assumption at the end of the Second World War that the fanatical Japanese would surrender only under threat of annihilation from the atomic bomb.

On October 14 an American U-2 plane photographed missile sites in Cuba, thus providing the first "hard" evidence, as distinct from the "soft" reports of exiles, that the island was becoming a nuclear base. "He can't do that to me!" snapped Kennedy when he saw the pictures on the 16th.⁹⁶ He had warned the Soviets that the United States would not suffer "offensive" weapons in Cuba, although the warnings had come after the Cuban-Soviet decision of early summer.⁹⁷ The President convened his top advisers shortly before noon on October 16. His first questions focused on the firing readiness of the missiles and the probability that they carried nuclear warheads. The tentative answers were negative, although he was advised that the missiles could become operational in a brief time. Discussion of military op-

tions (invasion? air strike?) dominated this first meeting. Kennedy's immediate preference became clear: "We're certainly going . . . to take out these . . . missiles." McGeorge Bundy urged consideration not only of military plans but of a "political track" or diplomacy. But Kennedy showed little interest in negotiations. When McNamara mentioned that diplomacy might precede military action, the President immediately switched the discussion to another question: How long would it take to get air strikes organized? Conspicuously absent from this first meeting was a serious probing of Soviet and Cuban motivation.⁹⁸

At a second meeting on the 16th, Rusk argued against the surprise air strike that General Maxwell Taylor had bluntly advocated. The Secretary of State recommended instead "a direct message to Castro." At the close of Rusk's remarks, Kennedy immediately asked: "Can we get a little idea about what the military thing is?" Bundy then posed a question now central to the history of the missile crisis: "How gravely does this change the strategic balance?" McNamara, for one, thought "not at all," but Taylor disputed him. Kennedy himself was uncertain, but he did complain that the missile emplacement in Cuba "makes them look like they're co-equal with us." And, added Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, who obviously knew the President's competitive personality, the presence of the missiles made it appear that "we're scared of the Cubans."

Then the rambling discussion turned to Khrushchev's motivation. The Russian leader had been cautious on Berlin, Kennedy said. "It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey," the President went on. "Now that'd be goddam dangerous. . . ." Bundy jumped in: "Well, we did, Mr. President." Not liking the sound of a double standard, Kennedy lamely answered, "Yeah, but that was five years ago."⁹⁹ Actually, the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey, under a 1959 agreement with Ankara, were put into launch position in mid-1961—during the Kennedy Administration—and not turned over to Turkish forces until October 22, 1962, the very day Kennedy informed Moscow that it must withdraw its SS-4 missiles from Cuba.¹⁰⁰

For the next several days, Kennedy's group of advisers, named the Executive Committee or Ex Comm, met frequently in tight secrecy. Taylor later summarized policy options: "talk them out," "squeeze them out," or "shoot them out."¹⁰¹ In exhausting sessions marked by frank disagreement and changing minds, Ex Comm members weighed

the advantages and disadvantages of invasion, bombing, quarantine, and diplomacy.¹⁰² The President gradually moved with a majority of Ex Comm advisers toward a quarantine or blockade of Cuba: incoming ships would be stopped and inspected for military cargo. McNamara persistently argued this alternative against the generals, Dillon, CIA Director John McCone, and Dean Acheson, all of whom urged an air strike. When queried if an air strike would knock out all of the known missiles, Taylor replied: "The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% . . ." In other words, some missiles in Cuba would remain in place for firing against the United States. Robert Kennedy also worried that the Soviets might react unpredictably with military force, "which could be so serious as to lead to general nuclear war."¹⁰³ In any case, the Attorney General insisted, there would be no "Pearl Harbor type of attack" on his brother's record.¹⁰³

By October 22 the President had made two decisions. The chief decision was to quarantine Cuba to prevent further military shipments and to impress the Soviets with American resolve to force the missiles out. If the Soviets balked, other, more drastic, measures would be undertaken. The second decision was to inform the Soviets of United States policy through a television address rather than through diplomatic channels. Ex Comm advisers have dubiously argued that a surprise public speech was necessary to rally world opinion behind United States policy and to prevent Khrushchev himself from issuing a "blustering ultimatum."¹⁰⁴ At least two Ex Comm participants recommended that negotiations be tried first. Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen advised that Moscow would have to retaliate against the United States after its technicians were killed by American bombs. A stern letter to Khrushchev should be "tested" as a method to gain withdrawal of the missiles. "I don't see the urgency of military action," Bohlen told the President.¹⁰⁵ And a grim Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson appealed to an unreceptive Kennedy: "the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything."¹⁰⁶ Going into the crisis, Kennedy refused to negotiate with either Khrushchev or Castro.

Kennedy's evening television speech on October 22 sounded familiar themes in American diplomatic history. He recalled the special United States relationship with the Western Hemisphere, and he reminded Americans that 1930s lessons taught them to resist aggression and surrender. The President lectured the Soviets to reverse

their "deliberately provocative" decision by dismantling their "strategic" missiles in Cuba, and he announced the Caribbean quarantine as an "initial" step. The United States Information Agency beamed his words around the world in thirty-seven languages, including Spanish for Cuba itself. For the Cubans Kennedy had an oft-heard message: Castro and his clique had become "puppets" of an "international conspiracy."¹⁰⁷

The missile crisis became an international war of nerves. More than sixty American ships went on patrol to enforce the blockade. The Strategic Air Command went on nuclear alert, moving upward to Defense Condition (DEFCON) 2 for the first time ever (the next level is deployment for combat). B-52 bombers, loaded with nuclear weapons, stood ready, while men and equipment moved to the southeastern United States to prepare for an invasion (thousands of road maps of Cuba were distributed).¹⁰⁸ American diplomats hastened to inform NATO allies; two African nations agreed to deny landing rights for Soviet aircraft, so that the Soviets would have trouble resupplying their military on the island; the OAS voted to endorse United States policy; and the United Nations Security Council debated. Strangely, the Soviets did not mobilize or redeploy their huge military, nor did they take measures to make their strategic forces less vulnerable.¹⁰⁹ The Soviets also refrained from testing the quarantine: their ships turned around and went home. But what next? On the 26th, Kennedy and some Ex Comm members, thinking that the Soviets were stalling, soured on the quarantine. Sentiment for military action strengthened.¹¹⁰

Kennedy also approved a State Department message to Brazil that invited its ambassador in Havana to talk with Castro about the "great jeopardy" in which the Soviet missiles had placed his government. Indeed, the Cubans could expect to suffer "desperate hand-to-mouth existence" under an expanded American quarantine. But, if the missiles and Soviet military personnel departed, "many changes in the relations between Cuba and the OAS countries, including the US, could flow." For the first time in the Kennedy presidency, as nuclear war threatened, Washington was suggesting an accommodation of Cuban-American differences. This overture, however, may have represented no more than a ploy to divide Moscow and Havana, for the President himself "doubted that it would do any good . . ."¹¹¹

The "first real blink" in the crisis came in the afternoon of the 26th. A Soviet embassy officer, Aleksander Fomin, called ABC correspon-

dent John Scali and asked for a meeting. They talked in a Washington restaurant, where Scali was surprised to hear Fomin urge him to carry a message to the television journalist's high-level friends in the State Department: the Soviet Union would withdraw the missiles if the United States would promise not to invade Cuba. Scali scurried to Rusk, who sent the unusual emissary back to Fomin with the reply that American leaders were interested in discussing the proposal.¹¹² In the meantime, a private Khrushchev letter arrived with the same offer, as well as with a pointed reminder for Kennedy: the missiles were in Cuba only because the United States had been threatening the island.¹¹³

But the next morning another letter came. Khrushchev now upped the stakes: he would trade the missiles in Cuba for the American missiles in Turkey. An angry Kennedy felt boxed, because "we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and in Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value."¹¹⁴ Indeed, the President in early 1961 had expressed doubts about the military efficacy of the Jupiters in Turkey and had later directed the Defense Department to prepare a study for phasing them out. But he had not ordered their removal.¹¹⁵ Now they seemed to stand in the way of settling the October crisis, for Kennedy hesitated to accept a swap—first, because he did not want to appear to be giving up anything in the face of Soviet provocation; second, because he knew the proud Turks would be upset with the appearance of being "traded off in order to appease an enemy";¹¹⁶ and third, because acceptance of a missile trade would lend credence to charges that the United States all along had been applying a double standard. Kennedy told his Ex Comm advisers that Khrushchev's offer caused "embarrassment," for most people would think it "a very fair trade."¹¹⁷ Indeed, Moscow had played "a very good card."¹¹⁸ Some of Kennedy's advisers had explored the issue days before Khrushchev's second letter. Stevenson had recommended a horse trade, and Ambassador W. Averell Harriman counseled that America's "ring of bases" around the Soviet Union had proven "counter-productive." The way out of the crisis, Harriman said, was to let Khrushchev save face through an agreement to withdraw the Jupiters. Such a bargain would also permit Khrushchev to gain politically on his tough-minded military and "swing" toward improved relations with the United States.¹¹⁸

This discussion raises another question: What if the Soviets and Cubans had announced in the summer of 1962 that they were deploy-

ing a limited number of missiles—the same number as Americans had stationed in Turkey (and Italy)? Would the United States have been able to compel reversal of a publicly announced decision and prevent emplacement without having to abandon the Jupiters in Turkey in a negotiated deal? Some Ex Comm advisers later suggested that, in such a case, Washington might not even have sought to force withdrawal of the SS-4s from Cuba.¹¹⁹ Many people abroad, including some European allies, would have asked if the USSR had any less right than the United States to practice deterrence. Moscow no doubt calculated differently—that Washington would attempt to halt shipments of missiles—and thus tried to sneak them in.

In the afternoon of the 27th more bad news rocked the White House. An American U-2 plane overflew the eastern part of the Soviet Union, probably because equipment malfunctioned. Soviet fighters scrambled to intercept it, and American jets from Alaska took flight to rescue the errant aircraft. Although the spy plane flew home without having sparked a dog fight, Moscow might have read the incident as provocative. Worse still, a U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a surface-to-air missile (SAM). Cubans, after having fought Soviet soldiers for control of the SAM sites, may have brought down the U-2.¹²⁰ American decisionmakers assumed at the time that the Soviets manned the SAM batteries; thus the shoot-down constituted a dangerous escalation. A distressed McNamara now thought "invasion had become almost inevitable."¹²¹ But Kennedy hesitated to retaliate, surely scared about taking a step in the direction of nuclear war. Upon brother Robert's advice, the President decided to ignore Khrushchev's second letter and answer the first. And he dispatched the Attorney General to deliver an ultimatum to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin: start pulling out the missiles within forty-eight hours or "we would remove them."¹²² After Dobrynin asked about the Jupiters in Turkey, Robert Kennedy presented an important American concession: they would be dismantled if the problem in Cuba were resolved. As the President had said in an Ex Comm meeting, "we can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil . . . when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey."¹²³ But, should the Soviets leak word of a "deal," Robert Kennedy told the Soviet ambassador, the United States would disavow the offer.¹²⁴ Just in case this unusual style of diplomacy failed, the President ordered the calling up of Air Force reservists. In the last Ex Comm meeting on the 27th, McNamara reminded his colleagues

Handwritten notes at the top of page 146, including "The U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a SAM missile" and "The U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a SAM missile".

Handwritten notes at the bottom of page 147, including "The U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a SAM missile" and "The U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a SAM missile".

that the United States had to have two contingencies ready if a diplomatic settlement could not be reached: a response to expected Soviet action in Europe and a government to take power in Cuba after an American invasion. Someone remarked: "Suppose we make Bobby mayor of Havana."¹²³

On October 28, faced with an ultimatum, a concession, and the possibility that the Cubans would shoot down another U-2 and precipitate a Soviet-American conflagration, Khrushchey (retreated) An agreement, although not written, was struck: the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the MRBMs under United Nations supervision and the United States pledged not to invade Cuba. "Everyone knew who were hawks and who were doves," Bundy told Ex Comm that morning, but "today was the doves' day."¹²⁴ A wary President cautioned his glib advisers that "this is not a time for gloating," for problems remained: implementing supervision, pressing the Soviets to remove their IL-28 bombers from the island too, and watching for Soviet mischief elsewhere.¹²⁷ But the crisis had passed—just when the nuclear giants seemed at the brink. Although an embittered Castro thwarted a United Nations inspection system, American reconnaissance planes monitored the departure of the SS-4s. The IL-28 bombers were also crated and shipped back to the Soviet Union.¹²⁸ In April 1963 the Jupiter missiles came down in Turkey. Castro remained skeptical of the no-invasion pledge. As he once remarked to U Thant, it was difficult for Cubans to believe a simple American "promise not to commit a crime."¹²⁹

John F. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis has received high grades as a success story and model for crisis management. But it was a near miss. "We were in luck," Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith ruminated, "but success in a lottery is no argument for lotteries."¹³⁰ Many close calls threatened to send the crisis to greater levels of danger. Besides the two U-2 incidents, there was the serious possibility that a "crackpot" exile group would attempt to assassinate Castro or raid the island.¹³¹ As well, Operation Mongoose sabotage teams were inside Cuba during the crisis and could not be reached by their CIA handlers. What if this "half-assed operation," Robert Kennedy worried, ignited trouble?¹³² One of these teams actually did blow up a Cuban factory on November 8.¹³³ To cite another mishap: not until October 27 did Administration officials think to inform the Soviets that the quarantine line was an arc measured at 500 nautical miles from Cape Maisi, Cuba.¹³⁴ What if a Soviet captain inadver-

tently piloted his ship into the blockade zone? And, when the commander of the Strategic Air Command issued DEFCON 2 alert instructions, he did so in the clear, instead of in code, because he wanted to impress the Soviets.¹³⁵ Alerts serve to prepare American forces for war, but they also carry the danger of escalation, because movement to a high category might be read by an adversary as American planning for a first strike. Under such circumstances, the adversary might be tempted to strike first. Finally, the Navy's anti-submarine warfare activities carried the potential of escalating the crisis. Soviet submarines prowled near the quarantine line, and, following standing orders, Navy ships forced several of them to surface. In one case, a Navy commander exercised the high-risk option of dropping a depth charge on a Soviet submarine.¹³⁶ As in so many of these examples, decisionmakers in Washington actually lost some control of the crisis to personnel at the operational level.

