
- Why JFK really picked LBJ as his running mate
- How the LBJ-Bobby feud began
- How LBJ tried to ditch Humphrey in 1964

LBJ and the Kennedys

by KENNETH O'DONNELL

Kenneth O'Donnell worked closely with the Kennedys and with Johnson. He was an intimate friend and confidant of both John and Robert Kennedy. He served President Kennedy as White House Chief of Staff, stayed on as Chief under Lyndon Johnson and operated L.B.J.'s '64 campaign. This excerpt is from a book soon to be published by Little, Brown and Company.




The Kennedy suite in the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles was filled with a throng of Northern Democratic leaders, the old pros like David Lawrence and Bill Green of Pennsylvania, Mike DiSalle of Ohio, John Bailey, Abe Ribicoff, Dick Daley, all of them milling around Kennedy and congratulating him for offering the Vice Presidency to Johnson. Jack was saying that he had just talked with Lyndon, and Lyndon wanted a little time to think it over but it looked as though he would take it. "Johnson has the strength where you need it most," David Lawrence was saying to Kennedy. I could have belted Lawrence. I was vehemently against; the Johnson selection because it represented precisely the kind of cynical, old-style politics we were trying to get away from. I also knew our liberal friends would be appalled by it.

When Jack Kennedy saw the expression on my face, he beckoned to Bobby Kennedy and me to follow him into the bedroom. The bedroom was crowded with people, too, and realizing that I was about to explode, Jack said to Bobby, "I'd better talk to Kenny alone in the bathroom." We went into the bathroom and closed the door behind us.

'This is the worst mistake you ever made,' I said to him. 'You came out here to this convention like a knight on a white charger, the clean-cut young Ivy

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Life, august 7, 1970



An aide's album pictures catch JFK n a party mood CONTINUED

League college guy who's promising to get rid of the old political ways. And now, in your first move, you go against all the people who supported you. Are we going to spend the whole campaign apologizing for Lyndon Johnson and trying to explain why he voted against everything you ever stood for?"

He became pale, livid with anger, so upset and hurt that it took him a while before he was able to collect himself.

"Wait a minute," he said. "I've offered it to him, but he hasn't accepted it yet and maybe he won't. If he does, let's get one thing clear."

I never forgot what he said next.

"Tm 43 years old, and I'm the healthiest candidate for President in the United States. You've traveled with me enough to know that. I'm not going to die in office. So the Vice Presidenty doesn't mean anything. I'm thinking of something else, the leadership in the Senate. If we win, it will be by a small margin and I won't be able to live with Lyndon Johnson as the leader of a small Senate majority. Did it occur to you that if Lyndon becomes the Vice President, I'll have Mike Mansfield as the Senate leader, somebody I can trust and depend on?"

That thought never had occurred to me or, incredibly enough, to anyone else around John Kennedy. Bobby had wanted Henry Jackson for Vice President; I had been for Stuart Symington. I had never heard anyone even mention Johnson's name. But Kennedy saw it differently, and the way he explained it sounded like an elementary history lecture.

He reminded me that Congress was still in session and that he had to go back to the Senate and put on a fight for the issues in his platform—housing, urban renewal, Medicare, relief for depressed areas. By not permanently adjourning Congress, Johnson and Sam Rayburn figured they could pressure various members of Congress in the state delegations into supporting Johnson for President at Los Angeles if the House and the Senate remained in session for the rest of the summer.

"If Johnson and Rayburn leave here mad at me," Kennedy said, "they'll ruin me in Congress next month. Then I'll be the laughingstock of the country. Nixon will say I haven't any power in my own party, and I'll lose the election before Labor Day. So I've got to make peace now with Johnson and Rayburn, and offering Lyndon the Vice Presidency, whether he accepts it or not, is one way of keeping him friendly until Congress adjourns. All of this is more important to me than Southern votes, which I won't get anyway with the Catholic thing working against me. I doubt if Lyndon will even be able to carry Texas, as Dave Lawrence and all those other pols out in the other room are claiming we will."

