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suspecting places and that those who have become independent are stubbornly resolved to remain so. And as we work with them toward that kind of a decent world community, of independent states cooperating across national frontiers, we shall find allies right around the world; in moments of great crisis there are not nearly so many neutralists as you might have supposed.

IX-109

VIETNAMESE-UNITED STATES AGREEMENT REGARDING FUNDING FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY AND OTHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DURING 1963: Joint Communiqué Issued at Saigon by the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam (Diem) and the American Ambassador (Nolting), May 17, 1963⁴⁵

The Government of Vietnam and the American Embassy announced on May 17 that agreement has been reached regarding funding for counter-insurgency and other economic development projects, particularly those supporting the Strategic Hamlet Program, during 1963. The agreement provides *inter alia* for the continuation of counter-insurgency projects supported under the piastre-purchase agreement announced in August, 1962.⁴⁶ As explained at that time, the latter was an extraordinary arrangement necessitated by the fact that full provision for the counter-insurgency operations in question was not made either in the Vietnamese budget for 1962 or in the United States AID Program. It was planned that the continuation of these operations would be budgeted and programmed in a manner calculated to be responsive to the requirements of the present situation.

Under the agreement just announced, the Government of Vietnam has undertaken to supplement U.S.-owned funds and counterpart, so as to make available up to \$2.3 billion piastres during calendar year 1963. The United States is also providing some \$55 million in the form of agricultural products, barbed wire, weapons for hamlet militia, cement, fertilizer and other commodities for the program.

Counter-insurgency projects will continue to be initiated and developed by the Vietnamese authorities, and all of them will be fully coordinated between the Vietnamese and American central committees, as in the past. The execution of projects will also continue to be closely coordinated between the Vietnamese authorities and American experts in the provinces.

During the course of the discussions, it was also reaffirmed that the scale of the U.S. advisory and support effort in Vietnam is directly related to security requirements and to the need to bring about throughout the country the economic and social improvements envisaged in the strategic hamlet program. Although at this time the present level of the advisory and support effort is still necessary, as the security situ-

⁴⁵ Republic of Viet-Nam Information Bulletin, June 30, 1963, p. 18.

⁴⁶ Aug. 11, 1962.

ation improves and as the strategic hamlet programme progresses, it is expected that the need for foreign assistance, both in terms of material and personnel, will be progressively lightened.

IX-110

UNITED STATES HOPE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOME AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIET-NAM BY THE END OF 1963 DEPENDING ON THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE: Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, May 22, 1963 (Excerpt)⁴⁷

[Regarding reports that President Diem's brother and adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had said there were too many United States troops in South Viet-Nam,]⁴⁸ . . . we would withdraw the troops, any number of troops, any time the Government of South Viet-Nam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. That is number one.

Number two is: we are hopeful that the situation in South Viet-Nam would permit some withdrawal in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present time. There is still a long, hard struggle to go. We have seen what happened in Laos,⁴⁹ which must inevitably have its effect upon South Viet-Nam, so that I couldn't say that today the situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the skies that would permit us to withdraw troops or begin to by the end of this year. But I would say, if requested to, we will do it immediately. As of today we would hope we could begin to perhaps to do it at the end of the year, but we couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the next few months.

IX-111

THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE DUTY TO DEFEND THE NATIONAL FLAG OF VIET-NAM: Communiqué of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to All Cadres of All Branches of Activity, May 29, 1963⁵⁰

Concerning the religious question on the territory of Viet Nam, the Government of the Republic confirms the following views:

1) All cadres must observe absolute respect for "the right to the freedom of faith, of religious practice, and religious propagation" as has been prescribed by

⁴⁷ The reply printed here is taken from p. 421 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*.

⁴⁸ See *The New York Times*, May 23, 1963.

⁴⁹ See *ante*, docs. IX-69-79.

⁵⁰ Viet-Nam Press, *The Buddhist Question: The Position of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Basic Documents* (Saigon, 1963), vol. I, pp. 1-2.

tion, have come to see me to express their grave concern at the situation that has arisen in the Republic of Viet-Nam, and have asked me to request Your Excellency's Government to take all necessary steps to normalize the situation by ensuring the exercise of fundamental human rights to all sections of the population in the Republic.