Ex Comm members represented considerable intellectual talent and experience, and the policy they urged upon the President ultimately forced the Soviets to back down. But a mythology of grandeur, illusion of control, and embellishment of performance have obscured the history of the committee. The group never functioned independently of the President. In an example of "promotional leadership," Kennedy picked his advisers, directed them to drive the missiles out, and used his brother as a "policeman" at meetings.¹³⁷ Ex Comm debated alternatives under "intense strain," often in a "state of anxiety and emotional exhaustion."¹³⁸ Apparently two advisers suffered such stress that they became passive and unable to perform their responsibilities.¹³⁹ An assistant to Adlai Stevenson recalled that he had had to become an Ex Comm "back-up" for the ambassador because, "while he could speak clearly, his memory wasn't very clear. . . ." Asked if failing health produced this condition, Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn answered that the "emotional state and nervous tension that was involved in it [missile crisis] had this effect." Stevenson was feeling "pretty frightened."¹⁴⁰ So apparently was Dean Rusk. Robert Kennedy remembered that the Secretary of State "frequently could not attend our meetings," because "he had a virtually complete breakdown mentally and physically."¹⁴¹ We cannot determine how stress affected the advice Ex Comm gave Kennedy, but at least we know that the crisis managers struggled against time, sleep, exhaustion, and themselves, and they did not always think clearly headedly at a time when the stakes were very high. Had Stevenson

Handwritten notes in the left margin: "The book says... it was a near miss... Bundy told Ex Comm... Kennedy picked his advisers... Ex Comm debated alternatives... state of anxiety and emotional exhaustion... Stevenson was feeling 'pretty frightened'... Dean Rusk... frequently could not attend our meetings... We cannot determine how stress affected the advice Ex Comm gave Kennedy... at least we know that the crisis managers struggled against time, sleep, exhaustion, and themselves, and they did not always think clearly headedly at a time when the stakes were very high. Had Stevenson"

Handwritten notes in the right margin: "What if a Soviet captain inadvertently... what if this 'half-assed operation'... what if a Soviet captain inadvertently"

Stimson was the master of the cold war, but not the only one. He was the one who made it all possible. He was the one who made it all possible. He was the one who made it all possible.

and Rusk, both of whom recommended diplomacy and compromise, been steadier, the option of negotiations at the start might have received a better hearing and the world might have been spared the grueling confrontation.

Contemporaries and scholars have debated Kennedy's stunning of formal, private negotiations and traditional, diplomatic channels and his opting instead for a public showdown through a surprise television speech. It does not appear that he acted this way because he thought the Soviets would protract talks until the missiles had become fully operational—even before his television address he knew that many of the missiles were ready to fire, and Ex Comm worked under the assumption that the SS-4s were armed with nuclear warheads.¹⁴² Nor did Kennedy initially stiff-arm negotiations in order to score a foreign policy victory just before the November congressional elections. Politics does not explain his decisions; indeed, the most popular political position most likely would have been an air strike and invasion to rid the island of both the missiles and Castro.¹⁴³ Did Kennedy initially reject diplomacy because the Soviet missiles intolerably altered the strategic balance? Kennedy seems to have leaned toward McNamara's argument that the missiles in Cuba did not make a difference, given the fact that the Soviets already possessed enough capability to inflict unacceptable damage on some American cities.

President Kennedy eschewed diplomatic talks before October 22 because his strong Cold War views, drawing of lessons from the past, and personal hostility toward Castro's Cuba recommended confrontation. His conspicuous style of boldness, toughness, and craving for victory also influenced him, and he resented that Khrushchev had tried to trick him by stating that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba and then clandestinely sending them. Kennedy had warned Moscow not to station such weapons on the island; if he did not force the Soviets to back down, he worried, his personal credibility would have been undermined. And, even if the missiles did not markedly change the strategic balance, the new missiles in Cuba gave the appearance of doing so. One Ex Comm member remarked that the question is "psychological," and Kennedy agreed that the matter was as much "political" as "military."¹⁴⁴ Kennedy acted so boldly, too, because the Soviet missile deployment challenged the Monroe Doctrine and United States hegemony in Latin America. Finally, with other tests in Berlin and Southeast Asia looming, the United States believed it had to make emphatic its determination to stand

firm in the Cold War. Remember, Rusk has said, "aggression feeds upon success."¹⁴⁵

President Kennedy helped precipitate the missile crisis by harassing Cuba through his multi-track program. Then he reacted to the crisis by suspending diplomacy in favor of public confrontation. In the end, he frightened himself. In order to postpone doomday, or at least to prevent a high-casualty invasion of Cuba, he moderated the American response and compromised. Khrushchev withdrew his mistake, while gaining what Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson thought was the "important thing" for the Soviet leader: being able to say, "I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion."¹⁴⁶

Kennedy may have missed an opportunity to negotiate a more comprehensive settlement. He and Ex Comm gave little attention to a proposal that Brazil had offered in the United Nations to denuclearize Latin America. This proposal also sought to guarantee the territorial integrity of each nation in the region. Harriman recommended that the United States accept the Brazilian plan, but enlarge it: the United States and the Soviet Union would agree not to place nuclear weapons in any nation in the world other than in nuclear powers. Thus Great Britain could hold American missiles, but Turkey and Italy could not. Nor could Soviet missiles be deployed in Cuba or Eastern Europe. Looking beyond the crisis, Harriman presented his scheme "as a first and important step towards disarmament," but Kennedy officials only briefly discussed the question of denuclearization.¹⁴⁷ Perhaps there could have been another aspect of a far-reaching agreement: the United States would turn Guantanamo over to Cuba in exchange for a Cuban pledge to end the Soviets' military presence on the island. In short, under this provisions, both American and Soviet militaries would leave Cuba, Latin America would become off-limits to nuclear weapons, Cuba's territorial integrity would be guaranteed, and Moscow and Washington would make a modest nod toward arms control.¹⁴⁸ Would the Cubans have accepted such a deal? Given his extreme anger with Moscow after the Soviets disengaged the missiles, Castro may well have grasped an opportunity to begin a process toward improved relations with Washington.¹⁴⁹ Such a bargain, of course, would have required Cuban-American discussions. Yet Kennedy never seemed open to such talks. Why? Because they would have legitimized the Castro-Communist government and signified a Cold War defeat.

In the end, Castro remained in power, the Soviets continued to

There's no doubt that Kennedy was the master of the cold war, but not the only one. He was the one who made it all possible. He was the one who made it all possible. He was the one who made it all possible.

He acted so boldly, too, because the Soviet missile deployment challenged the Monroe Doctrine and United States hegemony in Latin America. Finally, with other tests in Berlin and Southeast Asia looming, the United States believed it had to make emphatic its determination to stand firm in the Cold War. Remember, Rusk has said, "aggression feeds upon success."

garrison troops on the island and subsidize the Cuban economy, the United States persisted in its campaign of harassment, and new Soviet-American contests over Cuba erupted (1970 and 1979). The Soviets, exposed as nuclear inferiors, vowed to catch up in the arms race. At the same time, perhaps the "jagged edges" of Kennedy's Cold Warriorism were smoothed.¹⁵⁰ In the aftermath of the missile crisis, Moscow and Washington installed a teletype "hot line" to facilitate communication. The nuclear war scare during the missile crisis also nudged the superpowers to conclude the longstanding talks on a test ban treaty. Negotiated by Harriman in Moscow, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed on July 25, 1963, was limited, not comprehensive (it banned only tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and beneath the surface of the oceans). Although some analysts have trumpeted the treaty as a major accomplishment because it started the superpowers on a path toward arms control, the agreement did not prevent a plethora of underground nuclear detonations or slow the cascading arms race. It nonetheless stands as one of just a few successes in the diplomatic record of the Kennedy Administration.¹⁵¹

After the missile crisis, Cubans complained, Kennedy played a "double game." The President showed some interest in accommodation at the same time that he reinvigorated anti-Cuban programs.¹⁵² The Administration created a new State Department office, the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, and put more economic pressure on the island, including an unsuccessful attempt to block a United Nations-funded crop diversification project.¹⁵³ Washington intended by early 1963 to "tighten the noose" around Cuba.¹⁵⁴

