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SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE W. BALL,
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
Wednesday, July 13, 1966

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATO

In the course of my appearance here the other day I submitted for the record a statement that I intended to read to the Committee.

In order to suggest a framework for the discussion this morning, it may be useful for me to summarize the main points that I sought to put before this Committee in my statement.

Let me say at the outset that the "NATO crisis"-- as it was known in the press--is over. The fourteen members of NATO other than France have made a clear decision to continue the Organization with full vigor. What remains are largely technical discussions, such as those regarding the removal of American men and material from installations in France and the terms on which French forces may remain in Germany.

I.

The central issue before the American Government and the American people--and the question on which I am happy to note this Committee has so far focused--is the very much larger question as to what kind of Europe and what kind of Atlantic world do we want. What policies toward both Western and Eastern Europe and the Atlantic world should we pursue in order to assure peace and security among the people of North America and Europe who are industrially the most advanced in the world and who, because of the power they command, have today--as in the past--the greatest capacity for good or evil? How should this industrial heartland of the world be organized so that we and our European friends can most effectively achieve our common task of helping the less-developed peoples of the world to make progress both politically and economically?

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In seeking to answer these questions, we must recognize at the outset that the world that we know today is very different from the world of twenty--or even ten--years ago, and the world ten years from now will have changed even more profoundly. We are living at a time when technology is vaulting forward--perhaps beyond man's ability to adjust his political thinking to a constantly evolving world environment. The changes in the last two decades have been more profound than changes in the past that occurred over many centuries. The great colonial systems of the world under which one-third of the earth's population lived twenty years ago have been largely dismantled--to be replaced by more than sixty new states. The nations of Western Europe, in ruins at the conclusion of the war, no longer control these colonial systems, but they have nevertheless grown richer, with more highly-developed industries, than ever before in their history--and they are seeking to adjust to the new conditions in which they find themselves.

Six of these Western European nations have made more progress than any of us had expected toward the merging of their economies into a single mass market. And while they have not yet matched their progress in economic integration with political unity, the idea of a unified Europe holds a high place in the minds of Europeans--particularly the younger generation.

II.

The concept of substituting unity--based on equality and achieved by common consent--for rivalry among nation states is perhaps the most constructive political idea to emerge in the Twentieth Century. It is re-enforced by an unassailable logic, for in a world where colonialism no longer represents an acceptable relationship among peoples it is only through such unity that the peoples of Western Europe can harness their great talents and resources to playing an effective role of world responsibility.

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In the postwar period the needs and consequences of an age of technology have brought into positions of dominance states organized on a continent-wide basis. The emergence of these huge powers, commanding vast resources of men and material, has transformed the structure of world politics.

European states which a quarter of a century ago occupied the center of the stage now find themselves only medium powers with a limited capacity to influence world events. If they are to play a role worthy of their resources and their abilities, it is clear that they must restructure their political arrangements on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the modern age.

III.

Ever since the war we have encouraged our European friends to move in this direction. At the same time we have sought to build with Western Europe a partnership arrangement enabling us to coordinate our common efforts to meet the great common tasks that are the lot of the free industrialized nations.

We have recognized from the beginning that unity in Europe and an effective Atlantic partnership were closely related, and that there would always be severe limitations on that partnership until Europe moved toward a greater unity. For so long as there remained the great disparity in size and resources between the United States and the nations of Europe acting individually, there would be awkwardness in any Atlantic arrangement. The Europeans would continue to feel what they regard as the undue weight of American opinion in our common counsels, and they would tend to resent it.

This is an awkwardness that springs from fact--not from manners. It cannot be avoided simply by improved consultations or communications. It derives from the fact that we Americans can act through a single set
of institutions

of institutions and can thus apply the full resources of our continent to a single purpose, while the Europeans cannot.

IV.

European unity and Atlantic Partnership have relevance not only for the stability of the West but for the achievement of a secure settlement between East and West. A permanent East-West settlement cannot be achieved by fragmenting Europe or by loosening the institutional bonds that tie the West together. It will come only if the Western powers, acting from a base of unity, bring about a situation in which a settlement is possible.

