

of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

ARTICLE 17

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

ARTICLE 18

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(a) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-paragraph (c) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(c) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

The Government of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

ARTICLE 19

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairmen shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.

Background Info. Relating to S.E. Asia & Vietnam (2nd Revised Ed.), Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March 1966, U.S. Gov't Printing Office.

ARTICLE 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature.

It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States and to all other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand and nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

(In May 1963 Buddhist riots in Hué set off disputes between the Vietnamese Government and the Buddhists. In August, martial law was proclaimed after increasing demonstrations, including immolations. Against this background, President Kennedy made the following statements.)

33. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TV INTERVIEWS, SEPTEMBER 2, AND 9, 1963 (Excerpts)¹

(a) CBS Interview, September 2

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MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

MR. CRONKITE. Do you think this Government has time to regain the support of the people?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 30, 1963, pp. 498-500

MR. CRONKITE. Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

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(b) NBC Interview, September 9

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MR. HUNTLEY. Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

MR. HUNTLEY. Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

MR. BRINKLEY. Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?

The PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

Mr. BRINKLEY. In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

The PRESIDENT. No.

Mr. HUNTLEY. Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

The PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA; sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

Mr. BRINKLEY. With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT. We have some influence. We have some influence and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

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82. LETTER FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY MACARTHUR TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT, AUGUST 2, 1965, TRANSMITTING A PAPER ENTITLED: THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the course of Ambassador Lodge's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee July 27 you asked if the Department could supply a statement for the record on our commitment to assist South Vietnam.

Since this commitment was developed, restated, and redefined on several occasions during the last 15 years, I am enclosing a listing of the various agreements, public statements, communiques, and letters that together constitute the U.S. commitment to help South Vietnam defend itself against Communist aggression.

If I can be of any further assistance to you or the committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

1. December 23, 1950: Realizing that the Communist-led Viet-minh drive against the French in Indochina was part of the general Communist offensive in the Far East whose northern front was in Korea, the United States, under the Truman administration, signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (Pentalateral Agreement) with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This agreement, authorized by Public Law 329, 81st Congress, provided for indirect U.S. military aid through France to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

2. September 7, 1951: The United States signed an agreement authorized by Public Law 535, 81st Congress, with Premier Tran Van Huu's government providing for direct U.S. economic aid to Vietnam.

3. July 21, 1954: During the concluding plenary session of the Geneva conference, the head of the U.S. delegation, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, made a unilateral U.S. declaration. The main points of this declaration were as follows:

(a) The United States "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements.

(b) The United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

(c) The United States "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly" (p. 61).¹

4. October 23, 1954: President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem pledging U.S. aid and support to South Vietnam (p. 67).

5. January 1, 1955: On the basis of the existing Pentalateral Agreement, the United States began sending direct supporting assistance to the Vietnamese armed forces.

¹ Page references are to the committee print dated June 16, 1965, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam."

6. February 19, 1955: The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO Treaty) came into force. In a protocol to the treaty, the "SEATO umbrella" was extended to cover Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos should these countries request SEATO assistance in resisting Communist aggression. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1 (p. 62).

7. March 7, 1955: The United States, under the Eisenhower administration, and the government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem signed an agreement which supplemented the agreement mentioned in (2) above.

8. July 6, 1956: Vice President Richard Nixon visited Vietnam and delivered a letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem stating that President Eisenhower looked forward to many years of cooperation between the two countries.

9. May 11, 1957: A joint communique of President Eisenhower and President Diem was issued in Washington. President Eisenhower assured President Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam (p. 73).

10. October 26, 1960: In a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, President Eisenhower assured President Diem that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

11. May 13, 1961: At the close of Vice President Johnson's visit to Vietnam, a joint Vietnamese-United States communique was issued stating that:

(a) Both Governments will extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid.

(b) Vietnam's regular armed forces will be increased with U.S. assistance.

(c) The United States will provide assistance for the entire Vietnamese Civil Guard.

(d) U.S. military experts will be used to assist Vietnam's armed forces in health, welfare, and public works activities at the village level.

(e) A special group of U.S. economic and fiscal experts will be sent to Vietnam to work out a financial plan as the basis for joint efforts (p. 77).

12. August 2, 1961: President Kennedy declared that the United States would do all it could to save South Vietnam from communism.

13. October 26, 1961: In a letter to President Diem, President Kennedy reaffirmed U.S. determination "to help Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth."

14. December 7 and 14, 1961: An exchange of messages between President Diem and President Kennedy resulted in President Kennedy's stating that the United States, in response to the Vietnamese Government's request, was prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and preserve its independence. President Kennedy went on to promise that the United States would promptly increase its assistance to Vietnam's defense efforts against Communist aggression (p. 84).

15. January 4, 1962: The United States and Vietnamese Governments issued a joint communique on the expansion of economic

development programs which called for both Governments to do "their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi" (p. 86).

16. November 24, 1963: President Johnson affirmed the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Vietcong.

17. December 31, 1963: In a New Year message to Gen. Duong Van Minh, President Johnson pledged that the "United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Vietnam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory" (p. 106).

18. April 20, 1964: President Johnson stated that no one should "doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Vietnam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom."

19. August 7, 1964: The Congress approved the southeast Asia resolution by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House of Representatives. The resolution stated that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It also declared that the United States was prepared "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the used of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom" (p. 128).

20. April 7, 1965: In his speech at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson stated that he intended to keep the promise repeated since 1954 to help South Vietnam. "To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong" (p. 197).

21. May 4, 1965: In his message to the Congress accompanying a request for an additional \$700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam, President Johnson stated: "This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our efforts to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed." The House approved the appropriation by a vote of 408 to 7 and the Senate by a vote of 88 to 3 (p. 219).

22. July 28, 1965: President Johnson told his press conference that "We are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation."