

THE STORY OF DISARMAMENT 1945-1963

Disarmament Committee
of the Washington, D.C.



This is the second edition of THE STORY OF DISARMAMENT. We have brought the summaries of the Test Ban and Disarmament negotiations up to date.

Since our last printing at the end of July 1962, the two great nuclear powers, the USSR and the US, confronted each other over Cuba. A thermonuclear holocaust was averted by a hair's breadth. For the first time in history, men in position of power had to consider that if wrong decisions were made the destruction of civilization might result.

The Cuban situation is related to the disarmament problem in many ways. First, it gave us the kind of a nuclear war scare that should impress on every thinking person the importance of bringing the arms race under control, and second, it demonstrates that to perpetuate the risk of the destruction of civilization is not the right way to reduce tensions around the world in order to come to a disarmament agreement.

We have to learn to think in new ways. We have to learn that disputes between nations and demands for social change cannot be resolved by physical force. These problems can only be settled by a spiritual renaissance, the responsible use of our vast technological knowledge, and world law.

The technology we now know is so vast that if it were used today in peaceful pursuits it would enable the two-thirds of the hungry people of the world not only to be fed, but housed, clothed and educated. With the knowledge and experience already at our command we could build a world that would provide for every single person more than the richest can hope for today.

This goal could perhaps be accomplished in the span of a generation--but only if DISARMAMENT under international law is achieved and WAR ABOLISHED as an instrument of policy among nations.



THE STORY OF DISARMAMENT 1945-1963

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Disarmament Committee
of the Washington, D.C.



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foreword

This booklet is the product of careful research and is an attempt to present an objective account of both sides of the history of the disarmament negotiations and events of recent years. It is designed as a "springboard" for study and discussion and is not meant as the last word on a difficult subject.

It is our hope that many such studies will be made throughout the USA and that these will be widely read and discussed.



Jagmar Wilson

why we wrote this booklet

This booklet was prepared by a committee of the Washington, D.C. Women Strike for Peace. We women felt that nowhere was the picture of past disarmament negotiations, past test-ban negotiations, or the general and complete disarmament proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union made clear, and so for our own understanding we compiled the information contained in this booklet.

As we studied and read, the realization came to us that the United States was not all white nor the Soviet Union all black as depicted in our mass communication media. To quote from Dr. Leo Szilard in his article, For A Peace Lobby:

"Many people have a black and white picture of the world. They believe that the nations fall into two classes; the peace-loving nations, and those which are not peace-loving. America, France and England and, generally speaking, our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peace-loving nations. Russia and China are not peace-loving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peace-loving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

"You can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation."

We have tried in this booklet, after a great deal of study, to let the truth prevail.

From a careful comparison of the two disarmament proposals presented to the United Nations by the United States and the Soviet Union, we have come to the conclusion that there are many points of agreement and no insurmountable differences to be overcome. It is the conviction of our committee that if both sides have the will for a disarmament agreement, compromises on both sides can make disarmament a present possibility.

Disarmament Committee of Washington, D.C. **WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE** 1822 Mass. Ave. N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

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The Disarmament Committee of the Washington Women Strike for Peace assumes sole responsibility for the production of this pamphlet. No other branch or committee of Women Strike for Peace took any part in compiling this booklet; and no other branch or committee is in any way responsible for any statement contained herein.

three myths

Three myths appear to have gained such currency in the popular press that especial attention is required to dispel them.

First it must be clearly understood that two series of negotiations have been proceeding concurrently over the past few years. The first series is the disarmament negotiations. The second series concerns the banning of nuclear tests. The requirements for control in these two different types of operations differ greatly and should not be confused. They are clearly separated in the paragraphs that follow.

Myth number one...

The first myth is that the USSR refuses to accept any controls over the early stages of disarmament, but demands complete disarmament at once and no inspection until the last weapons are destroyed. The Soviet disarmament plan of September 1960 (used as the basis for negotiations prior to March 1962) is more specific and detailed in regard to controls than the United States plan of September 1961.

Three stages of disarmament are proposed in both the above plans. In the first stage the USSR plan proposes to destroy all delivery systems (rockets, missiles, military aircraft, surface warships, submarines, etc.) so that all atomic weapons remaining would be useless, as the means of carrying the bombs to their targets would have been destroyed.

Soviet proposals outlined for initial disarmament step...

The following is a partial quotation from the USSR plan, during this first step in disarmament:

"In all countries parties to the agreement the control organization will have its own staff, recruited internationally with due regard for the principle of equitable geographical distribution, and in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The control organization will distribute its inspectors over the territory of States in such a way as to enable them to start discharging their functions the moment States initiate the implementation of disarmament measures. Each Party to the treaty will undertake to give the inspectors and inspection teams timely and unrestricted access within its territory to any place where disarmament measures subject to verification are

being carried out or to any area in which on-the-spot inspection of such measures is to be made.

"On-site international control will be established over the destruction of rocket weapons, military aircraft, surface warships, submarines and other means which can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons.

"The control organization will have the right to inspect without hindrance all enterprises, plants, factories and ship-yards, previously engaged wholly or in part in the production of rockets, aircraft, surface warships, submarines and any other means of delivering nuclear weapons, in order to prevent the organization of clandestine production of armaments which can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons. By agreement, permanent control teams may be established at some plants and installations."

For a more complete understanding of the Soviet position on controls, see text of the USSR plan included in this booklet.

The major U.S. objection...

Before the opening of disarmament talks in Geneva on March 14, 1962, the United States objected that while the Soviets were willing to have inspection of arms destroyed they were unwilling to have inspection of the arms remaining. This seemed to be a major point of disagreement.

Let us examine this question. It is implied, of course, that unwillingness to open the USSR to unrestricted inspection in the first stages means the Soviets would try to re-make the armaments as fast as they were destroying them. Is this a real possibility?

Mineralogists and other specialists, by reading Soviet technical journals, have a fairly accurate idea of the USSR's production capacities on all fronts, and the uses to which this production is being put. The rebuilding of any great number of destroyed weapons would be almost impossible to conceal.

Would a country planning to cheat by rebuilding destroyed arms offer to destroy all delivery systems in the first stage in one and one-half years, along with other drastic cuts in conventional weapons and manpower? Would such a nation propose admitting the international inspection team, perhaps permanently, to the factories which had made these weapons, as the USSR suggested? The factories, as well as the weapons, would have to be clandestinely duplicated.

Furthermore, the USSR cannot at present supply all its civilian needs in addition to those of a military nature. Were it to divert the large quantities of materials and labor necessary to rebuild destroyed weapons, the shock to the civilian standard of living would be apparent to the most casual observer.

The USSR fear of a "first strike"...

The only remaining danger then, is the concealment of some missiles or atomic warheads. This is an admitted possibility, and one not readily removed even by unrestricted inspection of countries as large as the United States and the USSR. It is a risk which must be balanced against the dangers of a mounting arms spiral and the spread of nuclear weapons to even small and very unstable nations.

A possible counter balance might be an international police force under the UN, that would not be sufficiently large in itself to be a threat to any single great nation but when combined with component police forces of other nations against a would-be aggressor would comprise a deterrent (but not an overwhelming force).

The unwillingness of the USSR to submit to unrestricted inspection until total disarmament has been achieved may be based upon

But U.S. says
it has more
than 4 S.S.R.

the fear that, since she is the weaker of the two great protagonists, the United States might be tempted to make a first strike against her if the exact location of her retaliatory missile bases were known. If we can imagine ourselves in the position of the Soviets, and remember that our image has been rendered no less terrible to her than hers to us, we will perhaps understand to some extent this Soviet position.

However, it is not necessary to accept either the Soviet or the United States proposals on inspection. Several other plans have been devised which seem to render it unnecessary for us to "trust the Russians" or for them to trust us. Probably the most notable is the Sohn plan which is at present under study by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

How the Sohn Plan would work...

The Sohn Plan would call for the US and the USSR to divide their own territories and possessions into an agreed equal number of parts, roughly equal in armed potential. Lists of arms in each area without disclosure of the location, would be prepared by each country and exchanged. To prevent large scale shifts of arms between areas, inspection teams would be permitted at key transportation centers between areas. The US would have the option to choose any one of the designated areas in the Soviet Union, and the Soviets could choose an area here. International inspection and verification would then be fully authorized in those two areas and disarmament under strict controls would proceed there until completion. The process would then be repeated in two new areas, and soon until disarmament had been completed in each area of each country.

The difference between the U.S. and Sohn Plans...

The proposals for disarmament offered by the American government to the Geneva conference in April 1962 contained a feature of Zonal inspection reminiscent of the Sohn plan*. The USSR rejected this plan. There is a tendency to confuse this plan with the Sohn plan. However, the American plan is very indefinite as to the amount of disarmament to take place upon the opening of any zone. It allows for the possibility of arms disclosure without disarmament. This American plan fails to meet the Soviet objection to complete inspection without complete disarmament. The original Sohn plan, which called for each zone to be completely cleared of armaments and kept so after it was opened, concluded with complete disarmament by the time the inspection was complete. Thus the Sohn plan would seem to meet the Soviet objection, but this plan has never been embodied in any disarmament proposal to date.

Another valuable plan has been advanced by Arthur Waskow in his book "The Limits of Defense." Philip Noel Baker, Seymour Melman, David Singer and J. Orear have also offered workable ideas for enforcing disarmament. Some combination of all the above plans would seem to offer hope of an inspection system that would be practically cheat-proof.

Myth number two...

The second myth is that the Soviet refusal to permit test ban treaty inspectors on her territory represents pure obstructionism.

It should be explained here why inspection has assumed such importance in test ban negotiations. Involved are infinite technical complexities. But simply, the basic issues come down to this: nuclear tests above a certain range of power will register on seismographs, and the vibrations they cause will be distinctly different from those caused by earthquakes or other natural phenomena. Blasts of low power will also register on seismographs but it may not be clear what caused them -- earthquakes, thunder storms, or nuclear

explosions. Careful analysis of recorded data, taking into account readings obtained at several points, would make it possible to identify up to 90 percent of all continental earthquakes. This was the opinion of the nuclear experts who in Geneva in 1958 worked out the original international control system for policing a test ban. The remaining 10 percent of suspicious events might be identified, the experts said, by inspection of the site.

Many scientists now believe...

Now, four years later, there is a sizeable body of scientific opinion that believes the science of detection has advanced to such sensitivity that no clandestine nuclear test could occur, either above or under the ground, without detection by instruments already in operation within the borders of the nuclear nations. No further on-site inspection would be needed, according to this body of opinion. On the opposite side, however, remains the view that international on-site inspection is, indeed, as necessary as it was in 1958, if clandestine testing is to be pinned down and prevented.

And as some influential newspapers have stated...

In an article from Geneva by Flora Lewis, the Washington Post of March 19, 1962, said:

"The American position that international inspection is essential has run into the flat disbelief of most neutrals here, and even some Allied representatives have made it clear that they are backing the United States stand only with reluctance..."

"Privately, members of most non-Communist delegations have said they see no reasonable arguments against the Soviet stand that national detection systems are now good enough to police a test ban and that international on-site verification is not really necessary."

("International inspection" means on-site inspection of possible nuclear explosions recorded seismographically. "National inspection" means that each nation would monitor underground and atmospheric explosion by means of seismographic and other detection devices within its own borders.)

The New York Times of March 23, 1962 also stated:

"This has led some scientific advisers to the conclusion that a test ban with currently feasible monitoring techniques, but little or no inspection, would be acceptable. Their reasoning rests in part on the assumption that the risks of being caught in a violation would outweigh the limited gains to be achieved in underground tests."

Professor Leet, Harvard authority, speaks up...

In the Harvard Crimson, publication of Harvard University, the following appeared on March 24, 1962.

"Professor L. Don Leet thinks that the great detection dispute which separated American and Soviet negotiators in January 1959 (and has kept them apart since), was based on scientifically invalid information. The man who has been in charge of the University seismograph station since 1931 is convinced that the Berkner panel report which insisted that the US raise its inspection demands just when treaty plans had been settled, was simply dead wrong.

"'They had data so insufficient that they shouldn't have made any claims,' Leet said the other day in reference to the fourteen man advisory committee, 'but they swore by their findings. The Russians took one look at the stuff, and laughed. And by God they were right. Any good seismologist would have laughed.'

"The crux of Leet's complaint is that the Berkner panel, formed to study the problems of the test detection, excluded professional

seismologists. The only members of the panel who had any seismological experience were what Leet calls, not derisively but not respectfully, 'doodlebuggers.' This is a popular term for seismic prospect seismologists, electronic engineers who use a fraction of the know-how of earthquake station seismology. Leet himself is an earthquake station seismologist.

Qualifications (or the lack of same) ...

"Not using earthquake station seismologists on a project like this," he explains, "is like revising our measurement system without consulting the Bureau of Standards." Others on the committee included representatives of instrument companies, and one man who, according to Leet, "never took the equivalent of Nat. Sci. 10." Berkner himself is a fairly well-known scientific administrator; he and nuclear physicist Hans Bethe were the only members of the panel not associated with those who were awarded grants by the panel itself (for 'further research')."

Thus it would seem possible that the on-site inspection demanded by the United States in March of 1962 had become unnecessary.

Myth number three...

The third myth is the persistent assertion that the People's Republic of China would welcome a nuclear war with the West. Her leaders are frequently quoted to the effect that they could afford to lose large numbers of their people in such a conflict and still emerge with a considerable advantage over the Western powers.

In a TV interview with the British journalist Felix Greene on September 5, 1960, Chou En-Lai, Premier of the People's Republic of China said:

"China has always advocated peaceful coexistence among nations with different Social systems. Proceeding from this principle of peaceful coexistence, the Chinese government recently again proposed that the countries of Asia, and those bordering on the Pacific, including the United States, should conclude a peaceful pact of mutual non-aggression, and turn this whole area into an area free of nuclear weapons. This proposal has wide support from world public opinion.

"But the proposal was hurriedly rejected by the US State Department.

"This (proposal) also shows that the allegations of the United States officials and certain newspapers to the effect that "China is belligerent", that "China rejects peaceful coexistence between countries of different social systems", that "China wants to start a war to advance world revolution" and so forth are all groundless slanders. The Chinese government's proposal is not only in the interest of the people of China and the United States, but it is also in the interest of the people of other Asian countries and those bordering on the Pacific. The Chinese people will work tirelessly over a long period of time together with the peoples of these countries, to bring this proposal to fruition."

An atom-free Pacific ...

It has been suggested that the conclusion of a pact for an atom-free Pacific would: (1) free China of the pressure of American nuclear weapons, (2) lessen the economic pressure on China which development of her own nuclear force would entail, and (3) leave Chinese manpower overwhelmingly superior in Asia. The United States would, in effect, be forced to retire to its own borders.

Nevertheless, China needs her manpower on her farms and in her factories. It is possible that negotiations looking toward a re-

duction of China's armed manpower and a nuclear-free Pacific might open the door to a fruitful settlement.

"Documents on Disarmament - 1960", Department of State Publication 7172 - July 1961 - page 180-181 mentions Chou En-Lai's proposal, and the fact that he has advanced it several times, but dismisses it as "another meaningless propaganda gesture..." As China will in time also possess atomic weapons, would it not seem wiser to open the way to negotiation, rather than leave competing forces as the only alternative in settling disputes in Asia?

Janice Holland

* The description of the Sohn plan is quoted from the Keynote Speech by Senator Joseph S. Clark, First Intercollegiate Conference on Disarmament and Arms Control, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Penn.

ONLY A SUGGESTION

I thought as I sat by the shore of the sea
What a wonderful, beautiful thing it would be
If the Briton, the Teuton, the Gaul and the Slav
Should take all the guns and the tanks that they have
And sink them out there in the infinite main,
And then begin building them over again.
For no one, you know, is desirous to fight,
They are only protecting the Truth and the Right,
And nothing but armaments endlessly made
Can stop Unemployment and benefit Trade,
And the Heart of a Nation as never before
Is united when making Munitions of War.
How happy the state of the world when it finds,
What is simple to all mathematical minds,
That you cannot go on making gun after gun,
Because there is nowhere to put them when done,
And the largest of factories, even the Banks,
Would refuse in the end to find storage for tanks.
But a little more trust between nations, I think,
Would allow them to meet every August and sink
In a suitable place they could easily settle
Enormous supplies of explosives and metal,
And a cup would be given—the winner to count
As the one that got rid of the largest amount,
And could soonest return to the Blessings of Peace
Which are instantly doomed should Rearmament cease.

I thought as I sat by the shore of the sea
What a wonderful, beautiful thing this would be
For Commerce and Culture, and Friendship and Cash;
And the children, no doubt, would be pleased by the splash.

EVOE

(From *Punch*, August 9, 1939)

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general and complete disarmament without depression

Within the past few months two studies of the economic consequences of disarmament have been released. The first entitled Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, was prepared by a committee of the United Nations. The second called The Benoit Report, was the work of United States experts.

Ten leading economists from both the East and West have reported to the United Nations* that complete world disarmament could lead to wide development and prosperity rather than economic depression if governments planned for it adequately.

The panel consisted of economic experts from the United States, the Soviet Union, Poland, the Sudan, Pakistan, France, Britain, India, Czechoslovakia and Venezuela.

The experts' first point for consideration was that "a large segment of opinion" all over the world seemed to believe that disarmament would bring a world depression. After study, the experts agreed unanimously that this need not be so.

The second major consideration was the belief that disarmament would raise serious problems of social as well as economic adjustment in all countries. The economists, in spite of the widely different situations in their countries, agreed unanimously that the adjustments could be made.

Four and one-half million jobs directly affected...

A study by Professor W.W. Leontief of Harvard University, one of the members of the group, estimated that the total number of persons whose jobs would be directly affected in the United States would be 4,500,000. This would include 2,530,000 from the armed forces, 700,000 civilian employees of the services and 1,320,000 from industries working for military purposes.

Professor Leontief said that more than four-fifths of the job eliminations in the United States would be in four industries: aircraft and parts (including missiles), radio, ordnance, ships and

*This report is entitled, Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, and may be obtained from the United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations, New York.

FACTS?

boats. He estimated that an increase of one percent in total government and private expenditure spread over the period of the disarmament process could keep up the level of employment.

The United Nations report says that "there are so many competing claims for usefully employing the resources released by disarmament that the real problem is to establish a scale of priorities." These alternative uses are classified and described as:

- Raising standards of personal consumption of goods and services.

- Expanding or modernizing productive capacity through investment in new plant and equipment.

- Promoting housing construction, urban renewal, including slum clearance and rural development.

- Improving and expanding facilities for education, health, welfare, social security, cultural development, scientific research, etc.

The report goes on to say ...

"The promotion of economic and social development in under-developed countries is one of the most important ways in which the resources released by disarmament could be put to use. Two-thirds of the world's population lives in countries that obtain only a modest part of the benefits which modern technology and science are capable of providing. The peoples of the under-developed areas are determined to raise their levels of living, and the peoples of the more industrialized countries have undertaken to help them do so.

"Disarmament would be bound to have favorable effects on the development of international economic relations. The political détente that would accompany an international disarmament programme would in itself imply that nations were willing to reconsider their economic relations with one another. The consequent relaxation of international tensions would provide a sound basis for reduction of trade barriers and for modification of existing trade agreements and trading practices. In the long run this would encourage an expansion of international trade, a more rational international division of labour and a more effective use of the world's resources. In the short term it might help conversion by generating new demands for exports from existing sources of supply that could be satisfied fairly easily from existing capacities.

"The release of scientific and technical manpower would make it possible to encourage programmes of basic scientific research in fields which have hitherto been neglected.

Benefits of joint research foreseen ...

"Disarmament would also open up possibilities for joint international ventures of an even more ambitious kind, including the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, space research, the exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic for the benefit of mankind, and projects to change the climates of large areas of the world. Joint research into the earth's interior may lead to discoveries that would be of real value to the whole world.

"It is evident from the foregoing illustrative discussion of the magnitude of current and impending needs that the resources freed by disarmament would not be large enough for the many claims upon them. Though it would take active decisions by governments in light of national and international needs to set in motion the ne-

cessary programmes for employing the released resources, it seems abundantly clear that no country need fear a lack of useful employment opportunities for the resources that would become available to it through disarmament."

owns
of
plans

Prospects brightened for young people...

A special section of the UN report*, "Some Social Consequences of Disarmament," says, "Human life would acquire a new meaning, once war and preparations for war were eliminated. The whole prospect of life would be brightened, especially for young people about to enter a profession or found a family. There would no longer be any separation from the family for compulsory military service..."

Careful economic planning is set forth in the UN report as the main requirement to prevent immediate depression, long-range stagnation of growth, and structural dislocations as a result of disarmament. Optimism about conversion to peace production is based in part on the successful adjustment made by all economies after World War II. US experience after the Korean hostilities is similarly cited. The report states:

"All the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind."


On March 4, 1962, William C. Foster, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, released a report on "Economic Impacts of Disarmament,"** which had been submitted to him on October 24, 1961, by Professor Emil Benoit of Columbia University on behalf of a panel of government, industry, and labor economists of which he was chairman.

Economic Knowledge and Leadership can avoid depression...

This report said that the American economy could meet without serious long-term difficulty the huge cut in defense spending which would result from a general disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. This cut in defense spending "should create small danger of provoking immediate depression in our economy, assuming sensible adjustment policies and vigorous government leadership to dispel adverse effects on business and consumer anticipations and to provide reassurance that aggregate demand will not be allowed to decline precipitately....These problems can be mastered by application of appropriate policies, the chief obstacles to which would be political resistance rather than deficiencies in our economic knowledge."

*This report is entitled "Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament", and may be obtained from the United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations, New York.

**This report is entitled, Economic Impacts of Disarmament, Publication 2, January 1962, and may be obtained from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington 25, D.C.



Original illustration by JANICE HOLLAND

Dr. Herman J. Muller, Nobel Prize winning geneticist, believes that this impairment of the apparently normal will be a much greater total burden on the human race than the increased number of obvious defectives. He warns: "Our genetic heritage is the most precious thing we

have. If it deteriorates, we deteriorate. The human race must become genetic conscious . . .

[Aside from this genetic damage] the tests are doing more harm than good because they raise war feelings between nations."

summary of disarmament negotiations, 1945-1962

by Lorraine Nelson

Disarmament negotiations have gone on since the end of World War II. The result has always been the same, deadlock. That is where things stand now -- on dead center -- as the 18-Nation Committee gets down to serious work in Geneva.

How to get off dead center is the heart of the matter. How can the treacherous treadmill of terror and counter-terror, threats and counter-threats, and ever mounting weapons of annihilation, be brought under mankind's control?

To decide what can be done, it is necessary to understand what has been tried before. What follows, therefore, is a brief review of the disarmament negotiations of the past sixteen years.

The Baruch Plan...

One year after the end of World War II, negotiations to rid the world of its newest, and worst, weapon of war were opened at the United Nations when the United States submitted its plan for the international control of atomic energy. This plan was thereafter known for the man who introduced it, Bernard M. Baruch. The day of its introduction was June 14, 1946. What the US proposed was the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which would be handed over all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, beginning with raw materials. Specifically, the IADA was to control, inspect and license all "safe" atomic energy activities (such as power development) and to own outright and manage all potentially "dangerous" activities (including all research in military developments). Peaceful development of atomic energy was to be the main purpose of the agency, but it was nevertheless to be permitted to carry on research in nuclear explosives. This was seen as a tool necessary to those whose job it would be to prevent nuclear warfare.

Once an adequate system of control was agreed upon and in operation, free of the exercise of a veto by any one state, the US proposed, "subject to ... constitutional processes," to give up its then-exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, destroy its stockpiles of the weapon and turn over its atomic know-how to the international authority. It never was said precisely when the US would feel the time had come to do this.

On June 19, 1946, five days after the unveiling of the US plan, the USSR responded with a counter-plan.

The Russian interpretation ...

As the Russians saw it, the Baruch plan provided for effective US (or at least Western) domination of the proposed international authority. This would mean, in their view, that the US could keep its atomic monopoly effectively under its own wing, and at the same time prevent the USSR from ever attaining nuclear capabilities, for either peaceful or military purposes. They claimed the plan contained no provision compelling fair treatment for, and respect for the sovereignty of, Russian interests or those of its allies. The USSR proposed instead, therefore, a plan of its own that prohibited at the outset both the production and use of nuclear weapons and provided for destruction within three months of all existing nuclear stockpiles. Military development of atomic energy was to be denied to all. Peaceful developments were to be enhanced within each country by the international exchange of scientific information. Enforcement of the ban on military uses of nuclear materials was to be by individual states, whose legislatures were to prescribe penalties. However, an international committee was to be formed to ensure that this ban was effective and that atomic energy was not used in any way to the detriment of mankind.

and a subsequent proposal ...

The vagueness and inadequacy of its control proposals was apparent to all from the outset. The Soviets sought to remedy this a year later with a new elaboration of their views on control. At this time, the USSR endorsed the concept of an international control commission which would make periodic inspections of all facilities and special investigations of suspicious activities, on a veto-free basis. But the commission the Russians wanted would be denied the power of punitive action except with the approval of the United Nations Security Council (where the USSR retained the veto). Ownership and management of the individual nations' atomic energy facilities was not to be a function of this commission. Its research activities were to be limited to peaceful applications of atomic power, since military developments were to be denied to all.

The UN Atomic Energy Commission found the Russian plan unacceptable and in May, 1948, gave its final stamp of approval to the Baruch plan. This became the UN plan in November, 1948, when it was voted favorably upon by a majority of the UN General Assembly.

While in the United Nations ...

The creation in the meantime of a separate Commission for Conventional Armaments, within the United Nations, had begun. This grew from a Soviet initiative of October, 1946. Over USSR objections, the Commission was denied any role in formulating policy on atomic armaments. This was still to be left to the AEC, which had charge of the Baruch plan. The US endeavored to have the Commission undertake a census of conventional armaments, with appropriate verification by inspection, but this eventually was vetoed in the Security Council by the USSR, after it failed to have atomic armaments included in the census. The Russians felt the census was an insufficient measure anyway -- what they wanted was a cut of one-third in all land, sea and air forces, accompanied by a ban on atomic weapons. In this they were also rebuffed.

The United States position ...

The general position of the US in this period was that international control and management of atomic energy must be a necessary prelude to nuclear disarmament. Conventional armaments were held to be a separate matter. But all regulation and reduction of armaments, whether conventional or atomic, could be undertaken only after a system of control had been installed and proved effective.

... and what the Soviet Union wanted ...

The USSR's position was the reverse. They held that conventional and nuclear disarmament were linked indissolubly and should be deep and drastic. Throughout this period they worked for an unconditional ban on atomic weapons. Control over disarmament, in their opinion, was necessary but it should not precede, or in any way prevent, disarmament itself. In their view, the Western position would lead to control over armaments and this was the surest road to military insecurity for one side or the other, and hence away from disarmament. On atomic energy controls, they continued to stand steadfastly against the Baruch plan.

As the two sides made little effort to modify their positions in the light of mutual objections, the result was deadlock everywhere.

U.S. atom-bomb monopoly ended ...

In 1949, the USSR exploded its own atomic bomb. If the Baruch plan was indeed intended to maintain American monopoly of the bomb, as the Russians felt, its premise was henceforth removed. The Russians thereafter laid new stress on banning use of the bomb, as well as further manufacture of it. Outlawing use of the bomb has remained an unflinching element of all their plans for nuclear disarmament.

The US and its colleagues of the West have always rejected the Russian case for banning the bomb, and to this day they still do. Nobel Prize Winner Philip Noel-Baker offers an explanation of the Western position in his book, The Arms Race: "The United States genuinely believed that their use of A-bombs had shortened the war against Japan, and had saved great suffering and loss of life; they were making sincere proposals for the total abolition of all nuclear weapons; until nuclear disarmament with effective safeguards was agreed to, they thought their A-bombs were a guarantee against aggression."

Noel-Baker argues that under accepted rules of international law, "the Russian case was unanswerably strong," but "by their conduct in the early disarmament debates and by their cold war policy ... they ensured majority support for the Western governments' view."

The Korean War...

The explosion of the first atomic bomb in the Soviet Union was followed within less than a year by the outbreak, in June, 1950, of a full-scale war in Korea. Disarmament negotiations came to a standstill. The one development in the following years was a US initiative at the United Nations that led to the merger of the two disarmament commissions in 1952. The new unit, combining the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, became the UN Disarmament Commission.

The UN General Assembly proposals...

It was apparent in this commission from the outset that the nuclear powers were as divided over disarmament as ever. The UN General Assembly had directed the negotiators to use the Baruch plan as the basis for controlling atomic armaments "unless a better and no less effective" plan were found and, on conventional armaments, to give priority to arranging an arms census that would be used for negotiating limits on armed forces at a later time. The USSR didn't like the new commission's terms of reference and had voted against them -- it was as opposed as ever to the Baruch plan and it felt the arms census would do nothing for disarmament unless it was coupled with a compulsory reduction in armaments -- but it agreed nevertheless to work with it.

The year, 1952, saw the beginning of a period of negotiations that climaxed in a moment of hope on May 10, 1955, when the Western side and the Soviets were nearer to agreement than they had ever been before -- or have ever been since. What were the events that produced this "moment of hope" -- and what happened to dispel its promise?

Western initiatives...

At the outset, the initiative was a Western one. The United States, Canada, and particularly England and France, seemed determined to press the Russians toward a disarmament agreement. Proposal after proposal was devised and presented to the USSR. The Soviets in turn constantly hesitated, objected and pointed out flaws in the Western approach. They clearly doubted Western sincerity. Their own nuclear capabilities were still insufficient to give them a feeling of equality with the West. Whatever other reasons they may have had, they were clearly unwilling to make the necessary compromises required for a disarmament agreement at this time.

The aim of the West was explained time and again -- what was sought were major reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments, the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks to peaceful uses, under effective international control. The US assured the Russians that the Western side was unanimous in supporting all these objectives, including the prohibition on use and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Deep reductions were desired by the West in manpower levels -- a ceiling of 1.7 million men was proposed for the US and USSR and between 700,000 and 800,000 for England and France.

Anglo-French efforts

It was in this period that the latter two powers came to the fore as conciliators between the nuclear giants. With US encouragement they devised a detailed plan for phasing conventional and nuclear arms reductions in such a way that neither the West (which held nuclear superiority) nor the Soviets (where more manpower was under arms) should feel their security jeopardized while the disarmament process was building up. At first, the Russians rejected the Anglo-French efforts.

On the matter of control and inspection the West remained adamant that the inspectors must be in position in every country before arms reductions began, that there could be only one organ with gradually expanding rights and powers, and that it should be able to make aerial and field surveys to verify compliance with disarmament obligations. Many of these demands called for concessions the Russians had always refused to make.

The post-Stalin thaw...

In 1954, after Stalin had died and relative atomic parity with the West was growing nearer, the Russians began to thaw. They showed a new interest in the Western initiatives, especially the English-French plan for achieving comprehensive disarmament. In 1955, pressures from the West were intensified. The West appeared determined to forge a disarmament agreement or to show up the Russians as obstacles to it. New compromises were devised. Again the English and the French, with US blessings, went out of their way to arrange a scheme (afterwards called for short the "75 percent cut-off") by which they sought to reassure the Russians that completion of conventional disarmament would occur no sooner than elimination of all nuclear stockpiles.

Having satisfied themselves the West was on the level, the Russians responded May 10, 1955. They laid before the Western powers

a paper in which, to quote James Wadsworth, of the US, they accepted "in large measure ... the concepts which we have put forward over a considerable period of time and which we have repeated many times." The British reaction, offered by Anthony Nutting, was that "the proposals (of the West) have now been largely and in some cases, entirely, adopted by the Soviet Union and made into its own proposals." Jules Moch of France said: "It all looks too good to be true."

An international control organ ...

On the key question of inspection and control, the Russians agreed with the Western view that a control organ should be established with an internationally chosen staff permanently stationed in all countries, including Russia, with wide powers of access to military and other installations and with the right to full information about all aspects of each state's military finance. But for full measure the Russians put forward their plan for the establishment of ground control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in airbases, to warn against military buildups that might be a prelude to a surprise attack by modern weapons. This ground "alarm" system was to start before any measures of armament reduction began.

The Anglo-French plan for phasing conventional and nuclear disarmament in stages, so both might be accomplished without diminishing the security of any party, was accepted in full.

There were of course many other points in the Russian paper on which there was not yet agreement and on which perhaps agreement might have been difficult to obtain.

The comment of the Washington Post on it all was: "Perhaps ... honest negotiations may (now) become possible."

The USSR wanted to get on with the business of negotiating, now that its plan was on the table. The West was urged to proceed. But instead it pulled up sharp. The US demanded, and got, an adjournment in the negotiations to rethink its policy.

What resulted was a major rethinking indeed.

The chief obstacle to a disarmament agreement...

In September, 1955, Harold Stassen, who had been appointed some months earlier as Special Assistant on Disarmament to President Eisenhower, announced the US was withdrawing all its previous "substantive positions" on disarmament. In other words, the Baruch plan, the manpower ceilings, the commitment to nuclear disarmament, the detailed plans for inspection and control -- all the proposals urged with such vigor and persistence just three months before, all were withdrawn. The reason given -- the only reason ever given -- was that there was now no known means for controlling evasion of an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons. Secret nuclear stocks from past production could be hidden in ways that were beyond detection.

In the next five years, this problem of clandestine nuclear stocks was the chief obstacle to a disarmament agreement. The Soviets had indeed also pointed out this phenomenon in their May 10 plan. Now suddenly the US, which had never seen the problem as a bar to disarmament before May 10, seemed overwhelmed by the pitfall the Russians had opened up. The implication always was that if they hadn't mentioned it, the US would never have thought of it.

Some stated reactions...

On this point, Noel-Baker has stated: "But this difficulty did not come as a sudden, blinding revelation to the Western governments when the Russians mentioned it May 10. Dr. Robert Oppenheimer had

warned them about it in 1946. M. Moch had spoken of it in UN discussions every year since 1952; as late as May 5, 1955 he had urged that, for the very reason that there was the difficulty about a secret stock, it was better to have the imperfect plan of nuclear disarmament and control than to have no plan at all."

The Russian reaction was, and still is, that what they had said was not and could never be an excuse for abandoning nuclear disarmament. The US position was expressed by Harold Stassen when he said that unless some "more effective" system of control came along, nuclear disarmament would now be a "tragic mistake."

And so ended the "moment of hope." Noel-Baker has commented: "The US rejection of the Russian offer of May 10, 1955, may have been a terrible mistake."

Ike's advocacy of an "Open Sky" ...

The US thus turned away from nuclear disarmament, from planning for controlled, comprehensive, equal and balanced armament reductions. It turned instead to promoting the Eisenhower plan for "open skies" -- aerial and ground inspection of the whole territory of the USSR and the US as a means to prevent the danger of surprise attack. The ground inspection feature was adopted from the Russian plan of May 10 -- it was the only element of that plan that ever won American acceptance. "Open skies" became an integral part of all disarmament plans advocated in the remaining years of the Eisenhower Administration. At no time was it ever offered as a disarmament measure in itself. Eisenhower himself originally presented it at the Geneva "summit" meeting of 1955 as a good way to build confidence among nations while new efforts were made toward devising effective inspection techniques which would ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons under any future disarmament agreement.

Then "partial" disarmament ...

From measures of total disarmament, the US now turned to advocating "partial" disarmament. The English and French continued for a time to talk of comprehensive disarmament but they too came to see the problem of secret nuclear stocks as an insuperable difficulty and they eventually supported the "partial" approach of the US. Essentially what was proposed here was a new and higher manpower ceiling of 2.5 million men for the US and Russia. More cuts were to be dependent upon progress in settling political disputes. In the nuclear field, the key proposal was a "cut off" of new production of new atomic weapons, upon installation of an effective inspection system. Once this was done it was thought the job of accounting for past production of fissionable materials -- thus eliminating the likelihood of secret nuclear stocks -- would be easier and that progress could then be made on gradual verified transfers of fissionable materials from nuclear stockpiles to peaceful purposes.

The USSR, meanwhile, preserved its position on comprehensive disarmament but at the same time made an effort to meet the Western preference for the "partial" approach. For instance, the Soviets continued through 1957 to advocate their plan of May 10, 1955, in which they had now clarified and improved their stand on inspection and control, and also added a proviso for the total abolition of all missiles, both intercontinental ballistic missiles and the medium and short-range missiles as well.

USSR offers to reduce manpower ...

Since the Western side would not now consider comprehensive disarmament, the Russians produced another plan limited to conventional armaments, an area in which they were presumed to have superiority over the West. But they still wanted deep manpower reductions, down to the level of 1 to 1.5 million men. The US, however, was unwilling now to accept such a drastic reduction, on the ground

that too low a level of armaments would reflect weakness and would not be conducive to stability in the world.

The end to "partial" approach...

As for the Western "cut-off" proposal, the Soviets felt it was unfair and besides they felt the US itself was not prepared to make it effective as a disarmament measure. They noted the US contention that, should a "cut off" be enforced, America would still be free to make new nuclear weapons from fissionable material on hand at the beginning of disarmament, that it would refabricate existing weapons into new, more efficient weapons and that it would be free to introduce and maintain nuclear weapons on the territory of its allies, train them in the use of them and equip them with the means of their delivery.

The "partial" approach now came to an end. In November, 1957, the USSR announced to the world it would no longer participate in the work of the UN Disarmament Commission because it was not leading to disarmament and because its membership was weighted on the side of the West.

USSR wins parity ...

For the next two years, the main efforts of the USSR were directed to winning parity for itself and its allies and representation for neutral nations on all disarmament negotiating bodies. It was ultimately successful in this and today most UN forums dealing with disarmament (including space) matters have equal Soviet and West membership with a generous balancing force of neutrals.

