

Bonn Is Silent as Rightists

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BONN, Feb. 14—"Non-proliferation" is fast becoming a dirty word in West Germany. A week before negotiators for the United States, Russia and 15 other nations reconvene at Geneva to discuss a treaty to ban the spread of atomic arms, West German rightists have largely succeeded in making the treaty suspect here, no matter what it says.

Conservative publicists and politicians in the last fortnight have compared the non-proliferation pact to the Versailles Treaty ending World War I, to the Franco-Soviet pact of 1935 (which allegedly turned Hitler to war), and to the Morgenthau plan for partitioning and de-industrializing Germany after 1945.

Rightists have suggested that Bonn withdraw from NATO, expand trade and other relations with Red China, and join France in a concerted campaign against the treaty.

The vociferous campaign against the treaty, which is being led by the Axel Springer chain of newspapers, contrasts sharply with the relative silence on the subject thus far by the government of Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt.

Treaty's Foes Speak Out

Although government circles privately concede that West German ratification is inevitable, and that Brandt's visit to the United States last week cleared up many outstanding questions about the treaty, the government has largely left the field of public discussion to the treaty's foes. Individual government offi-



WILHELM GREWE



FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS

... campaign against non-proliferation treaty

cials, including Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss and Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, have been allowed to campaign publicly against the treaty.

The result, in the opinion of West German moderates, has been a dangerous blending of two very different strains of thought. On the one hand, there are the serious questions raised about details of the treaty by people basically sympathetic to its aims—including Kiesinger, Brandt, and such a distinguished scientist (and pacifist) as Prof. Carl Friederich von Weizsäcker.

These questions center mostly on the desire for assurances that legitimate German peaceful nuclear research and technology will not be hampered. Brandt's visit to the United States apparently produced agreement that such assurances, to be worked out

concretely by scientists and other experts, will indeed be given in one form or another.

Scatter-Shot Campaign

However, alongside these reservations being raised quietly by responsible circles, an anti-American scare campaign against the treaty is being waged by long-time advocates of German nuclear armament and a "hard" posture in the cold war. It has been a scatter-shot campaign on virtually every aspect of the treaty but the most fire has been concentrated on what one paper called "Kosygin's control clause," which would permit "Soviet control of German industry."

The implication has been raised that the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in Vienna, a United Nations agency which would supervise adherence to the treaty, is some kind of Com-

munist-controlled organization. It has not been mentioned that the IAEA was originally created under the Eisenhower Administration to administer the U.S. "Atoms for Peace" program. Nor is it mentioned that the United States, not the Soviet Union is primarily interested in a control clause.

Instead the IAEA is negatively compared with Euratom, which supposedly controls the atomic activities of the six Common Market states. Abandoning Euratom in favor of the IAEA, hardliners argue, would be a blow to European unity, as well as a concession to communism.

Euratom Controls

Privately, of course, Bonn government officials admit that Euratom's controls "amount to self-control"; that it has practically no control over the Common Market's one nuclear power—France; and that if Euratom were allowed privileged rights in a world treaty, one could hardly exclude creation of similar regional organizations such as "Arab-atom" or even "Viet-atom."

[It is even possible that the Soviets might welcome the idea of Euratom control as a Western form of "self-inspection" and use it as a pretext for rejecting international inspection, a long-time Western criterion under which IAEA control is presumed to qualify.]

The sudden enthusiasm for Euratom, which until recently had been considered moribund, appears to spring less from Euratom's bureaucratic interests (although those, too, are involved) than from the hopes of German "Gaullists"

Assail A-Treaty

for a Franco-German nuclear alliance. Although President de Gaulle has continually refused to aid German nuclear armament, Strauss and others have never relinquished hope that Bonn will someday enter the nuclear club through the French back-door. The calculation is that France will not be able to stay in the race without German money.

Such calculations are far from the outlook of Foreign Minister Brandt, who would

prefer to see more arms control on the part of the nuclear powers, rather than proliferation by Germany or other non-nuclear states. Brandt is aware that a hard-line German resistance to a carefully drafted treaty, approved by the United States, Britain and Russia, would be suicidal for the new government's effort to relax tensions in Eastern Europe and enter a realistic dialogue with Moscow.