

White House Staff

NR 4/11/66
Lyndon Johnson has traded a star pitcher with a brilliant, if occasionally erratic, performance record for two utility infielders of proved competence. Out went McGeorge Bundy, who as special assistant for national security affairs had carved out a sizable territory for himself: he was the effective middleman in the administration of foreign policy. He presented alternatives, then carried them out after a presidential decision. But his influence on the decisions grew steadily. He knew the territory and guarded every inch of it. (Once he burst into the office of his fellow-assistant, Joseph Califano and shouted: "Who the - - - do you think you are, sending *Hello Dolly!* to Vietnam?") One of the most successful politicians in the Academic Establishment in recent generations, Bundy was somewhat less successful in the new politics of the White House. The President has said in the month since Bundy left, "We're not going to have another Bundy around here."

Taking some of his duties, but not his role, is Walt Whitman Rostow, who started out in the same job when John Kennedy came to power in 1961. Bundy never really got along well with Rostow in the White House. Rostow took care of the little things which bored Bundy or for which he had little time - foreign aid and the difficulties US advisers were having in a backwater country called Vietnam. Then the policy planning council job opened up at the end of 1961, and Rostow moved out of the White House and into State.

What political implications his return will have are hard to predict. Mr. Johnson twice moved to the brink of appointing Rostow to his staff, twice stepped back, and then took the plunge. Rostow is a talented generalist. Some of his colleagues criticize what they call his "intellectual arrogance," but he does not have the jealousy of personal prerogatives that characterized

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Bundy. Rostow likes to present prepackaged, synthesized opinions about practically everything; Bundy tended to analyze the ideas of others. During the 1961 Berlin crisis, Rostow advocated the hardest of lines; he is reported to have "bought" completely the position of General Clay. He was "hard" on Laos, too. Now on Vietnam, he favors suspension of bombings, primarily because of his conception of guerrilla wars - they must be won on the ground, there must be social reform and so forth. But in terms of maintaining the US position, he is by no means a "dove." On less acutely critical matters - disarmament, the Alliance for Progress, foreign aid and economic development - he is close to the tone of the Kennedy Administration and quite disliked by the Cold Warriors. The President may hope that Rostow will be able to help bring the intellectual drop-outs back on his team, but it is not likely. Rostow has been too long in the Administration dugout.

Coming into the White House with Rostow is Robert Kintner, a new-breed tycoon, who has been president of both the American and the National Broadcasting Companies. Kintner is unlike the hero-worshiping, self-deprecating types that so often inhabit the White House. He is brash, authoritarian, unanonymous. He takes pride in working 17 hours a day and falling asleep at his desk at midnight. People at NBC say he always had an air of "studied weariness." His job - cabinet secretary and departmental liaison - is not much; presumably, he will do much more on an informal basis. The President is increasingly drawn to "media" men - and to television. He asked CBS' Frank Stanton to come into the Administration, considered TV newsman Ray Shearer for a job, and did appoint NBC's John Chancellor to head the US Information Agency. When decision-makers disagree, let the image-makers speak.