Description of Sample Documents from The Cuban Missile Crisis Papers Project

(1) "The Cuba Project," February 20, 1962 (Top Secret - Sensitive; declassified as a result of a FOIA request, January 5, 1989)

Outlines goals and a schedule of action for "Operation Mongoose," the U.S. program of covert action against the Castro regime. Director of Operations Edward Lansdale's plan, although later scaled back, aims for the overthrow of the Cuban government through internal revolt by October, 1962.

(2) "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose," March 14, 1962 (declassified as a result of a FOIA request, January 5, 1989)

Guidelines drafted by General Maxwell Taylor for the program of covert action designed to eventually overthrow Castro state that "final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention." President Kennedy would be briefed and give tacit approval to the guidelines on March 16, 1962. Soviet sources have recently disclosed that concern over a U.S. invasion of Cuba was one of the primary reasons for the Soviet decision in late April or Early May to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba.

(3) "Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 85-3-62: The Military Buildup in Cuba," Scptember 19, 1962 [Excerpt] (declassified April 15, 1975)

Disseminated by the United States Intelligence Board, the inter-agency intelligence group, just one month prior to the missile crisis, the report informed top administration officials that despite some indications that Soviet missiles could be heading into Cuba, the deployment of such missiles would be "incompatible with Soviet policy as we currently estimate it."

(4) "Notes of October 21, 1962 Meeting with the President" (Top secret; declassified September, 1985)

Minutes by Defense Secretary McNamara on a meeting between President Kennedy and military advisers shortly before Kennedy's final decision to opt for a blockade of Cuba rather than an airstrike. The minutes confirm the magnitude of the air attack against Cuba considered by the Kennedy Administration.

(5) "Soviet/Cuban Reactions to US Retaliation for Attack on US Reconnaissance Aircraft," November 17, 1962 (Secret; declassified as a result of a Mandatory Review request, June 22, 1988)

This State Department intelligence analysis, produced during on going tensions regarding Soviet bombers still in Cuba, concludes that U.S. retaliation against a Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) battery in the event of a downing of a U.S. airplane would not run "any great risk of triggering a Soviet military reaction." The paper also reflects that belief that SAM sites are Soviet manned and that any attack on U.S. aircraft "almost certainly would have been ordered by Moscow."

(6) "Historical Highlights: United States Air Forces in Europe," November 28, 1980 (Excerpt)

Reveals that U.S. Jupiter nuclear IRBMs were turned over to Turkey on October 22, 1962 -- the same day President Kennedy announced the naval quarantine of Cuba to in response to the introduction of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba.