

EISENHOWER SPEAKS HIS MIND—

Vietnam . . . nuclear weapons . . . the draft . . . welfare . . . crime . . . "black power" . . .

How does former President Dwight D. Eisenhower feel about the issues now dominating the U. S., and much of the world? Does he think America is on the right track?

In the exclusive interview on these pages, General Eisenhower speaks his mind about the whole range of matters of public concern.

The ex-President was interviewed at the Eisenhower farm in Pennsylvania by Paul Martin of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report."

GETTYSBURG, Pa.

Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, now 76 and living in retirement, made—during an interview with a member of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report"—these nine points about today's state of affairs in the nation and the world:

1. The war in Vietnam "worries Americans more than anything else"; it has been "going on too long"; the time has come to employ the military strength necessary to bring this war to an "honorable conclusion."
2. There is a "dangerous trend" toward "monopoly political power" in the U. S. with a disintegration of the "two-party system" and increasing "worship" of a "strong man" concept of Government by an all-powerful Chief Executive.
3. Federal courts are embarked on a "serious trend" toward rewriting the Constitution by a series of judicial decisions; too many "lifetime" judges have been "sitting on the bench too long."
4. Government welfare programs of the "Great Society" are building up vast and inefficient bureaucracies, using taxpayers' money out of the Federal Treasury to "encourage and reward laziness and malingering" on the part of some people "who just want an easier living."
5. The draft should be reformed, with one year of "tough military training" for every 18-year-old youth, without exemptions or deferments, or escape into civilian programs such as the Peace Corps; training should include basic education for illiterates, and physical fitness for those with defects.
6. The growth of racial disorders and juvenile delinquency is a threat to the nation; "education and self-discipline are what we need."
7. Crime is a "real problem" and is "getting worse"; criminals who are repeaters commit most of the "serious crimes"; judges must give "proper sentences."
8. Military security is necessary, but there's no need to "waste money" supporting a "large standing army" that would be "useless in a major war."
9. NATO is still a good concept, and should be strengthened; the Russians have not abandoned the goal of world Communist domination; eventually, Red China may become our most serious problem.

The interview with General Eisenhower also covered a wide range of other subjects. What follows are the views of the former President in detail.

1. VIETNAM

On the U. S. role in Vietnam, General Eisenhower says: "No one could hope more than I that the President will have a real success in winning the military war, so that we can give these people in Southeast Asia a better opportunity, better education, a better way of life."

However, General Eisenhower feels deeply that the idea has been allowed to develop in this country that we can fight the war in Vietnam as a sort of sideline activity of the Government, without interfering with any of our domestic comforts or "business as usual" at home.

This is where the General differs with policy planners advising the President. The disagreement is not over purpose, but the pace of military operations in Vietnam—the way the war has been conducted, not by fighting men in the field, but by Government overseers in Washington.

Looking back over five years of growing U. S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, General Eisenhower notes that former President Kennedy made the decision to send in the first 15,000 combat troops in 1961-1962.

The war strategy has been one of "escalation" of American military forces, gradually raising the premium the Communists must pay for continuing their subversive warfare against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

"I do not believe in 'gradualism' in fighting a war," General Eisenhower declared. "I believe in putting in the kind of military strength we need to win, and getting it over with as soon as possible."

"The war should have first priority over everything else. When we get to the stage that we are losing American lives, then we need to view the war as a far more serious problem than going to the moon, or any domestic welfare programs, or anything else."

"The casualties in this war are getting to be considerable. Every family in the United States is affected one way or another. Every private citizen should be involved, and realize that he has a personal stake in the war."

The five-star general receives regular reports from the Pentagon on military operations. He is consulted by President



—USN&WR Photo

Johnson. General Eisenhower says he does not have a "formula" for ending the war—"no one can solve this problem, except those who are living with it every day."

General Eisenhower has the highest regard for military personnel in the field in Vietnam. He says Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander, is "terrific—there's nothing too good I could say about him." General Eisenhower adds:

"When your man in the field says how much strength he needs, so long as we are in a war, there should be no hesitating in giving it to him."

The former President feels there is no fundamental disagreement in America over purposes and objectives of the war, although "some so-called 'doves' in Congress apparently see the United States as having no responsibility to defend freedom and self-determination of small nations around the world."

On the contrary, General Eisenhower says most Americans believe "freedom is indivisible—if we allow other people to lose their freedom, without doing anything about it, then we have lost some freedom of our own."

"We are not trying to gain for the United States any more power, wealth, or territory anywhere in the world," he points out. "It is simply a matter of protecting freedom wherever it exists."

The question, then, is not one of policy—but conduct of the war. Have we been going at it the way we should? General Eisenhower feels there has been too much of a political tendency to ease into the war gradually, without declaring a national emergency, calling up the reserves, or sounding any general alarm. "It hasn't worked," he declared.