Operation Mongoose had been put on hold during the October crisis, but raids by exiles, some of them no doubt perpetrated with CIA collaboration, and most of them monitored but not stopped by American authorities, remained a menace.¹⁵⁵ In March 1963, after an exile "action group" attacked a Soviet ship in Cuban waters, Kennedy speculated that such freelance raids no longer served a "useful purpose." They seemed to strengthen the "Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba. . . ."¹⁵⁶ He knew too that some Cuban exiles had developed links with right-wing political groups in the United States—in essence the exiles had also become a threat to his Administration.¹⁵⁷ The President ordered restrictions on unauthorized exile activities, because they had failed to deliver "any real blow at Castro."¹⁵⁸ Republicans and Cuban exile leaders denounced the decision.¹⁵⁹ Raiding

parties still managed to slip out of the Florida Keys to sabotage and kill in Cuba, and the Administration itself, to mollify the more than 500 anti-Castro groups, may have "backed away" from enforcing its own restrictions.¹⁶⁰

After the missile crisis, Castro had sought better relations with Washington, and he made gestures toward détente. He sent home thousands of Soviet military personnel and released some political prisoners, including a few Americans. He remarked in an April 1963 interview with ABC Television's Lisa Howard that the prisoner release could mark a beginning toward rapprochement.¹⁶¹ But then the mercenary *Jefe Máximo* departed for a four-week trip to the Soviet Union, where he patched up relations with Khrushchev and won promises of more foreign aid.¹⁶² Washington stirred against Moscow's "grandiose" reception of Castro, the latter's "vehemence" in denouncing the United States, his "tone of defiance rather than conciliation," and the refurbished Soviet-Cuban alliance.¹⁶³ Soon Robert Kennedy asked the CIA to "develop a list of possible actions which might be undertaken against Cuba."¹⁶⁴ In mid-June the NSC approved a new sabotage program. The CIA quickly cranked up new dirty tricks and revitalized its assassination option by making contact with a traitorous Cuban official, Rolando Cubela Secades. Code-named AM/LASH, he plotted with the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. In Florida, American officials intercepted and arrested saboteurs heading for Cuba, but they seldom prosecuted and usually released them. Alpha 66 and Commando L raiders hit oil facilities, sugar mills, and industrial plants.¹⁶⁵

In the fall of 1963 Cuba continued to seek an accommodation. Through contact with a member of Stevenson's United Nations staff, William Attwood, the Cuban government signaled once again its interest in improving relations. The President authorized an eager Attwood to work up an agenda with the Cubans.¹⁶⁶ In late October, when Kennedy met with the French journalist Jean Daniel, the President spoke in both hard-line and conciliatory tones about Cuba. Aware that Daniel was journeying to Havana to interview Castro, Kennedy asked the reporter to return for another White House discussion. Castro later claimed that Daniel carried a "private message" from Kennedy, who asked about the prospects for a Cuban-American dialogue.¹⁶⁷ Yet, on November 18, Kennedy sounded less the conciliator and more the warrior. In a tough-minded speech, he reiterated the familiar charges against Castro's "small band of conspirators."¹⁶⁸

The President, reported Bundy, sought to "encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt" and to "indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the hemisphere."¹⁶⁶

In Havana, meanwhile, Daniel and Castro met. On November 22, while discussing chances for Cuban-American détente, the news of the assassination in Dallas arrived. "Es una mala noticia" ("This is bad news"), the stunned Cuban mumbled repeatedly.¹⁶⁷ What would become of his overture? he wondered. In Washington, the new Lyndon B. Johnson Administration decided in fact to put the "tenuous" and "marginal" contacts "on ice."¹⁷¹ Castro also worried that he would be held personally responsible for Kennedy's death, because the alleged assassin Lee Harvey Oswald had professed to be pro-Castro (he may actually have been leading a covert life as an anti-Castro agitator). Some Americans did blame the Cuban regime. Several official investigations have concluded that Cuban officials played no part in the assassination, but conspiracy theories persist. One theory actually points an accusing finger at disgruntled anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States.¹⁷²

At the time of his death, Kennedy's Cuba policy was moving in opposite directions—probing for talks but sustaining multi-track pressures. "How can you figure him out?" Castro had asked in late October 1963.¹⁷³ On the very day that Kennedy died, AMMLASH rendezvoused with CIA agents in Paris, where he received a ball-point pen rigged with a poisonous hyperdermic needle intended to produce Castro's instant death.¹⁷⁴ But AMMLASH was but one obstacle to improved Cuban-American relations. For Kennedy and Castro to have reached détente, each would have had to suppress his strong ideological biases. Would Castro have risked a cooling of his close relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuban Communists at a time when Washington still worked for his ouster, some Americans yelped constantly for a United States invasion, and the next presidential election might send a conservative Republican to the White House? Would Castro have been willing to sever his lifeline? Would Castro have abandoned his bonds with Latin American revolutionaries in order to win a lifting of American economic sanctions?

From the Kennedy 1960s to the Reagan 1980s United States policy has consistently demanded two Cuban concessions: an end to support for revolutions in the hemisphere and an end to the Soviet military presence on the island. Havana has just as consistently refused to budge on either point before seeing United States concessions: aboli-

Handwritten notes:
This is the subject of the book
I know about it
I don't know about it
I don't know about it

tion of the economic embargo and American respect for Cuban sovereignty. As for Kennedy, could he have quieted the Cuban exile community, disciplined the CIA, and persuaded hard-line State Department officials? Would he have been willing to withstand the political backlash from his dealing with "Communist Cuba"? More important, did he want to improve relations with Cuba? Would he have shelved his intense, sometimes personal, three-year war against Cuba and disbanded the myriad spoiling operations? Would he ever have accepted the legitimacy of a radical revolution in the United States sphere of influence? It does not seem likely that either Kennedy, had he lived, or Castro could have overcome the roadblocks that they and their national interests had erected.

The Cuban-American confrontation was and is a question of the Cold War, domestic American politics, and personalities. But it has been primarily a question of faltering United States hegemony in the hemisphere. Kennedy struggled to preserve that hegemony. In the end, he failed—he did not achieve his well-defined and ardently pursued goals for Cuba. His Administration bequeathed to successors an impressive fixation both resistant to diplomatic opportunity and attractive to political demagoguery.

Handwritten note: What's the investment?

Handwritten notes:
Bundy
Oswald
Castro

- 1962, NSF: Memoranda and Meetings Series, NSAM #177 Folder, Box 338, JFKL.
51. "Summary of Training for Latin Americans in U.S. Military Schools and Institutions," October 16, 1961, and Chester Bowles to Kennedy, "Report on Police Training in Latin America," September 30, 1961, both in NSF: Memoranda and Meetings Series, NSAM #88 Folder, Box 331, JFKL; Schoultz, *Human Rights*, 179-83, 211-47.
52. MacNamara testimony in Senate, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1962*, pp. 60, 76; testimony of General Enemark, Senate, *Executive Sessions*, 1962, XIV, 433.
53. Bowles to Kennedy, September 30, 1961; NSF: Memoranda and Meetings Series, NSAM #88 Folder, Box 331, JFKL.
54. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, "U.S. Policies Toward Latin American Military Forces," February 25, 1965, Vol. III (1-6/65), and memorandum, Robert Sayre to Bundy, October 8, 1964, Vol. II (9-12/64), both in Box 2, NSC (Latin America-Country) Files, LBJL.
55. Llewellyn, *Generals vs. Presidents*, 127; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC, 1963), 206-8. The Kennedy Administration actually discouraged Bosch from purging his security forces of Trujillist elements. See Briefing Memorandum for the President, "Principal Problems Confronting Dr. Bosch," January 2, 1963, Box 115A, POF, JFKL.
56. Burrows OH; Williams OH.
57. Memorandum of conversation, Kennedy and Brazilian Foreign Minister Clemente Mariani, May 16, 1961; CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, memorandum, "Communist Inroads in Brazil," September 27, 1961; memorandum of conversation, Gordon and President Goulart, January 13, 1962, all in NSF: CO: Brazil, Box 12, JFKL.
58. Standing Group on Brazil, "Proposed Short-Term Policy for Meeting of Standing Group on Brazil," September 30, 1963; NSF: CO: Brazil, Folder (10/1-1/15/63), Box 14A, JFKL; Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia, PA, 1977), 138-78.
59. For the United States role in the overthrow of Goulart, see Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil*, 37-56; Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964* (Austin, TX, 1979).
60. Martin OH; memorandum of conversation, Kennedy and Celso Furtado, Director of Brazilian Development Agency, SUDENE, July 14, 1961, NSF: CO: Brazil, Box 12, JFKL.
61. DSB XLVII (July 23, 1962), 137-38.
62. Burrows OH; Levinson and de Onis, *The Alliance*, 224-54. See also "An Evaluation of the Alliance for Progress in Costa Rica—A Country Team Report," in Ambassador Raymond Telles to SD, August 21, 1963; NSF: CO: Costa Rica, Box 35, JFKL.
63. Memorandum of conversation, Kennedy and Furtado, July 14, 1961, and memorandum of conversation, Goulart and Gordon, October 22, 1961, both in NSF: CO: Brazil, Box 12, JFKL; Riordan Roett, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast* (Nashville, 1972), 70, 92-93.