It is in the light of humanitarian considerations, to which we all, as members of the human family, are bound, that I have felt it my duty to transmit the above request, adding to it my own personal appeal to Your Excellency, as the head of the Government of Viet-Nam, to find a solution to the questions which are so deeply affecting the population of your country, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁹¹

* IX-127

"IN THE LAST 2 MONTHS, THE GOVERNMENT [OF VIET-NAM] HAS GOTTEN OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE":
 Replies Made by the President (Kennedy) to Questions Asked on a CBS Television News Program, September 2, 1963⁹²

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government [of Viet-Nam] to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet-Nam, against the Communists.

We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months, the government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

I do [think that the Diem Government has time to regain the support of the people]. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

If he [Diem] does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that, but in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an

⁹¹ Text in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, pp. 1156-1159.

⁹² The replies printed here are taken from p. 652 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*. The President made these remarks in an interview with Mr. Walter Cronkite of CBS News video-taped at Hyannis Port, Mass., on the morning of Sept. 2, 1963.

effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

IX-128

REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF AN ITEM ENTITLED "THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM" ON THE AGENDA OF THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Letter From the Representatives of Fourteen Member States at the U.N. to the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), September 4, 1963⁹³

IX-129

"A SOLUTION HAS ALREADY BEEN FOUND TO THE BUDDHIST QUESTION WHICH BEARS WITNESS TO THE MERITS OF THE POLICY PURSUED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT": Letter From the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam (Dien) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), September 5, 1963⁹⁴

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your recent message in which you were kind enough to inform me of the concern shown by the representatives of African and Asian States Members of the United Nations with regard to the situation in Viet-Nam.⁹⁵

I thank you for the opportunity this gives me to clarify fully the Buddhist question, to which your message refers.

First of all, I can assure you that there has been no suppression of Buddhism in Viet-Nam since the establishment of the Republic. Any allegation to the contrary is nothing but an imperialist invention. The Buddhist question is not a question of suppression, but a phenomenon of the development of Buddhism, a growing-pain of Buddhism, which should be viewed in its historical context, that of an under-developed, newly independent country—a country, in other words, which is short of cadres and of financial resources but desirous of rapidly asserting itself. Like the other movements in process of expansion which are linked to the independence movement, the Buddhist movement began to develop all the more quickly because it was held in check during the colonial period. In this unduly rapid development, Buddhism, like other movements, both public and private, is suffering from a shortage of cadres both qualitatively and quantitatively, and this offers the East and the West an opportunity to infiltrate, if not to impose their own cadres who try to take over the leadership.

This results in ideological deviations, which in practice are reflected in techniques of political agitation and propaganda and in the organization of riots and *coups d'état* for the benefit of foreign interests. This is the tragedy of Buddhism

⁹³ U.N. doc. A/5489 and Add. 2 and 3. This letter was signed by the representatives of the following member states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Trinidad and Tobago, subsequently joined by Mali and Nepal. An explanatory memorandum was circulated Sept. 13, 1963 (U.N. doc. A/5489/Add. 1).

⁹⁴ U.N. doc. A/5542.

⁹⁵ *Ante*, doc. IX-128.

in Viet-Nam; it will no doubt be the tragedy of Buddhism in the other countries of Asia.

We hope that, instead of allowing themselves to be poisoned by an international conspiracy of the East or the West against the Republic of Viet-Nam, the fraternal African and Asian countries will benefit from the experience in our country and forestall the crises which they will possibly have to face.

Every Government is in duty bound to uphold public order and also to ensure that alien cadres both from the East and the West, with their specific ideologies and policies, do not mar the original purity of Buddhism and the other movements. In other words, the action taken by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in connexion with the Buddhist question has no other objective than to free the Buddhist hierarchy from all outside pressure and to shield the development of Buddhism from any external influence that works against the interests of the Buddhist religion and against the higher interests of the State.

I am also happy to be able to inform you that a solution has already been found to the Buddhist question which bears witness to the merits of the policy pursued by the Viet-Nameese Government. Freed from the evil influence of foreign agitators and adventurers, the Buddhist hierarchy has resumed charge of the Buddhist community and of the pagodas throughout the territory of Viet-Nam.

I request you to be kind enough to communicate this message to the representatives of the African and Asian States Members of the United Nations.

