anti-Semitic, where he traveled. It was calculated intimidation and they were caught red-handed. The Justice Department ought also to look into what other "routine" investigations GM may have under way. And Senator Edward Long's committee on snooping might profitably spend time on this interesting aspect of automobile manufacturing.

The Spanish Bomb

The four hydrogen bombs that an Air Force B-52 dropped over southeastern Spain on January 17 were from the stockpile of perhaps 150,000 nuclear devices of all sizes, shapes and strengths in the US arsenal. The wonder is that more of them are not similarly misplaced more often. Bombs are moved around all the time; like freight cars or airplane luggage, they do not always end up where the records say they should. One bomb lies buried near Goldsboro, N. C. – *exactly* where remains unknown. Others are reported to be at the bottom of the sea, having been dropped like ballast by damaged aircraft.

None of them have "gone off." The Defense Department says that "fail-safe" controls make it impossible for little accidents to become big explosions and that even the smaller accidents "probably" will not happen. Yet the whole concept of fail-safe is one of probabilities, and as the number of devices and the number of people handling them both increase, so does the probability of mishap.

The bombs aboard the B-52 over Spain were playpieces in the oldest established, permanent floating war game in the world. The Pentagon is playing it all the time, with real men, real ships and planes, and live bombs. Only the rules are make-believe. The consequences of mishap are real. Two thousand villagers in Palomares, Spain, were exposed to radioactive debris. And the Air Force is packing up 5,000 barrels of contaminated dirt and shipping it to the US for a safe burial, presumably out of harm's way.

There is no reason to believe that the accident will cause foolproof controls to be placed on the disposition of atomic weapons. Things are slightly better than they were under the Eisenhower Administration, when no one even kept a good count of all the nuclear weapons the US had lying around military bases, aboard ships and in planes. Kennedy's advisers instituted tighter checks, but there were still discrepancies between actual counts of bombs and the numbers in the records. It is almost impossible to know where every device is, and to what use it is being put at any given moment. Far from theoretical fail-safe, the controls so far reduce the probability of accidents to an "acceptable risk" in the judgment of the military game-players. At first, US authorities put a total ban on the release of information about the accident in Spain. Then, after 44 days of detailed but "unconfirmed" reports in the newspapers about every aspect of the story, the Spanish government announced that, indeed, the bomber had collided in mid-air with a KC-135 tanker, that the bombs had been dropped, that one was still missing, and that there had been some exposure to radioactivity in Palomares. The US said it would have told the whole story earlier but for "diplomatic courtesy" to Spain, which wanted secrecy.

Such good manners may seem inappropriate to the atomic age. But then the entire incident seems unreal – out of *Strangelove* and *Thunderball*. There was talk of a missing "black box" which contained secret codes or maps. To calm everyone's nerves, Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke and the Spanish tourist bureau director had a swim last week in the Palomares surf. They smiled to show they had stopped worrying. And the villagers of Palomares even learned to love the bomb. It will bring them jobs (carting away the dirt) and, they hope, a paved road, a water supply system and telephones. The US Air Force, they figure, owes them that.