One of my jobs was keeping the Labor leaders happy and all of them were against Johnson. Kennedy opened the bathroom door and called Bobby

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Johnson's complaints for handling hey had a set routine

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on them," he said. in to join us. "Now the two of you can go and see Walter Reuther and George Meany and get to work

toughest of the Kennedys. Bobby used to say, "We can't fire that fellow because he's got five kids." without saying a word. He was far and away the arm of a chair, watched the whole angry scene suite. Michigan Governor "Soapy" Williams, out of there." talk about it. Put him someplace else, but get him dled, so he's out-and let's not have any more he would lead a floor fight against Johnson. Jack fighting mad, told a group of Southern governors but he can't handle the job the way I want it hanlack would say, "I'm sorry about his five kids Kennedy, sitting with one leg hanging over the While we were gone, bedlam broke out in the

the labor leaders were furious and threatening to put up a candidate of their own, Jack told his should decide whether he wanted to face it. don there might be a floor fight, and Johnson nation, Bobby and I returned and told Jack that nedy suite that he was ready to take the nomirother to go right downstairs and inform Lyn-After Johnson had relayed the word to the Ken-

that picking Johnson was a shrewd political move. At first, in fact, he fully endorsed the judgment son from the ticket. This is simply not accurate. cepted, that Bohby Kennedy tried to block Johnwas neutral. It has been widely reported, and ac-Bobby's own feeling about Johnson at this point

> ly acting as an envoy. and Johnson did not begin here. Bobby was mere When he went with me to check the labor lead hard feelings that later developed between Bobby ers, and learned for the first time how enraged they were, he began to worry. In any case, the

ested in being chairman of the National Commit-Johnson and suggesting that Lyndon might want to withdraw if he didn't want to get involved in tee?" Bobby asked. Rayburn, incredulous at the such a battle. "Do you think he might be inter-Sam Rayburn and John Connally, explaining to idea, dismissed it with a four-letter word. them that there was a threat of a floor fight against Bobby went to Johnson's suite and talked with

was how he got on the ticket. son that if he was willing to face a floor fight the Vice Presidency was his. Johnson agreed, and that Kennedy got on the phone and reassured John-

get that day I had to straighten you out in the bathto disagree with one of his decisions, "Don't forer over a glass in the evening when I was trying ly tucked away." would still be running the Senate instead of safe room in Los Angeles. If I listened to you, Lyndon President Kennedy often used to needle me lat

trying to push him into running the State Defriends in the Administration, who were always fullen prestige on Bobby Kennedy, and it was on age and the power he had enjoyed when he was the majority leader in the Senate. He blamed his amusement to Johnson that many of Bobby's The President sometimes pointed out with great man in the government, which was true enough en over his rightful position as the number two them began to build. He felt that Bobby had takthis point that bad feelings between the two of As Vice President, Johnson felt sidetracked and ignored, and sorely missed the patron-

man in the government. upon his younger brother as the real number one partment as well as the Justice Department, looked

cial privilege of entering the President's office at a firm order that everybody in the White House aware of Johnson's unhappiness in the Vice Presdent with various personal complaints, frequently garden, without following the normal route into any time unseen through the back door from the Johnson and Bobby Kennedy, were given the speand held me personally responsible that the order volved in important government affairs. He issued me into his office and denounce me in front of ident would first hear him out alone, and then call routine for handling Johnson's laments. The Presabout Bobby. The President and I worked out a set came to see the President without calling me first them ever abused this privilege, and they seldom the front door and through my office. Neither of not be ignored. Only two men in the government, was to be courteous and considerate with Johnson ident would go away somewhat happier. promise to correct the situation, and the Vice Presng about. I would humbly take the blame and Johnson for whatever the Vice President was beef-Johnson often called and asked to see the Presiidency and leaned over backwards to keep him in-President Kennedy was always uncomfortably

in of Air Force One after the assassination. about Bobby ("That kid brother of yours") in-volved Sarah T. Hughes, the same long-time Texas Johnson in as President in the hot and sticky cabfriend who later as a federal judge in Dallas swore I remember one day when Johnson's complaint "Damn it, Kenny, you've gone and done it

it, as he usually did, with a recollection of John yourself what's happened this time." his office. "Lyndon, you go shead and tell him Johnson began a long recital of woe, prefacing

again," the President said when he called me into

Lyndon Johnson listens to a Kennedy speech at a breakfast during the 1960 Democratic Convention. As J.F.K.'s Vice President, Johnson felt sidetracked and ignored

Nance Garner describing the Vice Presidency as a thankless office with as much prestige as a pitcher of warm spit. He explained that he had asked Bobby Kennedy a few months earlier for a federal judgeship in Texas for Sarah Hughes, and when the Justice Department told him that Mrs. Hughes, then 65, was too old for the position, he had explained sorrowfully to Mrs. Hughes that she couldn't have the job, and had offered the appointment to another Texas lawyer, Now, Johnson said, he had just returned from Berlin to learn to his deep embarrassment that Mrs. Hughes had been given the judgeship after all, and, checking around, he'd found out how "ole Lyndon had been done in behind his back as usual,"

Bobby Kennedy, it turned out, had encountered another prominent Texan, Sam Rayburn, the Speaker of the House, and asked the Speaker when two key Justice Department bills would be getting out of the Judiciary Committee. Rayburn ventured the opinion that the bills might never get out if his friend Sarah Hughes did not get a judgeship in Texas. Bobby explained that she had been suggested by Johnson but she was too old for the appointment. Rayburn, who was almost 80, glared at the 35-year-old Kennedy. "Son, everybody looks old to you. Do you want those bills passed, or don't you?" The next day Sarah Hughes was nominated for the federal bench.

