

How Frail Are U.S.

By John Kenneth Galbraith

A former ambassador to India, Galbraith is professor of economics at Harvard.

A COUNTRY CAN HAVE a foreign policy because it reflects the reality of its interests and also because it is easier to continue to do what it is doing than to do something else. On the whole, American policy toward Europe can best be understood in light of the second tendency. Borrowing from the terminology of space mechanics, it is a reasonably advanced example of inertial guidance. But it is also evident that the momentum under which it has long been operating is at last running out.

This will not be universally conceded. There is still an influential commitment to the old policy. And it requires an exceptional breadth of mind to agree on one's own obsolescence. Yet the change is coming and in some aspects it is already visible.

The present policy was established following the breakup of the great wartime coalition between the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain. Ever since, its advantages, like those of truth, vaccination and regular bathing, have not been argued but assumed. Not even the policy itself has often been articulated, though this is possible in very few words.

The Countering Formula

THE POLICY assumes that the Communists are relentlessly ambitious and implacably hostile to the non-Communists, or, by more flexible terminology, the free world. So unified and pervasive is their threat that it is often called the Communist conspiracy. In accordance with opportunity, they use military aggression or internal subversion. These, however, can be countered, at least in Europe, by (1) a strong military establishment, including a strong coalition of the non-Communist powers, (2) strong and unified or integrated economies, and (3), though this is often unstated, a special concern for enlisting the military valor and industrial vigor of the Germans. Some decorative details apart, this has been American policy for Europe since the late 1940s.

In the years immediately following World War II, this policy won enormous prestige and this explains its continued momentum. The Marshall Plan, the founding of NATO and the

several steps toward European economic unification were, on the whole, highly successful. Those responsible basked, quite justly, in the reflected glory. All who are involved in foreign policy yearn at some moment for the mantle of a Castlereagh, Metternich or Talleyrand. Ever since, everyone concerned has imagined that this is to be

found in leading Europe in the battle against communism. Dreams of such grandeur survive.

At the same time, those who might argue for alternatives to the policy, meaning cooperation with the Communists in any form, were discredited as have been few before in history. The Korean War showed a Communist state taking the initiative in a military attack. That danger could not thereafter be denied. And those who warned that communism was a menace to liberty had their warnings confirmed by the condemnation of Stalin by his successors. To be adequately anti-Communist became a test of sophistication—even of the right to be heard — on foreign policy. As the new policy meant fame,

the alternatives meant obloquy — and possibly an encounter with Joseph R. McCarthy.

In the years since World War II, American foreign policy, more even than that of Britain and much more than that of France, has been an organization product. The State Department, which is itself a very large organization, the Pentagon, which is not small, agencies with a collateral interest in trade, chickens and air routes and, by popular, though in my experience considerably exaggerated account, the intelligence agencies all have asserted a role.

On any important matter, some scores, even hundreds, of policymakers can claim a right to be heard. The

agreement of so many people for something that is new and, by definition, untried is not easily won. Accordingly, the skilled and knowledgeable leader comes out firmly and courageously for doing what has been done before. This wins genuine confidence and trust. The genius of organization is that it can continue but it cannot change. President Kennedy, when faced with some seemingly sensible innovation, liked to say: "I agree but I'm not sure that we can get the Government to go along."

Given the initial prestige of the policy, the ability of organization to resist change was especially strong. And so the policy has survived four Presidents, five Secretaries of State

and three changes of political parties. It is still the automatic and slightly self-righteous response of the machine when asked. But it is in trouble.

Oddly enough, the worst damage has been done by the Communists; one must conclude that there is no end to the capacity of these people for inconvenience. The archons of the old policy had a settled view of Communist power; its sense of purpose and capacity for unified action was above all question. Few associated with the founding of the policy had had much firsthand experience with politics: They were lawyers and businessmen of distinction with a sprinkling of professional statesmen. Fewer still had ever


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A Prophetic Appraisal by Five Scholars Of the Embattled Atlantic Partnership



George W. Ball

"Today we see again appearing an old and all too familiar pattern in which the narrow interests of nation-states may well defeat the larger interest of the European peoples."




