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STATEMENT BY  
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ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE  
BEFORE THE  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
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U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATO

This Committee has served the nation well by this inquiry in depth, for no issue is more important to the peace of the world than the relations among European nations and the relations of Europe with America.

I.

This is the testimony of history, for in the last three centuries every world-wide war has had its origins in the commercial rivalries and power ambitions of European states. The danger, if anything, is even greater today, since any serious disturbance in Western Europe runs the risk of triggering a head-on clash between the United States and the Soviet Union. And this is a nuclear age.

But, if there is danger in Europe so also is there

potential

potential for constructive action. Western Europe and North America together are the principal workshop of the world. They possess 90 percent of free world industry. They are an enormous reservoir of capital and technology and trained manpower.

These are priceless world assets. They are the basis for progress and security, not only for the people of the Atlantic nations but for the men and women who live in the vast developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

We have, therefore, a vital interest in making sure that Western Europe organizes itself so as to use these assets to secure the peace and to advance the objectives of our common civilization.

We should not be hesitant to speak out on this subject. We have both the right and the obligation to hold clear views on the structure of Europe and to express them clearly. We have earned that right. For **twice** within the lifetime of many of us the United **States** has been called upon to help

rescue Europe from aggression and today our military might guards Europe against new dangers.

To be sure, conditions have altered since the first years after the war. The nations of Europe are now fully recovered. They enjoy a prosperity they have never known before. Europeans no longer live in constant fear of Soviet attack. And the Communist world too has changed. It has lost its monolithic character; it is divided and distracted by a quarrel between Moscow and Peiping and by <sup>the</sup>weakening of Soviet authority over Eastern Europe. All this tends to blur the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to diffuse the bipolar structure of the immediate postwar period.

Taken together these developments have had a sharp effect on people's thinking. With increased well-being, the Western European nations no longer feel so dependent on the United States. Quite naturally they seek a more effective--

a more self-reliant -- role in this changing world.

All this is good. It is on the side of freedom, and, if we and our European friends behave wisely, it can be on the side of peace. It results in large part from the success of the policies we have pursued together over the last two decades and from the common institutions we have built. But neither policies nor institutions are immutable, and it is quite appropriate that we and our allies should now take a thoughtful look at the changing realities, at where we wish to go and how best to get there.

There are two questions that demand our first attention:

-- Are the interests of the United States and Western Europe still basically parallel?

-- If so, how should we pursue those interests?

## II.

The answer to the first question seem to me quite clear.

We and our European allies are in the same boat and we shall sink or navigate together.

-- The security of the United States depends on the security of Western Europe; and Western European countries still count on us for their security. The words of the North Atlantic Treaty are as valid as ever- "an attack on one is an attack on all".

-- Economic well-being is also indivisible. Prosperity on both sides of the North Atlantic depends on what happens in the area as a whole.

-- We have great tasks that we must achieve together. The most difficult is to settle the obdurate problems left over from the Second World War--the problems between East and West. We shall make little progress toward a lasting settlement of these problems without common purpose and common action.

-- But our common responsibilities extend far beyond our own boundaries, for the Atlantic nations have a common  
also  
duty/to assist the peoples of the developing areas toward

peace and progress.

We should, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative. Recent changes have not diminished but expanded our common interests. In the light of these changes, how can we best fulfill those interests, not merely today but tomorrow?

### III.

The answer, it seems to me, is that we must first form a clear concept of relationships among Atlantic nations, and stick to it. Only in this way can we build an enduring structure. For the broad lines of that structure we should consult both history and common sense.

The first lesson of history is clear. The world should never again have to live with the dangers of a Europe in which each individual nation state seeks to advance its own interests at the expense of its neighbors or to gain ascendancy over its neighbors by shifting coalitions or balance of power politics. For three hundred years, such a system produced one bloody and senseless war after another. To return to a Europe of 1914 or

1939 would be folly beyond belief.

Our European friends have fully recognised this. One of the most hopeful developments of the post-war world has been their determination to substitute unity for national rivalry and to break forever with the pattern of the past.

They have expressed this determination by action. Through the Treaty of Rome six European nations have established common institutions which are applying common principles and practices to serve a common economic purpose. In a few brief years, the European Economic Community has made remarkable strides toward the integration of the separate economies of the member nations. Not only has it helped to create a prosperous Europe and to raise the standard of living of the European peoples to unprecedented heights, but that prosperity has reinforced the well-being of the whole Atlantic world.

Yet the building of a stable Europe will require something more than economic integration. It can be achieved only by progress toward political unity. For, until the Western

European peoples can be drawn together on a basis of equality, and under common rules and institutions, there can be no assurance that the nationalistic quarrels of the past will be permanently put aside.