"Mr. President," Johnson cried now, "you realize where this leaves me? Sarah Hughes now thinks I'm nothing. The lawyer I offered the job to after your brother turned Sarah down, he thinks I'm the biggest liar and fool in the history of the State of Texas. All on account of that brother of yours!" The President was unable to keep from laughing, and the Vice President, seeing the humor of the situation, laughed, too.

Johnson suspected that Bobby Kennedy was engineering a move to dump him as the Vice Presidential candidate in 1964. Johnson was sure that Kennedy had been behind the exposure of Bobby Baker, a Johnson protégé. It was a ridiculous assumption because a scandal of any kind reflecting on the Democrats was the last thing the Kennedys wanted, Furthermore, President Kennedy never had any thought of dumping Johnson. I was sitting with the President and Senator George Smathers on the way to Florida the Saturday in November of 1963 before he went to Dallas. Smathers asked him if he was planning to get rid of Johnson because of the Baker case.

The President glanced at Smathers and said, "George, you must be the dumbest man in the world. If I drop Lyndon, it will look as if we have a serious scandal on our hands in the Bobby Baker case, which we haven't, and that will reflect on me. It will look as though I made a mistake in picking Lyndon in 1960, and can you imagine the mess of trying to select somebody to replace him? Lyndon stays on the ticket next year.

President Kennedy first began to have doubts about our military effort in Vietnam in 1961 when both General Douglas MacArthur and General

views on Vietnam stunned Kennedy

Charles de Gaulle warned him that the Asian mainland was no place to be fighting a non-nuclear land war. There was no end to Asiatic manpower, Mac-Arthur told the President, and even if we poured a million American infantry soldiers into that continent, we would still find ourselves outnumbered on every side.

The president's first meeting with MacArthur, a courtesy call on the general in New York after the Bay of Pigs disaster, turned out to be an agreeable surprise to Kennedy. Like a lot of Navy veterans of the Pacific war, Kennedy had assumed that MacArthur was a stuffy and pompous egocentric. Instead, the President told us later, Mac-Arthur was one of the most fascinating conversationalists he had ever met, politically shrewd and intellectually sharp. Later the President invited the general to the White House for lunch. They talked for almost three hours, ruining the whole appointments schedule for that day. I could not drag them apart. The President later gave us a complete rerun of MacArthur's remarks, expressing a warm admiration for this supposedly reactionary old soldier that astonished all of us. MacArthur was extremely critical of the military advice that the President had been getting from the Pentagon, blaming the military leaders of the previous 10 years, who, he said, had advanced the wrong younger officers. "You were lucky to have that mistake happen in Cuba, where the strategic cost was not too great," he said about the Bay of Pigs. MacArthur implored the President to avoid a U.S. military build-up in Vietnam, or any other part of the Asian mainland, because he felt that the domino theory was ridiculous in a nuclear age. MacArthur went on to point out that there were domestic problems-the urban crisis, the ghettos, the economy-that should have far more priority than Vietnam. Kennedy came out of the meeting somewhat stunned. That a man like MacArthur should give him such unmilitary advice im-

Late in 1962, when the U.S. was accelerating shipments of reinforcements to South Vietnam, Senator Mike Mansfield visited the President at Palm Beach, where the Kennedy family had gathered for the Christmas holidays. The Senate majority leader, whose opinions the President deeply respected, had just returned from a trip to Southeast Asia, which he had made at the President's request. Mansfield emphatically advised, first, a curb on sending more military reinforcements to South Vietnam and, then, a withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country's civil war, a suggestion that startled the President. A continued steady increase of American military advisers in South Vietnam, the senator argued, would lead to sending still more forces to beef up those that ere there, and soon the Americans would be dominating the combat in a civil war that was not our war. Taking over the military leadership and the

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General MacArthur as three-hour meeting at th

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General MacArthur and Kennedy conclude their three-hour meeting at the White House in 1961.

fighting in the Vietnam war, Mansfield warned, would hurt American prestige in Asia and would not help the South Vietnamese to stand on their own feet, either. The President was too disturbed by the senator's unexpected argument to reply to it. He said to me later when we talked about the discussion, "I got angry with Mike for disagreeing with our policy so completely, and I got angry with myself because I found myself agreeing with him."

