Anthony Hartley is the editor of Interplay magazine.	of his vignettes (e.g., McNamara and the President stuck in the Pentagon elevator on the day of the former's retirement) will reappear in the history books. Basically, this is a tale of military defeat. Hoopes, in his Pentagon niche, was one of the few civilian officials to contest the euphoria of the military command in	they're talking about." History will modify this picture, but Hoopes, who was first Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense and then, from 1967, Under-Secretary for the Air Force,	was their doyen, Dean Acheson, who first brought	as it developed during the Kennedy and Johnson Ad- ministrations, is, no doubt, the first of a long series of polemical memoirs, and a fascinating one. But its testi- mony will certainly be contradicted, and its judgments on individuals are a little too black and white to be true. In the Vietnam drama it is clear that, for Hoopes, L.B.J., Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow are the villains. In the center of the stage stands the Hamlet figure of Robert McNamara, the hesitant victim of his own com- petence. Up front shines the hero figure of Clark Clifford, while, in the background the elder statesmen of Ameri-	By Anth Townse	THE LI Hoopes. 1
Hartley i	his vignettes (e.g., McNamara and the President uck in the Pentagon elevator on the day of the former's tirement) will reappear in the history books. Basically, this is a tale of military defeat. Hoopes, in s Pentagon niche, was one of the few civilian officials contest the euphoria of the military command in	the function of the second sec	their doyen, Dean Acheson, who first brought	reloped d tions, is, al memoir al certain iduals ar iduals ar iduals ar the Vietna bean Rusta bean Rusta bean Rusta bean fusta article and the construction of the formary up from tra-	By Anthony Hartley Townsend Hoopes's inside story of the Vietnam war	THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION, By Townsend Hoopes, McKay. 245 pp. \$5.95.
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essor. Fo	in a pec ing Marc ing Marc is talks a n dealing lers a con	Saigon. His memoranda on the failure of the bombing of North Vietnam to stem infiltration into the South are the best explanation yet given of precisely why the policy of escalation did not succeed. But he and his like could not influence events until after the Tet offen-	10 m 10			
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successor. For it is now beginning to be evident that	Clark Clifford — a man who had the President's ear and was in a peculiarly strong political position. After that, during March 1968, things moved rapidly towards the Paris talks and Johnson's decision not to run again. In dealing with the Kennedy Administration Hoopes renders a considerable service to history by emphasizing the continuity between the voltation and there a the	re of th into the precisel 1. But 1 1. But 1		1		

to assume responsibility for the regimes that followed. was reached with the overthrow of Diem. Since the experiments. The point of no return in political terms South Vietnam should seem a suitable place for field interest in counterinsurgency, it was inevitable that of the concern with counterinsurgency that ruled the day American involvement in Vietnam was largely a result United States had encouraged this revolution, it had he believes "might conceivably succeed." Once you had in Washington. Hoopes himself was attracted by the low-cost counterinsurgency strategy which even now

can be mitigated by "adjustments, reassurances, and consequences" of American withdrawal from Vietnam haunted American policy in Southeast Asia. the disastrous lack of political understanding which has and Japan." In its own way this book also demonstrates perhaps added U.S. effort in places like Thailand, Korea the same might be said of his belief that the "adverse Hoopes deplored in the Johnson Administration. And South Vietnamese . . . " drawal will be extremely painful for several strata of is no doubt that such a United States policy of withabout the possible fate of the South Vietnamese, "There it is the impatience of the military technocrat with such bit as much a Vietnamese nationalist as Ho. Perhaps namese politics. His judgment that "national aspiration language used to gloss over unpleasant reality that political details that leads him to be rather cold-blooded Mao. Besides, it ignores the fact that Diem was every Minh" is as question-begging as earlier judgments about was the historical imperative that explained Ho Chi war is badly flawed by his inability to sort out Vietof course, limited. Hoopes's general narrative of the The view from the Pentagon during these years was, Quite, but this is the same

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