Fuller, better
kept in
Senate
Documents

* IX-130

"WE ARE USING OUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE [VIETNAMESE] GOVERNMENT THERE TO . . . WIN BACK [POPULAR] SUPPORT": Replies Made by the President (Kennedy) to Questions Asked on an NBC Television Program, September 9, 1963 (Excerpts)⁹⁶

. . . I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however, the difficulties with the Buddhists, we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time and we must be patient, we must persist.

I don't think we think that [—reducing our aid—] would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World

⁹⁶ The replies printed here are taken from pp. 659-660 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*. The President made these remarks in an interview with Messrs. Chet Huntley and David Brinkley of NBC News video-taped in his office at the White House on the morning of Sept. 9, 1963.

War II, where China was lost, a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

. . . China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. . . .

We have some influence . . . [—in Southeast Asia]. We have some influence, and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir.⁹⁷ That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia,⁹⁸ Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States, [and] SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

IX-131

“WHAT HELPS TO WIN THE WAR, WE SUPPORT; WHAT INTERFERES WITH THE WAR EFFORT, WE OPPOSE”: Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, September 12, 1963⁹⁹

I think I have stated what my view is [on Viet-Nam] and we are for those things and those policies which help win the war there. That is why some 25,000 Americans have traveled 10,000 miles to participate in that struggle. What helps to win the war, we support; what interferes with the war effort, we oppose. I have already made it clear that any action by either government which may handicap

⁹⁷ See *ante*, docs. IX-48-54.

⁹⁸ Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with South Viet-Nam, Aug. 27, 1963.

⁹⁹ The reply printed here is taken from p. 673 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*.

the winning of the war is inconsistent with our policy or our objectives. This is the test which I think every agency and official of the United States Government must apply to all of our actions, and we shall be applying that test in various ways in the coming months, although I do not think it desirable to state all of our views at this time. I think they will be made more clear as time goes on.

But we have a very simple policy in that area, I think. In some ways I think the Vietnamese people and ourselves agree: we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is our policy. I am sure it is the policy of the people of Viet-Nam. But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war.

IX-132

2) **"SECRETARY McNAMARA AND GENERAL TAYLOR REPORTED THEIR JUDGMENT THAT THE MAJOR PART OF THE U.S. MILITARY TASK [IN VIET-NAM] CAN BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1965": White House Statement Read to Correspondents by the President's Press Secretary (Salinger), October 2, 1963**¹

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 624. The Secretary of Defense (McNamara) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Taylor) visited South Viet-Nam, Sept. 24-Oct. 1, 1963, on a special mission ordered by President Kennedy, Sept. 21, 1963.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.²

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam.³ While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

IX-133

VIETNAMESE INVITATION FOR A UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO INVESTIGATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND BUDDHIST COMMUNITY: Letter From the Vietnamese Special Representative at the U.N. (Buu Hoi) to the President of the U.N. General Assembly (Sosa Rodríguez), October 4, 1963⁴

IX-134

UNITED STATES PROTEST OF "PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN NEWSMEN IN SAIGON": Statement by the Secretary of State (Rusk), Issued October 5, 1963⁵

Ambassador Lodge has protested to the Government of Viet-Nam in the most serious terms the physical assault on American newsmen in Saigon. The treatment of news correspondents is a matter the United States has pressed with the authorities of Viet-Nam for many months.

Unfortunately, repeated assurances given to American officials by those authorities have not prevented this recent incident.⁶ The matter is being pressed further.

² See footnote 36 to doc. IX-149, *post*.

³ President Diem's decree of Sept. 14 ended martial law in Viet-Nam Sept. 16, 1963. See *ante*, doc. IX-117.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/PV.1232, par. 93. The U.N. General Assembly authorized the President of the U.N. General Assembly (Sosa Rodríguez) to appoint a U.N. Fact-Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam, Oct. 8, 1963 (U.N. doc. A/PV.1234, pars. 82-84). See *post*, title IX-147.

⁵ Department of State files.

⁶ American newsmen David Halberstam of *The New York Times*, John Sharkey and Grant Wolfkill of NBC, who witnessed the suicide of a Buddhist monk in Saigon Oct. 4, 1963, were beaten by plainclothes police on leaving the scene.