In the meantime, an effort was made to put new life into disarmament negotiations by placing them outside the United Nations. East and West agreed in 1959 to form a committee, linked only informally to the UN Disarmament Commission, in which they would try again to find some basis for agreement.

The 10-Nations Committee on Disarmament...

The new forum became known as the 10-Nation Committee on Disarmament, its members evenly divided between the Western and Soviet blocs. It met between March and June, 1960, and its fate was not a happy one.

At the outset, this committee had before it the USSR's new and drastic plan for "general and complete disarmament." The concept and the plan based on it had been offered the United Nations in September, 1959, by the USSR's Premier Nikita Khrushchev while he was a visitor in the United States. It was his country's idea that the long deadlock over which should come first, control or disarmament, could be ended only by a phased, step-by-step program of radical disarmament, strictly limited as to time, and accompanied by an expanding, step-by-step system of inspection and control. When disarmament was general and complete, so too would control be general and complete.

Khrushchev's plan...

He proposed a plan, to last no more than four years, which was brief and plain. In the end it would see: troops totally disbanded except for police (they were called militia) units to keep internal order, military production would be outlawed except for light arms for the police, some of whom could be contributed upon demand to the UN Security Council, and nuclear weapons and all means of delivering them would be totally prohibited and all stockpiles destroyed.

No details on the central issue of inspection and control were offered in this original statement of the plan but it was stated

generally that disarmament should be implemented by an international control organ having powers corresponding to the nature of the measures being enforced and increasing as disarmament increased. Once disarmament was general and complete, control also would be general and complete -- Khrushchev's words were that the controllers could then "exercise their zeal to the hilt."

The U.S. counter-move...

The US countered Khrushchev's initiative in March, 1960, with a plan of its own for "general and complete disarmament." In it, the US and its Western allies began to edge back toward support of comprehensive disarmament, toward a program of equal and balanced armament reduction, leading -- if scientific controls could be worked out -- to total disarmament. It was held out for the first time since 1955 that the problem of secret nuclear stocks might not, after all, be an insuperable obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

The British had led the Western return to this position. At the UN in September, 1959, Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Minister, had offered a broad, three-stage disarmament proposal, including the new suggestion that in the last stage, a committee of experts might "reexamine the possibility of controlling and then eliminating" nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. The Lloyd proposals became the basis of the new Western plan.

Yet what was proposed in the new plan was vague and ill-defined to say the least. Total disarmament was once again the goal of the West. Yet no time limit was set. And disarmament was always to depend upon the feasibility of control. If control was not feasible, there was to be no disarmament.

and the points it raised ...

The "partial" measures previously proposed in 1957, including the "cut-off" of production of new nuclear weapons, were to come in the first stages. In the final stage, if joint studies had produced an agreed control system, existing stocks of bombs would be reduced. After that, "further steps, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge," would be taken "to achieve the final elimination of those weapons." Nowhere was it specific about what these final steps would be or when they would occur, nor what should be done to ensure agreement on a control system. The plan also spoke in an imprecise way of the need to establish control over "production of agreed categories of military missiles and existing national stocks and their final elimination." This was the first mention made in a Western disarmament plan of eliminating delivery vehicles.

A more precise development of the March plan, however, was the removal of the prior settlement of political disputes as a condition for balanced manpower reductions down to the level needed to maintain internal order.

A final new feature -- to come also in the final stage of disarmament -- provided for an international police force to preserve world order once the nations were disarmed.

The USSR rejected the plan as a basis for negotiation, contending it was not a serious attempt to meet the requirements of general and complete disarmament.

The thinking of Jules Moch...

New thinking in the West, and also on the Soviet side, appeared to flow in these months from the genius of Jules Moch of France, whose efforts unfailingly have aimed at achieving genuine compromise between the contending positions of West and East. He had told the UN General Assembly in October, 1959, that the answer to the problem

of secret nuclear stocks might be to abolish the means of delivering these weapons. Once the vehicles had been banned, the nuclear stocks would be worthless. Mr. Lloyd of Britain had commented that this might be a "much more practical possibility" than attempting the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Again, the Russians...

The USSR on June 2 and the West on June 27 offered revised plans which put new emphasis, each in its own way, on the destruction of missiles and other means of delivering nuclear weapons.

The USSR was "categorical and plain" (to use the words of Noel Baker). It gave a new, first priority to the total and immediate destruction of "military missiles of all range" and to all other systems of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including not only missiles and rockets, but also military ships and aircraft, submarines, and artillery systems. The original Russian plan of 1959 had placed this destruction in the last stage. Now the USSR said it wanted this to occur in the first stage. Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction were still to be destroyed, but in the second, instead of the last, stage. Throughout all three stages, men under arms and all conventional armaments were to be gradually reduced until all armies were disbanded except for police units and all weapons, except light arms, were abolished.

Their proposals are spelled out...

For the first time, the USSR also spelled out the methods it had in mind for inspecting and controlling the drastic disarmament it proposed.

International inspection teams would maintain on-site supervision of the destruction of all kinds of armaments and the disbanding of forces. But beyond that, they proposed that inspection teams should have access to all undertakings, plants, factories, and shipyards engaged in military production and to facilities engaged in producing atomic materials and energy, to prevent the clandestine accumulation of new armaments to replace those destroyed. Permanent control teams would be established by agreement at "certain factories and plants." As a final measure, the control organization was to have free access to all legislative and executive decisions on military budgets, as another means of guarding against clandestine weapons production. These methods were to be used during disarmament itself. Once disarmament was complete, no kind of control, including aerial inspection, would be barred.

A more precise Western plan...

The West's new plan of June 27 also elaborated its views on the problem of military missiles. New stress was laid on the necessity for making an "early study" of measures necessary to control the "reduction and elimination" of nuclear delivery systems. For instance, the plan proposed for the first stage of disarmament a trial system of on-site inspection of air bases, launching pads and naval bases "in order to establish a basis for control over nuclear delivery systems in later stages." No mention was made of the exact time when this control system would be inaugurated. However, in the second stage, "specified categories" of these vehicles, including missiles, rockets, military ships and aircraft, submarines and artillery systems (the same categories mentioned in Russia's plan) were to be reduced. In the end, "all remaining weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their delivery" were to be destroyed.

This was a more precise statement of Western views on nuclear disarmament than was contained in the March plan. But the means and time limits for achieving it were left unspecified. On inspection, the plan said only that means of verification would be spelled out in an eventual treaty, but that verification should not depend

merely upon the word of any state. Moreover, verifiers should have the power to oversee not only arms reductions but also the right to certify the levels of arms retained during the disarmament process.

Nuclear weapons themselves, as the wording of the plan indicates, were to be eliminated in the end. But in line with M. Moch's thinking, this was placed now in a position subordinate to eliminating the delivery vehicles. As in all previous plans, also, the bomb was to be destroyed only if the "control system found necessary to verify this step" were agreed upon in "a prior technical study."

International peace force...

A new and significant priority was given in the June 27 plan to establishing an international peace force. It was to operate from the second, instead of the third, stage of disarmament. It was to be equipped with "agreed types and quantities" of armaments. What the US would support in the way of armaments for this force -- and whether nuclear armaments would be included -- was not mentioned.

Consideration of all these plans came to nothing in the end.

The U-2 plane incident...

In the meantime, a U-2 airplane belonging to the US had been brought down 1,200 miles inside Russia, on a mission of photo-reconnaissance. It was only one of many such flights the US had been making for four years. It had provided the US with much information about Russian missile and rocket launching sites, among other things.

The 10-Nation Committee peters out...

The USSR and its allies walked out of the 10-Nation Committee at the end of June, just as the revised Western plan was being submitted. For all practical purposes the Committee never functioned again. The USSR contended the Western plan "could not be considered a disarmament plan." In a letter of June 27 to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev accused the West of "trying to reduce the whole thing to establishment of control over international ballistic missiles and artificial earth satellites." He said the West wanted "a plan of control without disarmament, i.e. of a legalized military espionage which apparently someone in the USA would not be averse to using as a supplement to the practice of invading the airspace of other countries for espionage purposes."

The US sought to require the USSR to continue negotiations in the 10-Nation Committee but the UN Disarmament Commission, to which it appealed for assistance, would not take a stand on where these negotiations should occur. It nevertheless readily urged continued negotiations.

But an 18-Nation Committee takes its place...

In December, 1961, the US and USSR finally settled upon the membership of a new committee, consisting of five representatives each from the Western and Soviet blocs and eight from neutral states. This group, known as the 18-Nation Committee, also will operate outside the United Nations, though it was endorsed by the UN General Assembly and is to report to the Disarmament Commission.

Before the 18-Nation Committee are, as usual, two contending plans -- one by the US, the other by the USSR. Both claim to have the goal of "general and complete disarmament."

Russia's plan is still little changed from what it was in September, 1959, and as revised in June, 1960. It was reintroduced in

the General Assembly on September 23, 1960. The US, however has a decidedly newer plan, though in many respects it still resembles the plan of June 27, 1960. President Kennedy introduced the new plan to the UN September 25, 1961.

U.S. policy goals formulated...

The US, under the Kennedy Administration, has now accepted "general and complete disarmament" as the goal of its policy. It seems convinced that the program it advocates includes all the essential elements of an international security system which can be applied with equal justice to all nations. It lays particular stress on development of the UN Peace Force (still a feature of the second stage) and on progressively developing peace-keeping processes of the UN.

Differences from previous plans...

Its most notable change is a commitment in the first stage of disarmament to cease production of new nuclear weapons. This is no longer made conditional upon prior establishment of a system of controls. At the same time, the US would have a Nuclear Experts Commission examine "the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles." The plan speaks of "reducing" and then "eliminating" in later stages, all nuclear weapons from state arsenals. But eliminating nuclear armaments was to depend upon the findings of the experts. Nothing was said about methods for ensuring acceptance of a control system, once it was agreed upon by the experts, nor was anything said about what would happen if a control system was not, after all, found feasible.

This was, therefore, not the firm commitment to total nuclear disarmament that the US had maintained until 1955.

U.S. desire to make a new start evident...


On vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons the plan was far less ambiguous than the plan of June, 1960. Gone from the plan was any implication that control was to be established "over" nuclear delivery systems, rather than over their elimination. Indeed, the new plan's words were that "strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems in specified categories" were to be reduced in the very first stage, independent of any prior study or trial system of on-site controls. Production at the outset was to be "limited or halted." In the end, these vehicles were to be "eliminated from state arsenals."

Still, the questions, how much and when, and how is it to be inspected, were left unanswered. In many areas the plan was still vague and subject to varying interpretations.

For instance, the plan left open the question of whether the UN Peace Force was to be equipped with nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery. The wording of the plan was such that the US could, indeed, support such equipment for the force, if it chose. It did not say it wouldn't.

In one final respect, the new plan showed the Kennedy Administration wanted to make a new start. It removed entirely the priority laid by President Eisenhower on aerial and ground inspection schemes as a prior condition for disarmament. What was offered instead was a new version of the "alarm" system first proposed by the Russians on May 10, 1955. This, as noted already, offered ground control posts at strategic communications centers to warn against undue concentrations of military forces. An international commission was to study means for preventing nuclear war by accident.

March, 1962



summary of negotiations to ban thermonuclear weapon testing, 1955-1962

by Lorraine Nelson

Testing of nuclear weapons has gone on since 1945. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by atomic bombs only after the weapons had been proved in trial explosions. Then in 1954, the atomic bomb was succeeded by the hydrogen bomb and the world at last woke up to the consequences of nuclear experiments.

In March of that year, a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon, by accident lay near the site of the US hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean. When the Japanese fishermen aboard her went home ill and dying, the world suddenly began to hear of radiation hazards. For the Lucky Dragon, untouched by the explosions, had nevertheless been contaminated by "fallout," the radioactive debris from the burst of the bomb.

The "Lucky Dragon" warning...

The message of the Lucky Dragon was that hydrogen bombs, multiplying the power of atomic bombs many times over, made the testing of thermonuclear weapons, no less than their use in war, a danger to all mankind. Fallout became a dreaded word throughout the world. Unseen and unavoidable, it filtered gently down over all the world, bringing the threat of early death, sickness, disfigurement and shortened lives to all persons everywhere, irrespective of national boundaries, even those unborn when it fell. Generation after generation the world over would bear the burdens of genetic damage if these tests continued.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Japanese Parliament on April 1, 1954, passed a resolution calling for international control of nuclear testing.

But it was Prime Minister Nehru of India who on April 2, 1954, made the world's first call for a "standstill agreement" on nuclear test explosions.

For a permanent test-ban...

On May 10, 1955, the USSR was the first nuclear power to call for a permanent ban on all nuclear testing as an integral part of a general disarmament plan.

The US, for its part, was interested in restricting the testing of nuclear weapons but only if nuclear weapons themselves could be

eliminated under international control. Yet at the same time, it was a major contention of the American government that there existed no scientific method of inspection which would ensure the cheat-proof prohibition of these weapons. The US, consequently, gave scant encouragement in this period to the growing support throughout the world for ending nuclear tests. It sought study of radiation hazards and took the lead in establishing, in December, 1955, the United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation.

A new Soviet idea...

The USSR's representatives at the United Nations, meanwhile, were urging the US to agree to cease experiments with nuclear weapons "as a first step" towards solution of the question of eliminating nuclear weapons themselves. Occurring in late 1955, this was the first official Soviet proposal for a ban on tests, apart from a general disarmament agreement.

For the next year and a half, this was the line the USSR urged at every opportunity. Their reasoning was, as Premier Nikolai Bulganin put it, that "the discontinuance of such tests does not in itself require any international control agreements, for the present state of science and engineering makes it possible (through national systems) to detect any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb, wherever it may be set off." Therefore, said Bulganin, an agreement on testing need not await agreement on other disarmament problems.

with Anglo-American modifications...

The US could not accept the USSR's view. In April, 1956, the US proposed, not to ban, but to limit and monitor experimental explosions as part of the first stage of a general disarmament treaty. For the next two years, the US continued to oppose abstracting the test ban from the deadlocked disarmament negotiations.

A modified approach did develop, however, in March, 1957, when President Eisenhower, with Prime Minister Macmillan, of England, announced they were unwilling to discontinue testing but would register advance notice of their tests with the United Nations and permit limited international observance if the USSR would do likewise. The USSR considered the proposal inadequate.

In June, 1957, the Soviet Union began urging, instead of a permanent test ban, a two- or three-year moratorium. It also reversed itself on the question of controls. Instead of leaving the job to national detection systems, it now offered to turn control over to an international supervisory commission that would establish inspection posts, on the basis of reciprocity, in the US, England and the Soviet Union and in the Pacific Ocean.

U.S. package plan...

Two months later, the US made a major concession on the testing issue, though it was hedged with conditions. What was offered was a package plan of "partial" disarmament measures, to include a one-year ban on testing if agreement could first be reached on a system of international control. Another year's suspension was to be offered if the control system worked satisfactorily and if progress were being made in cutting off production of new nuclear weapons -- another measure of "partial" disarmament proposed in the package. Thus a permanent test ban was still made conditional on other measures of disarmament.

On its side, the USSR continued to push for a separate and unconditional ban on tests.

In March, 1958, the USSR, upon termination of a series of nuclear tests, announced it would cease testing altogether if other powers would also abstain. The US, itself just on the verge of be-

ginning a series of tests (a fact known to the USSR), called the Russian offer "propaganda" and went ahead with its own tests.

The big breakthrough...

The big breakthrough on the issue came on April 28, 1958, when the US indicated its first willingness to separate the problem of nuclear testing from the unsolved question of disarmament and invited the USSR to send nuclear specialists to a technical conference to "agree on what would be required" to control violations of an agreement to suspend tests.

The USSR quickly agreed, though its new Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, expressed fear that the technical study could be exploited by those wishing to delay suspension of tests. He tried to get the US then and there to commit itself more specifically to ending experimental explosions, once detection methods had been agreed upon, but the US insisted that such a decision would have to await the report of the experts.

The scientific experts, evenly divided between countries of the East and West, met in Geneva from July 1 to August 21, 1958. Upon adjournment they reported that they had reached the unanimous conclusion that detection of nuclear explosions was feasible down to the level of one kiloton in the air and five kilotons underground. Dr. Hans Bethe, a leading American scientist who was at the Geneva conference, has reported that the detection system was largely the work of the Western side. He has said that whatever the Western experts felt was necessary, the Russians accepted.

What was recommended was a system of 180 ground observation stations distributed over the world and from 20 to 100 on-site inspections yearly to determine the nature of suspicious events that could not be identified on seismographs as either nuclear explosions or earthquakes. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold of the United Nations commented: "This agreement makes an effective dent in a problem which so far has proved rather intractable -- the problem of disarmament." The world over, there was an almost audible sigh of relief.

Test suspensions announced...

The very next day the US announced it would suspend its nuclear tests for one year at the end of the series it was then conducting. The situation was to be reexamined anew at the beginning of each year.

In the meantime, England also opened a series of tests. The USSR retaliated, holding a short series of its own in October. At the end, it announced itself still in favor of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing but in lieu of this it would continue to test on a one-for-one basis. It was not until August, 1959, that Russian edginess about Western nuclear progress had calmed down sufficiently for it to undertake a new pledge against testing. In that interval, no further testing had in fact occurred and the USSR announced it would abstain as long as the Western nations did.

In the meantime, and despite the interlude of new explosions by the three nuclear powers, a diplomatic conference among the US, UK and USSR met October 31, 1958, in Geneva to begin negotiating a political agreement to implement the proposed ban on tests. The control system worked out by the scientists the previous summer was still accepted by all as the basis for the ban.

Test-ban opposition gathers force at home...

In the US, opposition to any kind of test ban was strong, vocal and gathering force. As the political conference, with its difficult, technical bargaining, moved along, this opposition came increasingly into the open. It never was a secret that major elements of the US government itself did not want an international ban on nuclear test-

ing. The military leaders were particularly interested at this time in conducting underground tests for the purpose of perfecting the smaller, tactical nuclear weapons. Only a powerful, determined executive could have resisted the opposition of the military leadership, the Atomic Energy Commission, major Congressional leaders and leading scientists such as Dr. Edward Teller, "the father of the H-bomb."

The view-point of Dr. Teller...

The reasoning of this formidable opposition was that the only hope of the Western world in its struggle with communism was to keep militarily ahead of the antagonist, to maintain a superior force. Without nuclear testing to develop always newer and more advanced weapons, this was not possible. It was Teller's view that the western world could maintain a lead and that it must do so or face its doom. He felt weapons could be developed ad infinitum and that it was necessary to get on with the job.

That these powerful opponents of a test ban would have to be reckoned with was always a certainty.

Nevertheless, it seemed that progress was being made at the Geneva political conference. By December, 1958, four articles of a test-ban treaty had been hammered out.

The "Hardtack" conclusions...