John K. Galbraith

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
Arthur Schlesinger

"Every gesture of rebuff to American foreign policy is accompanied by a gesture of fealty to American civilization." (Page E5)



Raymond Aron

"The clash of French and American policies is transforming the inevitable soul-searching in Germany into a crisis, probably a long one." (Page E4)



Golo Mann

"... vast political expectations frequently lead to nothing, and even if fulfilled they are never as glorious as originally envisioned." (Page E4)

John Kenneth Galbraith

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been involved firsthand with Communists—the latter are not too common in the better residential sections of New York, Boston and Washington where most of the postwar leaders lived.

So it was easy to endow the Communist leaders, in the abstract, with supernatural powers of discipline and dedication. The same process works well in religion. But the Communists did not live up to (as it would now be called) their image.

Although the Yugoslavs started it, the Soviets were not far behind. Aided by God's most notable contribution to political science, which is the mortality of politicians, they changed their leadership. And while Khrushchev helped to complete the crucifixion of the American left by confirming the conservative's view of Stalin, he also insisted on talking about peaceful co-existence. This was damaging to the vision of a poised military threat.

Then came the perceptible liberalization of cultural life in the Soviet Union and under the Eastern European regimes. This was damaging to the doctrine of enduring conflict. Perhaps patience might be a policy.

Then came the loosening of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and a visible desire by these states to retain their ties with Europe, and then the traumatic split between Moscow and Peking. These were not damaging but destructive of the notion of a unified worldwide conspiracy.

Not the Only Enemies

BUT the Communists were not the only enemies of the old policy; it was the victim of its own accomplishments. The Marshall Plan, and even more the new and rational economic policies of the Keynesian era which it brought to postwar Europe, laid the foundations for a period of unparalleled prosperity. Prosperity, as the prophets of the commonplace rightly hold, is bad for Communism. How can one be sure that the Reds will produce a decent automobile for the struggling masses? Moreover, all postwar calculation, both East and West, greatly underestimated the latent power of the Western economies when properly managed and also the opportunities in socialist economic planning for bad management.

As the danger of internal subversion and the fear of external attack have receded, so has the cohesive influence of fear. And so, accordingly, has the

willingness to accept American leadership. It was assumed that this leadership rested on the divine right of military power, economic wealth or conceivably our inherently fine national character. But, alas, it really depended on being needed.

Age has been the final enemy of the old policy. The generation of leaders who made their reputation under Truman, continued under Dulles and formed their ideas under Stalin is passing from the scene. The clichés of the old policy are still piped, like Muzak, through the bureaucracy. The image of a free world confronting the Communist menace has a special hold on the lesser military mind and a total hold on all Air Force generals who write books as nearly all have a passion for doing. But there are few replacements for the old leaders.

Youth Questions

IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT a younger group now actively questions the old policy, particularly the war with de Gaulle. So do nearly all of the men of active age and mind on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In American diplomatic practice, it is the beginning of understanding to know that a change in policy always precedes an avowal of change. Often it is accompanied by a disavowal of change. So it will be in this case. Increasingly, in the practical realm of trade, diplomacy and perhaps even military affairs, Eastern Europe will be treated as part of Europe. Increasingly, as in Europe, communism will cease to be viewed as an insuperable or even very grave barrier to such an association. Unless the Vietnam conflict, or some similar disaster, makes it impossible, there will also be increasing effort to reach accommodation with the Soviets on practical matters.

By way of confirmation, one has only to reflect how far matters have already gone without formal proclamation. Poland, though still formally a part of the Communist conspiracy, has long been a major recipient of American aid. Trade, travel and cultural relations with all of the Eastern countries has been expanded except for Albania, which evidently doesn't miss these things. On pacification between India and Pakistan, nuclear testing, nuclear proliferation and (though without success) pacification in Vietnam, we sought help from or accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Three years ago the archons of


the old policy were busy devising the ploy by which the Soviets were to be tossed out of the United Nations unless they paid their assessments for peacekeeping under Article 19 of the Charter. This was in keeping with the old policy. It assumed hostility to be implacable so the United Nations was principally important as a theater for Cold War polemics. Now the dispute has been sidetracked and forgotten and its architects dispersed to ponder, one trusts, the unwisdom of remaining with a policy after its day is run. There will be no more enterprises of this kind.

Accommodation with the Soviets may well extend to the question of troop strength in Europe. And this, in any case, will be on the agenda of change. A measure of a man's commitment to the old policy in Washington has long been the adamant character of his reaction to any suggestion that American forces in Europe be diminished by so much as a soldier. But 20 years after the war, these vast Allied and Soviet encampments in the middle of Europe, the most durable since the Romans, have been increasingly an anachronism. Increasingly they will be so regarded. And one day it will be announced that there will be a reduction in strength—or, more likely, some past depletion will be permanent. This will be accompanied by an exceptionally lucid statement explaining that nothing has changed.

The centerpiece of the old policy, its proudest creation, is NATO. NATO will certainly continue; the question is how much of what survives will be form and how much will be content. Official doctrine holds that NATO has not been damaged by the lessening fear of military attack which was once so important as a cohesive force. Nor has it been greatly damaged by the withdrawal of French troops, facilities and real estate. Evidently it needed leaning down, simpler meals and different scenery. This is awful nonsense; it reflects the oldest and least justified of diplomatic beliefs, which is that official myth, if sufficiently reiterated, will do as a substitute for fact.

Descending to Ceremony

AS THE MEN WHO have no personal stake in NATO take over, American association will become more ceremonial, as will the organization itself. Only the speeches will remain unchanged. And as NATO shrinks in prestige so, one imagines, will the special bargaining position of the Germans. American policy—here I confess that I am influenced by hope—will



"For a little man who isn't there, he sure looks at home out on our stairs!"

tend once again to be a friendly and undifferentiated association with all of the European powers.

This will mean other changes. The mellowing of relationships with Eastern Europe will affect, sooner or later, relations with East Germany. But these for a long while have been anomalous. Out of consideration for the German contribution to NATO, we have kept these considerably more frigid, especially as regards trade and credits, than has Bonn itself. And Bonn seems now to be taking further steps toward informal association. So eventually will we. No one imagines an early reunification of Germany; policy on this has been uniquely liturgical. So it will one day be decided that something better might as well be made of the status quo.

Finally, it could well be that the last official speech has been written on European economic and political unification although it is probable, in the manner of the muzzein in the mosque, that some of the old will still echo forth. We did well with this policy in its place and time; all credit goes to the men who saw an opportunity and exploited it. I can't think that the gains

of the last two decades will be lost; the notion of Europe is here to stay. But the further progress will be by Europeans. It wasn't the American vision but the American leverage that really counted. And the leverage has gone.

These changes, to repeat, will occur before they are avowed. They will not, of course, be wholly uncelebrated. As they become evident, there will be some frightful rumblings from this side of the tomb and maybe from beyond. We are letting down our guard. The Soviets are being invited to take Berlin. This is the day for which the Communists have been biding their time. America is surrendering her leadership.

Truth begins with the latter point. Maybe the Communists are engaged in a great charade to lull us into complacency. But this assessment is no longer accepted. And this being so, leadership and policy based on this assessment are not accepted. We can still summon spirits from the vasty deep but, alas, alas, they do not come. More precisely, the Frenchmen do not come, and from the others we get a purely formal response. That is the reality. Thus the change.

By George W. Ball

Ball recently resigned as Under Secretary of State and is now writing a book about foreign affairs.

IN THE LAST EIGHT years, the peoples and governments of six European countries have created a mass market within which goods will soon be able to move with complete freedom. The world accepts the European Economic Community as among the most constructive achievements of the century. It can hardly do otherwise.

Those who predicted its failure have had to change their tune. They are now reduced to pointing out that economic integration has not been matched by a comparable and parallel progress toward political unity.

In this, of course, they are right. Ever since the beginning of 1963, when the French government abruptly blocked the expansion of the Community to include Britain, the drive toward unity has been blunted by the resurgence of nationalism.

Today we see again appearing an old and all too familiar pattern in which the narrow interests of nation-states may well defeat the larger interest of the European peoples.