Serious obstacles, of course, now block progress toward political unity in Europe. But in a great affair such as this it is a grave mistake to judge the future on the basis of day-to-day events. For political unity responds to a compelling logic that, in the longer term, can hardly be avoided. In Western Europe there are more than a quarter of a billion of the most highly educated, trained, skilled people in the world. It is their tradition to play a significant role in world affairs. But today they are facing the hard fact that, in spite of their intellectual and material resources, they will not again play such a role unless they organize their affairs to accord with the needs of the modern age.

For the postwar world has been marked by a new and decisive political reality—the predominance of two nations,



the United States and the Soviet Union. Each is organized on a continent-wide basis; each commands vast resources of men and material equal to, or surpassing, the combined resources of all the Western European nations. The emergence of these two powers reflects the needs and consequences of an age of technology. And it has transformed the whole structure of world politics. European states which a quarter of a century ago occupied the center of the stage now find themselves only medium powers, with a limited capacity to influence world events.

I do not think that the European peoples will be content for very long to stand aside from a major participation in world affairs. Yet, so long as Europe remains in its present form, their participation will be severely limited. If Europeans are to play a role worthy of their resources and their abilities, it is clear what they must do. They must build their political arrangements on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the modern world.

V.

This question of size has a special significance in our trans-Atlantic relations.

During the past few years some have suggested that the proper policy was to forget European unity and try to move directly to some form of Atlantic political structure. This proposal, it seems to me, creates a false choice between the steps toward unity in Europe and the establishment of a closer partnership across the ocean. There is no contradiction between these ideas; they go hand in hand. A healthy relationship between Europe and America can be fully established only when the principle of equality is solidly grounded in the facts of relative power.

For, so long as there remains the great disparity in size and resources between the United States and the nations of Europe acting individually, there will be awkwardness in any Atlantic arrangement. The Europeans will be concerned by what some regard as ~~the~~ undue weight of American influence in our common

counsels. Some European industrialists will be concerned by fear of the disproportionate power of American enterprises.

Something can be done to meet these concerns even within the present structure. Our government can make a greater effort to improve consultation--although our initiatives in that direction have not met much response. But, in the long pull, equality between Western Europe and America is not something that the United States can grant or create merely by avoiding unilateral actions. It springs from the fact that we Americans can act through a single set of institutions and can thus apply the full resources of our continent to a single purpose, while the Europeans cannot. For they are not yet organized, as President Kennedy said, "to speak with one voice and act with one will".

The efforts to build the basis of Atlantic partnership cannot, of course, await the emergence of a united Europe--and they need not. There is much that we can and should do. For some years, in OECD and NATO, the Atlantic nations have been seeking to perfect instruments for common action for defense, economic

policies, and foreign policy, and we should get on with this work. But we should have no illusions as to the limits of possible progress. So long as Europe remains disunited the essential goal of equality will be more a matter of manners than reality.

VI.

European unity and Atlantic partnership have a meaning beyond the stability of the West. They are essential for the achievement of a secure settlement of the great unfinished business left over from the War. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized. A permanent East-West settlement will not be achieved by fragmenting Europe or by loosening the institutional bonds that tie the West together, but only if the Western powers, acting from a base of unity, bring about a situation in which a settlement is possible.

The obvious preconditions to a settlement are changes in the attitude of the Soviet Government. Such changes as have already occurred have not come through the independent action of individual Western states. They have occurred in part because of internal

shifts and movements within the Soviet system. But equally as important, they have occurred because the Western powers, acting together, have created conditions to which the Soviet Union has had to adjust.

The common action of the West has blunted Soviet hopes for expansion.

The stability and prosperity that followed economic integration in Western Europe have created new aspirations and have stimulated new thinking in Eastern Europe.

By sublimating nationalistic ambitions, Western cohesion has dampened traditional fears among the Eastern European peoples.

In short, Western unity does not conflict with the serious pursuit of an East-West settlement, it opens the only effective route to it.

We should not, of course, seek any settlement as an end in itself. What we must achieve is a settlement embodying conditions that will assure stability and lasting peace for all of Europe—a settlement that will endure. This means that it must be free

from built-in stresses and tensions. The essential condition of such a settlement is that it must be fair to all. It must embody the same basic principle that is essential to enduring relations within the West--the principle of equality.

This point is central. No secure settlement of Europe can leave the German people divided. Nor can a lasting settlement place the German people under permanent discrimination. This was tried before and, as we all know, it did not work. We must aim for something better and not for improvisations that are inherently unstable.