Then, on January 5, 1959, the White House startled the world with an announcement that data from its own recent testing (known as the Hardtack series) showed underground explosions were much more difficult to detect than the Geneva Experts had thought. This data, it was said, showed the Geneva detection system (though meticulously worked out and agreed upon by leading scientists of both East and West) could probably not detect and identify underground bomb explosions under 20 kilotons (instead of the minimum five kilotons decided upon at Geneva).

An American about-face...

This signaled an American about-face on the Geneva detection system. From then on, the US tended to doubt the validity of the Geneva conclusions and to urge their reconsideration.

The USSR, for its part, continued to support the Geneva system. It fought any reconsideration of the conclusions. Since Bethe states that this system was largely the fruit of Western research, the conclusion can reasonably be drawn that the fight over its validity was largely a feud between contending Western -- and primarily American -- scientific factions. Dr. Bethe himself upheld, in essence, the Soviet position at this time when he stated that the controls designed at Geneva were better than those that provided the information on which the new US contentions were based.

In any case, the Soviets said they were willing to try to improve the Geneva system. They pointed out that the scientists had, themselves, written into the system a proviso for its review and improvement at regular intervals, based on the inevitable advance in scientific knowledge.

Repercussions at Geneva...

The political conference in Geneva was adversely affected by the new US attitude. With the US contending that the previously-agreed upon detection system was not, after all, scientifically reliable, and the USSR insisting that it was, the conference decided to throw the disagreement once again into the hands of scientific experts.

Though the Soviets were reluctant to give even the appearance of reconsidering the 1958 system, they nevertheless agreed to send experts to a new meeting in November, 1959, to arrange some improvements in seismic equipment to be used in the detection stations.

Some agreements in the political conference...

In the meantime, despite the new disagreement over the mechanisms of control, the political treaty was gradually being hammered out. Dr. Bethe tells us that concessions were made by both sides. The Soviets, for instance, agreed to permit veto-free inspections on its territory by mixed national-foreign teams, provided the West agreed to limit the on-site inspections of suspicious seismic events to a fixed number each year. (They finally suggested an annual quota of three inspections, as against the Western desire for from 12 to 20.) The USSR also wanted parity of representation with the West on the control commission. Both the principle of inspection on a quota basis and parity of representation ultimately were agreed to by the West, but by that time new developments on the international scene had reduced the contributions these concessions could make to an agreement.

For, while the political conference had been progressing, the second conference of the scientific experts had not.

Disagreements in the conference of scientists...

This conference, called largely at American insistence, had agreed upon a few improvements in the Geneva detection system. But the Western and Soviet scientists were now in hot disagreement over the basic reliability of the system itself. The Soviets disputed the accuracy and objectivity of the information from the 1958 tests which had led the Americans to downgrade the Geneva controls. They said the Americans had disclosed the conclusions drawn from the information but had withheld much of the original data from which other investigators might have drawn different conclusions. The Americans, on the other hand, came to the conference with the news that they now thought the system even less reliable than ever. They cited the theory developed by the RAND Corporation, an arm of the Air Force -- a theory that nuclear explosions might be concealed altogether if they were conducted in a hole large enough to contain the blast.

The RAND theory wins out...

Recognized American scientists, such as Professor Jay Orear of Cornell University, attempted to show that this, though possible theoretically, was so difficult as to be highly unlikely in practice. Anyway, the knowledge to be gained in this way would be limited and scarcely worth the immense labor and cost of digging the hole to acquire it.

The arguments against their position were to no avail. The American scientists accepted the RAND theory as one means, not excluded by the control system, for violating the treaty. They walked out of the second experts conference in December, 1959, and reported to the American people that there wasn't any scientific basis for controlling underground tests at all.

"The brink of absurdity"...

The Soviets said the Americans were "bordering on the brink of absurdity." It would never be possible, they contended, to eliminate all theoretical possibilities for evading a treaty. They submitted data to back up their view that the Americans were both inaccurate and unscientific in their position on underground tests. On the political level, they accused the US of bad faith and of taking steps to ruin any agreement as soon as it came in sight.

The test ban talks, though appearing to progress on the poli-

tical level during this period, were never the same again. By hindsight it seems likely that it was here that the chance of agreement went into fatal decline. Essentially it had become a dispute between American and Russian scientists. Though they had agreed in 1958 that a test ban could be effectively controlled, they were now in disagreement over whether it could be controlled effectively enough.

Eisenhower announces freedom to resume testing...

A major consequence of the deadlock in the second experts meeting came December 29, 1959, when President Eisenhower announced that the US was allowing the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing to expire. It had been in effect since October 31, 1958. The US now considered itself free to resume nuclear weapons testing, he said, but it would not do so without advance notice to the world. He laid part of the blame on the unwillingness of the Soviet scientists to consider the inadequacies of present techniques for controlling underground tests.

On January 14, 1960, the USSR said it would continue to abstain from nuclear weapons testing, but only as long as the Western powers did.

Since it was the American side which would not now accept the validity of the 1958 detection system -- a system Western scientists had had the largest hand in drawing up -- the next move logically came from Washington.

U.S. proposes "limited" test ban...

President Eisenhower offered in February, 1960, to solve the scientific conflict on the political level. What he proposed was a limited test ban, instead of the comprehensive one the Russians were seeking. Tests in the atmosphere were to be banned as well as those under the ocean -- but not the smaller underground ones (those with a yield of up to 20 kilotons), which American scientists now thought did not lend themselves to control. The Soviets were invited to engage in a program of both joint and coordinated research to improve methods of detecting and identifying these smaller explosions. Stress was laid at this time on the value of joint research among the nuclear powers, as a parallel to coordinated national research programs.

Soviet suspicions re underground testing by U.S. ...

The Soviets, not surprisingly, were suspicious of the proposed treaty exemption of the smaller underground tests. American military leaders had been calling for just such experiments as necessary for the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, the USSR's goal, constantly repeated, was the "universal stopping of tests for all time." In exchange for opening its territory to international inspectors, a concession it had long seen as the gateway to espionage, it wanted a complete and unconditional test ban. To reverse its long-standing opposition to international infringement of its sovereignty, the USSR demanded a maximum assurance that the nuclear arms race, in which it held an inferior position, had come to a complete standstill.

USSR suggests a long moratorium...

In effect, the Soviets continued to seek a comprehensive test ban. They announced they would accept the Western plan for a limited treaty, but only on condition that no small underground tests were actually made while the disputed control system was being improved through joint research. The USSR suggested a moratorium of four to five years. Furthermore, it stressed the importance it attached to

the joint nature of the proposed research, as opposed to coordinated national programs. A single program among all the nuclear powers was the speediest way to get international agreement on a control system to bring the underground tests under the ban, in the USSR view.

The US, unwilling to accept what it considered just another Soviet method of obtaining a comprehensive test ban, finally agreed to a moratorium of 27 months on the controversial underground shots. date

Four years of U-2 spy flights justified...

Outside the treaty talks, meanwhile, an event of major significance occurred on May 1, 1960. Francis Gary Powers was shot down 1,200 miles inside Russia on a photo-reconnaissance mission. The world then learned that for four years these aerial inspection missions had been conducted over Soviet territory, providing Americans with considerable information on Russian nuclear bases and missile sites. President Eisenhower justified the spying as necessary to American security.

An entirely different climate surrounded the test ban talks after that.

Quid pro Quo...

New differences now arose over the proposed research program. On May 7, 1960, the US announced it was going ahead with its own plans for seismic research to improve test detection methods and that "where necessary" it would make nuclear explosions. It politely indicated that the Russians should do the same, undertaking nuclear explosions on a quid pro quo basis. With this, the US in effect turned down the Russian request for a joint, single research program. Its own previous views on the value of joint experimentation also appear to have been reversed in this period.

From slow-down to standstill...

The Russians now took a new attitude toward the whole matter. They declined to undertake any research or experimental nuclear explosions under any circumstances, saying they had only agreed to research in the first place to please the Americans. For its part, the USSR said it still maintained faith in the 1958 detection system. Therefore, the US should do the research. But in case it made nuclear explosions, the USSR would demand the right of inspection to make sure they were not used for military developments.

The Americans said their laws forbade foreign inspection of atomic devices. The Russians were unwilling to settle for anything less. It was here that negotiations on the research program came to a standstill. Work on the treaty generally was stalled for the remainder of the Eisenhower Administration.

U.S. offers concessions...

In March, 1961, when Arthur Dean was sent by the new Kennedy Administration to try to revive the lagging talks at Geneva, he offered a number of concessions designed to mitigate Soviet suspicions of the American desire for a limited treaty. To break the deadlock, it was proposed that the 27-month moratorium on smaller underground tests be extended to three years; that Congress would be asked for legislative authority to permit Soviet inspection of nuclear devices to be used in the American program of seismic research, provided the Soviets accepted the proposal for such research; and that the USSR be granted parity of representation on the control commission. Further an offer was made to reduce the quota of inspections to 12 a year.

The American nuclear lead ...

But it was too late.

Some experts, such as Dr. Bethe, believe that, in view of the extensive preparations needed for nuclear testing, the Soviets had decided to resume testing by the time they returned to Geneva in March. The American nuclear lead, for whatever the reason, had become too great for them to bear. At any rate, the USSR chose this moment to make a new demand which appeared calculated to be unacceptable to the US -- they wanted to replace the single administrator of the control organization with a tripartite administrative council, the troika, that could act only by unanimous agreement of all its members.

The French continue nuclear experiments ...

From there on it was a straight road to the resumption of testing. The French, always outside the test ban talks, were meanwhile conducting their own nuclear experiments in the Sahara. Since 1960, when France began testing, the USSR had been issuing intermittent warnings. In May, 1961, it threatened to resume testing if the French explosions continued. Its own security would require it, said the USSR, since it had been voluntarily inhibiting its own nuclear progress while the West was indirectly improving its capabilities through the French tests.

In June, 1961, Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy he thought a test ban might better be achieved, after all, as part of a general and complete disarmament agreement. This took the Russians full circle back to their original position of 1955 on banning nuclear tests.

The Russians resume testing (atmospheric)

On August 30, 1961, the USSR did, in fact, resume nuclear testing.

On September 3, 1961, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan asked the USSR to come to Geneva to sign a treaty banning atmospheric tests. National detection systems were, they indicated, adequate to police the ban. The USSR was unwilling to interrupt its experiments.

Likewise, the United States (underground)

On September 5, 1961, the US announced it had begun underground testing, a series in which it apparently is still engaged at the present time. Long preparations for the tests obviously preceded the Presidential announcement.

National detection vs. international inspection ...

On November 28, 1961, the Soviets, having ended their own tests, announced they were ready to agree unconditionally to suspend all testing along with other world powers, leaving detection up to national seismographic systems. They also said they were ready to undertake an indefinite moratorium on all underground testing until agreement had been reached on an adequate international control system, but that this control system might be installed in the territory of the USSR only as part of a plan for general and complete disarmament. In effect, the Soviets now sought a comprehensive test ban to be policed for an indefinite period by national detection systems. International inspection was postponed to the future. This amounted to the position the USSR held on testing between late 1955 and 1957.

U.S.-U.K. conclusions...

On January, 1962, the US and England walked out of the test ban talks, thus bringing them effectively to an end for the time being. The countries concluded that the USSR was no longer willing to accept international inspection of a test ban, apart from disarmament, and they were unwilling to consider a ban with anything less.

First, one thing - then, another...

On February 7, President Kennedy announced that the US now would accept a test ban only with international controls, irrespective of the environment. This served to withdraw the offer of Sept. 3 to accept national control of a ban on atmospheric tests. (The US later said the September offer had been made hurriedly and without adequate consideration.) Kennedy furthermore said the US would now seek a treaty that provided for inspection to detect clandestine preparations for tests, as well as of the tests themselves.

The Soviets stated Feb. 23 that they wanted to discuss a test ban treaty at the general disarmament negotiations about to begin March 14 in Geneva.

At the Geneva conference, the US went into the test ban talks -- these were resumed concurrently with, but separate from, the disarmament negotiations -- with a new and major concession.

U.S. objection to 1958 Detection Plan now revised...

After three years of insisting upon the inadequacy of the 1958 inspection system to control the smaller underground explosions, the US now reversed itself and agreed to conclude a comprehensive treaty banning all tests. The 1958 detection plan, which it had long doubted, was now accepted as the basis for international control of the ban. The US did not explain what, if any, new scientific evidence had renewed its faith in the system.

And the USSR reverts to original position...

The USSR had now, however, gone full cycle back to its original position that national detection systems were adequate to police an international ban on tests. It appeared to have withdrawn for good its willingness to admit international inspectors within its domain, prior to agreement on general disarmament.

With this, the Americans in late April, 1962, also resumed testing in the atmosphere.

April, 1962

CAN AN ACCELERATED ARMS RACE KEEP OUR COUNTRY SAFE?

General Douglas MacArthur:

"... the constant acceleration of preparation will precipitate a kind of spontaneous combustion."

General Omar Bradley:

"We are now speeding inexorably toward a day when even the ingenuity of our scientists may be unable to save us from the consequences of a single rash act or a lone reckless hand upon the switch of an uninterceptible missile."



STATEMENT OF POLICY

AGREED UPON BY 82 WOMEN FROM 15 STATES
 AT THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE
 ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN JUNE 1962

• We (local title) represent a resolute stand of women in the United States against the unprecedented threat to life from nuclear holocaust.

• We are women of all races, creeds and political persuasions who are dedicated to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

• We cherish the right and accept the responsibility of the individual in a democratic society to act to influence the course of government.

• We demand of governments that nuclear weapons tests be banned forever, that the arms race end, and that the world abolish all weapons of destruction under United Nations safeguards.

• We urge immediate planning at local, state, and national levels for a peace-time economy with freedom and justice for all.

• We urge our government to anticipate world tensions and conflicts through constructive non-military actions and through the United Nations.

• We join with women throughout the world to challenge the right of any nation or group of nations to hold the power of life or death over the world.

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300 Women at U. N. Protest A-Tests



The New York Times
 Women and children in demonstration yesterday near U. N.

A demonstration against
 further atomic bomb testing
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steps to lessening tensions

It is generally agreed that historically, disarmament follows rapprochement. It would appear highly unlikely that disarmament today could come without a lessening of tensions. There are many areas in which tensions could be eased prior to disarmament. One proposal has been in the internationalizing of canals, free ports and overseas military bases.

➔ Many world tensions are derived from the ancient habit that military powers have had of maintaining strong points and bases on the territory of another nation. Such bases and free ports as Gibraltar, Suez, Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Aden, Guantanamo, and Okinawa are examples.

➔ The problems created when one nation controls canals and waterways used by all nations are particularly well known and have long figured in the news. The situation at Suez has been particularly difficult, but problems are also raised by the "extraterritoriality" of the United States at Panama. In addition, the freedom of the Dardanelles should be secured.

➔ Today there exists a great number of air and navy bases and military establishments of all kinds on the territory of other nations. They constantly serve as sources of friction and generate fears in the local populations that these areas may be attacked.

➔ To achieve a withdrawal of nations from the territory of other nations is difficult and fraught with dangers of "face" and international standing.

➔ The United States might take the lead in promoting the removal of potential "sore spots" in international relations. By declaring a schedule under which it would be willing to turn over its military bases to the countries in which they are established--with the provision that these bases will be "policed" by the United Nations to insure against aggressive acts toward neighboring nations--the United States could make an important step toward peace. These establishments might well be used by the United Nations as bases for an international police force.

➔ Since effective disarmament cannot be realized until a minimal world security force is established, a series of bases dedicated to

an international police force should be in the interest of a stronger United Nations.

➔ Also, in releasing to the United Nations the administrative control of the Panama Canal (as an example)--with the provision that other nations do the same with their canals and waterways of similar status --the United States would prove to the world its dedication to world peace and relaxation of tensions.

➔ As the balance of world strength clearly lies in the United States, it would be an entirely safe and feasible "first move" toward disarmament for the US to take these steps.

WHAT CAN WE GAIN BY FURTHER TESTING?

"An argument will never end between two parties each insisting on having the last word."

David R. Inglis, Physicist at Argonne National Laboratory

President Kennedy himself has said that we retain military superiority over the Russians.

Atomic Energy Commission, Dec. 9, 1961:

"... there is no reason to believe that the balance of nuclear power has been changed to favor the Soviet Union."

Secretary of Defense McNamara, Feb. 6, 1962:

"... the U.S. has right now a nuclear capability to absorb a first strike from any nuclear power and retaliate in sufficient weapons to completely destroy our opponent."

Dr. Hans Bethe, President's chief adviser on Soviet tests, Jan. 5, 1962:

"Nothing has been fundamentally changed by the Russian tests . . . nothing is likely to be changed by any amount of future nuclear testing."

comparison of USSR-USA disarmament proposals, 1960-61

similarities

THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SEPTEMBER 25, 1961

Identical ideas are expressed in the USSR
Disarmament Plan presented to the United
Nations General Assembly September 23, 1960.
These comparisons while applying to plans
previously submitted to the United Nations
give some idea of the relative positions of
the United States and the USSR at the time
of the Geneva Conference opened on March 14, 1962.

1 GENERAL AND
COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT

Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

2 BALANCED
STAGES

Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safe-guarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

3 CONTROL
ORGANIZATION
UNDER THE
U.N.

An International Disarmament Organization (I.D.O.) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

- | | | |
|-----------|--|---|
| 4 | FUNCTIONS AND COMPOSITION OF I.D.O. | The I.D.O. shall have: (1) a general conference of all the parties; (2) a commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis. |
| 5 | NO SPREADING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS | States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture. |
| 6 | PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE | The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited. |
| 7 | ADVANCE NOTICE OF SPACE VEHICLE LAUNCHINGS | States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the I.D.O. of launching of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle. |
| 8 | DISMANTLING OF BASES | Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses. |
| 9 | REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS | In the first stage levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. |
| 10 | REDUCING THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK | States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the I.D.O. of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event. |
| 11 | CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE | States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force--including nuclear, conventional, or C.B.R.--contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter. |

... and the differences

BETWEEN THE USA DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, SEPT. 1961, AND THE USSR
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, SEPT. 1960, PRESENTED TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

These comparisons while applying to plans previously submitted to
the United Nations give some idea of the relative positions of the
United States and the U.S.S.R. at the time the Geneva Conference
opened on March 14, 1962

USA

- The US wants to reduce armed forces to 2,100,000.
- The US wishes verification of remaining armaments.
- The US wishes to reduce delivery systems in Stage 1, and reduce them further in Stage 2.

●The US wants verifiable reduction of chemical, biological, radiological warfare in Stage 1 and further reduction in Stage 2.

●The US provides for removal of arms to be destroyed from each country to an agreed depot and at the agreed depot these weapons of mass destruction be destroyed.

●The US does not spellout the termination of Universal Military Training, etc., but requires: The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than that required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a UN Peace Force.

USSR

●The USSR wants to reduce armed forces to 1,700,000.

●The USSR does not wish verification of remaining armaments.