I have questions about all these notes. I believe that the author of the notes is not the author of the book. I believe that the author of the book is the author of the notes. I believe that the author of the notes is the author of the book.

64. Roett, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, 112-38, 170. See also Ruth Lencock, "JFK, Business and Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review* LIX (November 1979), 636-73.
65. Draft memorandum by Martin on "Problems of Alliance," 1963, Alliance for Progress Folder, Box 1, Schlesinger Papers.
66. PPP, JFK, 1963, p. 458.
67. Chester Bowles OH, JFKL.
68. Schlesinger, "The Alliance for Progress," 59; Jerome Slater, "Democracy Versus Stability: The Recent Latin American Policy of the United States," *Yale Review* LV (December 1965), 175. See also Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States Policy Toward Latin America: 'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and 'Bureaucratic' Perspectives," *Latin American Research Review* VIII (Spring 1974), 3-25.
- Two copies of the above are in the folder 'Latin American Research Review'.*
- Chapter 5. Cuba**
1. Quoted in Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York, 1981), 174.
2. Richard Bissell in Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *The Kennedy's* (New York, 1984), 278.
3. Claude Pepper to Kennedy, April 27, 1962, Box 23-G-4-2F, Senatorial Files, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN.
4. Paul Miller, "Confidential Memorandum—Conversation with President Kennedy," March 13, 1963, Box 48, Gridiron Club Records, LC.
5. Quoted in U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report* (Washington, DC, 1975), 142n.
6. See, for example, Ernest R. May, "Writing Contemporary International History," *Diplomatic History* VIII (Spring 1984), 105.
7. A 1968 comment in Harris Wolford, *Of Kennedys and Kings* (New York, 1980), 426.
8. William Attwood, *The Twilight Struggle: Tales of the Cold War* (New York, 1987), 257.
9. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York, 1965), 306; Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, *With Fidel* (New York, 1975), 145.
10. Kennedy to Elizabeth Swank, January 29, 1959, Box 717, Senate Files, Pre-PP, JFKL; Kennedy to C.A. Nolan, April 25, 1959, *ibid.*; John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace*, Allan Nevins, ed. (New York, 1960), 132.
11. U.S. Department of State, *Cuba* (Washington, DC, 1961), PPP, JFK, 1961, p. 369; Memorandum for the President, "Latin American Program," 1961, Box 121, POF, JFKL. Theodore Draper popularized the "betrayal" theme in his *Castro's Revolution* (New York, 1962) and *Castroism* (New York, 1965).
12. Richard N. Goodwin, *The American Condition* (Garden City, NY, 1974), 256.

13. Adolf A. Bertle, *Latin America—Diplomacy and Reality* (New York, 1962), 77.
14. CR CIX (May 20, 1963), 8986.
15. Quoted in Kent M. Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths: Cuba in the 1960 Campaign," *Diplomatic History* VIII (Winter 1984), 45.
16. Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston, 1965), 224.
17. Robert Anderson in Memorandum, January 19, 1961, Box 11, Post-presidential, Augusta, Georgia. . . Papers, DDEP, DDEL.
18. For American interest groups and Cuba, see Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985).
19. "Notes on National Security Council Meeting, 15 November 1961," Box 4, VPSF, LBJL.
20. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Memorandum for the President, March 3, 1961, Box 65, Schlesinger Staff Memoranda, POF, JFKL.
21. Carlos Franqui, *Family Portrait with Fidel* (New York, 1984), 73.
22. Quoted in Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1975), 185.
23. Quoted in Drew Pearson to Lyndon B. Johnson, May 24, 1964, Box G265, Drew Pearson Papers, LBJL.
24. Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1978), 68, 149.
25. William D. Pawley, "Memoirs" (unpublished manuscript, Coral Gables, FL, n.d.), ch. 19. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean*, Part 10: *Testimony of William D. Pawley* (Washington, DC, 1960), 739; Justo Carrillo, "Vision and Revision: U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1902 to 1959," in Jaime Suchlicki et al., eds., *Cuba: Continuity and Change* (Miami, FL, 1985), 166.
26. "Why the Cuban Revolution of 1958 Led to Cuba's Alignment with the USSR," February 21, 1961, CIA Records (FOIA).
27. For 1959-1961, see Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988); Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immerman, *Ike's Spies* (Garden City, NY, 1981), 303-316; Welch, *Response*; Blasier, *Hovering Giant*; Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba* (New York, 1988).
28. Bonsal to Secretary of State, November 6, 1959, 611.37/1-659, Box 2473, DSR, NA; Eisenhower quoted in Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs* (New York, 1987), 48.
29. Memorandum for the President, "Current Basic United States Policy Toward Cuba," November 5, 1959, 611.37/1-559, Box 2474, DSR.
30. Quoted in Wayne S. Smith, *The Clash of Enemies* (New York, 1987), 64.
31. Philip W. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1971), 192.
32. *Washington Post*, April 23, 1963.
33. Memorandum of meeting with the President, January 3, 1961, Box 22, OSANSA, WHOF, DDEL; Memorandum of conversation with Dean Rusk, January 3, 1961, Box 10, Christian Herrer Papers, DDEL; Memorandum by A. J. Goodpaster, January 5, 1961, Box 4, International Series, Office of the Staff Secretary, WHOF, DDEL.
34. For the Bay of Pigs, see Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs* (New York, 1979); Higgins, *Perfect Failure*; Gabriel Molina, *Diario de Girón* (La Habana, 1983); Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs* (New York, 1964); Karl Meyer and Tad Szulc, *The Cuban Invasion* (New York, 1962); Lucien S. Vandembroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," *Political Science Quarterly* XCIX (Fall 1984), 471-491.
35. Quoted in Herbert Parmet, *JFK* (New York, 1983), 139.
36. Discussion on Cuba, March 11, 1961, National Security Action Memorandum No. 31, Box 329, NSF, JFKL; Dulles in Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 242.
37. Department of State, *Cuba*.
38. Quoted in Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 309.
39. *Ibid.*, 297.
40. Louis Halle to Walter Lippmann, May 3, 1961, Box 75, Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University Library.
41. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions, 1961: Historical Series*, XIII, Part 1 (Washington, DC, 1984), 445; Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York, 1967), 32; Welch, *Response*, 72; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 306.
42. Allen Dulles in *Meet the Press* No. 61, V (December 31, 1961); Sherman Kent, "Is Time on Our Side," memorandum for the Director, March 10, 1961, CIA Records (FOIA); Senate, *Executive Sessions, 1961*, XIII, Part 1, p. 401; Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York, 1963), 169.
43. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., OH Interview, OH Project, Columbia University, New York; Bissell, "Response to Lucien S. Vandembroucke," "Confessions of Allen Dulles," *Diplomatic History* VIII (Fall 1984), 379-380; Senate, *Executive Sessions, 1961*, XIII, Part 1, p. 392.
44. For these and other operational failures, see Senate, *Executive Sessions, 1961*, XIII, Part 1, pp. 342, 412; Bissell OH Interview; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs," *Naval War College Review* II (December 1972), 39; Tad Szulc, *Fidel* (New York, 1986), 550-551; Barton J. Bernstein, "Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs Revisited—Twenty Four Years Later," *Foreign Service Journal* LXII (March 1985), 32; Hilsman, *To Move*, 78; "Comments by Fidel Castro, 14 and 15 June, on the Invasion of 17 April 1961," Maxwell Taylor Papers, National Defense University, Washington, DC; Welch, *Response*, 80-81; CIA, Report No. 00-K-3/187, 928, "Experiences Just Before, During, and After the 17 Apr 1961 Invasion Attempt," June 5, 1961, No. 1977 (12D), DDRS.
45. Interview with Richard Bissell by Lucien Vandembroucke, May 18, 1984. See also Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots: Thomas Powers*, "Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks," *Atlantic Monthly* CCXLIV (August 1979), 40.
46. Charles J. V. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," *Fortune* LXIV (September 1961), 92ff; Hanson Baldwin OH Interview, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD; Allen W. Dulles to L. Paul Bremer III, April 28,

