

BLACKWELL LIBRARY
SALISBURY STATE UNIVERSITY
SALISBURY, MD. 21801

E
841
.G675
1994

© 1994 by edition q, inc.

Chapters 1 through 5 are based on *Im Dienste der Sowjetunion*, published by edition q Verlags-GmbH, Berlin.

Excerpts from Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban missile crisis*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1969, reprinted with permission. Copyright © 1971, 1969 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Copyright © 1968 by McCall Corporation. Excerpt from *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis*, by James Blight and David Welch, copyright © 1989, 1990 by James Blight and David Welch, reprinted by permission of Hill & Wang, a division of Farrar Straus & Giroux, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data:

Gribkov, A. I.

Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet generals recount the Cuban missile crisis / by Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith; edited by Alfred Friendly, Jr., with a foreword by Michael R. Beschloss.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-86715-266-4

1. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. 2. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962—

Sources. I. Smith, William Y. II. Friendly, Alfred, 1938—

III. Title.

E841.G675 1994

909.82'6—dc20

93-35789

CIP

All rights reserved. This book or any part thereof may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher.

Manufactured in the United States of America

Thus, when he decided on the Cuban operation, none of his uniformed advisors tried to talk him out of it. According to later accounts, only Gromyko and Deputy Premier Mikoyan initially opposed the idea; Malinovsky, among others, backed it from the start.⁶ Neither I nor any of my colleagues at the top of the General Staff would have dared to question the initiative, and by the time it was put to a formal Politburo vote, Mikoyan and Gromyko were in accord as well.

Strategy for Deterrence

Mikoyan, Khrushchev's intimate friend and oldest political ally, had traveled to Cuba in 1960 to initiate the relationship with Fidel Castro. He returned from the trip filled with a deep sympathy for the Cuban leaders and their revolutionary aspirations. Once he even told U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that "old Bolsheviks," such as he and Khrushchev, had "been waiting all our lives for a country to go Communist without the Red Army. It has happened in Cuba, and it makes us feel like boys."⁷

Khrushchev himself had told Kennedy at their Vienna meeting in June 1961 that Castro was no Communist, but "you are well on the way to making him a good one."⁸ In the same conversation, the Kremlin leader also said that Cuba posed nothing like the threat to the United States that U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy posed to the Soviet Union. In April 1962 the risk to Cuba and the risk to the Soviet Union from their respective neighbors were still very much on Khrushchev's mind.

The latter concern surfaced first. During a vacation stroll that month along a beach in the Crimea, Khrushchev and Marshal Malinovsky talked about the U.S. missiles across the Black Sea in Turkey. Accenting our vulnerability in a way Khrushchev had done many times himself, the defense minister noted that the Jupiter rockets could reach and destroy vital centers of the Soviet Union in just ten minutes.

Some days after that talk, Ivanov confided to me, Khrushchev raised the matter of Cuba's security with Mikoyan. During the visit to Bulgaria, he pursued the issue with Gromyko, and by the time the two men flew back to Moscow together on 20 May, the need to mount a missile-based defense of Cuba *on* Cuba was firmly lodged in Khrushchev's mind.

Distressed by a spate of intelligence reports of U.S. plans for a second invasion, Khrushchev felt that Cuba could not possibly be defended by conventional weapons. Only missiles with nuclear warheads, he believed, would provide an

effective deterrent. To deter an attack, he asked Malinovsky to develop a hypothetical island resistance.

"Three to five days," he said, "to hold out against Cuba, Khrushchev would have to replace Soviet missiles with nuclear missiles to deter attack."

When I learned of this, I was clear sky. Until then, the main concern had been the Cuban missile crisis in summer 1960, which had strained relations. Even Alekseyev was surprised when Khrushchev decided to ask Fidel Castro to ask Fidel Castro against U.S. attack.

Alekseyev, who had been a correspondent, and our ambassador there, had been the first to station Soviet missiles in Cuba. Castro's long-term goal was to remain neutral and non-aligned.

What Castro thought was on his mind. Using the Cuban party Presidium as the soundest of plans as the soundest of plans, Khrushchev was installing Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Installing thirty-five nuclear missiles on Cuba was a big step up rocket for every country. For Khrushchev, it was a big step up nuclear forces, putting R-12s and the rest of the 2,800-mile-range missiles in Cuba.

In 1962 the Soviet Union had a nuclear force analogous to the U.S. system. The R-14s on forty launchers could not be defended by conventional missiles in Turkey and Italy. It would be a warning.

Some historians believe that Khrushchev was as bargaining counter to the U.S. nuclear force.