When his advice was sought several years ago, General Eisenhower said in effect: Don't delay. Don't procrastinate. If you are going to do this, then summon all necessary military strength, do what you must do quickly, and get it over with. Don't give the enemy time to build up his own strength, and disperse his military targets. But this advice went unheeded by the Administration. Now, General Eisenhower says, "the war has been going on too long,

and something has to be done to bring it to an honorable conclusion."

Nuclear Deterrent

General Eisenhower has neither called for, nor rejected, the possibility of using atomic weapons in Asia. However, he feels the theory of "nuclear deterrent" power has been widely misunderstood. It could be stated this way:

The principle of "nuclear deterrence" depends, not only on how much atomic weaponry you possess and what you intend to do with it, but also on what the enemy thinks you might have, and what he thinks you might do with it.

Thus, if the enemy is convinced that you are committed against using nuclear power under any circumstances, then your advantage no longer has any "deterrent" value—no matter how many atomic weapons you may possess.

2. POLITICAL POWER

The former President stated these political views:

"We are tending too much toward a one-party system in the United States. We are too close to a monopoly of political power in this country.

"That is one of the reasons I chose the Republican Party when people came after me to run for President back in the period 1946-1952. I thought we needed to restore some kind of equality of power between the two political parties.

"The easiest thing for me to do would have been to go the other way. For six out of the eight years of my Administration, I had to persuade my political opponents who controlled the Congress, to get anything done.

"If we have a rough equality between our two political parties, then anyone attempting to go to extremes is going to be blocked. But if we don't have balance in our political system, if the party in power stays in power too long—who is there to stop its excesses?"

3. COURTS

"I had always thought that the Supreme Court would protect us from excesses and extremism—but the Supreme Court today seems concerned with only one slant of political direction, the same that reigns in the executive offices. When this happens, we are in trouble. In the 1966 election, there is no greater objective for all Americans than to restore the regular balance of equality in the two political parties.

"Our experiment in self-government is still going on today, just as much as when the Founding Fathers first conceived of our form of democracy, the American Republic. The older I grow, the more certain I am that only by education can we really save our form of government.

"I read where members of the so-called intelligentsia, some professors, urge a strong President. They are deluding themselves, their readers, and everyone else, with this idea of an all-powerful Chief Executive. A strong President is one who will be concerned about doing things in a constitutional way, respecting the legislative and the judiciary. Yet some writers are beginning to worship this concept of 'strong man' government. This has a very serious connotation for America. It means autocracy in the long run.

"The centralization of power in Washington—when we talk about this, we must also consider the need to strengthen city and State government, to make it better. So you must argue for improvement in local government.

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... "What we need is universal military training"

"These problems do exist—in health, education, welfare, and other things. They must be solved. But the closer you can bring the action to the local level—that is the best way to do these things."

4. WELFARE PROGRAMS

"All Americans are concerned with real need—where people are not getting a proper education, are not being fed and clothed properly," General Eisenhower continued.

"But we are getting the feeling today that we are not just taking care of the needy, but that we are acting unwisely to the extent that we are actually using the Federal Treasury to encourage and reward laziness and malingering. I would like to see more efficiency in determining who actually are the needy, and who it is that just wants to get an easier living.

"There are a lot of complaints that we have bad administration in these programs, that they are wasteful, that there are duplications of effort. Such programs should be started on a pilot basis; otherwise, you build up big bureaucracies and overheads, and you get nothing done.

"In our welfare programs, an effort should be made to make sure that the needy have proper support. But the idea of temporary relief seems to be giving way to a new idea that hard work is not the way to make a living, that you should look to the Government to take care of you.

"How are you going to get ahead in the world? By hard work—that was always the American way. But now, no longer do all our people take pride in good work well done. Some unions are causing this by setting maximum work quotas. Too many people depend on political influence in supporting candidates with particular theories on welfare, or the political power of the union.

"We are paying too much for this welfare in terms of self-reliance, courage, and devotion to freedom. When you talk about economic security, and neglect to talk about opportunity, you are destroying the pioneer spirit. I expect to see a swing away from all this one of these days, back to traditional values."

5. MILITARY SERVICE

Instead of the draft, the General said, "what we need is universal military training. We ought to have one year of compulsory military training for everyone—not the regular pay, just a few dollars—but one year of basic education. At age 18, this would encourage a lot of enlistments.

"Anyone who would rather enlist should be given the option. I wrote in a recent article about a two-year enlistment, but now I believe it should be three years if we are to have a real, regular, military force.

"There should be exemptions for no one. Anyone who is illiterate—we should give him additional duty and good teachers, and a year of basic education in the 'three R's'—reading, writing, and arithmetic. We should give physical fitness for people who are now being rejected with minor defects.