- 1965, Box 138, Allen Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ; "Interview Between Paul D. Bethel . . . and Orlando Cuervo of Cuban Brigade 2506," January 30, 1963, Kenneth Keating Papers, University of Rochester Library, Rochester, NY; Bissell OH Interview, *Time* CXXIX (June 1, 1987), 29.
47. "Comments by Fidel Castro;" Bissell OH Interview.
48. Vandenhroucke, "Anatomy," 475; Joseph B. Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* (New York, 1976), 324.
49. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ, 1976), 356-406; Vandenhroucke, "Anatomy," 488-489.
50. Kirkpatrick, "Paramilitary," 41.
51. Admiral Arleigh Burke OH Interview #4, U.S. Naval Institute. See also Maxwell Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York, 1972), 188-189; Robert Dennison OH Interview #8, U.S. Naval Institute; Vandenhroucke, "Anatomy," 477; Jeffrey G. Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and His Joint Chiefs of Staff" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1981), 177-200.
52. Dean Rusk, "Reflections on Foreign Policy," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Kennedy Presidency* (Lanham, MD, 1985), 195. See also Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, NJ, 1980), 96-115.
53. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro*, 179; Smith, *Closets*, 69.
54. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Memorandum for the President, "Joseph Newman on Cuba," March 31, 1961, Countress, POF, JFKL; Schlesinger, "Howard Handelman on Cuba," *ibid.*; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 252-256.
55. J. William Fulbright, "Cuba Policy," March 29, 1961, Box 38, File 1, Series 48-14, J. William Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 252.
56. Clayton Fritchey in Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 183n.
57. Ellis O. Briggs, *Farewell to Foggy Bottom* (New York, 1964), 192.
58. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 254; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro*, 184-186.
59. Chester Bowles, "Notes on Cuban Crisis," May 1961, Box 392, Diary, Bowles Papers. Also, Bowles to the President, April 20, 1961, Box 297, *ibid.*
60. Memorandum, June 5, 1961, Box 10, Post-presidential Papers, DDEP, DDEL; "Off-the-Record Breakfast with Nixon . . . April 21, [1961]," Box 65, Schlesinger Staff Memoranda, POF, JFKL.
61. Wolford, *Of Kennedys*, 341.
62. *PPP, JFK*, 1961, pp. 304-306.
63. Taylor, *Swords*, 200.
64. On Laos, see "Background Dinner with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.," May 10, 1961, Box 1, Robert H. Estabrook Papers, JFKL; Herbert L. Matthews, "Talk with Kennedy," July 2, 1965, Box 27, Herbert L. Matthews Papers, Columbia University Library. Quotation in Draft Record of Action, 478th NSC Meeting, April 22, 1961, Box 4, VPSF, LBL.
65. Walt W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power* (New York, 1972), 210-211.
66. *Operation ZAPATA: The "Ultra-sensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs* (Frederick, MD, 1981), 51-52.
67. Quoted in Taylor Branch and George Crite III, "The Kennedy Ven-

- etta: How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against Cuba," *Harper's Magazine* CCLII (August 1975), 50.
68. CIA, Report No. CS-3474-882, "Reaction Within Cuba to Attempt to Overthrow Castro Regime," May 19, 1961, No. 1977 (12C) DDRS; CIA, "Experiences"; CIA, Staff Memoranda No. 23-61, April 28, 1961, CIA Records, (FOIA); Justo Carrillo to Jose Miro Cardona, September 30, 1961, Box 23, Theodore Draper Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA; NSC Action Memorandum No. 2413-C, May 4, 1961, Box 4, VPSF, LBL; *New York Times*, July 17, 1961.
69. CIA, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," NIE 85-62, March 21, 1962, Box 9, National Intelligence Estimates, NSF, LBJL.
70. *Operation ZAPATA*, 52. For propaganda, see Edward R. Murrow (USIA) to the President, "Our Latin American Program," May 15, 1961, Box 121, POF, JFKL.
71. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 476.
72. Quoted in Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 139.
73. Branch and Crite, "Kennedy Vendetta," 52.
74. Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 481-498.
75. Quoted in Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 148-150.
76. Morris Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1932-1987* (New York, 1987), 191-203, 367-374; Dominguez, *Cuba*, 148; Margaret P. Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (New York, 1980), 39; *PPP, JFK*, 1962, p. 106; Gay C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington, DC, 1985), 315-323; Donald Losman, "The Embargo of Cuba: An Economic Appraisal," *Caribbean Studies* XIV (October 1974), 95-120; U.S. Department of State, "Success of the Economic Boycott," Draft Update to White Paper on Cuba, n.d. (but probably 1964), DSR (FOIA); CIA, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba"; Anna P. Schreiber, "Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* XXV (April 1973), 387-405; Robin Renwick, *Economic Sanctions* (Cambridge, MA, 1981), 64-66; Interview with John Cimmamus by Thomas G. Paterson, Washington, DC, February 4, 1985.
77. Bryce N. Harlow, Memorandum for the Record, March 4, 1960, Box 47, Staff Notes, DDE Diary Series, Whitman File, DDEP.
78. Christian A. Herrer, Memorandum for the President, "Status of Possible OAS Action on Cuba," March 17, 1960, Box 10, Dulles-Herrer Series, *ibid.*
79. Delesseps S. Morrison, *Latin American Mission* (New York, 1965), 152-197; Morley, *Imperial State*, 155-162.
80. Szulc, *Fidel*, 574.
81. *PPP, JFK*, 1962, p. 911; Milton S. Eisenhower, *The Wine Is Bitter* (Garden City, NY, 1963), 274-295; Diary, James B. Donovan Papers, Hoover Institution Archives; Rudolf A. Clemens, "Prisoners Exchange" (unpublished manuscript by Red Cross officer, Washington, DC, n.d.).
82. Richard N. Goodwin, "Annals of Politics: A Footnote," *The New Yorker* XLIV (May 25, 1968), 94.
83. Goodwin quoted in memorandum for the President, August 22, 1961,