Such a trend, if it should persist, would be tragic for Europe and dangerous for the world. Hope for the ultimate achievement of a unified Western Europe in which Europeans might speak with a single voice and act with a combined will has already proved of enormous value.

Confusion in Germany

IT HAS BEEN an essential stabilizing force during the whole of the postwar period. It has offered a new meaning and purpose to the younger generations of Europeans revolted by the havoc of two disastrous wars.

Yet today all this is in jeopardy.

The immediate result of assertive nationalism has been the growing alienation of France from her Western friends and a developing confusion in the German Federal Republic as to just what the future German role should be.

During the early years of the Bonn government, the German people were sustained by the thought that they might find a satisfying outlet for their remarkable talents and energy within the framework of a unifying Western Europe organized on the basis of equality.

But doubt has grown as spanners have been thrown into the machinery, momentum has been lost and the spirit of Poincaré has re-emerged in a neighboring capital.

The first sour fruits of this develop-

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ment are already evident; its longer-term consequences, if the trend continues, are not hard to foresee. If the German people—and particularly German youth—should become finally convinced that there was no longer a serious chance for them to play a role within a united Europe that could offer a fulfilling alternative to nationalism, they would inevitably concentrate—as they are now beginning to do—on re-establishing the German state as an independent force in world politics.

Road to Frustration

ONE MIGHT THEN envisage an obsessive preoccupation with reunification as the single important objective of German policy. This could be hazardous in the extreme.

It could lead to frustration and even—with the coming of age of a new generation—to a fundamental alteration in the direction of German policy, since it is the East and not the West that will, in the end, hold the power of final decision on this issue.

The dangers from a revival of corrosive national rivalries should not, therefore, be underestimated, but they are not the only unhappy results that would flow from a failure to make progress toward European unity. Such a failure would deny to the European people the chance to play an effective part in world affairs commensurate with their abilities.

In terms of the power realities of the second half of the 20th century, nations of 50 million people simply cannot command the manpower and material resources to have a major impact on other than regional issues.

Over time, the refusal to face this fact and its implications would bring grave disappointment to the proud and vigorous people of Western Europe, who have for so many centuries played dominant roles on the world stage.

It would tend also to inhibit the development of healthy relations between Europe and America, since, as anyone knows who has worked at the problem, the most severe impediment to full and easy understanding across the Atlantic is the disparity in power and resources between the United States and any individual Western European state.

A Western Europe organized politically on a modern scale would certainly have a voice comparable to that of the United States and the Soviet Union in deciding the great issues that will determine the fate of mankind.

But equality is not something that

can be conferred as an act of grace. It will not come about merely by improving arrangements for transatlantic consultation.

Feelings of Vexation

IT IS NOT A question of international manners but the reality of power and resources, and European feelings of vexation and futility in many of their relations with America are bound to increase so long as their economic prosperity is not being translated into an equal and adequate voice in world affairs.

Thus the failure to modernize the political structure of Europe embarrasses political relations between our two continents. It also creates economic and commercial frictions.

Fear of being overwhelmed by the disproportionate weight of American industrial enterprises is leading to agitation to limit direct investments in certain sensitive sectors. The degree of disparity in the size and resources of enterprises has led also to what is currently being called the technological gap.

There has been great confusion about the sources and meaning of the gap. Suggestions, for example, to close it by a kind of technological Marshall Plan are, in my view, misconceived, since the accident of a common nomen-

clature is the only point of resemblance to the dollar gap of 1946.

The technological gap has come about because the structure and habits of European industry have not yet been adequately overhauled to meet the requirements of the present day—and this is again affected by the inadequate political structure of Western Europe.

The Rome Treaty was a giant stride forward, but merely freeing the movement of goods has not by itself created the climate or psychology that impels European entrepreneurs to build larger corporate enterprises by mergers across national boundaries.

Common Taxation

NOR ARE MANY such marketwide corporate concentrations likely to come about without greater progress in such vital areas as common, or at least harmonized, taxation and regulatory laws, the fusion of capital markets, and perhaps even the creation of a common currency—achievements probably impossible, in spite of the language of the Rome Treaty, without substantially greater political unity.