"I don't believe in finding make-work jobs for rejects—a choice of the Peace Corps, or some other Government service. What we need is good, tough, military training—and I am just as much concerned for the benefit of the youths as a whole as for the military service.

"It is just as much of a duty to learn 'how' to serve the country in case of need, as it is to serve. If you don't have

men with sufficient education to know how to use or to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, then you are worse off than if you didn't have the weapons. We want a nation that is patriotic, and improving itself. The nation is made up of spiritual, intellectual, economic, and military strength. We want to keep these values at a high level."

6. DEMONSTRATIONS

Asked about student protests, campus morals, and current behavior of young people, General Eisenhower said:

"The spirit of rebellion is rather healthy in young people. But rebellion must accept the guidelines of civilization—honesty, decency, monogamy, virtue in sexual relations. We found it necessary to protect the family, because the family is the basic unit of society. If we had a storm of illegitimacy, what we would wind up with would be anarchy.

"I talk to college students from time to time. These young people are just as concerned about these matters as you or I. I think some young people feel they have to demonstrate, wear their hair long and call attention to themselves because they are suffering from an inferiority complex. They have to make themselves seen and heard in some way. They are gaining headlines—but they are creating an image of American youth that is false.

"People come in and want my views. I'm particularly encouraged by the attractiveness and personality of the young people who come to see me. Some are young men running for Congress. They have a mission and a dedication. I encourage them to carry the truth as they see it to the country. The fate of our country, really, depends on education."

"Black Power"

General Eisenhower was asked about racial demonstrations and the slogan "black power." "No one has defined what it means," he observed. "If it means using legitimate voting power—that's one thing. If it means reckless, destructive, power by force—that's something else.

"Free government is nothing but an opportunity for the exercise of self-discipline. If we don't do that ourselves, then someone is going to do it for us, a strong central agency. If we do not exercise self-discipline, we will be inviting a Hitler, or someone like him.

"We have got to have enough people who understand this in America, so that there is no question that the laws will be enforced."

7. CRIME

On the crime question, General Eisenhower said this:

"Crime is a real problem in this country, and it is getting worse. The problem is how to deal with criminals who are paroled or suspended. They are the ones who commit most of the serious crimes in the country.

"Judges have to give proper sentences, and not be subject to influence. I have come to the point where I do not believe in lifetime judges. I don't want to reduce their independence, but I don't think they should stay forever.

"With life expectancy getting into high figures, we have too many judges who have been sitting on the bench too long. This is serious, because there has been a trend toward rewriting the Constitution by a series of judicial decisions.

... "Our efforts to keep NATO effective should be increased"

"We have got to punish people for excessive speeding, and killing other people on the streets and highways. Self-discipline is what we need. We must teach this across the board—in the press, in the schools, at home, in the churches, in Government. It must be some kind of movement.

"Today, people scoff at the word 'crusade.' But a great force brought on the Crusades—a great belief. What we have to do in America is generate a great belief in democracy. One of the things it demands is respect for law and order.

"If we can achieve this self-discipline, this self-government, then all the rest of our problems will take care of themselves."

8. SECURITY VS. ECONOMY

The former President is annoyed by popular writers who stress personality rather than achievement in Government, and history professors who write about his Administration "by quoting other professors," rather than going directly to officials who served in the Eisenhower Administration.

"They write that I put a 'balanced budget' above security," General Eisenhower observed. "Well, let me tell you this—I'm the only President in the history of the United States who went before Congress and said this is one time we are not going to disarm, not after this war.

"Actually, I think the neglect of our defenses at the end of World War II was one of the major causes of the Korean War. After Korea, no American was killed in combat during my Administration, although we had to prevent Communist efforts to take over in Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Formosa Strait, and South Vietnam.

"A balanced budget is necessary, especially in times of prosperity, but I certainly didn't neglect security.

"I decided that we were not going to waste money just raising the kind of large standing army that would be useless in a major war—that we would rely on the nuclear deterrent, and have the kind of standing forces we needed to take care of brushfires. And that is what we did."

9. WORLD AFFAIRS

The former President was asked about foreign affairs—the outlook in Europe, where he served as Supreme Commander of the NATO military alliance in 1950-52, in the Soviet Union, and in Asia. The General made these observations:

Europe

"The outlook in Europe is worrisome. Europeans have lost some of their fear of a major Communist invasion. The Europeans are more willing to indulge themselves today.

"Just because one country is defecting, or abandoning NATO, is no reason for us to do the same. NATO is still a good concept; it gives the Atlantic community a place to discuss its problems. Our efforts toward keeping NATO effective should be increased."

However, General Eisenhower has always believed that the six U. S. divisions assigned to NATO in 1950 were for "emergency purposes." He thinks we should keep some U. S. troops in Europe as an earnest of our readiness to be committed to any defensive war from the outset, but that the American ground force does not need to be too strong.

The General pointed out that NATO countries of Western Europe—even without France—are equal to the population

of the U. S. "We in the United States are providing the great nuclear deterrent strength of NATO, the major navy for all the West, and the major air force," he said.

"It would appear that, so far as ground forces are concerned, we should not have to supply any more than just enough to make sure that all of Europe understands that we are not reneging on our treaty obligations."

Soviet Union

"Soviet leaders have not abandoned their goal of Communist domination of the world. But they seem to have come to a conclusion that all-out war and military force—in a nuclear age—is not the way to go about it."

Mr. Eisenhower recalled that former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev told him at Camp David in 1959 that a major war between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. would mean "mutual suicide." The Soviet strategy now apparently is to use every other method, short of military means, to bring about Communist control of the world.

Red China

"In the long run, Asia may become our most serious foreign problem," General Eisenhower continued. "If Red China continues to develop destructive power, and remains dedicated to world revolution by naked force, then it is a problem that will have to be handled one of these days—and it is not going to be pleasant.

"The hope is that as a nation gains in wealth, as it gets more consumer goods, then it tends to become more cautious, in order to protect its investment. Some say this has happened in Soviet Russia. This is possibly true. If Red China dedicates everything, not to developing the welfare of its own people but to a doctrine of world revolution by force, then it will be a serious problem."

OUTLOOK FOR 1968

Former President Eisenhower refuses to engage in any discussion of presidential candidates for 1968. He says of the two men most talked about for the Republican nomination—Richard M. Nixon and George W. Romney—"these are very fine men. I could support either with great enthusiasm."

But Mr. Eisenhower adds that he would like to see—just as he said in 1956, and 1960, and 1964—more young men coming into prominence in the Republican Party. He would like to have a party so rich in respected leaders that it could look to any one of a dozen persons for the Presidency.

The General feels that the press, politicians, and radio-TV commentators are making too much out of adjectives—such as "liberal" or "moderate" or "conservative"—and paying too little attention to actual problems.

"We ought to grade people in politics on the basis of where they stand on issues, or problems," he says. If you did, he thinks you wouldn't find much difference between the views of various Republicans on these problems.

The former President commented: "When I look back on what I had to do during eight years in office, I don't know whether I'm a liberal, or a conservative, or what. There are certain basic truths on which our Government is founded, and you have to use common sense in dealing with different problems as they arise."

IS A "DEAL" WITH RUSSIA STIRRING?

Despite Vietnam, there's a noticeable thaw in the diplomatic climate between U. S. and Russia. Cautious probing is under way for agreements that will affect both Asia and Europe. Here's how U. S. allies read the signs.

Reported from
WORLD CAPITALS

All around the world—in Western Europe, America and Asia—diplomats are signaling that something big is stirring in relations between the United States and Soviet Russia.

The talk is of a "deal" starting to cook. Its shape and possible terms remain obscure. Russia, for her part, is interested in shelving the cold war in order to be more free in her ideological struggle with Communist China. The U. S. wants Russia's tacit aid in "de-escalating" the war in Vietnam.

The Soviet Union, too, is under increasing pressure from her satellites in Eastern Europe to come to some kind of accommodation with the U. S. so that trade with America and Western Europe can be returned nearer to normal.

A meeting of Communist nations has just concluded in Moscow without the predicted blast at the U. S. Not an unkind reference was made to the U. S. in the conference communiqué. There had been an earlier meeting at the White House in Washington between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and President Johnson.

Mr. Johnson persuaded Congress, in its closing hours, to kill a proposal that would have barred Government-backed financing of trade with Communist countries. The President, too, named as Ambassador to Russia Llewellyn E. Thompson, who in previous service as Ambassador to Moscow became known as a leading exponent of the idea of a *détente* with the Russians. A White House invitation went to the Soviet leaders to visit the U. S.—an invitation rejected for the time being.

A "peaceful engagement." The President, in a major address on October 7, stressed his desire for a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. At that time, Mr. Johnson said: "Our task is to achieve a

reconciliation with the East—a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement."

On the surface, it appeared that the initiative in today's maneuvers to shelve or downgrade the cold war was coming from the United States.

Yet Russia's leaders find that their economy is in trouble, needing infusions of capital and capital equipment that only the U. S. really can supply. The Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, at the same time, is increasingly restive over the inability of Russia to supply its needs in modern machinery and high-quality consumer products. The Russians are finding it more and more difficult to resist the pressure from satellites to increase trade with the West and to relax ties to the Soviet Union.

It is out of this situation, and out of Russia's part in the Vietnam war, that a possible "deal" is emerging.