- Box 115, POF, JFKL; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 542n; Goodwin, "Annals," p. 110.
84. Quoted in Mankiewicz and Jones, *With Fidel*, 150.
85. See, for example, Arnold Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics* XVI (April 1964), 363-389; John L. Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States* (New York, 1978), 236-237; David Detzer, *The Brink* (New York, 1979), 41, 49; Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston, 1971), 52-56.
86. Herbert S. Dinerstein, *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962* (Baltimore, MD, 1976), 155-156, 186-187.
87. Lee Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (New York, 1969), 224; Mankiewicz and Jones, *With Fidel*, 152.
88. Quoted in J. Anthony Lukacs, "Class Reunion: Kennedy's Men Re-live the Cuban Missile Crisis," *New York Times Magazine*, August 30, 1987, p. 27.
89. U Thant, "Summary of My Meeting . . .," October 30, 1962, DAG-1/5-2.2.6-2-1, United Nations Archives, New York. See also Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Radio Propaganda Report: Castro on Normalization of U.S.-Cuban Relations," March 2, 1964, Box 21, Country File-Cuba, NSF, LBJL; Anatoli A. Gromyko, "The Caribbean Crisis," *Soviet Law and Government* XI (No. 1, 1972), 3-53; Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, 1970), 492-496; Herbert L. Matthews, "Return to Cuba," *Hispanic American Report*, special issue (1964), pp. 15-16; Szulc, *Fidel*, 578-580.
90. CIA, "The Military Build-up in Cuba," No. 85-3-62, CIA Records (FOIA). See also Thomas Mann to Secretary of State, Telegram 761, September 761, September 6, 1962, NSF, JFKL.
91. Department of State Airgram CA-3675, October 5, 1962, Box 43, Series B, Wayne Morse Papers, University of Oregon Library, Eugene, OR. See also Colonel Burris to the Vice President, October 2, 1962, Box 6, VPSP, LBJL.
92. "Evidence of a Soviet Commitment to Defend Cuba," OCI No. 2428/62, October 19, 1962, Box 51, NSF, JFKL.
93. Thomas L. Hughes to Acting Secretary of State, "Daniel's Conversation with Castro," December 13, 1963, Box 23-F-1-2F, Humphrey Papers.
94. Servando Gonzalez, "The Great Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis," undated paper by former Cuban army officer, Servando Gonzalez Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.
95. Mohamed H. Heikal, *The Cairo Documents* (Garden City, NY, 1973), 142, 148.
96. Quoted in Allison, *Essence*, 193.
97. *PPP, JFK, 1962*, p. 674.
98. "Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba," 11:30 A.M.-12:57 P.M., October 16, 1962, transcript, Presidential Recordings, JFKL.
99. "Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba," 6:30-7:55 P.M., *ibid*.
100. James M. Grimwood and Frances Strowd, "History of the Jupiter Missile System," July 27, 1962, U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command, copy in National Security Archive, Washington, DC; Raymond L. Garthoff,

- Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC, 1987), 37, 43n; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* XCIV (Spring 1980), 97-125.
101. Quoted in Lukacs, "Class Reunion," 58.
102. Much of what follows draws upon the "minutes" of Ex Comm meetings, Box 316, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL, and Box 8, VPSP, LBJL.
103. Robert S. McNamara, "Notes on October 21, 1962 Meeting with the President," National Security Archive. See also Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York, 1969), 31.
104. "Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba," 6:30-7:55 P.M., October 16, 1962; George W. Ball to Thomas G. Paterson, December 17, 1984; Allison, *Essence*, 201-202.
105. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York, 1973), 489-492.
106. Quoted in John B. Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World* (Garden City, NY, 1977), 721-722.
107. *PPP, JFK, 1962*, pp. 806-809.
108. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report for Fiscal 1963* (Washington, DC, 1964); Department of Defense, "Actions of Military Services in Cuba Crisis Outlined," November 29, 1962, Department of the Army Record (FOIA); Adam Yaromolinsky, "Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis," February 12, 1963, in *Naval War College Review* XXXII (July-August 1979), 83-99.
109. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* X (Summer 1985), 158.
110. Bromley Smith, "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7, October 26, 1962, 10:00 A.M.," Box 216, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL; Lyndon B. Johnson notes, October 26, 1962, Box 8, VPSP, LBJL.
111. Secretary to Ambassador, October 26, 1962, Box 8, VPSP, LBJL; U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, October 26, 1962, Box 316, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL; Smith, "Summary Record . . . No. 6."
112. Hilsman, *To Move*, 216-219.
113. *DSB LXIX* (November 19, 1973), 640-645.
114. Bromley Smith, "Summary Meeting of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7, October 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M.," Box 316, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL.
115. Garthoff, *Reflections*, 43n. Bernstein, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 102-104.
116. Raymond Hare to Secretary of State, Telegram 587, October 26, 1962, National Security Archive. Also, Thomas Finletter to Secretary of State, Telegram 506, October 25, 1962, *ibid*; Roger Hilsman to Secretary of State, "Trading US Missiles in Turkey for Soviet Bases in Cuba," October 27, 1962, *ibid*.
117. "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 27, 1962," transcript, Presidential Recordings, JFKL. See also Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC, 1987), 111-114.

118. Harriman, "Memorandum on Kremlin Reactions," October 22, 1962, National Security Archive.
119. Garthoff, *Reflections*, 12, 19.
120. Seymour M. Hersh, "Were Cuban Fingers on the Trigger in the Cuban Missile Crisis?" *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, October 19, 1987.
121. Bromley Smith, "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 8, October 27, 1962, 4:00," Box 316, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL.
122. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 108.
123. "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 27, 1962."
124. Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 521-523.
125. "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 27, 1962."
126. Bromley Smith, "Summary Record of NSC executive Committee Meeting No. 10, October 28, 1962, 11:10 A.M.," Box 316, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL.
127. "Chronology of the Cuban Crisis, October 15-28, 1962," n.d., Army Records (FOIA).
128. Barton J. Bernstein, "Bombers, Inspections, and the No Invasion Pledge," *Foreign Service Journal* LVI (July 1979), 8-12.
129. U Thant, "Summary . . . , October 30, 1962."
130. John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Plain Lessons of a Bad Decade," *Foreign Policy*, No. 1 (Winter 1970-1971), 32.
131. "Call from the Attorney General," W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, October 29, 1962, FBI Records (FOIA).
132. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 532.
133. Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Cuban 'Contras' Capers," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1987.
134. "Chronology of the Cuban Crisis"; Smith, "Summary Record . . . No. 6."
135. Lukacs, "Class Reunion," 51.
136. Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," *International Security* IX (Spring 1985), 112-118.
137. Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore, 1981), 302.
138. Ball, *The Past*, 295, 309. See also Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 22.
139. Alexander L. George, "The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Decision Making," in Frederic Solomon and Robert O. Marston, eds., *The Medical Implications of Nuclear War* (Washington, DC, 1986), 541.
140. Charles Wellborn OH Interview #10, U.S. Naval Institute.
141. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 507.
142. CIA, "Readiness Status of Soviet Missiles in Cuba," October 23, 1962, Box 316, Meetings and Memoranda, NSF, JFKL; CIA, "Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action in Cuba," October 20, 1962, CIA Records (FOIA); McGeorge Bundy, "Kennedy and the Nuclear Question," in Thompson, *Kennedy Presidency*, 212; "The Cuban Missile Crisis," transcript of discussion conducted by Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, New York, NY, 1983, Reel # 4, p. 13.