IX-135

* "I CAN FIND NOTHING . . . TO INDICATE THAT THE CIA HAS DONE ANYTHING BUT SUPPORT [ADMINISTRATION] POLICY [IN VIET-NAM]": Replies Made by the President (Kennedy) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, October 9, 1963 (Excerpts)⁷

. . . reports [that the Central Intelligence Agency has undertaken certain independent operations in Viet-Nam] are wholly untrue. The fact of the matter is that Mr. McCone sits in the National Security Council. I imagine I see him at least three or four times a week, ordinarily. We have worked very closely together in the National Security Council in the last 2 months attempting to meet the problems we face in South Viet-Nam. I can find nothing, and I have looked through the record very carefully over the last 9 months, and I could go back further, to indicate that the CIA has done anything but support policy. It does not create policy; it attempts to execute it in those areas where it has competence and responsibility. I know that the transfer of Mr. John Richardson, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises.⁸ But I can just assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence, operating with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions.

. . . while the CIA may have made mistakes, as we all do, on different occasions, and has had many successes which may go unheralded, in my opinion in this case it is unfair to charge them as they have been charged. I think they have done a good job.

I would agree with the . . . [criticism] that [what is needed is less backbiting between U.S. agency officials]⁹ . . . They are faced with a very difficult problem in South Viet-Nam, which we are all familiar with, both on the military and political side. Men have different views about what actions we should take, and they talk to members of the press, to all of you, in Saigon and here in Washington. But I must say that as of today, and I think this is particularly true since General Taylor and Secretary McNamara came back,¹⁰ I know of no disagreement between the State Department at the top, CIA at the top, Defense at the top, the White House and Ambassador Lodge, on what our basic policies will be and what steps we will take to implement it. Now if down below there is disagreement, I think in part it will be because they are not wholly informed of what actions

⁷ The replies printed here are taken from pp. 768-769 and 774 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*.

⁸ John H. Richardson, First Secretary and Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Saigon (Lodge), left Saigon Oct. 5, 1963.

⁹ Reference to an interview of Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1958-1961, reported in the *New York Journal American*, Oct. 9, 1963.

¹⁰ See *ante*, doc. IX-132.

we are taking. Some of them are necessarily confidential. But I think our policy, though we can't say what effect it is going to have, I think we are in agreement about what we ought to do. I would think that Saigon, and personnel in the various agencies, should support that policy, because that is the policy we are going to carry out for a while.

IX-136

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES NOT COMMITTED TO FIELD OPERATIONS OR RELATED TRAINING PROGRAMS: Statement Read to Correspondents by the Deputy Director of the Office of News (McCloskey), Department of State, October 22, 1963¹¹

The U.S. Government has informed the Government of Viet-Nam that U.S. support will no longer be provided to those elements of the special forces which are not committed to field operations or engaged in related training programs. This action is in line with President Kennedy's statement on September 12 that "What helps to win the war we support. What interferes with the war effort we oppose."¹²

[UNAUTHORIZED INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES BY NORTH VIET-NAM INTO LAOS: Statement and Reply Made by the Director of the Office of News (Phillips), Department of State, to a Question Asked at a Press and Radio News Briefing, October 29, 1963—Ante, doc. IX-79]

IX-137

PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN VIET-NAM: Military Order No. 1 Issued by the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic of Viet-Nam (General Minh), November 1, 1963¹³

Martial law is now proclaimed throughout the territory. As of November 1, 1963, the Vietnamese Republican Armed Forces assume the responsibility of protecting public security throughout the territory. The people are forbidden:

1. To leave their houses from 2000 to 0700 hours in the morning.
2. To hold meetings harmful to public security and order.
3. To engage in violations of public security and order, such as printing, circulating, and keeping documents, newspapers, and leaflets aimed at destroying the national security and order. All printing material and tables must be censored.
4. All organizations and individuals having weapons must immediately hand weapons and ammunition, including sharp weapons, over to the nearest military authorities.

Those who violate the above articles will be prosecuted before the military court in accordance with emergency procedures.

¹¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 736.

¹² *Ante*, doc. IX-131.