●The USSR proposes to get rid of all delivery systems in Stage 1. "The USSR wants all means of delivering nuclear weapons eliminated from the armed forces of states, their manufacture discontinued and stocks destroyed in Stage 1. Such means include: strategic and tactical rockets, pilotless aircraft of all types; and all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons; surface warships that can be used as vehicles for nuclear weapons; submarines of all classes and types; all artillery systems, as well as other means, that can be used as vehicles for atomic and hydrogen weapons."

●The USSR wants complete prohibition of chemical, biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Stage 2.

●The USSR provides for on-site destruction with controlled inspection of weapons destroyed.

●The USSR advocates the termination of Universal Military Training and the closure of all military education systems; the abolition of war ministries, of general staffs and their local agencies, and of all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations; the discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes whether from public funds or private individuals.

The USSR is for much more specific and drastic reduction of all arms in Stage 1. The United States lingers over reduction throughout the three stages. The USSR completely prohibits chemical, biological and radiological weapons in Stage 2. The United States advocates reduction of these weapons.

some do's and don'ts of disarmament

Don't succumb to the belief that only "the experts" can have an opinion about armaments, about our foreign policy, about war and peace.

Don't accept the idea that "it's all too complicated." The essential facts, the areas of agreement and disagreement between the two great powers are really very few and easily understood by the layman.

Don't believe everything you read or hear. Check - and double check the facts as you find them reported, even by government spokesmen (who often differ among themselves.)

Don't, above all, give way to despair as each day seems to bring more bad news, more tension, more fear.

Do remember that human values must be and are a factor in every decision, whether the decisions are made by governments, by "experts", by scientists or by laymen. Women must keep injecting these "human values" (sometimes called "emotional" by those who like to think of war and diplomacy as a chess game) into politics and the effort for peace.

Do have faith and courage to keep your sights on the goal, which is disarmament and peace.

Do form a "cheering section" which applauds - so as to be heard - when a move is made in the direction of peace and relaxation of tensions between nations.

Do have faith in your ability to make a contribution, however small, to end the arms race.

what you can do toward achieving disarmament

1

Circulate this pamphlet to your friends and neighbors. Wider education on the subject of past and present negotiations must precede the public understanding which alone will compel governments to disarm.

2

Mobilization of public opinion for disarmament is essential. At various times our own government has been divided at the highest levels between those who favored disarmament and those who favored a greater arms build-up. Public opinion for disarmament would strengthen the hand of our negotiators at the conference table.

3

When your senators and congressmen are at home, visit them and impress upon them the need to work for and vote for disarmament.

4

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the only branch of our government exclusively working toward disarmament. Appropriations for this office have been pitifully small. Urge your representatives in Congress to grant the Agency the funds it needs for disarmament studies.

5

It is hoped that those who read this work will be encouraged to go on with their own studies, to read their newspapers more critically, and to let others know that they are interested-vitally interested- in progress toward disarmament and peace.

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you may want to read...

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- THE ARMS RACE A program for world disarmament, by Philip Noel-Baker N.Y., Oceana Publications. (The author was awarded the Noble Peace Prize in 1959)
- POST-WAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL by Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Brookings Institute.
- ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DISARMAMENT by Emile Benoit, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 2, January 1962.
- ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT Report of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, March 1962.
- PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT by Hans Bethe, Douglas F. Dowd, et al Monthly Review Press 1962. (Articles by six Cornell University Professors, reprinted in pamphlet form, 31 pp.)
- FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT by J.P. Morray. (A history of negotiations on disarmament by a graduate of Harvard Law School, currently teaching at the University of California at Berkeley)
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- THE PRICE OF PEACE by James Wadsworth, Praeger, 127 pp, April 1962. (Ambassador Wadsworth has been one of our most experienced and successful disarmament negotiators. Probably the most remarkable feature of Wadsworth's presentation is that despite the frustrations of years of fruitless negotiations, he rejects decisively any thought of discontinuing the negotiations.)
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- THE BEYOND DETERRENCE SERIES Seven excellent pamphlets put out by the American Friends Service Committee Peace Literature Service, 160 N 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The authors of these pamphlets are: Mulford Sibley, D.F. Fleming, Dallas Smythe, Erich Fromm, Fred Warner Neal, Arthur Waskow, Sidney Lens. Single copies 35¢

Several pamphlets have been put out by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since its formation. These may be procured from the United States Department of State, Public Services Division, Washington 25, D.C.

chronological highlights of disarmament and test-ban negotiations, 1945-62

USA

USSR

JUNE 1945: The United Nations was organized with a veto for the five permanent members of the SECURITY COUNCIL on all matters pertaining to the condemnation and punishment of states.

AUGUST 1945: World War II ended after the explosion of the first atomic bombs on Japan.

JANUARY 1946: The United Nations General Assembly created a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to plan for control of atomic energy, ensure its use for peaceful purposes, eliminate atomic weapons, and devise effective safeguards against violators.

JUNE 14, 1946: The Baruch Proposals for control of atomic energy were presented to the United Nations.

This plan proposed that a strict control system free of any veto be set up under the United Nations. All nations signing the agreement would reveal all their sources of uranium and thorium, and forego the right to do any research leading to the development of nuclear weapons.

There was no definite commitment on the part of the United States to destroy its stockpile of nuclear bombs and convert the fuel to peacetime uses. When the United States was satisfied that an effective control system was in operation it would, "subject to our constitutional processes," turn over its atomic bombs and knowledge of atomic development to the United Nations.

The USSR at this time could command only five out of fifty-one votes in the General Assembly. The Soviets regarded the United Nations as American dominated. Due to greater American experience with atomic energy, it was felt that the control organs would be largely staffed with Americans. The Soviets, who knew that they could discover the secret of the bomb eventually, felt that the Baruch plan would perpetuate American monopoly of the bomb and condemn the USSR permanently to the status of a small power by comparison.

USA

MARCH 1947: The United States introduced at the first meeting of a recently established United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments, a plan of work calling first for consideration of effective safeguards, then for formulation of practical proposals for reduction of armaments.

MARCH 1947: The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted the United States plan of work and refused to consider the question of atomic weapons.

APRIL 1948: The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission decided that the Soviet proposals were not an acceptable basis for the international control of atomic energy. It stated that the USSR wished to ban nuclear weapons without any assurance that all nations would be prevented from producing them. The Commission majority favored the Baruch Plan. By May of 1948, the Commission suspended its work indefinitely.

OCTOBER, 1948: US and other Western powers opposed USSR resolution for the two atomic energy treaties and the 1/3 cutback and proposed the General Assembly adopt a substitute resolution directing the Security Council to make proposals for a census of conventional armaments.

NOVEMBER 4, 1948: The United Nations General Assembly approved the Baruch Plan. The Soviet bloc provided the only dissenting votes.

The US continued to insist for a number of years that control of atomic energy and nuclear disarmament should be based on the Baruch plan. In 1952 it began to withdraw from the plan, and officially abandoned it in 1955.

USSR

MARCH 1947: The USSR proposed that the United Nations Committee on Conventional Armaments adopt a reverse priority from the United States plan. It urged the Commission to establish limits on armaments, and after that to consider the question of controls. It also requested the Commission to consider the banning of atomic weapons despite the fact that the Security Council had already foreclosed discussion of this subject.

JUNE 11, 1947: The USSR elaborated its view on the inspection and control of atomic energy. It proposed an international control commission which would make periodic inspection and special investigations of dangerous processes. These acts of control would be veto-free, but the commission could take no punitive action without the approval of the Security Council, where the USSR had a veto.

SEPTEMBER, 1948: USSR proposed the UN General Assembly direct the UN-AEC to resume work and write two conventions, one to ban atomic weapons, the other to provide international control of atomic energy. Also recommended was a reduction of 1/3, within a year, of all land, sea and air forces of permanent members of the UN Security Council. Opposed by the US and other Western powers, these proposals were defeated by the UN Political Committee.

NOVEMBER 19, 1948: The United Nations General Assembly, after defeating the USSR resolution on "banning the bomb" and cutting back armed forces, went on to approve the US-Western substitute proposal for an arms census of conventional armaments.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1949: The USSR exploded its first atomic bomb.

OCTOBER 11, 1949: The USSR vetoed in the United Nations Security Council the Western plan for a verified census of conventional armaments and armed forces. Before exercising the veto, it attempted to amend the plan to include atomic armaments in the census.

JANUARY 19, 1950: The USSR refused to attend further meetings of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the Security Council, and other United Nations organs.

For the next few years proposals and counter-proposals were made. The Western side concentrated on plans for a verifiable census of conventional arms and on plans for safeguards and control. The USSR insisted that safeguards and control, while important, should follow actual agreement on the amount of reductions to be made in armed forces and armaments. The West wanted to keep conventional arms reductions separate from nuclear disarmament, and it continued to insist upon the Baruch plan as the basis for nuclear disarmament. The USSR, on the other hand, wanted to combine conventional and nuclear disarmament in one treaty, and it continued to denounce the Baruch plan.

The United States and its Western allies finally proposed the merger of negotiations on conventional and nuclear disarmament in the United Nations, but insisted that the Baruch Plan should be the basis for the latter "unless a better and no less effective" system were found. The new negotiating forum became the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

NOVEMBER 1, 1952: The United States tested its first H-bomb in the Pacific Ocean.

AUGUST 20, 1953: The USSR announced that it had tested an H-bomb.

APRIL 21, 1955: The United States joined with the United Kingdom, France and Canada in a new statement on the powers necessary to inspect and supervise the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

MAY 10, 1955: The USSR accepted the following Western propositions:

The control organ, they said, should:

- (1) Insure by inspection that installations, facilities, and materials were not used for making weapons;

- (1) Manpower ceilings of between one and one-half million for the United States, the USSR, and China, with corresponding reductions in armaments.
- (2) A fifty percent arrangement for the cutoff of nuclear production.

USA

- (2) Make aerial and on-the-spot surveys to verify disclosure of installations and facilities;
- (3) Conduct research necessary to keep itself in the forefront of nuclear knowledge.

Punitive powers were no longer to be veto-free. This offered some concession to Russian views. It was stated that the controllers could take only such action as the states agreed upon, pending action by the Security Council.

MAY 12, 1955: James Wadsworth, United States Delegate to the United Nations Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, commented upon the USSR plan of May 10: "We have been gratified to find that the concepts which we have put forward over a considerable length of time ... have been accepted in a large measure by the Soviet Union."

JUNE 1, 1955: The United States asked for a three month adjournment of the Sub-Committee so that the new Soviet proposals could be studied.

JULY, 1955: President Eisenhower, at the Geneva summit conference, put forward the "Open Skies" proposal, calling for an exchange of blueprints of military information between the United States and the USSR with authorized missions of mutual aerial reconnaissance to verify the information. Past disarmament proposals were too sweeping, the President said, to be ensured by inspection.

The United States thus withdrew many of its own prior proposals which were now accepted by the USSR.

SEPTEMBER 6, 1955: Harold Stassen announced before the United Nations Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that the United States "does now place a reservation upon all its pre-Geneva substantive positions taken in this sub-committee ... on these questions in relationship to levels of armaments." The reservation was to remain in effect until better control methods had been found to eliminate the possibility of states hoarding secret nuclear stockpiles.

DECEMBER 5, 1955: Henry Cabot Lodge told the United Nations General Assembly that the United States felt that all prior inspection plans for disarmament control were unrealistic, as known detection devices could not guarantee against hidden nuclear materials.

USSR

- (3) A seventy-five percent arrangement for the abolition of nuclear weapon stockpiles.
- (4) Establishment of a single control organ operating under the United Nations Security Council with progressively expanding powers to station internationally chosen inspectors permanently in all countries.
- (5) Veto-free power of inspection for the control organ, all of whose punitive powers, contrary to the Western view, would be subject to the approval of the United Nations Security Council.
- (6) Agreement by the states at the outset not to use atomic weapons, except in defense against aggression, as defined by the Security Council. (The West did not provide for this definition.)

The USSR also proposed to inaugurate measures to prevent surprise attacks. Ground control posts were to be established at large ports, air bases, main motor and rail junctions. Other provisions were that international inspectors should have access to all records of budgetary appropriations of states for military purposes. When disarmament was complete the USSR proposed to grant the inspectors unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control. The USSR also proposed execution of complete disarmament in two years, and a ban, at the outset, on all nuclear testing.

1955 and after (see Sept. 20, 1957): The USSR's reply to the new Western position on secret nuclear stockpiles was that the problem had been well known since the early days of nuclear weapons production. The Soviets pointed out that they had mentioned the problem in their May 10, 1955 plan to justify a new approach to the problem of a control organ to insure against nuclear aggression. They protested that what they had said could not be valid ground for abandoning total nuclear disarmament.

NOVEMBER 1955: The USSR gave qualified support to the Eisenhower "Open Skies" plan. In the USSR's view the aerial photography procedure should be reserved for the final stages of a disarmament control system.



From The Sunday Times, London
 "Does it matter? You be the American and I'll be the Russian..."



From The Evening Standard, London

MARCH 27, 1956: USSR sought to meet the US part-way in the new emphasis on "partial" measures. It offered a new plan limited to conventional arms reductions (essentially the same as those of the May 10, 1955 plan). Noting the difficulties that had arisen in attempting to reach agreement on comprehensive disarmament, it was suggested that greater progress might be made if all powers concentrated instead on conventional arms. It proposed:

- (1) Manpower ceilings for US, USSR, and China be held to 1.5 million men, and for France and UK 650,000 each.
- (2) A new chapter on controls (rewriting the May 10, 1955 plan) with the following changes:
 - (a) the control organ would be established within 2 months following a disarmament agreement;
 - (b) it would operate fully from the beginning of the disarmament treaty;

(c) it could require from states within one month after operations began "complete official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditures for military requirements." (This represented an acceptance in principle of the arms census idea long advanced by the West--see April 5, 1952); and

(d) a definition of "objects of control" as follows: military units, stores of military equipment, land, sea and air bases, and factories manufacturing conventional armaments. (No reference to nuclear weapons was included in this plan of control, since the proposal was limited to cuts in conventional forces.)

- (3) To the main proposal were added other suggested methods for building confidence among nations. They were offered independent of a general disarmament agreement. These included:
 - (a) a pilot zone for the limitation and inspection of armaments in the territory of both parts of Germany and adjacent states. In this area, atomic armaments would be barred, with joint inspection to ensure enforcement.
 - (b) a ban on atomic weapons only in this area, if the more comprehensive scheme were not acceptable.
 - (c) cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

(d) a 15 percent cut in arms budgets.

MAY 14, 1956: The USSR announced a unilateral demobilization of armed forces amounting to 1,840,000 men from 1955 levels.

SEPTEMBER 1956: Premier Bulganin wrote to President Eisenhower, urging that the problem of nuclear tests be separated from that of disarmament since inspection of a test ban treaty was simpler than inspection of a disarmament agreement.

MARCH 24, 1957: Eisenhower and Macmillan announced that continued nuclear testing was necessary to maintain "free world" security.

APRIL 1, 1957: Harold Stassen told the disarmament subcommittee that the United States now believed that if armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures were reduced too low the danger of war would be increased. A low level of armaments would reflect weakness and would not be conducive to stability in the world.

Stassen also stated that the United States no longer considered that the extreme form of control necessary to police a low level of armaments was "practicable, feasible, or attainable."

MARCH 18, 1957: The USSR again put forward comprehensive disarmament proposals incorporating its own plans of May 10, 1955, and March 27, 1956, together with compromises on certain United States initiatives. Among the proposals was one for total abolition under international control of all missiles for warlike purposes. The USSR also reiterated the offer to have ground control posts at large ports, railway junctions, main motor highways, and airports to warn against surprise attacks.

The proposed international organ would start by establishing an aerial inspection system in a zone extending eight hundred kilometers on each side of the line roughly running along the border between West and East Germany. Arms would be limited and restricted in this area.

This plan was similar to that also introduced in 1957 by Adam Rapacki, foreign minister of Poland. The essence of the Rapacki plan was the establishment of a "non-nuclear" zone along the East-West frontier in central Europe. It planned to include as a nucleus East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.

In this area atomic weapons and long range missiles would be barred, and efforts would be made to thin out the concentration of military forces then stationed there. While warmly endorsing the Polish proposals, the Soviet Union never made them a central position in its disarmament policy.

AUGUST 29, 1957: The United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada, after a summer of negotiations among themselves and with NATO members, announced their "Proposals for partial measures of disarmament."

Among these proposals was the first Western concession on the subject of nuclear testing. A suspension of testing was offered for one year

AUGUST 1957: USSR delegate Zorin told the subcommittee that the four-power "partial measures" were unacceptable to the Soviets. The West had made it plain, he said, that it did not intend to renounce the use of the stocks of nuclear material for the production of weapons nor was it willing to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.

provided agreement could be reached on controls. Another year's suspension was offered provided the control system worked satisfactorily and progress had been made in a plan to cut off new production of nuclear weapons.

SEPTEMBER 19, 1957: Mr. Dulles told the General Assembly that the United States did not feel it prudent, in view of the USSR rejection of partial disarmament measures, to forego nuclear testing.

NOVEMBER 14, 1957: The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution adding sixteen new members to the disarmament commission; seven from the West, two from the Soviet bloc, and seven neutrals.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1957: The USSR submitted a memorandum outlining in vigorous terms why the problem of secret nuclear stockpiles could not be a ground for abandoning total nuclear disarmament.

NOVEMBER 14, 1957: The USSR announced that it would not participate in the work of the enlarged commission.

A TWO-YEAR HIATUS ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ENSUED. The period saw separate negotiations on nuclear testing.

APRIL 28, 1958: President Eisenhower proposed talks between East-West specialists to determine the feasibility of working out an inspection system for nuclear test suspension.

MARCH 31, 1958: The USSR terminated a Soviet nuclear test series, and announced it would cease testing altogether if other powers would also abstain.

MAY 9, 1958: The USSR agreed to a conference of specialists to work out a test ban inspection system.

JULY 1, 1958: A conference of fifteen experts, representing five Western and five Eastern nations, met in Geneva to seek agreement on the technical problems involved in detecting nuclear explosions.

AUGUST 21, 1958: The experts at Geneva announced they had reached unanimous conclusions. Detection was feasible down to the level of one kiloton in the air and five kilotons underground. They recommended one hundred eighty ground observation stations distributed over the world with from twenty to one hundred on-site inspections yearly to determine the nature of seismic events that might be either earthquakes or nuclear explosions.

AUGUST 22, 1958: The United States announced it would suspend nuclear tests for one year beginning at the end of its testing series (then under way) on October 31, 1958. The situation was to be examined anew at the beginning of each year.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1958: The USSR resumed testing of nuclear weapons, in retaliation for US and UK tests which were begun after the March offer of a moratorium. These tests ended November 3, 1958. In the meantime, the USSR had been urging the US and UK to agree to an immediate and unconditional discontinuance of tests until arrangements had been worked out for technical controls. The West felt this amounted to a permanent cessation without controls and would not agree.

