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THE FOREIGN SCENE

A Fresh Setback For Detente Hopes

Soviet arrest of a Yale professor, announced on Tuesday, drew an unusually vigorous protest from President Kennedy, who ordered a postponement of negotiations for a new United States-Soviet cultural exchange pact. The Russians released the professor and sent him to London yesterday.

Thirty years ago last week President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, declaring that "two great nations like America and Russia should be on speaking terms," overrode widespread domestic opposition and recognized the 16-year-old Communist government of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets held a meeting in Moscow on Friday to hail the anniversary of their diplomatic acceptability to the United States. Mrs. Khrushchev, wife of the Soviet Premier, presided over it. Presumably she would repeat what Moscow radio had said earlier in a broadcast beamed to the United States:

"The Soviet people sincerely extend the hands of friendship to Americans, urging them to uphold the fine traditions of Soviet-American relations."

But American Embassy officials, bruised by a fresh example of the Soviet's "fine traditions," boycotted the affair. Although they undoubtedly acted under instructions from Washington, they had an excellent reason: The secret arrest and imprisonment of a renowned American professor on "spy" charges.

The new—and major—disruptive incident involved Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn, 52, of Yale, a Soviet affairs expert, author and political scientist. The professor was seized on the night of October 31 or the morning of November 1, shortly before he was to leave Moscow for Warsaw after a

month's visit in the Soviet Union. The American Embassy was not notified of the arrest until November 12, on which date Tass, the Soviet government news agency, announced it publicly in a two-sentence dispatch.

Protest Arrest

American Ambassador Foy Kohler made six protests in the first 48 hours and went personally to the Soviet Foreign Office on the matter. He got no satisfaction; no American official was allowed to see Prof. Barghoorn, who reportedly was held in the notorious Lubyanka Prison.

The Soviet action and attitude provoked the anger of President Kennedy like it has not been provoked before by these so-called "spy" cases involving Americans in the USSR. And a deluge of protests by American intellectual and university groups hardly encouraged a cooling-off period in the White House.

The President's mood was demonstrated at his Thursday morning news conference. The second question posed to him was on his attitude toward the Soviet action and what he was going to do about getting the professor released.

"The United States Government is deeply concerned about the unwarranted and unjustified arrest of Prof. Barghoorn," came the stern reply. "He was not on an intelligence mission of any kind."

Mr. Kennedy did not limit his reaction to words. He ordered the indefinite postponement of a meeting between American and Soviet officials, originally slated for Moscow on Tuesday for the purpose of hammering out a new two-year pact on cultural ex-

changes.

'Innocent Men...'

While the President declined to take the position that there would be no further cultural exchanges unless the professor was released, he said "there is no sense having a program" if an innocent man is arrested and given no means of defense.

"How can you carry on that kind of a program?" he asked. "I am sure that everybody would agree that it would be hopeless under those conditions."

The feeling of the intellectual community in the United States was vented somewhat on a touring group of 16 Soviet cultural exchange delegates which happened to be in Washington when the Barghoorn story broke. Georgetown, Maryland and American Universities all abruptly canceled programs with the group as a symbolic protest.

What the President planned to do next to prod the Kremlin, he did not disclose. But he did say, in effect, that he would not call off the current negotiations (blessed by the White House) between private American companies and the Soviet Union for the sale of \$200 million worth of surplus wheat to the USSR.

The Wheat Deal

He told his news conference that the wheat deal stands on its own. It is a case, he said, of our benefitting a little (in the balance of payments area) and their benefitting a little (making up a critical shortage of wheat). He did, however, suggest that the current atmosphere was not conducive to trade of this kind.

If the President was giving the Kremlin a little more time to reconsider its high-handed action, it paid off. On Saturday morning,

the Russians announced that they had freed Prof. Barghoorn and "expelled" him from the country. They put him on a plane for London and then informed the American Embassy. They still insisted that the American had engaged in espionage activity, but explained they released him because of Mr. Kennedy's "personal concern." A Tass announcement of the action said:

"As it was reported earlier, the state security organs in Moscow arrested for espionage the American citizen, Frederick C. Barghoorn, who was in the USSR as a tourist. The investigation confirmed that he had been engaged in intelligence activities against the USSR. . . .

"But in view of the concern of the United States high officials . . . the Soviet government decided merely to expel him from the Soviet Union."

Mr. Kennedy, who was inspecting the space and missile test center at Cape Canaveral when the word came to him, was reported to be "gratified" over the release of the professor.

It seems quite likely that the Kremlin, which must have ordered the arrest, was sharply surprised by the Kennedy reaction to it. Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin made this statement to Western reporters on Friday:

"I do not understand how this single incident can color the whole range of Soviet-American relations. I think it is a completely artificial link."

The fact that the Kremlin finally backed down convinced many Americans anew that firmness, if not toughness, is what the Russians understand best.