After all, it should be clear from our own postwar experience that governmental decisions have become so closely related to the health of modern industrial economies that political unity is increasingly necessary if a great market is to flourish.

These then are some of the costs and dangers of a failure to unify Europe. But the logic of unity is so compelling that I do not believe such failure will occur.

So far, one of the weaknesses of the European edifice has been the absence of the United Kingdom—which alone has the size and strength to provide the necessary balance to France and Germany.

Yet within the past three years the British people have gone a long way toward understanding the need to join in the common economic arrangements of the Continent, and I am convinced that once Britain identifies her economic life with that of Europe, her interest in participating in a political

Europe will burgeon beyond most present expectations.

Obviously the United States must exert its influence on all of this more through encouragement and advice than direct action. This is the course we have consistently followed since the war and those Europeans who have fought the valiant battle for unity have greatly welcomed our help.

For our country to depart from this policy now or in the future would, I think, be the height of folly, and I am confident that we will not do so.

Curious Nostalgia

AT THE SAME TIME, in certain intellectual circles there is a tendency to regard the recent disquieting trends in Europe with almost masochistic delight as though the prospect that the nations of Europe might backslide to their old bad habits of nationalistic rivalry was a good thing.

I find this nostalgia for a catastrophic past curious in the extreme.

The desire for a return to the "normalcy" of a fragmented Europe in the 1960s seems to me quite as foolish as was the desire to return to the "normalcy" of American isolationism in the 1920s—and the two phenomena are not unrelated.

Certainly it is turning things upside down to argue, as some writers appear to assume, that a reversion to the old discredited habits of the past constitutes vision, leadership and a bold new idea.

Nor, finally, am I impressed by the argument that the West can solve its problems with the Communist bloc by weakness and internal disunion. By maintaining common policies we can, with patience, exert powerful leverage for helpful change.

Magnetism is a function of mass, and strength inspires respect. Gradually, over time, if the West holds together, we should certainly find increasing areas of common interest with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And at the end of the day, we should be able to resolve the division of Germany and of Europe on a basis that will assure the maximum of freedom to the whole of mankind.

Golo Mann

With or Without a Pact, Western Europe Will Remain Under United States Protection

Historian Mann is noted for writings and teachings on the political development of Europe and the United States and has interpreted the American scene to students in German universities.

EVEN A FEW YEARS ago the hopes in a European and possibly in an Atlantic community were high. No longer today. What has happened?

The reason most commonly adduced is that vast political expectations frequently lead to nothing, and even if fulfilled they are never as glorious as originally envisioned. But there are also specific reasons.

One of these is success itself. The European-American association has been a success. It has imposed outermost limits on Russian imperialism, behind which we feel in practice safe; it has also stolen the Russian thunder somewhat, so that it is scarcely accurate to talk of an expanding Moscow imperialism any longer.

Through the atmosphere of international confidence it has generated, as well as through the international institutions that have been formed in the course of time, the American-European association has given a powerful impetus to European prosperity. But with returning safety, and with the resurrected forces of life, the old prides have also largely returned.

The situation prevailing in 1950 was considered more permanent than it actually was. Europe was not ended, neither were the European nation-states. This led to greater independence of Europe from America; also, greater independence of the European states from each other.

In de Gaulle's Mind

BOTH THESE propositions coexist in the mind of Gen. de Gaulle: a French France, and a European Europe.

The propositions are mutually exclusive. Perhaps, however, that great artisan of states could have successfully accomplished this had the Germans been there to help him. They did not want to do so, however, as even today they still are uncertain about what they want.

There is no nationalism in regard to

Europe, although something akin to love does exist. A unified Europe (Western Europe) would have been one rationale, rendered necessary through new and logical reasons.

Nationalism is old and irrational: one harks right back to Spanish, German, Polish, French nationalism, and the rest. It obviously is on the rise again in Europe, and not only in Germany.

On the contrary, the Germans as usual are reacting to what others are doing, after having for a while honestly tried a new approach. The terror of the German—and Austrian—fanatics in the South Tyrol is as infamous as it is foolish. But no less foolish, imperialistic, and nationalistically inclined is the Italian regiment stationed in the South Tyrol. Both elements exacerbate each other.