USA

January 5, 1959: The United States delegation to a Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests introduced data indicating that it was more difficult than the experts had assumed to distinguish between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. This seemed to indicate the need for a far denser network of detection stations and for more on-site inspections of unidentified explosions than the experts had recommended.

MARCH 1959: The Geneva political conferees decided to refer the technical questions regarding improvement of the seismographs in the test detection stations to a second conference of experts. This met in Geneva on November 25, 1959.

SEPTEMBER 7, 1959: The United States and the USSR agreed to establish a new disarmament committee operating outside the United Nations but reporting to it. Its ten members were to be chosen equally from the West and the Soviet bloc.

OCTOBER 14, 1959: Speaking to the General Assembly, Henry Cabot Lodge said the United States would favor general and complete disarmament following agreement on:

- (1) The type of international police force that should be established to preserve international peace;
- (2) The principle of international law that should govern the use of such a force;
- (3) The precise definition of internal security forces that would be allowed individual nations in place of existing armaments.

DECEMBER 19, 1959: The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had reached agreement on seventeen articles of a treaty covering inspection and control. The US scientist Hans Bethe, who attended the conference, has stated: "... the give and take on both sides was considerable and approximately equal." For instance, agreement was reached on most features of the control organization. As examples of "give and take," the West agreed to permit the use of the veto on matters regarding treaty revision and budgetary decisions. The USSR agreed to drop the veto over on-site inspection in return for which the West accepted a fixed annual quota of such inspections. The USSR agreed to permit teams of mixed nationals (from Soviet, Western, and neutral countries) to make these inspections, provided the West accepted parity of Soviet representation on the proposed control commission. This the West ultimately did in 1961.

DECEMBER 21, 1959: The US Atomic Energy Commission announced that the Rand Corporation had found a method to conceal nuclear explosions in enormous

USSR

JANUARY 1959: The USSR delegation accused the United States of seeking an excuse to torpedo the talks. They said the United States was deliberately falsifying scientific data to prove the impossibility of devising an adequate detection system. They said the United States data had been taken from outmoded stations that were not as reliable as the more efficient system that the Geneva scientists had devised.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1959: Chairman Khrushchev, in a major address before the United Nations General Assembly, introduced a new concept - "General and Complete Disarmament." He proposed the abandonment of all the partial approaches that had resulted in deadlock since 1955 and the substitution of drastic disarmament in return for which the USSR would be willing to grant drastic measures of control. His proposal was the Soviet solution to the long dispute with the West over inspection and control.

DECEMBER 1959: The USSR scientists conceded the validity of the "big hole" theory, as theory, but they said the whole attempt from any

cavities. In theory this could make useless the whole test detection system worked out by the 1958 Geneva conference of the experts.

practical standpoint was ridiculous. The Americans were implying, it was said, that the Geneva test detection stations could be relied upon only to locate explosions of hundreds of thousands of kilotons.

They submitted that this bordered "on the brink of absurdity." They accused the United States of bad faith and of taking steps to ruin any partial agreement as soon as it came in sight.

DECEMBER 23, 1959: The second conference of technical experts recommended a list of new seismological techniques to improve the test ban control system, but broke up over (1) the effectiveness of the improved system, (2) the possibility of concealing explosion in big holes, and (3) the nature of instrument readings that would require on-site inspection of suspicious seismic events. The experts, who had agreed in 1958 that a control system could be effective, were thus contradicted in 1959 by new experts who disagreed over whether it could be effective enough. The Americans said it could not be, the Soviets said it unquestionably could.

DECEMBER 29, 1959: The United States announced it would not renew the moratorium on nuclear testing, and would consider itself free to resume nuclear testing at any time.

JANUARY 1960: The USSR announced it would continue to abide by the moratorium as long as the Western powers abstained from testing.

N.B. Each side introduced additional proposals, but still at issue were the quota of on-site inspections. The United States wanted twenty to thirty inspections per year, the USSR no more than three. Also, the United States wanted nuclear explosions for research to be uninspected on a reciprocal basis. The USSR opposed uninspected tests of this sort.

MARCH 16, 1960: The US, UK, and France introduced a new plan for "General and Complete Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World." It called for disarmament in three stages, and mentioned for the first time in any Western plan since 1955 the possibility of total nuclear disarmament. No promise was offered that it would ever happen, however. The plan called for "further steps" (unspecified), in the last stage of disarmament, "to achieve the final elimination" of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Also, a provision stated that in the final disarmament stage, control was to be established over "the production of agreed categories of military missiles and existing national stocks and their final elimination."

An international organization to preserve the peace was to be established at the end of disarmament.

MARCH 25, 1960: The USSR criticized the Western proposal on the ground that it did not make provisions for disarmament "without which disarmament cannot be general and complete; that is, it did not provide for destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles or for renunciation of the use of such weapons, nor for the complete abolition of armed forces and armaments, nor for the elimination of military bases on foreign territories.

The USSR also opposed an international police force, as proposed by the West, because this would be creating new armed forces in a world which, under general and complete disarmament, would have no weapons or military resources. It said the West would never agree to a leading role for socialist states in such a force, and the socialist states would never agree to such a role for the West.

USA

JUNE 1960: The United States response to this plan was that it required a commitment to move automatically to radical disarmament steps before studies had been completed showing the feasibility of effective control of disarmament. The measures proposed by the USSR, it was said, were "hasty, untried, radical ... (and) immediate" and could create an unstable situation in which the danger of military conflict would increase, not diminish.

JUNE 27, 1960: The US and its Western allies introduced a new version of the March 16 plan for "General and Complete Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World." Greater stress was laid on controlling military missiles, and details of a plan for doing this were offered. In the first stage, a trial system of on-site inspection of air bases, launching pads, and naval bases was to establish "a basis of control" of nuclear delivery systems in later stages. In the final stages, all nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons themselves were to be destroyed provided control was first installed and operating effectively, and provided also that "satisfactory progress" was being made in the field of conventional disarmament. An international peace force was provided in the second stage.

MARCH 1961: Arthur Dean, appointed by the new administration of President Kennedy, went to Geneva to resume the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. He offered several new compromises. One, on the dispute over the annual quota of on-site inspections, offered a new minimum of 12 (instead of 20) such inspections. He also offered the USSR parity of representation on the control commission, and agreed to ask Congressional authority to permit USSR inspection of US nuclear tests for seismic research and peaceful uses.

SEPTEMBER 5, 1961: The United States resumed underground testing of nuclear weapons.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1961: The United States and the USSR, having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament, agreed to recommend eight principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and to call upon other states to cooperate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.

SEE TEXT OF THESE PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN THIS BOOKLET.

USSR

JUNE 7, 1960: The USSR resubmitted the plan for general and complete disarmament, offering revision in the stages of disarmament. The principal changes were destruction of military rockets, missiles, and launching facilities in the first instead of last stage, and the postponement of manpower reductions until the second stage.

JULY 27, 1960: The USSR walked out of the ten-nation disarmament committee. It complained that the NATO powers on the committee had failed to carry out the General Assembly directive to produce measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1960: The USSR introduced a general and complete disarmament plan in the United Nations General Assembly, based on their 1959 plan. An updated version of this plan was submitted by the USSR to the March 1962 negotiations. SEE TEXT OF THIS PLAN INCLUDED IN THIS BOOKLET.

MARCH 1961: The USSR, having once agreed to a single administrator for the control organization, now demanded a triumvirate. The three men were to represent the West, the Socialist, and the Neutral States, and would have to agree un-animously on all decisions.

AUGUST 30, 1961: The USSR announced they were resuming testing of nuclear weapons.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1961: The USSR resumed nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere.

SEPTEMBER 25, 1961: The US presented a new plan to the United Nations General Assembly containing a more specific commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament. It offered to support the examination by a Nuclear Experts Commission of "the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles." If this commission failed to find it feasible, presumably these weapons, under this plan, were to remain in national arsenals. Nuclear weapons delivery systems were to be reduced, their production "halted or limited," and stockpiles finally eliminated -- all without reference to an experts' study.

An international peace force was to be established in the second stage of disarmament. SEE TEXT OF THIS PLAN INCLUDED IN THIS BOOKLET.

DECEMBER 13, 1961: The United States and the USSR announced agreement on a new eighteen-nation negotiating body on disarmament, to be composed of five countries from the West, five from the Soviet bloc, and eight neutral states. Meetings were scheduled to begin March 14, 1962.

JANUARY 29, 1962: The United States and United Kingdom walked out of the Geneva test ban talks, stating that the USSR position of November 28 meant renunciation of the international inspection system previously agreed to in some details.

FEBRUARY 22, 1962: The United States refused to resume test ban talks within the context of the Geneva disarmament negotiations on what it termed the USSR's "condition" that each state police the test ban with its own instruments.

NOVEMBER 28, 1961: The USSR called upon the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to join with it in a declaration of intent to cease nuclear testing, leaving verification to the detection systems within the separate states or to agree alternatively to halt nuclear testing with international inspection as part of an overall agreement on general and complete disarmament.

FEBRUARY 22, 1962: The USSR announced that it was willing to discuss the test ban at the forthcoming disarmament negotiations at Geneva, since the West seemed unwilling to consider a test ban that would be policed by each state, using detection devices within its own borders.

Prime Minister Macmillan, March 6, 1962:

"... remarkable advances in scientific instruments may make it easier to arrange for a form of international verification without some of the difficulties which have hitherto made it difficult for the Russians to accept."



President John F. Kennedy:

*“... in the long run, the only real security
in this age of nuclear peril
rests not in armament but in disarmament.”*

ALBERT EINSTEIN: Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.

actual disarmament proposals

USSR

22 March 1962

Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control

Draft Submitted by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Full Text)

PREAMBLE

THE states of the world,

Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, the more so under the present conditions of the headlong development of means of mass annihilation, such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,

Discharging the historic mission of saving all the nations from the scourge of war,

Proceeding from the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and feasible way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of assuring eternal and inviolable peace on earth,

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilation and of destruction of material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards the assurance of the further growth of wellbeing and social and economic progress in all countries of the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among states on the basis of the principles of peace, neighbourliness, equality of states and peoples, non-interference, and respect for the

independence and sovereignty of all countries,

And reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty, and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

PART I—GENERAL

ARTICLE 1

Disarmament Obligations

The states parties to the present Treaty undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of four years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

The prohibition, and the destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the manufacture, of weapons of mass

destruction of all kinds, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

The destruction and discontinuance of the manufacture of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

The dismantling of foreign military bases of all kinds, and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed on the territory of any state;

The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

The termination of military train-

ing of the population and the closing of all military educational institutions;

The abolition of War Ministries, of general staffs and their local agencies, and of all other military and paramilitary establishments and organisations;

The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment, and the termination of their manufacture, except for the manufacture of strictly limited amounts of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by states after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from state budgets or from organisations or private individuals.

2. To have at their disposal, upon the completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with small firearms, and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of Article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously, in three consecutive stages, as is set forth in Parts II, III, and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place upon a decision by the International Disarmament Organisation that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified, and that any additional verification arrangements, recognised to be necessary for the next stage, have been prepared and can, when appropriate, be put into operation.

4. To carry out all measures of

general and complete disarmament in a manner that will ensure that at no stage of disarmament could any state or group of states gain a military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all states parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

Control Obligations

1. The states parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to assure the implementation on their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organisation including all states parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as the disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organisation and its bodies are laid down in Part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all countries parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organisation shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to assure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of states.

This staff shall exercise control, on a temporary or permanent basis depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by states with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their manufacture, and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The states parties to the Treaty shall in good time submit to the

International Disarmament Organisation such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organisation shall be kept in being to maintain supervision over the implementation by states of the obligations they have assumed, so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of states in any form whatsoever.

ARTICLE 3

Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security

1. The states parties to the Treaty have solemnly resolved in the course of, and after general and complete disarmament:

(a) To base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly co-existence and co-operation;

(b) Not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) To strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The states parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament, in any manner other than for the assurance of the internal security of states or for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

PART II—FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

ARTICLE 4

First-Stage Tasks

The states parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous

elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases on alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories, and to reduce their armed forces, conventional armaments and the manufacture of these armaments, and military expenditures.

ings under the provisions of Article 15 of the present Treaty. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of the aforementioned rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and subsidiary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The manufacture of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft, and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article, shall be completely discontinued.

All enterprises, or workshops thereof, engaged in their manufacture shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the manufacture of such items shall be destroyed, and the premises of such enterprises, as well as general-purpose machine tools and equipment, shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. For the peaceful exploration of

Chapter 1

Elimination of Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons and of Foreign Military Bases on Alien Territories, and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Those Territories. Control over Such Measures

(a) MEANS OF DELIVERY

ARTICLE 5

Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, all rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons, of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical

(except for strictly limited numbers of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses), as well as pilotless aircraft of all types. There shall be completely demolished all launching pads, ramps and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those pads that will be retained for peaceful launch-

space there shall be allowed the manufacture and testing of appropriate rockets, provided that the plants manufacturing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, are subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation.

ARTICLE 6

Elimination of Military Aircraft Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft, repair and maintenance facilities, and storage places at these airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The manufacture of all military aircraft referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. Enterprises, or workshops thereof, designed for the manufacture of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the manufacture of civil aircraft or other peaceful items.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

ARTICLE 7

Elimination of All Surface Warships Capable of Being Used as Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines

1. There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines of any class or type. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of these warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and converted to peaceful uses by the merchant marine.

2. The building of warships and submarines referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or in part designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

ARTICLE 8

Elimination of All Artillery Systems Capable of Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from

the armed forces, and destroyed, all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons. All subsidiary instruments and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage places and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire non-nuclear stock of munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems, and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof, shall be destroyed.

2. The manufacture of artillery systems referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. To this end all plants, or workshops thereof, engaged in the manufacture of such systems shall be closed or dismantled. All specialised equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The manufacture of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the manufacture of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialised equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

(b) FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS ON ALIEN TERRITORIES

ARTICLE 9

Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the present Treaty, the states parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases on foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or stand-by, as well as all depot bases of any designation. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments at such bases for which provision is made in Articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall be destroyed on the spot in accordance with Article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the state which owned the base.

All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. Living quarters and subsidiary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the states on whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fully applicable to those military bases that are used by foreign troops, even though legally they may belong to the state on whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with regard to those army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other states or groups of states, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at these bases at

the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the bodies of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment and use of military bases on foreign territories, shall become invalid and not subject to renewal. The granting henceforth of military bases for use by foreign troops and the concluding for this purpose of any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements shall be prohibited.

3. The legislatures and governments of the states parties to the present Treaty, shall enact legislation and promulgate decrees to ensure that no military bases for use by foreign troops are established on their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

ARTICLE 10

Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the present Treaty, the states parties to the Treaty which have troops, or military personnel of any nature, on foreign territories, shall withdraw all such troops and personnel therefrom. All armaments, and all installations of a military nature, which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and for which provision is made in Articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot.

Other armaments shall be destroyed on the spot under Article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the state withdrawing the troops. Living quarters and subsidiary installations formerly held by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the states on whose territory such troops have been stationed.

2. The measures set forth in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces, or engaged in the manufacture of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes on foreign territory. The said persons shall be recalled to the territory of the state whose citizenship they hold, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by bodies of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities shall be invalidated and made not subject to renewal. The future dispatching of foreign troops, military personnel or the said civilians to foreign territories shall be prohibited.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations and the transfer of the premises referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article. The International Disarmament Organisation shall have the right to exercise control over the recall of civilians referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article. The legislation and decrees referred to in Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the present Treaty, shall include provisions prohibiting the citizens of states parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities for military purposes in foreign states.

Chapter 2—Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control over Such Measures

ARTICLE 11

Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the states parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America — 1,700,000 enlisted officers and men and civilian employees;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—1,700,000 enlisted officers and men and civilian employees.

[agreed levels of armed forces for other states parties to the Treaty shall be included in this Article].

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilisation of personnel released due to the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in Articles 5 to 10 inclusive of the present Treaty, and primarily by way of the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilised.

3. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as

the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released and where conventional armaments and military equipment are destroyed, and shall also control the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc

ARTICLE 12

Curtailment of Manufacture of Conventional Armaments

1. Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in Article 11 of the present Treaty, the manufacture of conventional armaments and munitions not referred to in Articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the present Treaty shall be curtailed. Such curtailment shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the manufacture of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises shall be dismantled, their specialised machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises, and general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE 13

Reduction of Military Expenditures

1. The states parties to the present

Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their manufacture, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawals of foreign troops from alien territories, as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the curtailment of the manufacture of such armaments as are provided for in Articles 5 to 12 inclusive of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidising of the national economy. At the same time a certain share of the funds thus released shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this share shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article through its financial inspectors, whom the states parties to the Treaty shall undertake to assure unhindered access to the records of central financial offices pertaining to the reduction of budgetary allocations of states due to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and to the reduction of conventional armaments, including the relevant acts of their legislative and executive bodies.

Chapter 3—Measures to Ensure the Security of States

ARTICLE 14

Restriction of Displacement of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. From the very beginning of the first stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5 to 8 inclusive of the present Treaty, the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited.

2. The International Disarmament Organisation shall control the compliance by the states parties to the Treaty with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article. The states parties to the Treaty shall provide advance information to the International Disarmament Organisation about all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes, as provided for in Article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as about all flights of military aircraft within their national frontiers and movements of warships within their territorial waters.

ARTICLE 15

Control over Launchings of Rockets for Peaceful Purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article through the establishment of inspection teams at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings and these teams shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before it is launched.

ARTICLE 16

Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The states parties to the Treaty owning nuclear weapons shall undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their manufacture to states not owning them.

The states parties to the Treaty not owning nuclear weapons shall undertake to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other state into their territories.

ARTICLE 17

Prohibition of Nuclear Tests

The holding of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited. [If such a prohibition is not implemented under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed].

ARTICLE 18

Measures to Improve the Capacity of the United Nations to Assure International Peace and Security

1. To ensure that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting the states against threats to, or breaches of the peace, all states parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council on making available to the latter armed forces, assistance and appropriate facilities, the right of passage included, as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter

2. The armed forces provided under the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the corresponding states and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be fully manned, equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, commanded by the military authorities of the corresponding states, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

Chapter 4—Time-Limits for Measures of First Stage. Transition from First to Second Stage

ARTICLE 19 Time-Limits for Measures of the First Stage

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (under Article 46 of the present Treaty), within which period the International Disarmament

Organisation shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months.

ARTICLE 20 Transition from First to Second Stage

In the course of the last three

months of the first stage, the International Disarmament Organisation shall review the results of the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the states parties to the Treaty, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART III—SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

ARTICLE 21 Second-Stage Tasks The states parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the second

stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well

as the further reduction of their armed forces, conventional armaments and the manufacture of these armaments, and military expenditures.