As a Precedent

The Soviet surprise, to be frank about it, is perhaps understandable to this degree: Never before have the American Embassy or Mr. Kennedy gone to such lengths to deny the guilt of a private

civilian traveling as a tourist. Certainly, the case of John Mackinsen, an American student at Berlin University, provoked no such protestation by the United States.

Mr. Mackinsen was arrested on spy charges as he was leaving the Soviet Union. He was clapped in jail for two years. As Edmund Stevens, special correspondent for *The Star* in Moscow, pointed out, both Prof. Barghoorn and Mr. Mackinsen were presumably entitled to the same protection.

Mr. Kennedy's flat assertion that the professor "was not on an intelligence mission of any kind" was unusual, even though the President must have checked with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and other Government security organs before he made it.

Why?

Why did the Russians arrest the professor in the first place? Ascribing motives to Communists is always interesting if not always fruitful.

Some Kremlinologists saw it as a retaliation for the recent arrest of a Soviet spy in New Jersey, with the Russians planning to offer the professor in a swap for their man.

Others felt that it indicated a Kremlin warning to Soviet citizens to avoid contact with Americans.

Most Western observers, however, saw the Soviet action as a determination to torpedo the cultural exchange program, pinning the blame on the United States, in the process. They wish to end the exchanges, this theory says, because the United States is benefiting more from them than they are.

It seems clear, despite the outcome of the Barghoorn case, that

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the hopes for a genuine detente or easing of tensions generated by the July partial nuclear test ban agreement have been dealt a new blow. The first, of course, was the recent harassment of American military convoys on the autobahn between West Germany and the divided city of Berlin. When and whether these hopes will be restored depends, as usual, upon Soviet behaviour.

Viet Nam: New Strategy

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will head major strategy session on South Viet Nam in Honolulu on Wednesday.

Cambodia last week threatened to refuse American aid after January 1 and turn to Red China because of clandestine radio attacks from South Viet Nam.

Are American policy changes called for in wake of the military coup which deposed the South Viet Nam regime of Ngo Dinh Diem? How goes the battle in the vital Mekong delta against the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas? When may we expect a return to civilian constitutional government in Saigon?

A New Problem

These and other questions will be taken up at a major strategy meeting of American officials in Hawaii on Wednesday. Among those attending will be: Secretary of State Rusk; Secretary of Defense McNamara; McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's adviser on national security matters; Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam; Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Commander of the American Military Advisory Force in South Viet Nam, and Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander of all United States Forces in the Pacific.

Although the coup took place only a little more than two weeks

ago, it is clear that the ouster of the unpopular Diem regime has not magically solved all problems. And, of course, it created some new ones.

Harkins' Role

One of the latter concerned the attempt by some quarters in Saigon, both American (embassy and press) and Vietnamese, to promote the removal of Gen. Harkins as top American military commander on the curious ground that he had close contacts with the old government and supported it.

The Pentagon moved to squelch the anti-Harkins campaign before it damaged the relations between the general and South Viet Nam military leaders. A Defense spokesman branded the stories that his position had been eroded in South Viet Nam as "baloney." Then the President, at his Thursday news conference, followed up, saying:

"He was just doing his job. . . . That was what he was sent for, to work with the government in power. That's what he will do with the new government. I have great confidence in Gen. Harkins, and there may be some who would like to see Gen. Harkins go, but I plan to keep him there."

The general, incidentally, indicated last week that he did not go along with those critics, American and South Vietnamese, who held that former President Diem could not have won the war against the guerrillas, with American aid. He told an interviewer that Mr. Diem was "bold" and "very effective" in some of his military operations.

As to Military . . .

As for the military situation, last week was one of the worst for the government since the guerrilla war began in earnest in the late 1950s. Communist attacks on stockaded villages, outposts and patrols resulted in 925 government casualties, a record high for a single week. In addition, and importantly, the Reds captured 450 weapons and lost only 140. While the Communist attacks have increased in tempo, the government counter-operations have not yet regained the level maintained under the Diem regime.

Despite the situation outlined above, the United States military announced in Saigon on Friday that 1,000 American soldiers would be sent home by Christmas time. There are 16,500 American military men in South Viet Nam today.

On the administrative-political side, the ruling junta made it plain that there would be no quick return to civilian government in South Viet Nam. Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh said on Friday the junta would stay in power for at least a year, although elections might be held "six to 12 months" from now.

In Cambodia

There was a disturbing development in Southeast Asia last week which could have a very serious effect on our whole position in the area. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia threatened to oust American and French military advisers, cut off all American military aid programs and seek Communist Chinese and Russian loans and technicians unless clandestine radio attacks from South Viet Nam were halted.

The United States, which has advanced \$365 million in aid to Cambodia since 1954, has assured the Prince that we, too, deplore these broadcasts but do not control them.