Russia holding back? Mr. Johnson, for the U. S., is reported to have made a decision, revealed at the Manila Conference, not to escalate the Vietnam war by heavier bombing of really vital targets or by a large-scale addition of troop strength. This decision, diplomats suggest, could be related to a Soviet commitment—tacit if not spoken—not to step up aid to North Vietnam.

Both Russia and the U. S. are having to walk a tightrope in the secret maneuvering that appears to be going on.

The Russians cannot afford to give the Chinese Communists a chance to claim, in propaganda appeals to other Communists of the world, that Russia's leaders are "selling out" to the U. S. And the U. S. cannot afford to take steps that will offend the West Germans—the one firm U. S. ally in Europe.

Word from German leaders even now reveals a suspicion that President Johnson is engaged in maneuvers that can end in an ultimate American-Soviet "deal" at German expense.

Two straws are pointed to by the Germans. One is the fact that the U. S. President did not reveal to West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, during Mr. Erhard's visit to Washington, that a gesture was to be made toward Russia and that—as Mr. Johnson indicated in his October 7 speech—U. S. troop withdrawal from Western Europe could be tied to better relations with Russia.

The other straw, as the Germans see it, is the decision to send Mr. Thompson to Moscow as Ambassador. He is one of a group of American diplomats who have served in Russia who have attitudes classed by the Germans as "near poison."

The German attitude is: The Kremlin wants the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, permanent division of Germany, and the maximum control over Western Europe. Johnson's new policy gives the Soviets a better chance of achieving these goals than they have had for years.

German officials make no secret of their worry over the possibility of a



—Hesse in "St. Louis Globe-Democrat"

"Can I Be of Any Assistance?"

Washington-Moscow "deal" that might leave Germany out on a limb. Said a German diplomat:

"The average German thinks he sees a shift in U. S. policy. Where reunification of Germany used to have No. 1 priority and U. S.-Russian relations No. 2, the priorities seem to have been reversed.

"The German sees the U. S. as playing ball with the archenemy, Russia; hears talk of the U. S. withdrawing troops from Germany; sees no progress toward reunification 20 years after the war."

In the British view, the U. S. and Russia are engaged in a "probing operation" that could lead to a "deal" which might include:

1. A political settlement of the Vietnam war over the next year or so. It's pointed out that, after stony refusal even to discuss that conflict, the Russians now are actively talking with U. S. diplomats and hinting that the Soviets might try to influence Hanoi to negotiate if the U. S. stops bombing North Vietnam.

2. A treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. After nearly two years

of deadlock the Russians now seem willing to move toward a compromise on the "German problem" which would allow West Germany to take part in consultation on nuclear strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if the U. S. barred any West German ownership or control of NATO nuclear weapons.

3. Cutbacks of U. S. forces in West Germany and Russian forces in East Germany, which would let Russia strengthen its frontier with China.

Why are the Russians suddenly showing interest in a "deal" with the U. S. after repeatedly ruling out anything of the kind until the war in Vietnam ends?

Chief reason, British officials say, is Red China's emergence in recent months as an unpredictable and potentially dangerous power next door to Russia.

Madness in Peking? Soviet diplomats, in the past few weeks, have been telling Western diplomats that the Chinese Communists "seem to have gone mad" and that Peking is attempting to goad the U. S. and Russia into a war confrontation.

This is the way that an influential

British publication, "The Economist," analyzes the situation:

"President Johnson has seen the chance that Chairman Mao and the Red Guards are offering to him, and he has jumped at it. He has now made his bid to coax Russian foreign policy off the dead-center position on which it has been stuck for the last two years. The Russians are afloat again. For the first time since Mr. Khrushchev was sacked there is water under Mr. Gromyko's keel, and it is China that has put it there."

Mr. Johnson, "The Economist" asserts, has dramatically changed the American order of diplomatic priorities so as to rank relations with Russia above those with Germany. The publication adds: "If the Russians are willing to do business with the Americans despite the Vietnam war, then Mr. Johnson is willing to do business with the Russians despite the opposition this will arouse in Germany."

What the Russians are after, the British say, is an arrangement that would consolidate the present frontiers of Eastern Europe, keep Germany divided and make sure that the Germans do not get control over nuclear weapons.

British officials note that there are signs of opposition from militant elements in the Soviet leadership to any accommodation with the U. S. But, with Red China "going mad" and President Johnson holding out to Moscow the prospect of real economic concessions and stability in Europe, these officials see a fair chance that U. S. and Russia will inch toward a "deal."

Report from Paris. In France, two factors are seen as pushing the Soviet Union toward agreements with the U. S. —Russia's internal economic needs and

(continued on next page)



—USN&WR Photo

Sign of thaw: President Johnson confers at White House with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Chancellor Erhard reviews German troops. Bonn fears U. S.-Soviet deal may undercut America's firmest ally in Europe.