The anti-American feeling now prevalent in Europe, therefore, acts against promoting European integration. The feeling is not pro-European, but strictly nationalistic in the old style. It not only threatens to cut Europe off from America, but to tear Europe apart.

The danger is serious. But there would be no sense in pointing this out if one considered it unavoidable. In the final analysis the danger is founded on changing psychological factors, on sentiment, just as historical events are largely conditioned by feelings and moods.

If feelings are acute, bored or nervous, nothing goes right and difficulties pile up where there were none before. It is the task of political leadership to counter such sentiments, to point up new aspirations and to reinstate old ones.

Germany's Case

THIS IS ESPECIALLY difficult in the case of Germany; and unfortunately Germany is once again central to the European problem. It was the great German illusion that following World War II the peace would be incomparably better, sweeter, and more equitable than following World War I.

They naturally should have realized

that after 1945 the peace, on the contrary, would turn out worse, just as World War II had been worse.

One quarter of the country cut off, and a second quarter separated from it for an unknown period—the stark reality was for a long time obscured by Konrad Adenauer's successful Western-oriented politics.

Once the opponent had been punished and crippled, as was the case with Germany in 1945, it would have been logical—though admittedly unpleasant and unconventional as power politics—to keep him down for evermore.

The contrary happened. After a very few years Germany was actually wealthier than ever before and provided with considerable armed forces; and, at the same time, totally unable to overcome its unnatural partition, and even less to recover its lost eastern territories, which rightfully still belonged to it.

So long as Adenauer's considerable adroitness and authority prevailed in Germany, so long as the cold war flourished and the bonds of the Atlantic Pact system still held, the explosive nature of this paradoxical situation was not apparent. No special foresight was required, however, to predict that things sooner or later would begin to happen.

Does this mean we shall again find ourselves in an identical situation to that in the 1920s and 1930s? This I do not believe; not merely because I do not wish it, but because there are powerful reasons not to.

The Atlantic Pact system will continue to disintegrate. It was not de Gaulle who destroyed it; with his usual intuition, he simply saw further ahead than the others.

Without France, the pact cannot exist militarily: it no longer corresponds to the world situation, and furthermore the United States no longer has any vital interest in it.

U.S. Protection Continues

THIS DOES NOT ALTER the fact that with or without the pact, Western Europe remains and will remain under American protection. Nor can the great American-European encounter of the mid-century, and its continuing repercussions on the world, be obliterated.

There certainly are many things in Europe that have disappointed Americans; the converse almost certainly has happened too, and not only in the sense of obscure resentment.

The writer has for many years interpreted the American scene for the benefit of the German public, in an extremely favorable light. In the case of the Vietnam war, however, I cannot do

this and would prefer to keep silent. But these unfortunate events, which were born of necessity, can never wipe out such developments.

The Atlantic Community as we envisioned it in the 1950s will never materialize. Seriously, however, it could never come about, as its most powerful member—the United States—never was willing to merge its sovereignty with the others.

The new American-European community and its expression in innumerable manifestations will survive. Meanwhile, European society will continue to resemble the American.

Furthermore, certain simple facts of the 1950s remain valid in Europe, and no Gen. de Gaulle, and no German neo-nationalism can prevent this.

The European states have become too small ever again to be self-sufficient economically, politically and militarily—as they were up to 1914 and wanted to be after 1919—too small to allow their youth to participate in the great assignments and experiments of the next decade.

Protests against this state of affairs can change nothing and in any case they will probably not last.

I would add that the above is probable, not that it is certain. Anyone who has followed historical trends attentively over the past four decades is aware of the irrational forces that so often have torpedoed, and will continue to torpedo, our hopes and logical deductions.

Are there not mavericks today in Germany, for instance, who are prepared to cut themselves off from Europe and once again play the great game of power politics in mad independence? Who can tell? One cannot know anything for certain: one can only keep hoping.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr.

Historian Schlesinger was an aide to President Kennedy.

THE GREAT PARADOX in the Atlantic world in the years ahead will be the sight of Europe and America growing culturally together as they grow politically apart.