Chapter 5—Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons. Control over Such Measures

ARTICLE 22 Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

1. (a) There shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed, nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for the immediate re-establishment of weapons, and they shall form a special fund for peaceful uses, belonging to the state which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons purposes shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for immediate use in nuclear weapons, and shall be transferred to the aforementioned special funds.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall control the execution of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. (a) The manufacture of nuclear weapons, and of fissionable materials

for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to peaceful production. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the manufacture of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the manufacture of such weapons, shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful production.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a), shall be executed under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation.

The International Disarmament Organisation shall have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The states parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organisation documents pertaining to the extraction of nuclear raw materials, to their processing and to their utilisation for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each state party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, enact legis-

lation on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on liability under the criminal law for any attempt at their re-establishment by individuals or organisations.

ARTICLE 23 Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons

1. There shall be eliminated from the arsenals of states, and destroyed (neutralised), all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or stored in various depots and storage places. Simultaneously, all instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, as well as all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation, shall be destroyed.

2. The manufacture of all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or in part engaged in the manufacture of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful production.

3. The measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be executed under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation.

Chapter 6—Further Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control over Such Measures

ARTICLE 24 Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament, the armed forces of the states parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America—one million enlisted officers and men and civilian employees;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—one million enlisted officers and men and civilian employees.

[Agreed levels of armed forces for other states parties to the

Treaty shall be included in this Article].

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilisation of personnel previously attached to the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under Articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, and mainly by way of the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilised.

2. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the units being disbanded shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful

uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released and conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and shall also control the conversion to peaceful

uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

ARTICLE 25

Further Curtailment of Conventional Armaments Manufacture

1. Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in Article 24 of the present Treaty, the manufacture of conventional armaments and munitions shall be curtailed. Such curtailment shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the manufacture of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises shall be dismantled, their specialised machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation.

ARTICLE 26

Further Reduction of Military Expenditures

1. The states parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of their manufacture, as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the curtailment of the manufacture of such armaments as provided for in Articles 22 to 25 inclusive of the Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidising of the national economy. At the same time a certain share of the funds thus released shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall also be assured unhindered access to materials pertaining to the reduction of budgetary allocations of states due to the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

Chapter 7—Measures to Ensure Security of States

ARTICLE 27

Continued Improvement of the Capacity of the United Nations to Assure International Peace and Security

The states parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures, referred to in Article 18 of the present treaty, regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

Chapter 8—Time-Limits for Measures of Second-Stage Transition from Second to Third Stage

ARTICLE 28

Time-Limits for Measures of the Second Stage

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months.

ARTICLE 29

Transition from Second to Third Stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage, the International Disarmament Organisation

shall review the results of the implementation of the stage.

Measures pertaining to the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to those provided for the first stage under Article 20 of the present Treaty.

PART IV—THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

ARTICLE 30

Third-Stage Tasks

The states parties to the Treaty

undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, to disband fully all their

armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military establishment of states.

Chapter 9—Completion of Elimination of Military Establishment of States. Control over Such Measures

ARTICLE 31

Completion of the Elimination of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the states parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remain at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each state party to the Treaty shall be fully abolished.

2. The states parties to the Treaty shall destroy all armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remain at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc., to peaceful uses.

The International Disarmament

Organisation shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the states parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE 32

Complete Termination of Military Production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be terminated, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for purposes referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialised machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the manufacture of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments for the manufacture of armaments, military equipment,

munitions and matériel with national or foreign government-owned enterprises and private firms shall be annulled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE 33

Abolition of Military Establishments

1. There shall be abolished War Ministries, general staffs and all other military and paramilitary organisations and institutions, designed to organise the military effort of states parties to the Treaty. The states parties to the Treaty shall:

- Demobilise all personnel of these institutions and organisations;
- Abrogate all legislative acts, rules and regulations governing the organisation of the military effort and status, structure and activities of such institutions and organisations;
- Destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilisation and the operational

deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and paramilitary institutions and organisations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation.

ARTICLE 34

Abolition of Military Conscription and Military Training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the states parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for

reservists. Simultaneously there shall be disbanded all establishments and organisations dealing with military training as provided for in Article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organisations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation.

ARTICLE 35

Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for Military Purposes

1. There shall be discontinued the appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from government bodies or private individuals and public organisations.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidising of the national economy. At the same time, a certain share of the funds thus released shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this share shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. To organise control over the implementation of the provisions of this Article, the International Disarmament Organisation shall have the right of access to legislative acts and budgetary documents of the states parties to the present Treaty.

Chapter 10—Measures to Ensure Security of States and Maintain International Peace

ARTICLE 36

Contingents of Police (Militia)

1. To maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of the frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to ensure compliance with their obligations pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter, the states parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have, after the complete abolition of armed forces, strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with small firearms.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each state party to the treaty shall be as follows:

2. The states parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, and their quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organisation shall exercise control over the compliance by the states parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said small firearms.

ARTICLE 37

Provision of Police (Militia) Units to the Security Council

1. The states parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of

the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and appropriate facilities, including the right of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council is carried out under the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. To ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the states parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness that part of the police (militia) contingents which is intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the states parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, as well as the areas where they are stationed, shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by the states parties to the Treaty with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of states existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. The commanding body shall decide on all questions by agreement among its members representing the three groups of states.

ARTICLE 38

Control over the Prevention of the Re-establishment of Armed Forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the states parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the Inter-

national Disarmament Organisation, which shall verify the reports by states about the areas where such contingents are stationed and their strength and armaments in each such area, and about all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organisation shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each state party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organisation shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the states parties to the Treaty.

Chapter 11—Time Limits for Measures of Third Stage

ARTICLE 39

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage, the International Disarmament Organisation shall review the results of the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament, with a view to reporting on them to the states parties to the Treaty, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART V—STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANISATION

ARTICLE 40

Functions and Main Bodies

The International Disarmament Organisation, to be set up under Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organisation", shall have a conference of all states parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a control council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organisation shall deal with questions pertaining to supervision over the compliance by states with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions related to the

assurance of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 41

The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all states parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year, and special sessions which may be summoned by decision of the Council or on the request of a

majority of the states parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters pertaining to the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organisation, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each state party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority, and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any

matters pertaining to the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and may make recommendations to the states parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matters or measures.

4. The Conference shall:

- (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
- (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
- (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
- (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with Article 47 of the present Treaty;
- (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
- (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

ARTICLE 42

The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:

(a) The five permanent member-states of the United Nations Security Council;

(b) . . . [number] other states parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of states existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:

(a) Direct in practice the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organisation as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in

accordance with the present Treaty;

(b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it considers it necessary to prepare;

(c) Be in constant touch with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the states parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;

(d) Review the results of the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the states parties to the Treaty, and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(e) Recruit the staff of the Organisation on an international basis, so as to ensure that the three principal groups of states existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organisation shall be recruited from among those persons who are recommended by the governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending government;

(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organisation;

(g) Elaborate instructions to direct the operations of the various control elements;

(h) Make timely analyses of incoming reports;

(i) Request from states such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary to control the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;

(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council

shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorised to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 43

Privileges and Immunities

The Organisation, its personnel and representatives of the states parties to the Treaty shall enjoy on the territory of each state party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 44

Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organisation shall be met by the states parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organisation shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with Paragraph 4(c) of Article 41 and Paragraph 2(f) of Article 42 of the present Treaty.

2. The states parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditures of the Organisation according to the following scale:

[the agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present Article].

ARTICLE 45

Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty the states represented on the 18-power Disarmament Committee shall set up a preparatory commission with the task of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organisation.

PART VI—FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 46

Ratification and Entry into Force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes, within a period of six months from the date of the signing of the Treaty, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations secretariat by all the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those states that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by [number] non-aligned states.

ARTICLE 47

Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a conference of all states parties to the Treaty, and ratified in accordance with their constitutional procedures by the states referred to in Article 46 of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 48

Authentic Texts

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic,

shall be deposited with the United Nations secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory states.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at

actual disarmament proposals

USA

18 April 1962



COMPLETE TEXT

Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following-outline of basic provisions of such a treaty.

A. OBJECTIVES

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and complete disarmament, states would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with

agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament program would be honored and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

B. PRINCIPLES

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

Introduction

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other states as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

Stage I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty percent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph b below. Except as adjustments for production would be permitted in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b would be reduced by thirty percent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed).

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category).

2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I would be carried out during each step.

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments:

(1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category to the end that the ten percent reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore

(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater, the destructive capability of any such armaments produced within a category would be compensated for by the destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end that the ten percent reduction in destructive capability as well as numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in any category at a more rapid rate than required by the allowances provided in subparagraph b above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its production allowance. In any such instance, any armament so retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in subparagraph b (1) and, where applicable, b (2) above to the end that the ten percent reduction in numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

e. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. *Additional Measures*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. *Reduction of Armed Forces*

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one percent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. *Armed Forces Subject to Reduction*

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national governments in the following categories:

- a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.
- b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.
- c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

3. *Method of Reduction of Armed Forces*

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.
- b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I.
- c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

4. *Additional Measures*

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. *Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons*

- a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.
- b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.

(2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. *Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons*

a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 from past production. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the material belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.

3. *Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

4. *Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

- (1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
- (2) Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

- (1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;
- (2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

5. *Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions*

a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. OUTER SPACE

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Maneuvers

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and maneuvers to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to

be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications Between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of government and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.

b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified

activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.

c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below.

(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned, access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected.

(4) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

a. The International Disarmament Organization would have:

- (1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;
- (2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and
- (3) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;
- b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;
- c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;
- d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament

Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;

e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;

g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;

h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;

i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;

k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.

6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;

b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;

c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;

d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;

f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;

i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;

b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;

c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

a. The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements

with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.

c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

NOTE: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;

c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out.

b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and

c. All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.

3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage II would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

Stage II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;

2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty percent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty percent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to

the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by sixty-five percent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty percent in Stage I.

2. *Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction*

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph b below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty percent.

b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).

(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).

(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometers (declarations by types).

(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).

(5) Specified types of unarmored personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).

(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).

(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).

(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph 1.b and in subparagraph b above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

3. *Method of Reduction*

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

4. *Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities*

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

5. *Additional Measures*

a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical

and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty percent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II.

(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. *Reduction of Armed Forces*

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

(1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels fifty percent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I.

(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.

2. *Method of Reduction*

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

3. *Additional Measures*

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. *Reduction of Nuclear Weapons*

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for

which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stage II.

F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted

during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

H. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:

- All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out;
- All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and
- All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining at the end of Stage II whether they existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the fore-

going circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage III would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

Stage III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible. During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II.

2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

- a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes.
- b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements

necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

3. Other Limitations

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of Reduction

- a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction

- a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
- b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in

the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III:

a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.

b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with subparagraph a above.

2. International Cooperation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international cooperation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stage III.

2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage III.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps

and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

2. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine whether Stage III had been completed.

3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

General Provisions Applicable to All Stages

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry into Force of the Treaty

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession, by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by _____ states, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states:

d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would

have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository.

4. Finance

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organization's expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

A MESSAGE FROM DR. SPOCK

If you've been raising a family on Dr. Spock's book, you know that he doesn't get worried easily.

From the university in Ohio where he works, he sends you this message about the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere:

"I am worried. Not so much about the effect of past tests, but at the prospect of endless future ones. As the tests multiply, so will the damage to children—here and around the world.

"Who gives us this right?

"Some citizens would leave all the thinking to the government. They forget the catastrophic blunders that governments have made throughout history.

"There are others who think that superior armaments will solve the problem. They scorn those who believe in the strength of a just cause. They have forgotten that a frail idealist in a loin cloth compelled the British to back out of India.

"There are dangers in any course. I would rather we took small risks today if there is hope of lessening the enormous risks which lie ahead.

"And if I am to be destroyed through some miscalculation, I would prefer to be destroyed while we are showing leadership in the search for a cooperative world than while sitting in an illusory fortress blaming our opponents for the lack of a solution.

"In a moral issue, I believe that every citizen has not only the right, but the responsibility to make his own feelings known and felt."

Benjamin Spock, M.D.

agreement on goals

AGREEMENT ON GOALS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND USSR PROVIDING
EIGHT PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE NEGOTIATIONS BEGINNING MARCH 14, 1962
(McCloy-Zorin Agreement, September 20, 1961)

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on March 30, 1961,

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of November 20, 1959,

Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,

The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to cooperate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. The program for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a UN peace force.

3. To this end, the program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament program should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created

within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspector should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total program has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total program and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that program.

—September 20, 1961

(The U.S. Government was willing to remove one sentence from paragraph 6 in the interests of progress toward resuming disarmament negotiations, on the understanding that the substantive position of the United States Government remains unchanged, and is in no sense prejudiced by the exclusion of this sentence from the joint statement of agreed principles. The sentence read,



"Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage."

MOTHERS. LOBBY for a TEST BAN

WSP
TEST BAN LOBBY

May 7 '63





Photos by
OLGA DIAMOND

disarmament negotiations

1962-1963

by Lorraine Nelson

Disarmament negotiations, dormant since June 27, 1960 (see Story of Disarmament, pages 17-27), were formally renewed in Geneva on March 14, 1962, with the convening of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. Actually, only 17 nations were involved, for France, once among the most active of the disarmament negotiators, refused to take its place on the committee.

During the 18-month hiatus in negotiations, disarmament had become increasingly a world imperative. Peace movements everywhere gathered momentum and increased their influence. Peace research became a widespread and growing endeavor. The USSR, having proposed at the United Nations in September, 1959, that disarmament, to be effective, must be general and complete, vigorously pushed the concept. The United Nations in November, 1959, endorsed the Soviet concept, and with the breakdown of the 1960 negotiations, urged the US and USSR to resume the talks in another, more appropriate, body. President John Kennedy, in September, 1961, formally accepted the concept as the goal of United States policy and in the same month the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created as an autonomous agency of the federal government.

Joint Statement of Principles

The way was already being cleared for the reopening of disarmament negotiations. In June, 1961, bilateral discussions had begun between the US and USSR on composition of a new negotiating committee. These efforts culminated, first of all, on September 20, 1961, in agreement on a Joint Statement of Principles to guide future negotiations (see Story of Disarmament, page 80, for text of this statement). Chief among the principles were those declaring that disarmament must be general and complete, that nuclear armaments must be eliminated from national arsenals, that disarmament must be achieved by stages, and that it must be balanced so that at no time can any state or group of states gain military advantage over any other one or more states. It was also agreed that there should be an international peace force for which states would provide the manpower.

Later, on December 13, 1961, a collateral agreement was reached on membership of a new negotiating committee. Included were all of the old 10-Nation Disarmament Committee (the US, UK, France, Italy, Canada, the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania), plus the following neutral powers: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic.

Sessions of the new 18-Nation Committee are under auspices, though not an integral part, of the United Nations. The UN provides the meeting place at Geneva and the United Nations Secretariat staffs the meetings. The committee also makes regular reports to the United Nations General Assembly.

Structurally, the conference is divided into three working groups, realistically reflecting the several directions in which the nations now approach disarmament.

How the tasks are carried out

The main work of writing a treaty on general and complete disarmament has been given to the Plenary Session. The drafting of partial, collateral measures of arms control, aimed at lessening international tension and reducing the dangers of nuclear conflict in advance of agreement upon a comprehensive disarmament treaty, is in the hands of a Committee of the Whole. (See pp. 91-92 for a summary of this Committee's work.) A separate subcommittee, consisting of the US, the UK and the USSR, the main atomic powers of the world, is pursuing negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. This subcommittee in effect continues the work of the old Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. (See pp. 93-96 for a summary of developments in this subcommittee.)

Since convening, the Disarmament Committee has periodically interrupted its work with long recesses, to give negotiators time for consultations with their governments. Now in its fourth session, the committee appears to have become a continuing body in which the world's disarmament negotiations will be conducted for the foreseeable future.

The two draft treaties

The committee now has before it the two draft disarmament treaties submitted by the US and the USSR (see pp. 61-79 of the Story of Disarmament for texts of the original drafts of these documents). The proposed treaties differ not so much in detail or goals as they do in the basic manner in which each would arrive at nuclear disarmament. Reduced to a word, it may be said that the US follows the quantitative approach, the USSR the qualitative. As things now stand, each thinks the other's approach would impair its security during disarmament.

First on the table was the USSR's 48-page draft treaty, offered on the first day of the new committee's work in March, 1962. The treaty was, in effect, an expanded version of the short outlines presented to the UN in 1959 and again in 1960. (See Story of Disarmament, pp. 23-27.) No new ideas or formulas, as such, were offered.

Essentially, the Soviet treaty proposed that the world disarm through qualitative changes in the military posture of the chief powers, reflecting the official USSR view that disarmament, if it is

to give no side a military advantage over the other, can only be accomplished in conditions of equality.

The Soviet proposals

The treaty's provisions called for outright elimination, in the first stage of disarmament, of nuclear delivery vehicles and all foreign bases; and, in the second stage, for elimination of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. The process was to be accompanied by gradual reductions, to numerically equal levels, in armed forces and conventional armaments. The entire process was to be completed in no more than four years.

The Soviets maintained for several weeks that their document, as the only complete draft treaty before the conference, should be used as the basis for negotiations.

Seeing the advantages the Soviet side could gain by having the basic draft treaty, the US, on April 18, 1962, resubmitted its plan of September 25, 1961, in a rewritten and more detailed form. It was actually called a "blueprint" for a treaty, rather than a draft treaty. The New York Times of April 19, 1962, stated: "The US stopped short of submitting an actual draft treaty ... because in the West's view, East and West must negotiate their way to a similar meaning of what is involved before they get down to working out the treaty"

and the U.S. stand

The American document spelled out the US view that disarmament must be achieved by percentage, across-the-board (i.e. quantitative) cuts in delivery systems for nuclear weapons and conventional armament. Production of nuclear weapons themselves would be gradually reduced, by quantities to be negotiated, until stocks at the disposal of the various states were eliminated at the end of disarmament. The disbanding of troops was to be accomplished (in the same manner proposed by the Soviets) by cuts to numerically equal levels. What was specifically called for was a gradual reduction of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons by two-thirds, on each side, spread over a period of six years. The present military balance in these armaments would be maintained. Military bases would remain intact until the second stage of disarmament, when an agreed number, irrespective of location, would be dismantled. The elimination of the remainder of both vehicles and bases, as well as all nuclear weapons, was accepted as the goal of the plan, but it was to occur at a date unspecified in the future.

A figure of nine years was mentioned as a possibility in official statements at the time, but it was acknowledged that the time actually needed to complete the process of disarmament could be less, or longer, than that.

"... a tolerable balance today"

The drafts of the American and Soviet treaties, therefore, established seemingly incompatible interpretations of one of the major negotiating principles -- i.e. disarmament should give neither one side nor the other a significant military advantage at any point in the process.