—Wide World Photo



—Claude Jacoby Photo

People in Soviet satellite states, chafing at Russia's failure to fill their needs, demand more trade with the West.

IS A "DEAL" WITH RUSSIA STIRRING?

[continued from preceding page]

Red China's extremism. But, the French say, there are two countering factors: Vietnam and the German problem.

Contrary to reports in Washington and London, French officials insist they see no signs that the Soviets are moving toward the role of mediator in Vietnam. The Russians, it's said in Paris, want a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, "but they are in no hurry."

French officials emphasize that the Soviets want to keep Germany divided whereas the U. S. is under obligation to its West German ally to seek reunification. Thus, say the French, the German problem limits freedom of movement for the U. S. in any "deal" with Russia.

Italian interview. In Italy, some officials seem convinced that the Soviets consider it vital to the national interest to reach accommodation with the U. S.

But Italy's Deputy Prime Minister Pietro Nenni, who got to know Soviet

leaders well when he was one of their leading foreign supporters in the early postwar years, told "U. S. News & World Report" that he does not believe a "deal" will be possible as long as the Vietnam war continues. He noted:

"It's not that the Soviets do not want to. It is that under present circumstances they are simply not able to."

In Mr. Nenni's opinion, a Soviet *rapprochement* with the U. S. with the war still going on would gravely embarrass the Soviets in the eyes of the rest of the Communist world.

A leading Italian political analyst said that any Soviet agreement with the U. S. on troop reduction in Europe "would give the Chinese real ammunition for the accusations they are making of 'Soviet collaboration' with the U. S." The analyst said that "the Soviets are not ready to provide this kind of ammunition." He added:

"One more thing. The Soviets can never accept unification of Germany. This, and denial to Germany of the Eastern territories to which it lays claim, are absolutely vital national interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviets could not possibly make a deal in which these

interests are given up or even compromised."

The Austrian view. In Austria, diplomats say that a U. S. deal with Russia would please European allies of the U. S. except for the one ally which matters most—Germany.

These diplomats argue that a "deal" to which the Soviets would agree would only be one that would seal the *status quo* in Europe and slam the door in West Germany's face as far as access to nuclear weapons is concerned. Such a "deal," one diplomat said, would help to keep Germany weak, divided, isolated, "pincer'd in" by the U. S. on one side and Russia on the other.

Commenting on the German question as a possible barrier to a U. S.-Soviet get-together, an observer in Vienna said:

"Does it matter to the U. S. what the Germans say? Plenty. Economically and militarily, Germany is emerging as the most important power in Western Europe. She is emerging, too, as the most trustworthy and dependable U. S. ally; some would even say as the only dependable ally U. S. has left in Europe.

"Britain is squarely on the U. S. side one day and the next day she's in the

A "Deal" With Russia?

THE PROSPECTS, AS SEEN IN WASHINGTON

This analysis of the U. S.-Soviet thaw mirrors the thinking of officials who shape foreign policy in Washington. It was written by Francis B. Stevens of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report," who for years was a top expert on Soviet affairs in the U. S. State Department and headed the Department's Eastern European Division.

IN TODAY'S COMPLEX WORLD, where national policies and international relationships are still largely influenced—though by no means controlled—by the actions and attitudes of the two superpowers, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., American diplomatic strategy is to maintain maximum flexibility while seeking to co-operate with the Soviet Union on any issue where the interests of the two countries are in relative harmony.

It is only in the recent past that such a strategy has become feasible. For most of the half century since the Communists seized power in Russia in 1917, the interests of the United States were diametrically opposed to those of the Soviet Union.

This was true even during the "strange alliance" of World War II, when both countries were fighting the battle of survival against Nazi Germany. The Russian Communists openly proclaimed and more or less covertly fomented world revolution; the United States, particularly in the years after 1945, spearheaded efforts to resist the Communist drive and to contain Soviet power. In such an atmosphere, co-operation was out of the question.

The Soviets have never renounced their Marxist goals—on the contrary, they constantly reaffirm them—but their methods have changed markedly, particularly since Brezhnev and

Kosygin ousted Khrushchev two years ago and took charge. Three factors contributed to this change in emphasis:

- The development of the Soviet Union from a backward country into a modern industrial and military power. As attention has been focused on internal problems, as the party's stake in the burgeoning economy has grown, revolutionary fervor has evaporated and dedication to world revolution has become largely ritualistic.

- The revolution in modern weaponry. Once the Soviet Union had developed its own facilities for the production and delivery of weapons of mass destruction, it acquired both an appreciation of the suicidal implications of all-out warfare employing such weapons and a recognition of the desirability of holding their spread to the minimum practicable. It was on this point that U. S. and Soviet interests first began to converge.