For there seems little doubt that Europe will move increasingly on an independent course in world affairs—whether out of mistrust of American purpose, ennui with American moralism, or simple self-preoccupation and narcissism.

Yet, at the same time, in habits, tastes, enthusiasms, addictions, young Europeans become more American every day. Even as they bemoan American action in Vietnam, they do so in blue jeans or levis, sipping Cokes or milkshakes, with the beat of rock 'n' roll or the gabble of television in the background.

So while American policy grows increasingly irrelevant to Europe, American poetry begins to strike to the European heart. Our statesmen become bores, while our folksingers, our film stars, our genre novelists, our linguistic philosophers, our cyberneticians and our itinerant revivalists are the rage. McCloy is down; Robert Lowell is up. The multilateral force is out; the Beach Boys are in. Every gesture of rebuff to American foreign policy is accompanied by a gesture of fealty to American civilization.

Why should this be? Some will say that it is because American civilization at the moment is considerably better than American foreign policy.

But the problem surely goes deeper than that. For what is involved is real-

The Europeans Bemoan Our Foreign Policy But They Do It in Blue Jeans While Sipping Cokes to Rock 'n' Roll

ly not the cultural Americanization of Europe but something more comprehensive and deep-running: the modernization of the West.

First Modern Society

IN THE 19TH CENTURY, America, with its technological dynamism, its spiritual openness, its emancipation from the constraints of tradition and status, became, as Tocqueville pointed out, the first modern society. In America industrialism wrote with a free hand, simultaneously releasing energies and discontents, generating affluence and frustration, multiplying tensions and fulfillments.

It produced not only goods and services but a new society and a new ethos. America was the preview of things to come: in the 1920s Duhamel entitled his impressions of the United States, so full of foreboding, "Scenes de la Vie Future."

But in the 19th century Europe the modern spirit encountered the inner resistance of a society still deeply rooted in the ethos of feudalism. In the end, it took not only industrialization but war to break up the traditional structures of life and thought and make the ancient continent safe for modernity; and it was World War II which, in the course of smashing the old Europe, endowed the new with fresh intellectual audacity and unprecedented social mobility.

World War II, in short, prepared

Europe to become "American"—but not "American" in a national sense, only in the sense that America had gone through the ordeal of modernity first. Europe, it may be said, is now the America of the 20th century, as Asia may become the America of the 21st century.

Indeed, in the years to come we may hear decreasingly about the Americanization of Europe and increasingly about the Europeanization of America. For, by a not unfamiliar irony of history, what was old becomes young and what was young becomes old.

America, as a consequence of being the earliest modern society, is now in some respects the most antiquated. We still have a lead in the pursuit of various sorts of modernity. But Europe is in the position to take advantage of the American experience in culture, much as America in the early 19th century took advantage of the European experience in technology. Soon Europe may start to leapfrog ahead.

The Swinging Continent

ALREADY IT EXCELS in the most characteristically modern of arts—the film. In general, it is today Western Europe and not North America which is the swinging continent.

In the long run, this informal Atlantic community of cultural vitality may well be more important than the formal structure of political and military alliance whose fate so agitates our



Associated Press

Young England especially takes an active interest in American foreign policy.

statesmen today. Certainly the cultural thrust of the Atlantic world has been quite as effective as NATO in subverting the dogmatic rigidities of the Communist empire. It is safe to say that it will be far more effective than NATO in the future.

Thirty years ago, Communism cast a powerful spell on young people in Europe and America, adrift in a dark world of depression and Fascism. Today the situation is reversed.

The glitter of modernity casts an even more powerful spell on young people in the Communist empire. In Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, in Moscow and Leningrad, young Communists think wistfully and enviously of the opportunities enjoyed by their contemporaries to the West — Beatle records, the films of Fellini and Godard, anti-novels, Pop art, electronic music, even, I suppose, marijuana and LSD.

No doubt the modern spirit has its excesses. But let us not decry modernity. It is the West's strongest weapon.

This is why the paradox with which I began—Europe and America growing politically apart but culturally together—may in the end be the best means of moving the Western world beyond the cold war and uniting modern men in a common mood of fraternity and hope.