¹³ Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis* (Rev. ed.; New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 454.

of the meeting at Honolulu—Ambassador Lodge will be there, General Harkins will be there, Secretary McNamara and others, and then, as you know, later Ambassador Lodge will come here—is to attempt to assess the situation: what American policy should be, and what our aid policy should be, how we can intensify the struggle, how we can bring Americans out of there.²⁸

Now, that is our object, to bring Americans home, permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and independent country, and permit democratic forces within the country to operate—which they can, of course, much more freely when the assault from the inside, and which is manipulated from the north, is ended. So the purpose of the meeting in Honolulu is how to pursue these objectives.

IX-145

“WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH VIET-NAM WOULD COLLAPSE OVERNIGHT”: Remarks Made by the President (Kennedy), Fort Worth, Tex., November 22, 1963²⁹

IX-146

“WE SHOULD, ALL OF US, NOT GO TO BED ANY NIGHT WITHOUT ASKING WHETHER WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING THAT WE COULD DO THAT DAY TO WIN THE STRUGGLE [IN VIET-NAM]”: Remarks Made by the President (Johnson) to Employees of the Department of State, December 5, 1963³⁰

IX-147

THE QUESTION OF VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM: Report of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam, December 7, 1963³¹

[NOTE: The President of the U.N. General Assembly (Sosa Rodriguez) acting under the authority of the General Assembly (see footnote 4 to title IX-133, *ante*) appointed the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission which consisted of representatives of the following member states: Afghanistan (chairman), Brazil, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Morocco, and Nepal, Oct. 11, 1963. During its visit to Saigon Oct. 24–Nov. 3 and to Hué Oct. 30–31, the U.N. Mission interviewed spokesmen of the Government of President Diem, persons selected by the

²⁸ Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk conferred in Honolulu with the American Ambassador to South Viet-Nam, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam, General Paul D. Harkins, Nov. 20, 1963.

²⁹ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 888–890.

³⁰ *Ante*, doc. VI-2.

³¹ U.N. doc. A/5630.

Mission, and persons coming forward of their own accord. The Chairman of the Mission also made a courtesy call on the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council (Major General Duong Van Minh) and Generals Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim. The Mission was unable to interview Thich Tri Quang, a Buddhist monk who took refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Sept. 1, because the Government of President Diem informed the Mission that according to the laws of asylum a person in asylum was not allowed to make any contacts whatsoever while in asylum.

[Those members of the U.N. General Assembly who proposed the agenda item "The Violation of Human Rights in South Viet-Nam" (see footnote 93 to title IX-128, *ante*), in the light of recent events in Viet-Nam did not feel it useful to discuss this item. In these circumstances, the U.N. General Assembly decided it was not necessary to continue consideration of the item, Dec. 13, 1963 (U.N. doc. A/PV.1280, pars. 1-5).]

IX-148

UNITED STATES REVIEW OF PLANS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIET-NAM DURING 1964 IN VIEW OF THE "RAPID EXPANSION OF [VIET CONG] ACTIVITY": Remarks Made by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to News Correspondents at the White House, December 21, 1963³²

The members of my party and I returned this morning from South Viet-Nam.³³ We have just completed our report to the President of our observations. We observed the results of the very substantial increase in the Viet Cong activity, an increase that began shortly after the new Government was formed³⁴ and has extended over a period of several weeks.

During this time the Viet Cong have attacked, and attacked successfully, a substantial number of the strategic hamlets. They have burned the houses, the fortifications, and in many cases have forced the inhabitants to leave. The rate of that Viet Cong activity, however, has substantially dropped within the past week to 10 days.

This rapid expansion of activity, I think, could have been expected. It obviously was intended to take advantage of the period of organization in the new Government, a period during which there was a certain amount of confusion—confusion that you might have expected

³² White House press release dated Dec. 21, 1963 (text as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 13, 1964, p. 46). Secretary of Defense McNamara visited Saigon Dec. 19-20, 1963.

³³ Accompanying Mr. McNamara to Viet-Nam were John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Maj. Gen. Victor Krulak, USMC, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and William H. Sullivan, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State. [Footnote in source text.]

³⁴ See footnote 20 to doc. IX-141, *ante*.

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would result from the replacement of the province chiefs and other key administrators in the Government.

We reviewed in great detail the plans of the South Vietnamese and the plans of our own military advisers for operations during 1964. We have every reason to believe they will be successful. We are determined that they shall be.