- The rift between the Soviets and Communist China. This struggle, which, publicly, still largely revolves around the most effective method of spreading the Communist creed, is in fact much more serious. It reflects the conflicting national interests of the two countries, stemming from Russian acquisitions of Chinese territory in the Far East and Central Asia during the period of the Manchu empire when China was powerless to resist the encroachments of the imperialist powers. And it represented a deliberate effort by Mao Tse-tung to capture the leadership of the world Communist movement.

China, then—at least for the present—is a second area in which U. S. and Soviet interests have much in common. Mao Tse-tung, in the past two years, has experienced one setback after another. His policy of exporting revolution by sub-

role of 'honest broker,' trying to mediate between the U. S. and Russia. France, if she is an ally, isn't acting like one. The other nations of West Europe don't really count for much.

"Any far-reaching U. S.-Russian deal would be regarded by the Germans as a sellout. The U. S. must ask itself: Is it worth the sacrifice?"

The view from Asia. In Japan, the prevailing opinion is that the Russians want peace in Vietnam almost as much as the U. S. does, because Vietnam is crimping Soviet plans for a united Communist bloc in the world, for peaceful coexistence with the West, for a stronger Soviet economy.

The Japanese say, however, that the men in the Kremlin cannot afford to appear overeager or risk charges by Peking of a sellout—so peace probes must be made secretly.

Tokyo analysts believe Russia is aiming for gradual displacement of belligerent Chinese Communist advisers in North Vietnam by "peace-loving" Communists from the Soviet bloc, capped eventually by withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and cessation of hostilities.

Some diplomats in Japan believe one reason the U. S. is not blockading the port of Haiphong is to permit entry of Soviet-bloc aid and help Russia equalize the balance of power in Hanoi.

Washington size-up. In Washington, a top U. S. authority on Russia made these points:

- "The Soviets are in economic trouble. They need trade and credits from the West—particularly the U. S. So now they would like to end the war in Vietnam—not to help LBJ, but rather to generate a climate for better trade relations."

- "Any progress in U. S. relations with Russia will be made because of Russia's economic needs and because of the Soviet Union's bad relations with Red China."

- "When there are hard, practical, self-serving reasons for both sides, agreements are made. When talks on agreements get snagged, we just put them on the shelf. When the snags unwind, we start talking again."

"Major developments"? From an experienced observer abroad:

"I think we are on the verge of really major developments. The Russians finally are prepared for the showdown with Communist China, which is now isolated.

The Soviets apparently already have decided that the conflict with Peking no longer should inhibit their relations with the U. S. and the West in general.

"There's growing evidence that the Soviets are moving gingerly to press for a political settlement of Vietnam and at the same time to move toward an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

"This—together with American-British reduction of forces in West Germany and possible subsequent Soviet reduction of forces in East Germany—may work out as a major East-West deal, not explicitly negotiated as such, but falling together that way."

The consensus of diplomatic observers around the world is that a start has been made toward an important change in U. S.-Soviet relations.

These observers are in general agreement, however, on this point: a big change cannot come about suddenly or easily—and any "deal" made will require much secret diplomacy at high levels.

A look at two kinds of Communism—page 50. Inside view of Red China—page 58.

version and violence has been checked in Vietnam. But a militant China, with its vast population and possessing nuclear weapons, is the No. 1 threat to world peace today—and a potential threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Containment of an aggressive China is therefore in both the Soviet and the U. S. interest.

The effects of Vietnam. Vietnam creates the principal stumbling block to U. S.-Soviet co-operation at this juncture. As the leading nation of the Communist world, the Soviet Union has felt obligated to give military aid to North Vietnam. But it has rationed its assistance carefully, with a view to maintaining an influential voice in the councils of Hanoi without provoking the contingency it fears most—spread of the war beyond the borders of Vietnam, with the resulting danger of a world conflagration.

At the same time, Moscow has consistently refused to play any mediating role, including performance of its functions as cochairman of the Geneva Conference, unless requested to do so by Hanoi.

The delicacy of the Soviet position is well appreciated by policy makers in Washington. But they feel that recent events in China have given Moscow more room for maneuver. The excesses of China's "cultural revolution," as epitomized by the Red Guards, have alienated many of Mao's staunchest supporters in both the Communist and the nonaligned camps. This has resulted in the virtual isolation of Peking and the re-establishment of something approaching unity in the rest of the Communist bloc.

It is this analysis which is behind President Johnson's recent overtures to Moscow, in which he offered various inducements, particularly a reduction of trade restrictions, in a search for better relations. State Department officials have no illusions that a wide-ranging "package deal" with the Soviets is in the offing. Soviet-U. S. relations, they emphasize, are a

day-to-day, step-by-step process, in which progress is made only when conditions are right, and dramatic breakthroughs are neither expected nor likely.