143. Thomas G. Paterson and William J. Brophy, "October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962," *Journal of American History* LXXIII (June 1986), 87-119; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Historian as Detective: Senator Kenneth Keating, the Missiles in Cuba, and His Mysterious Sources," *Diplomatic History* XI (Winter 1987), 67-70.
144. "Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba," 6:50-7:55 P.M., October 16, 1962. See also *Washington Post*, December 18, 1962.
145. "The Cuban Missile Crisis," Sloan Reel # 5, p. 33.
146. "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 27, 1962."
147. Harriman to Under Secretary, October 26, 1962, No. 1977 (54B), DDRS; United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly*, 17th Session, Annexes, vol. III (New York, 1963), 12-13; Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, "Possible Soviet Attitude Toward Regional Denuclearization Proposals," October 26, 1962, National Security Archive; Smith, "Summary Record . . . No. 5," October 25, 1962; Smith, "Summary Record . . . No. 6."
148. Garthoff, *Reflections*, 114-116.
149. Szulc, *Fidel*, 588.
150. Rusk quoted in Peter Joseph, *Good Times* (New York, 1974), 58.
151. Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkeley, CA, 1981); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question* (New York, 1979), 159-189; Ronald E. Powaski, *March to Armageddon* (New York, 1987), 101-112.
152. Herbert L. Matthews to John Oakes, November 5, 1963, Box 85, Hanson Baldwin Papers, Yale University Library. See also Charles O. Porter, "An Interview with Fidel Castro [October 3, 1963]," *Northwest Review* VI (Fall 1963), 109.
153. Presidential Memorandum for Director McCone, December 13, 1962, Box 68, Departments and Agencies, POF, JFKL; Frederick C. Dutton to Senator Humphrey, April 4, 1963, Box 23-1-6-7B, Humphrey Papers; Memorandum, February 13, 1963, DAG-1/5.2.2.6.1-2, United Nations Archives; *PPP, JFK*, 1963, p. 176.
154. "Review of the Cuban Situation and Policy," February 28, 1963, Box 115, POF, JFKL.
155. See FBI Director to Attorney General, April 1, 1963, FBI Records (FOIA).
156. *PPP, JFK*, 1963, p. 278.
157. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Cuban Exile Plotting," July 19, 1963, Box 14, Attorney General's Correspondence, Robert F. Kennedy Papers, JFKL; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 540; Dean Rusk to the President, March 28, 1963, Box 4, VPSF, LBJL.
158. *PPP, JFK*, 1963, p. 305.
159. Robert Hurwitt OH Interview, JFKL; Press Release, Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, April 7, 1963, Box 66, Liebman Associates Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.
160. W.R. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan, April 2, 1963, FBI Records (FOIA).

161. "Lisa Howard Interview of Fidel Castro," 1963, Box 23-1-9-10F, Humphrey Papers, Lisa Howard, "Castro's Overture," *War/Peace Report*, September 1963, pp. 3-5. Also, Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 541.
162. Ernest Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro* (Berkeley, CA, 1972), 210-246.
163. Department of State to American Embassy, Paris, May 11, 1963, DSR (FOIA); Foy Kohler (Moscow) to Secretary of State, July 31, 1963, *ibid*.
164. John A. McCone, Memorandum for NSC Standing Group Members, May 1, 1963, CIA Records (FOIA).
165. Reports by George Volisky (USIA-Miami), August 16, 23, September 16, and October 4, 25, 1963, Box 26, Draper Papers; D.J. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan, "Anti-Fidel Castro Activities," November 4, 1963, FBI Records (FOIA).
166. William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks* (New York, 1967), 142-146; Attwood, *Twilight Struggle*, 257-264; Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy*, 551-552, 556.
167. Jean Daniel, "Unofficial Envoy: An Historic Report from Two Capitals," *New Republic* CXLIX (December 14, 1963), 20; Tad Sculz, "Friendships Possible, But . . .," *Parade Magazine*, April 1, 1984, p. 6.
168. *PPP, JFK*, 1963, p. 876.
169. "Meeting with the President," December 19, 1963, Box 19, Aides Files-Bundy, NSF, LBII.
170. Jean Daniel, "When Castro Heard the News," *New Republic* CLXIX (December 7, 1963), 7.
171. "Meeting with the President," December 19, 1963; Attwood, *Reds and Blacks*, 146.
172. Donald E. Schultz, "Kennedy and the Cuban Connection," *Foreign Policy*, No. 26 (Spring 1977), 57-139; U.S. House, Select Committee on Assassinations, *Final Report* (Washington, DC, 1979), 3; Carl F. Tagg, "Fidel Castro and the Kennedy Assassination" (M.A. thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 1982); Michael L. Kurtz, *Crime of the Century* (Knoxville, TN, 1982), 233-238; Anthony Summers, *Conspiracy* (New York, 1980); James W. Clarke, *American Assassins* (Princeton, NJ, 1982), 105-128.
173. Quoted in Herbert L. Matthews diary of trip to Cuba, October 24-November 3, 1963, Box 27, Matthews Papers.
174. Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 88-89.

Chapter 6. Middle East

1. Speech to Zionists of America, August 26, 1960, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *The Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of Senator John F. Kennedy, August 1 through November 7, 1960* (Washington, DC, 1961), 46-50. (Hereafter cited as *Speeches of JFK 1960*.)
2. John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace*, Allan Nevins, ed. (New York, 1960), 118.
3. Speech, May 14, 1947, quoted in Mordechai Gazit, *President Ken-*

- ney's Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel* (Tel Aviv, 1983), 33-34; Ian J. Bickerton, "John F. Kennedy, the Jewish Community and Israel: Some Preliminary Observations," *Australasian Journal of American Studies* II (December 1983), 33-35.
4. Speech to B'nai Zion, February 9, 1959, in Kennedy, *Strategy of Peace*, 118-19; Gazit, *Kennedy's Policy*, 43.
 5. Speech to Histadrut Zionist Organization, November 27, 1956, in Kennedy, *Strategy of Peace*, 112.
 6. William Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1953-1981* (Albany, NY, 1985), 8-35; Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez* (New York, 1981), 253-72, 371-406; Wilbur C. Eweland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York, 1980), 240-55.
 7. Kennedy, *Strategy of Peace*, 110-11.
 8. CR, CIII (July 2, 1957), 10780-10793. For reaction to the speech, see Richard Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York, 1983), 19-24.
 9. Burns, *Economic Aid*, 128, 250 (n. 29); C. L. Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants* (New York, 1970), 504-5; William Macomber OH Interview, JFKL.
 10. Speech to B'nai Zion, February 9, 1959, in Kennedy, *Strategy of Peace*, 119-23.
 11. Speech of November 9, 1959, *ibid.*, pp. 107-9.
 12. Speech of August 26, 1960, *Speeches of JFK 1960*, 49.
 13. Lawrence Fuchs, "JFK and the Jews," *Moment* IX (June 1983), 26-27; Steven Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chicago, 1985), 96-97. On Goldberg's role, see Goldberg to JFK, (n.d. but mid-1962), Box 1199, POF, JFKL.
 14. Herbert Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* (New York, 1983), 226; Spiegel, *Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 100; Philip Klutznick OH Interview, JFKL.
 15. Edward Tivnan, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1987), 59-61; William Quandt, *Decade of Deception: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley, CA, 1977), 37; Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (New York, 1984), 78-80; Isaiah L. Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington* (Buffalo, NY, 1981), 134-37, 172-74; Carl Solberg, *Hubert Humphrey* (New York, 1984), 183-84.
 16. Rusk to Kennedy, May 5, 1961, Box 127, POF, JFKL; Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Tortowa, NJ, 1980), 16-31; Talbot to the author, August 26, 1985.
 17. John S. Badeau, *The Middle East Remembered* (Washington, DC, 1983), 169-85.
 18. On Komer, see William Colby, *Honorable Men* (New York, 1978), 236, and I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy* (New York, 1984), 184.
 19. Memnon, "Algeria," March 10, 1961; Ambassador James Gavin (Paris) to Rusk, tel. September 21, 1961; and Walt Rostow to JFK, January 1962, all in Box 4, NSF, JFKL; Rusk to author, July 1, 1985; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston, 1965), 564-65.