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VIETNAM VICTORY BY THE END OF '65 ENVISAGED BY U.S.

Officials Say War May Be
Won if Political Crisis Does
Not Hamstring Effort

WARN ON REPRESSION

McNamara and Taylor Tell
the President and Security
Council of Their Mission

*Text of White House statement
on Vietnam is on Page 4.*

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2—The United States said tonight that the war in South Vietnam might be won by the end of 1965 if the political crisis there did not "significantly" affect the military effort.

A formal statement of United States policy, approved by President Kennedy after a National Security Council meeting at the White House, warned that while repressive actions by the Saigon regime had not yet "significantly affected" the war effort, "they could do so in the future."

It said that under the present conditions most of the 14,000 United States military personnel could be withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of 1965 and that 1,000 men might be able to leave by the end of this year.

"The political situation in South Vietnam remains deeply serious," the statement said.

Based on Recommendations

The policy statement was ap-

proved on the basis of recommendations from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam.

Mr. McNamara and General Taylor returned here early today from a week-long fact-finding mission in Vietnam on President Kennedy's orders.

The mission was designed to evaluate the military and political situations in the Southeast Asian country, with particular emphasis on whether the political crisis, stemming from the regime's repression of its Buddhist and other opponents, is affecting the eight-year-old war against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.

Policy May Be Reviewed

It was hoped that the mission's findings would resolve the differences within the Administration over United States policy toward South Vietnam.

The statement, which was read to newsmen by Pierre Salinger, White House press secretary, after the 50-minute meeting of the National Security Council, deliberately avoided committing the United States to a frozen position toward the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Administration quarters said later that while the present decision was to maintain military and economic aid to South Vietnam at its present levels, this policy would come under review at any time if it became clear that, indeed, the political crisis was seriously damaging the conduct of the war.

In that sense, it was acknowledged, the United States was in effect placing the Diem re-

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PRESIDENT GETS VIETNAM REPORT

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gime on notice that it might have to reconsider its support for South Vietnam if adequate measures were not taken to redress the political situation.

Officials said that although the policy statement deliberately avoided making a formal judgment that the war could not be won without a meaningful political change in Saigon, the implication was there for President Diem to see.

The statement said that United States policy remained one of "working with the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism," but added significantly that "effective performance in this undertaking is the central object of our policy in South Vietnam."

It said that the United States sought to support Vietnamese efforts to defeat "aggression" as well as "to build a peaceful and free society."

"The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Vietnam," it said.

Up to now, the statement said, the McNamara-Taylor mission found that "the military program in South Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought."

It said that "major United States assistance" was needed only until the Communist insurgency had been suppressed or until Vietnamese forces "are capable of suppressing it."

Mr. McNamara and General Taylor were reported to believe that "the major part" of the United States military task could be completed by the end of 1965, although a limited num-

White House Statement on Vietnam

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 2—
Following is the text of a statement read by the White House press secretary, Pierre Salinger, after a meeting of the National Security Council today:

"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action.

"Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador Lodge.

"The security of South Vietnam is a major interest of the United States as of other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Gov-

ernment of South Vietnam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Vietcong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central object of our policy in South Vietnam.

"The military program in South Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

"Major United States assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Vietnam are capable of suppressing it.

"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the United States military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there

may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of United States training personnel.

"They reported that by the end of this year the United States program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 United States military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn.

"The political situation in South Vietnam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Vietnam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

"It remains the policy of the United States in South Vietnam, as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society."

ber of training personnel might still be required.

By the end of this year, the statement said, the training program for the South Vietnamese forces should have progressed to the point where 1,000 United States personnel can be withdrawn from the country, in the opinion of Mr. McNamara and General Taylor.

United States military strength in South Vietnam has risen from 685 men in early 1961 to more than 14,000 men at this time. The build-up began after General Taylor's first mission to Vietnam in 1961.

Mr. McNamara and General Taylor went into a top-secret White House meeting shortly after 6 P.M., about 12 hours after their return here from a week-long fact-finding mission in Vietnam.

They had given Mr. Kennedy,

a preliminary briefing at a morning conference. The President then called the Council meeting for the early evening.

The findings, conclusions and recommendations by Mr. McNamara and General Taylor are expected to provide the basis for the formulation of a common States policy in Vietnam, following long weeks of hesitations and disagreements within the Administration.

Lodge's View at Saigon

By DAVID HALBERSTAM

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 2—Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge tried to convince Secretary McNamara, during his visit here that the political situation in South Vietnam was serious while Gen. Paul D. Harkins, head of the United States mili-

tary mission, tried to convince him that the war was going well, was on schedule and could

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be won under existing conditions.

Mr. McNamara and General Taylor were said to have been considerably impressed by the seriousness of the political situation and what one source described as "the police aspects of this state."

A qualified American said their final report would stress parts of both sides' presentations, "grays more than blacks and whites."

Mr. McNamara and General Taylor were sent here by President Kennedy to investigate the effect on the war effort of the dispute between Vietnamese Buddhists and the ruling family of President Ngo Dinh Diem, and, to estimate how well the war was going.

Although their mission started out as primarily a military investigation, it was also by the end of the visit as much an investigation into the political situation.

The United States is supporting the Ngo family government with an estimated total of \$1.5 million a day in military and economic aid in the fight against the Communist guerrillas.

The United States is considerably disturbed over recent political developments, including the crackdown on the Buddhists

and the emergence of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President's powerful brother, and his wife in the Government.

Slowly and with some exceptions, there has been a gradual crystallization of ideas at the highest American civilian and military levels here. This crystallization in part reflects somewhat different readings of the situation in Vietnam and what to do about it on the part of the military and civilians.

Civilians, including the Embassy, do not believe the war can be won with a government that includes the Nhus. The military believe the war is being won.

Although in the past Mr. Lodge has stayed somewhat in

the background during disputes on what the reaction to events should be and on basic decisions, with Mr. McNamara here Mr. Lodge moved for a stronger role.

He and General Harkins are old friends from Boston days, but in recent weeks, according to military sources, the general has become angry because Mr. Lodge has been challenging his military evaluations.

During Mr. McNamara's visit General Harkins had the advantage that the Military Assistance Command was running the show and making basic schedules. Among other advantages that Mr. Lodge had was the fact that the Secretary of Defense was staying at his resi-

dence. General Taylor stayed with General Harkins.

The visitors' schedule included tours of all military areas, where briefings were given by both South Vietnamese and American officers. General Harkins attended all these sessions.

It was believed that the briefings were aimed at comparing the military situation now with the lean times of October, 1961.

Some of the optimism of the briefings, the sources say, was reflected in the early and quite optimistic statements by Arthur Sylvester, an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The fact that considerable military progress had been made in some areas came through in the briefings.