They are hopeful, however, that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries can be reached, and they feel that Moscow is now convinced of U. S. determination and ability to prevent a Communist victory in Vietnam. If they are correct in this judgment, they believe that Moscow may soon be ready to use its influence to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a conference to seek a mutually acceptable settlement.

The President's offer to the Soviet Union also included the countries of Eastern Europe. But this is not, officials stress, an attempt to detach these countries from the Soviet orbit. That policy was tacitly abandoned at the time of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. What it is hoped to achieve is not so much a reversal of their allegiance to Moscow as the development of a greater degree of political and economic independence through freer trade and cultural relations with the West—a process which is already well under way.

Fear in Germany. As inevitably happens, any rise in the temperature of U. S.-Soviet relations produces a conditioned reflex in West Germany—a fear that German interests are about to be sacrificed. Washington officialdom has been through this before, and is quick to administer soothing syrup. The U. S., they point out both publicly and privately, will not be unmindful of the interests of its major ally in Western Europe. And, they add, the problems of that area are not currently under discussion with Moscow.

First point on the agenda right now, they say, is Vietnam. If the Russians can be induced to help in finding a settlement there, every reasonable effort should be made to persuade them to do so. Once Vietnam is out of the way, it may be possible to get back to the problems of Europe.

RUSSIA VS. CHINA: "THE END OF 'REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISM' "

Interview With a French Authority on Soviet Affairs

The "fourth world conflict" is now under way, and it can mean the end of today's Communism. That is the conclusion of a noted French expert on Communist affairs. In the following interview, he discusses the meaning to the U. S. and the rest of the world of the growing antagonism between Soviet Russia and Red China.

At PARIS

Q Colonel Garder, is some sort of fundamental change going on in the world?

A I believe that the war in Vietnam is just one front in a new struggle which is beginning to dominate the world scene. We are no longer in what I call the third world conflict—the cold war between Soviet Communism and the West.

The basic conflict now is not between the U. S. and Russia, nor even between the U. S. and China. It is between Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism.

Q What do you foresee as the outcome of this conflict?

A It can end only with the total defeat of either Soviet Communism or Chinese Communism.

Q How does the U. S. fit in?

A The U. S. is, in fact, an ally of the Soviet brand of Communism in this new, fourth conflict—although neither the U. S. nor the Soviet Union would admit it.

Q But aren't they far apart in Vietnam?

A The Kremlin—despite appearances—wants a negotiated settlement in Vietnam under the auspices of Moscow. The Soviets would hail this as a "moral victory for the Vietnamese people"—being aware, at the same time, that it would not dangerously damage American prestige.

Q What effect is U. S. intervention in Vietnam having on the Soviet brand of Communism?

A Although it benefits Soviet Communism to the detriment of Chinese Communism, at the same time it puts Soviet Communism in a very difficult position.

For the first time since 1917, it can be said that time is not working on the side of Communism as such.


Q Why do you say that?

A As American intervention in Vietnam helps to deepen the conflict between Moscow and Peking, the Chinese—as, for example, in recent purges and the wild actions of the Red Guards—are being driven to absurd extremes of "revolutionary Communism." The Russians, condemning the Chinese folly, are obliged to show themselves less dogmatic and more and more reasonable.

This means that the process of moderation is speeding up in the rest of the Communist world.

Q Is a shooting war between Red China and the Soviet Union likely?

A I would be very surprised if China, shaken as she is by domestic crises, would deliberately commit aggression against the Soviet Union. At the same time, I do not think



—USN&WR Photo

Col. Michel Garder, analyst with the French Institute of Strategic Studies, got wide attention in Europe with his book, "The Last Days of the Regime in Soviet Russia." His "History of the Soviet Army" is being published in the U. S. by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.

that the present leadership in Russia would take military action—unprovoked action—against China.

In the long run, this could change. For example, if the possibility of civil war in China intensified, there might be Soviet intervention to help one faction against another. Or a change in Soviet leadership could result in war.

But, in any case, I don't think such a confrontation could come about in less than five years.

Q What do you see ahead for the U. S.?

A Barring a domestic crisis, the U. S. will remain for the foreseeable future the greatest world power—not only because of its military potential, but also because of the appeal of the American way of life, which attracts the rest of the world.

I believe that the U. S. may be called upon to play a decisive role in the great conflict between Russia and China, just as it has in preceding world conflicts.

In the past, the U. S. has tipped the scales in favor of a coalition without really solving basic problems. This time, I hope that conflict may give way to a constructive period, marked by unification of Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok—a unification not aimed against the U. S., but made in collaboration with the U. S.

This is optimistic, but I believe that it is possible because the struggle between Chinese and Soviet Communism may very well mean the end of "revolutionary Communism," which started at the beginning of this century.

A world more and more densely populated and drawn closer together through transportation and communication will, I hope, decide that there are greater problems to solve than those which arise from ideological conflicts.

[END]