VII.

In working toward a lasting settlement, a sense of both security and unity in the West is needed to set in motion the process of ending the partition of Europe.

We have a constructive role to play in that undertaking. Our purpose is to create conditions that will make it possible for Europe to be reunited, with neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seeing in that happy event any threat to themselves.

That is why the United States is committed to a policy of peaceful and intimate engagement toward the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Ours is not an effort to subvert their governments nor to make those states hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other. No one would benefit from an Eastern Europe that is again balkanized. We wish to build bridges to the East so that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states can begin to see a genuine interest for themselves in moving toward ending the partition of Europe and Germany.

All of us--Americans, Russians, Europeans--can benefit from drawing closer together. In that way we can reduce the risks of war, minimize the bitter legacies of national conflicts, and increase the tangible fruits of economic cooperation, so that the wealth and the talent which Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union have in such abundance can serve the cause of humanity. What we thus desire for Europe, we firmly believe, is what most Europeans want, and that is why America remains so relevant to Europe's future.

This kind of peace and stability in Europe will not be achieved by any sudden or dramatic gesture. The difficulties are many, and the obstacles great. The road to the eventual ending of the partition of Europe and of Germany will be long.

But a start has been made.

There are already many contacts between East and West. These must be expanded. That is why the President has asked the Congress for authority to extend most-favored nation privileges to Eastern European states. Cultural contacts must



also grow, and it may be pertinent to note that it was American foundations that took the first major initiative in developing such East-West cultural exchanges.

It is also important to expand multilateral ties. Existing multilateral institutions, such as OECD, can and doubtless will respond to these emerging opportunities.

If we can help, in all these ways, to narrow the existing differences in European standards of living, to develop East-West communications systems, and to facilitate trade, we can create some of the preconditions for solving basic political and security issues. The United States is prepared to share in this effort, for we believe that it represents a serious and a constructive way of working to end the partition of Europe.

We believe that just as peace and stability in Western Europe have been advanced by reconciliation between the Germans and their Western neighbors, so too in the East, a reconciliation between the German people and particularly the Poles, the Czechs, and the

Russians is in the interest of all of us. The German Federal Republic recently reaffirmed its desire to develop friendly relations with the East, and the United States will do everything it can to promote that desirable end. The continuance of old hatreds--however real and bitter may be their causes--is not in the interest of Europe, and in the nuclear age they are dangerous to all of us.

VIII.

These, then, are the general principles that define our policy. Changed conditions have not impaired their basic validity. Yet this does not mean that their application need not be re-examined in the light of changing conditions or that all of the institutional arrangements established since the war are perfect or may not need to be adapted.

Certainly, some changes in the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be required as a result of the recent actions of the French Government. The Alliance has weathered those actions and stayed remarkably well on course.

Our first common task was to maintain a solid defense and an effective deterrent. We made good progress toward this end

at the recent Brussels meeting. The fourteen members other than France agreed to relocate the North Atlantic Organization military headquarters, and will probably move in a few months to relocate the North Atlantic Council. They laid the basis for negotiation with France about French forces in Germany.

But defence and deterrence are not NATO's sole objects. It must also provide the unity of purpose that will facilitate a lasting settlement between East and West.

This does not mean, of course, that we should think of NATO as a negotiating instrument. But it can help to ensure that individual Western nations, in dealing with the East, will work toward a common purpose, rather than toward competing national advantage. Only on this basis will there be any chance of success.

IX

I have tried in this brief statement to outline the main elements of United States policy toward Europe.

Those elements briefly are three in number:

First, to encourage the nations of Western Europe to submerge their old national rivalries in the achievement of a new political unity based on principles of equality;

Second, at the same time to continue to build the institutional arrangements that can result in a more effective partnership between the United States and a Europe moving toward unity; and

Third, to continue by every means available to create the conditions that will make possible a secure and lasting settlement of the division of Europe.

These principles form a broad framework for United States policy. Obviously, no one of them can be realized by US efforts alone. We cannot, solely by American efforts, bring about the unification of Europe; that is a task primarily for Europeans.

We cannot by ourselves create an effective working relation with the Western European peoples; it takes more than one to make a partnership.

Finally, we cannot alone bring about a settlement of the fundamental issue of a divided Europe; that will come to pass only when the conditions are created that will influence the Soviet Union to take the necessary decisions to make that possible.

But we can, by a loyal adherence to these principles, prevent their frustration and encourage their achievement. For we have a great deal running for us--good sense, logic, the lessons of history, and the desire of peoples to contribute their full share to a peaceful world.

These, Mr. Chairman, are heavy battalions on our side.

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