Publicly over the next few months the President continued to stress the need for bolstering the South Vietnamese government of Diem, even though he was embarrassed by Diem's terrorist brother Nhu. But we noticed that privately Kennedy complained that everybody in the State Department and the Defense Department seemed to be forgetting that our role in Vietnam should be political rather than military. In the spring of 1963, Mike Mansfield again criticized our military involvement in Vietnam, this time in front of the congressional leadership at a White House breakfast, much to the President's annoyance and embarrassment. Leaving the breakfast the President seized my arm and said. "Get Mike and have him come into my office." I sat in on part of their discussion. The President told Mansheld that he had been having serious second thoughts about Mans held's argument and that he now agreed with the senator's thinking on the need for a complete military withdrawal from Vietnam.

But I can't do it until 1965-after I'm reelected," Kennedy told Mansfield.

President Kennedy felt, and Mansfield agreed with him, that if he announced a total withdrawal of American military personnel from Vietnam before the 1964 election, there would be a wild conservative outcry against returning him to the Presidency for a second term.

After Mansheld left the office, the President told me that he had made up his mind that after his reelection he would take the risk of unpopularity and make a complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. "In 1965, I'll be

CONTINUED

he need to get rid of Bobby haunted Johnson

pletely now, we would have another Joe Mcdamned everywhere as a Communist appeaser. But I don't care. If I tried to pull out comsure that I am reelected." after I'm reelected. So we had better make damned Curthy red scare on our hands, but I can do it

issued an order, against the objections of many around him, to reduce American military advisers in South Vietnam immediately by bringing he decided to put pressure on them to liberalize ident was so disgusted with Diem and Nhu that their police state government. Along with sharp-ty reducing economic aid to Diem, the President time because the American forces in South Viet-This was a considerable troop withdrawal at that home 1,000 U.S. soldiers before the end of 1963. That fall, before he went to Dallas, the Pres-

Namara and General Maxwell Taylor game to a num then numbered only about 16,000. port on a trip to Saigon, President Kennedy asked meeting of the National Security Council to re-Un Oct. Z, when Defense Secretary Robert Mc-

McNamara to announce to the press after the

called to him, "And tell them that means all of Talk to the White House reporters, the President all American forces from Vietnam by the end of diers and to say that we would probably withdraw meeting the immediate withdrawal of 1,000 sol-1965. As McNamara was leaving the meeting to

tige in Southeast Asia. els in spur-of-the-moment anger, shocked and dekillings of Diem and Nhu, committed by the rebno surprise to President Kennedy, but the brutal itary withdrawal without losing American presand useful purpose. One day when he was talking pressed him. The President was not averse to the Vietnam, we asked him how he could manage a milwith Dave Powers and me about pulling out of idea of changing the government for a practical The anti-Diem coup of Nov. 1, 1963 came

that will ask us to leave. "Easy," he said. "Put a government in there

that he went to Texas. fore the end of 1963 was still in effect on the day, military personnel in Vietnam by 1,000 men be-The President's order to reduce the American

key people left it would cause party problems durwork at the White House. I felt that if Kennedy's A fter the President's death, I had several talks with Bobby Kennedy about going back to

ing the coming election year, and Bobby agreed. The first time I talked alone with Lyndon John-

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the helicopter pilots, too." did not want Boliby Kennedy as his Vice Presaboard Air Force One, on the way to Bill Green's son after the assassination was in December 1963 funeral in Philadelphia. He told me then that he

forced to take Kennedy as his Vice President. ticket with me," he said. "But I'll take him if I need him." In other words, if the Republicans this office because I had Bobby Kennedy on the Goldwater, Johnson realized that he might be nominated a more liberal candidate than Barry idential candidate in 1964. "I don't want history to say I was elected to

ocratic Convention. Johnson went through as he planned for the Demened by anyone who had a constituency. That, in anybody to be his Vice President. He felt threattory. Through the spring of 1964 I saw firsthand Johnson's eyes, would detract from his own victhe strange, agonized gyrations that President The simple fact was that Johnson didn't want

had always directed his energy and attention to Democratic leaders around the country, His verage with Johnson to influence crucially the se contacts with them were unbelievably slight; he needed me and other Kennedy staffers as his links lection of the Vice President. First, Johnson badly There were two reasons why I felt we had the le

General Electric Side-by-Sides.