US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a speech delivered in Geneva March 27, 1962, put it this way:

"The United States proposal is based on the conviction that there is a tolerable balance today, and that across-the-board, carefully implemented, progressively larger percentage reductions serve disarmament most while disturbing balance least.

"The thought behind the approach is that reductions in this manner will in fact leave nations with compositions of armaments, that is armaments mix, which are organically sound and which they and their neighbors understand and to which they are accustomed.

"The difference, as the percentage of cuts go higher and higher, is only that the overall levels of arms will go lower and lower. The across-the-board, carefully implemented, percentage-cut approach avoids the shock of removing, by major surgery, a disproportionate part of any one component of an intricately integrated military mix upon which a nation has come to rely in protecting its security."

The "Major Surgery" approach

The Soviets, for their part, were firmly committed to the "major surgery" approach. Running through the speeches of their representatives at Geneva, including those of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, was the persistent contention that disarmament must be carried out in conditions of equality. To achieve it, therefore, according to this reasoning, the balance of power must be, in effect, progressively equalized. In their opinion, the threat of nuclear war is directly linked to the existence of nuclear armaments and the pervasive fear of the world that they may be used. Hence their outright elimination, reducing both sides roughly to a state of parity, is the sine qua non of balanced disarmament. The Soviets complained that the US disarmament plan would weaken Russian rocket strength while keeping Russia itself ringed with American bases.

AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS

Manpower Cuts

The American and Soviet plans both proposed gradual cuts across the board, to numerically equal levels, in men under arms. The Soviets wanted the more drastic reductions -- to 1.7 million men in the first stage for itself and the US, to 1 million men in the second stage, and complete elimination of all armed forces except for militia (police) units in the final stage. These units would be used for purposes of internal security and some of them would, upon request, be placed at the disposal of the UN Security Council.

The US, for its part, proposed to cut armed forces in the first stage to 2.1 million men for itself and the USSR, to 1.5 million men in the second stage, and to send back to civilian life in the third stage all those except the number who by agreement would be contributed to a United Nations Peace Force.

The UN Peace Force

The US and USSR, while agreed on the need for international peace-keeping machinery, differed profoundly on the method of organization of these forces and (potentially) the type of equipment they would use.

The Soviet plan appeared to envision a peace force that would be contributed to the UN Security Council (with its big power veto) by the various states on an ad hoc basis. The US sought a more permanent and independent organization.

On how it would be equipped, the Soviet draft contained provision for the states to continue to manufacture weapons for the militia units, whether used nationally or internationally, but these weapons in all cases would be limited to light firearms.

The US plan said only that the force would have such armament as could be agreed upon and that the various states would continue to supply it. While nuclear weapons and means for their delivery would no longer be available to the states at the end of disarmament, they were not, under the US plan, prohibited to the UN peace force.

Actually, at the time the American disarmament plan was submitted in Geneva, unnamed officials of the US were quoted (by both the Washington Post and the Washington Evening Star on April 19, 1962) as saying that the American government thought the peace force might have to be armed with atomic weapons.

This statement, and the ambiguity in the US plan which lent credence to the possibility that the Americans might indeed pursue this goal, was seized upon again and again in the following months by the Soviet negotiators at Geneva as one of the grounds why they could not accept the American approach to disarmament.

Inspection and Control

On the key question of how disarmament shall be controlled and enforced, the US and USSR also offered dissimilar, though perhaps not irreconcilable, approaches.

The essence of the problem was to determine how, in the early stages of disarmament, while each side still retains weapons and forces in its own defense, international inspectors can verify the actual quantities retained.

The Soviet plan called for elaborate inspection of actual destruction and dismantlement of weapons and weapons systems, and of the disbanding of men under arms. In the main, the treaty provided for outright elimination of the crucial, i.e. nuclear, armaments; hence from the second stage of disarmament nothing was to be retained in these categories. However, controls were provided (though they were poorly spelled out) against the clandestine replacement of any or all of these elements of the states' military posture, including access for international inspectors to all factories formerly engaged in manufacturing arms and to budgetary decisions of legislative and executive authorities. Once disarmament was complete, international inspection to prevent violations, including aerial inspection, would be unlimited.

However, until disarmament was complete in all its phases, the Soviets would give the international inspectorate little choice but to accept the word of any state that the factories opened up to them, and the men who remained under arms, were in fact all that existed.

The Western powers' principal complaint against the Soviet disarmament scheme is on this point -- that no precaution is taken against secret force levels and clandestine operation of armament facilities while disarmament is still incomplete.

The Americans, on their side, insist that the international inspectorate should be operated intensively from the beginning and that there must be inspection of the levels retained as well as verification of the actual disarmament.

Like the Soviets, the Americans want an inspection system that is unlimited in scope only when disarmament itself is complete. As an example of the type of arrangement it had in mind, the US mentioned a system of progressive zonal inspection (though it did not endorse it specifically). Under such a system, as the US outlined it, each country would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones of more or less equal military significance. At specified times, during the disarmament process, an agreed number of zones in each country would be selected for inspection by the other side. Inspection in the zones selected would be intensive and complete and would include aerial and ground inspection. It would remain open for inspection while other zones were inspected on a similar basis, as disarmament progressed from state to stage. All zones would be opened by the end of disarmament.

MAJOR CONCESSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS

During the year's negotiations, both the US and USSR have made concessions and modifications in their treaty proposals.

US modifications

The United States amended its draft to provide for a halt in testing and production of new nuclear and conventional weapons at the beginning of stage one, instead of, as originally proposed, at the beginning of stage two.

It also modified the procedure it had established for transition from stage to stage in the disarmament process. In essence, the American position now is that the transition should occur provided there is agreement by both the US and USSR. As originally proposed, the US wanted ultimate authority for this transition to reside with the UN Security Council, where veto of all the big powers would apply.

Changes by the Soviet Union

A number of changes in its draft treaty were offered by the USSR. The major ones are listed below:

1. Percentage cuts in conventional armaments, instead of reductions proportionate to the cutback in armed forces, were accepted. The

figures of 30 percent for the first stage and 35 percent for the second stage were proposed, thus bringing the Soviet approach a step closer to the American on this point.

2. The Soviets also moved in the direction of the Western view by proposing that some measures of arms control should be incorporated in the first stage of a disarmament treaty. (Since 1959, "partial" disarmament had been resisted by the USSR) Now it proposed (a) the exchange of military missions between states and groups of states, (b) the establishment of rapid and improved means of communications among governments and the United Nations, and (c) a restriction on the carrying out of combined military maneuvers by two or more states or groups of states.

3. The proposed four-year time period for completion of disarmament was lengthened to five years.

4. The cutback in force levels in the first stage was changed to 1.9 million men for the US and USSR, instead of the 1.7 million originally suggested.

A concession to the West


5. Finally, on September 22, 1962, the USSR tabled a new version of its draft treaty in the United Nations General Assembly. The major change made in the new treaty was a concession to the Western view that nuclear delivery vehicles should not be eliminated in one fell swoop but should remain in some number during the disarmament process. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko gave the UN on September 21, 1962, the following explanation of the treaty's new approach:

"Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers, the Soviet government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage, exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global inter-continental missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the USSR and the US alone. Thus for a definite period, the means of defense would remain in case someone, as certain Western representatives fear, ventures to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft."

(The Western nations had protested that the total elimination of nuclear vehicles, together with the destruction of foreign bases, would place the West in a strategically inferior position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, with its superior conventional forces.)

6. Earlier, another concession had been tentatively offered, but it was not incorporated in the new draft treaty of September 22. It was suggested by Vassily Kuznetsov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, on September 5, that the Soviet Union also was willing to incorporate the destruction of nuclear weapons themselves into stage one, if the West wished. All Soviet disarmament plans since 1959 have called for destruction of all nuclear weapons in stage two. (Western representatives had protested at the Geneva disarmament talks that the destruction of delivery means, while nuclear weapons remained, would not lead to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, inasmuch as the methods of transport which would still remain at the disposal of member states, such as civil aircraft, ships, and so on, could still be used for delivering the bombs.)

March 15, 1963



photo—The Washington Post

**“What is there left to protect in a child
if he loses faith in a better tomorrow?”**

Supt. of Schools,
Wichita, Kansas

“There is no known security for the masses of the people if there should be an all-out thermonuclear war. The Wichita Public School system is in no position to guarantee physical protection to adults or pupils from a thermonuclear explosion or radioactive fallout. . . .

“That children are affected by the adults speculating on the inevitability and horrors of thermonuclear war needs to be of concern to teachers. Children are more in need of protection against the commitment of a nation to irresponsible fatalism than for either public or private shelter against nuclear fallout. What is there left to protect in a child if he loses faith in a better tomorrow and concern for the human race? What can be a greater curse against the human race than utter futility and hopelessness?

“Teachers have a responsibility to become informed on the nuclear facts of life . . . Teachers need to understand why a nation cannot wage a nuclear war on another nation without affecting the destiny of the human race on this planet. Teachers need to attack the premise of those who argue from the inevitability of a thermonuclear war. Teachers need to help pupils remain morally secure by challenging them to a rational approach of living in a nuclear age by waging an all-out war for peace.

“The responsibility of deciding whether or what kind of a fallout shelter should be built to protect the family belongs to the membership of the family. If survival is of national concern, it is the responsibility of the President of the United States and Congress to make public shelters available. In neither case does this responsibility rest with the public schools.

“It is, however, the responsibility of the schools to search for the truth of how to live in our emerging nuclear and space age. It is an obligation of the schools to train the mind of the child so that he may think clearly and act wisely. This is the civil defense program of the schools.”

Lawrence Shepoiser, Superintendent of Schools, Wichita, Kansas, Dec., '61

actions of the committee of the whole on measures of arms control

by Lorraine Nelson

A separate arm of the conference, called the Committee of the Whole, was established expressly as a forum for negotiating measures of arms control. Their purpose would be to lessen international tension and build confidence among the nations; their value would be that they need not await agreement on total disarmament and their effect could be to facilitate negotiation of a treaty on the greater goal.

Sometimes called "partial disarmament," measures of this kind, though supported from time to time by the USSR, have always been more vigorously promoted by the US. (Actually, a test-ban agreement would amount to a measure of arms control; because of its worldwide significance, this agreement has always been treated as a matter deserving separate consideration. See pages 93-96 .)

All members of the disarmament conference became members of the Committee of the Whole.

At the outset, the Committee acceded to the wish of the USSR and agreed to work on formulating a declaration against war propaganda. As the major powers involved, the US and USSR were asked by the Committee to get together in private and work out a declaration for consideration by the whole group.

Negotiations between the two lasted six weeks and culminated in an agreed text. This was presented jointly to the Committee on May 25, 1962, where it was given unanimous approval and referred to each delegation's government for final decisions.

The declaration called on members of the conference to condemn "statements to the effect that war is necessary or inevitable" and to affirm their conviction that "in our day war can no longer serve as a method for settling international disputes." Legislation banning war propaganda was urged upon the states, but not required of those subscribing to the declaration.

During the discussions in the Committee of the Whole, Valerian Zorin, the USSR's chief delegate to the conference, said his govern-

ment preferred more concrete provision for legislation against war propaganda. Arthur Dean, chief delegate of the US, responded that any laws against propaganda would violate US constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press.

Second thoughts about the declaration must then have occurred within the Soviet government.

For on May 29, 1962, when the Plenary Session of the Disarmament Conference met to record its action on the declaration, Mr. Zorin introduced four amendments, all of which appeared calculated to be unacceptable to the US. Without their adoption, it was made clear, the Soviet Union would not now accept the declaration.

The amendments would (a) have required states to pass legislation making a criminal offense of war propaganda; (b) condemn any appeals for preventive nuclear war; (c) oppose defense against colonial wars; and (d) oppose "revenge-seeking" propaganda aimed at revising European borders resulting from World War II.

Mr. Dean turned down the amendments for the US, which now took the position that it was useless to reopen negotiations on the declaration for the time being.

The Committee of the Whole, having come to a dead end on outlawing war propaganda, subsequently agreed to a parallel debate on two items: (1) measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons (an item favored by the USSR), and (2) measures to reduce the possibility of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication (favored by the US).

Negotiation of agreements on these measures still is in progress.

Others which the US and USSR have jointly agreed to discuss at later times are: (1) establishment of nuclear free zones in various parts of the world; (2) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and countries of the Warsaw Pact; (3) cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; and (4) measures to ensure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only.



test-ban negotiations 1962 - 1963

by Lorraine Nelson

The main nuclear powers of the world--the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom--continued in 1962 to talk about a treaty to govern nuclear weapon tests. France, by its own choice, was outside the talks, and China, widely believed to be on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, was not invited.

While they talked (their forum now is the Test-Ban Subcommittee of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, meeting in Geneva), both sides resumed atmospheric testing. The Soviet Union, in fact, engaged in two series. Following its original, unexpected resumption of testing in September, 1961, the USSR launched a new series of explosions in August, 1962. The United States, which resumed underground testing in September, 1961, on the heels of the Soviet air tests, began its own tests in the atmosphere in April 1962.

By the beginning of 1963, as the treaty talks were going into their fifth year, negotiating positions were not as far apart as generally believed; given mutual will to bridge the gap a treaty might prove attainable.

The opinion gap slowly narrows

For one thing, the negotiators were finally agreed upon the desirability of a comprehensive ban on tests in all environments. Efforts to arrive at a limited treaty (banning explosions in the air, under water and in outer space, but leaving the controversial matter of underground tests for later disposition) had been made by both the US and USSR during 1962, but neither was seriously pursuing this approach any longer. In the United Nations, where there had been strong sentiment for a limited treaty rather than none, the view prevailed that, even if only a limited treaty were the best attainable, it should nevertheless include a moratorium on underground testing.

There was, moreover, a slowly narrowing gap among the contending nations on the crucial point at issue between West and East--the quantity and quality of international inspection and control that would be

required to make sure no clandestine testing occurred underground.

Throughout 1962, the United States gradually lowered its inspection demands. Early in the year, in company with the UK, it accepted for the first time the idea of a comprehensive test ban policed by the purely international control system envisaged by the Geneva Conference of Experts. The system contemplated by the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958 included 180 international control stations, 170 of them on land, 10 on ships at sea, and including 24 in North America and 42 in Europe and Asia. The Experts believed the system could accurately identify all but 20 to 100 earthquakes each year; these might be suspected as nuclear explosions and were to be subject to on-site inspection. Previously the US had doubted the efficacy of that system and had proposed, successively, the exclusion of all underground tests from a treaty controlled by the Experts' system, and, later, the exclusion of all tests of weapons smaller than the bomb used at Hiroshima. (See Story of Disarmament, pages 31-37)

Enter the "black boxes"

In August, 1962, the US, again with the UK, modified its position on the composition of a control system, indicating it would agree to a system which, while having important international aspects, including international supervision, would nevertheless make greater use of existing national detection systems. In addition, the US and UK agreed that all types of control stations -- whether part of the existing national systems or newly built to international specification -- could be manned by nationals of the country in which they were located. International observers, however, would have the right to be attached to the posts. Purely international control stations could still be built, if all powers agreed upon the necessity.

By the end of the year, US thinking on acceptable control methods underwent a new change. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was preparing (according to newspaper accounts) a new draft treaty reflecting the view that national detection systems, nationally manned, would be adequate -- if combined with a certain number of automatic recording devices, now popularly referred to as "black boxes," located in the territory of the nuclear powers and adjacent countries -- to guard against violations of a test-ban treaty.

Just how much international supervision of the national systems would be deemed necessary by the US awaited an official version of the new position. It was expected that the Americans also would offer the USSR a treaty commitment against the use of international personnel for espionage.

Inspection demands decline in number

The US and UK continued to insist upon the necessity, irrespective of the control system utilized, of international on-site inspection to supplement distant instrument detection of underground seismic events. In the Anglo-American view, adequate assurance against the confusion of natural earthquakes with underground nuclear explosions was impossible without some amount of on-site inspection. The number of proposed inspections, however, was reduced considerably, from the maximum of 20 (in early 1962) to a maximum of 7 (in early 1963).

The US explained that the steady decline in its inspection and

control demands grew out of the observations and data collected from "Project Vela," an American research project designed to improve the methods of distinguishing earthquakes from underground nuclear explosions (see Story of Disarmament, page 34-35), which was pursued with intensity following the resumption of US underground testing in September, 1961.

USSR opposition to on-site inspection

The USSR, for its part, disputed the contention that international on-site inspection was a necessity. Science, in its view, already made it possible to detect all underground testing. Western insistence upon on-site inspection, the Soviets claimed, was a political demand, designed at best to prevent agreement on a test ban treaty, and at worst to facilitate Western espionage against the Soviet state.

In keeping with these views, the USSR insisted, from November, 1961, to late 1962, that, since all underground testing was being effectively monitored by existing national detection systems, there was no obstacle to an immediate treaty relying exclusively upon these systems for control of violations. This was a reversion to the position on controls which the USSR held between 1955 and 1957. But like the US, the USSR has gone through a series of changes on the matter of controlling a test-ban treaty. Between 1958 and November, 1961, the USSR supported the 180-station international control system devised by the Geneva Experts. During this period, it had also agreed to the idea of three annual international on-site inspections to supplement the detection work of the control stations, albeit with the reservation that the inspections were a political, rather than a scientific, concession.

Quid pro Quo

Finally, in late 1962, the US and USSR moved toward a compromise, spurred on by the steady efforts at compromise of the neutral nations participating in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. These nations -- Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic, plus at times Canada -- were not officially participants in the Test-Ban Subcommittee. They were, however, keenly interested spectators. By skillfully using the machinery of the Conference, which permitted discussion of any topic at regular informal sessions of the full committee, they gradually added both their voices and influence toward the goal of resolving the East-West deadlock on terms of a test-ban treaty.

In December, 1962, the Soviet government officially announced that it was again ready to support the principle of international on-site inspection, provided (a) the number of inspections was limited to two or three a year, and (b) adequate precautions were taken to prevent the use of such inspections for espionage.

As a quid pro quo for its acceptance once again of the principle of international on-site inspection, the USSR demanded that the US agree to the installation and use of "black boxes" on the territory of nuclear powers as the only international element of a test-ban control system. In other respects, the control system the Soviets proposed would be based on national detection stations already in place.

Where the matter now stands

It was this type of system which the US appeared ready to accept in early 1963. The US, however, has continued to insist upon at least seven annual on-site inspections, and there is as yet no agreement with the Soviet Union on the make-up of the inspection teams, the number of "black boxes" to be installed on American, Soviet and UK territory, or the method of supervising and collecting data from these devices. In fact, the US apparently will insist that the methods of control must be agreed upon before -- or at least simultaneous with -- negotiation of agreements on the number of inspections and the number of black boxes.

Despite the remaining difficulties, negotiation has brought the parties in 1962 and early 1963 to within reach of an agreement upon the techniques and methods of implementing a test ban treaty. The question which looms largest of all is whether both principals will ultimately conclude that considerations of "strategy" or national politics shall not be permitted to bar the way.

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