The obvious pre-conditions to a settlement are changes in the attitude of the Soviet Government. Such changes as have occurred have resulted in part from shifts and movements within the Soviet system. Equally important, they have occurred because the Western powers, acting together, have created conditions to which the Soviet Union has had to adjust.

We should be realistic about the kind of settlement that we are working for. A settlement as such should not be seen as an end in itself. What we must achieve is a settlement embodying conditions that will assure its permanence. To endure it must be free of built-in stresses and tensions. The essential condition of such a settlement is that it must be fair to all. It must embody the same basic principle that is essential to durable relations within the West--the principle of equality.

This point is central. No secure settlement of Europe can leave the German people divided. Nor can a lasting settlement place the German people under permanent discrimination. This was tried before and, as we all know, it did not work. We must aim for something better and not for improvisations that are inherently unstable.

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This kind of peace and stability will not be achieved by any sudden or dramatic gesture. The road to the eventual ending of the partition of Europe and of Germany will be long. But we have made a start through many bilateral contacts between East and West. These must be expanded.

At the same time it is important that we expand multilateral ties. Existing multilateral institutions such as the OECD can--and doubtless will--respond to these emerging opportunities.

If we can help in these ways to narrow the existing differences in European standards of living, to develop East-West communication systems, and to facilitate trade, we can create some of the pre-conditions for solving basic political and security issues.

We believe that justice, peace and stability in Western Europe have been advanced by reconciliation between the Germans and their western neighbors. So too in the East, a reconciliation between the German people and particularly the Poles, the Czechs and the Russians, is in the interest of all of us. The German Federal Republic recently re-affirmed its desire to develop friendly relations with the East, and the United States will do everything it can to promote that objective. The continuance of old hatreds--however real and bitter may be their origins--is not in the interest of Europe, and in the nuclear age they are a danger to all of us.

V.

These, then, are the general principles that define our policy. Changed conditions have not impaired their basic validity. At the same time, we must continually re-examine them in the light of changing conditions, since no one would maintain that the institutional arrangements established since the war are perfect or immutable. Certainly some changes in the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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will be required as a result of the recent actions of the French Government. But so far the Alliance has weathered those actions and stayed remarkably well on course.

Our first common task has been to maintain a solid defense, and an effective deterrent and this is still essential. It would be foolish to assume, as some complacently suggest, that because NATO has prevented Europe from being overrun for more than a decade and a half, we no longer need an integrated common defense.

Those who make this argument overlook the arithmetic of Soviet power. The Soviet Union today has some three million men under arms, most of whom are stationed in western areas of the country. Three hundred thousand Soviet soldiers are stationed in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Eastern European countries have armed forces totalling a half million, making a total of 800,000 men facing NATO in Europe. Also to be taken into account in the overall equation are hundreds of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, more than 700 medium-range missiles aimed at Western Europe, squadrons of the most modern bomber and fighter planes, and a constantly growing fleet of submarines, including many armed with nuclear missiles. There is no basis to think that we can safely let down our guard. We must continue in close concert with our allies to deter these forces. The words of the North Atlantic Treaty are as solid as ever--"an attack on one is an attack on all."

VI.

But defense and deterrence are not NATO's sole objects. NATO must also provide the unity of purpose that will facilitate a lasting settlement between East and West.

This does not mean, of course, that we should think of NATO as a negotiating instrument. But NATO can help to assure that individual Western nations in dealing with the East will work toward common purposes, rather than toward competing national advantage. Only on this basis will there be real and lasting success.

We cannot

We cannot, of course, achieve these tasks by ourselves. Some things only the Europeans can do. On others we must continue to work closely together. But we can, by loyal adherence to the principles that have inspired our policy for twenty years, prevent their frustration and encourage their achievement. After all, we have a great deal running for us--good sense, logic, the lessons of history, and the desire of peoples to contribute their full share to a peaceful world.

These, Mr. Chairman, are heavy battalions on our side.

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