Mr. Kennedy did not appear overly concerned about the Prince's threat, although he termed it "serious." He said he thought the Prince was more concerned about his country's independence than we are and would not jeopardize it (by inviting the Chinese in).

Cambodia's geographical position, however, makes it extremely important when considering the near-war in Laos and the fighting in Viet Nam. Cambodia borders on these countries and Thailand as well.

A Pipeline

Much military aid from North Viet Nam to the guerrillas in the South has come through Cambodia. In addition, it has been reported that many Viet Cong guerrillas have been trained in that nation. Should the Red Chinese find themselves in a strong posi-

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tion in Cambodia, the pressure on South Viet Nam would increase substantially, perhaps critically.

Market: Showdown

The Common Market ministerial meeting last week indicated a fateful crisis over the issue of agricultural prices may be near.

President de Gaulle of France made a statement last June that is haunting the memories of members of the European Economic Community. He said:

"The year 1963 is decisive for the future of the Common Market."

It was widely interpreted at the time and, unhappily, few are willing to put any different slant on the words today, that Gen. de Gaulle meant this: If the Common Market countries cannot agree on an agricultural policy by January 1, well in advance of the so-called "Kennedy round" talks with the United States on lowering tariff barriers, France might cripple the EEC or withdraw from it.

The major problem concerns agricultural prices. The French farmer, blessed with rich land, is perhaps the most efficient in Europe. He desires a substantial share of the German market. But the relatively inefficient, uncompetitive German farmer says no. There are 4 million of them and they have a great influence on the new Chancellor, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, who, with his party, must stand for re-election in 1965.

Date of Talks

This is the nub of the trouble the EEC ran into head-on in Brussels last week, without any progress. With the De Gaulle deadline drawing near, the French wanted to begin marathon talks on the matter on December 2. The Germans said they would not be ready to debate until December 16. The talks may begin on the 9th.

A compromise plan has been offered, one which would level wheat prices—one of the most delicate issues—among the Common Market Six. The prices in Germany, Luxembourg and Italy

would be reduced and those in France, Holland and Belgium would be raised. German farmers would be reimbursed in full for their losses for three years and then given a 10 per cent per year payment.

Dr. Erhard is said to be aware that German farmers need to be diverted into labor-short industrial activity, but given the stubborn refusal of his rural countrymen to compromise, he has taken the position that the Common Market should not rush into any agreement on the matter.

Where does this leave the French and, more specifically, Gen. de Gaulle?

No one can say for sure, but the general himself. It is believed, however, that he will not move to kill the Common Market if his deadline is not met. The "Kennedy round" talks are scheduled to begin on May 4, four months later. If the Germans should show concrete signs of sincerely seeking a compromise before that time, the storm in the Market may yet blow over.

Alliance: Time of Crisis

An inter-American ministerial conference in Brazil reviewed last week the two-year record of the Alliance for Progress and took up new proposals for strengthening it.

Is the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy's bold, new program to aid the economy of Latin America, in a state of crisis?

Any observer who listened to a string of speeches by Latin officials at the annual review meeting on the Alliance held in Sao Paulo last week could only come to the conclusion that the Latins believe it is. For example, listen to Jose Antonio Mayobre, executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America:

"What is apparent before the eyes of the world is that after two years of this program (the Alliance) we are far from attaining the minimum goals set by us and that in many countries stagnation, economic retrogressions and

the inflationary spiral are the predominant situation."

Even W. Averell Harriman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and ace trouble-shooter of the Kennedy administration, didn't argue the point. Noting that the United States has made \$2.3 billion available to Latin America in the last 27 months, he cited some of the causes of trouble, saying:

"Within Latin America, there have been delays in establishing effective planning machinery, in mobilizing domestic resources, in establishing priorities and, above all, in the development of well-conceived and technically sound projects."

Mr. Harriman went to the meeting in Brazil to encourage the Alliance membership of 20 nations to do something about the problem. He backed the United States-supported plan to "Latinize" the Alliance by creating a seven-man co-ordinating commission. Presumably this group could draft solutions to outstanding problems and recommend the awarding of funds, although it would have no effective control over the latter.

A hopeful sign that the plan would be adopted appeared on

Thursday when Brazil, a key member of the Alliance as Latin America's largest country, indicated it would not press its opposition to it.

The difficulty for the continent, which has slipped economically as an entity in the last two years, is that declining exports and falling prices for its products have not been made up by foreign investments or loans. One reason has been the uncertain political atmosphere in a number of countries which has acted to scare off private investors.

A concrete example of this problem is the new Argentine government's decision to cancel governmental contracts with United States oil companies—companies which have invested about \$400 million in Argentina since 1958. Mr. Harriman visited Buenos Aires before going to the Sao Paulo meeting, but failed to dissuade the Argentines, despite threats to cut off our aid programs.

Unless ways are found to increase foreign private investment in Latin America and increase exports from the continent, not even the generous Alliance will be able to arrest Latin America's downhill economic slide.