

THE  
**German**  
**problem**  
roadblock to disarmament



Disarmament Committee



of the Washington, D.C.

The Disarmament Committee of the Washington Women Strike for Peace assumes sole responsibility for the production of this pamphlet. No other branch or committee of Women Strike for Peace took any part in compiling this booklet, and no other branch or committee is in any way responsible for any statement contained herein.

---

Additional copies may be secured at \$1.00 each.

Special bulk rates; 25-99 copies, 75¢ each;

100 copies or more 50¢ each.

Donations are welcome to enable widest possible coverage to libraries, schools, mailings, etc.

Comments and suggestions are solicited.

---

*To expedite deliveries, please order directly from*

Book Dept. WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE

Box 4055, Washington, D.C. 20015



---

# THE German problem

roadblock to disarmament



Disarmament Committee of Washington, D.C.



1822 Mass. Ave. N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

*Library of Congress Catalog No. 64-21445*

© Copyright 1964



*Shown at the White House gates, WSP founder Dagmar Wilson delivers peace petitions destined for the President of the United States.*

## **preface**

If silence on the part of those who knew the truth about Nazism contributed to its growth and culmination in World War II, then those who strive to avert war hereafter must inform themselves, seek the truth and speak it.

*The Problem of Germany, Roadblock to Disarmament* was written to provide a basis for further study and to stimulate public debate. We hope that it will fill a similar need to that of the *Story of Disarmament* (WSP 1962) which sold 9,000 copies and found its way into many a college and library throughout the USA and the world.

Knowledge is the basis for effective action. In this case to know the facts is to impel action.

*Dagmar Wilson*

---

# contents

---

*page*

## INTRODUCTION

- 5** Why We Wrote this Booklet
- 6** Map of Germany
- 7** Statistical Comparison of East and West Germany

## THE DIVISION OF GERMANY (BACKGROUND SUMMARY)

- 9** Victory, 1944-1945 (Agreements of the Allied Powers)
- 10** Occupation, 1945-1948
- 10** Division, 1948-? (Chronology)
- 11** Negotiations, 1949-1961
- 12** Summary of Proposals

## THE SPECTRE OF THE PAST IN THE NEW WEST GERMANY

- 15** Rearmament
- 16** Chronological Developments in West German Rearmament
- 18** Remilitarization
- 20** Recartelization (Deconcentration)
- 20** Chronological Developments in Recovery of the West Germany Economy
- 23** Renazification

## 27 DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCES IN WEST GERMANY: THE OTHER GERMANY

- 28** A Brief Chronology of SPD Activity

## THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF GERMANY

- 31** The Unique Problem of Berlin
- 32** The Official West German Position
- 32** The Realities of the Two Germanys
- 33** The Western and Soviet Positions on Germany

## CONCLUSIONS

- 35** What We Have to Work with: The Germany We Have Made
- 35** The Necessity for a Solution
- 36** Some Imperatives that Need to Be Considered
- 36** "Let Us Continue . . ."

## APPENDIX (PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO BERLIN AND A DIVIDED GERMANY)

- 37** Official Proposals
- 45** Independent Proposals
- 46** Organization Proposals



**Seed Corn Must Not Be Ground** (1942) Kathe Kollwitz

War seen through the eyes of the mother—this is the lifelong theme of the art of Germany's famous printmaker, **KATHE KOLLWITZ** (1867-1945). Her younger son, Peter, was killed in action early in World War I. Her first grandson, Peter, was killed in action in World War II. Her Berlin home, in which she lived for half a century and which held a vast collection of her drawings and prints, was destroyed by aerial bombing in 1943. As art critic Frank Getlein in his "The Bite of the Print" has stated: "Confronted by the madness of her century, she twice compressed all that she wished to say to a single cry—**Seed Corn Must Not Be Ground.**"

## Introduction

# why we wrote this booklet

"We cherish the right and accept the responsibility of the individual in a democratic society to influence the course of government.

"We demand of governments that nuclear weapons be banned forever, that the arms race end, and that the world abolish all weapons of destruction under United Nations safeguards." (*Statement of Policy, 82 Women Strike for Peace, Ann Arbor National Conference, June 1962*)

As this study is being prepared, the United States government is arranging a 1964 NATO conference specifically to propose the initiation of a multi-lateral nuclear fleet of 25 surface ships, carrying Polaris nuclear missiles that will be jointly owned, financed and outfitted by mixed crews under NATO command. Since 1957, the United States has supplied NATO partners with nuclear delivery systems, but has never surrendered control of actual war heads.

Since West Germany will share a large part of the cost, she will want this provision open to revision when the force becomes operational. West Germany has joined the United States in urging the multi-lateral defense scheme. It is the only scheme by which she could obtain nuclear weapons control without violating treaties and pledges she has signed. West Germany, with 12 divisions in NATO, is second only to the United States in NATO strength, so West Germany's share of command in the multi-lateral nuclear force would be large.

"The United States of America wants to see the Cold War end; we want to see it end once and for all. The United States wants to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them." (President Johnson at the United Nations, December 18, 1963)

It is our responsibility to give the President support in opposing any step which takes us off the road to peace, as we feel the NATO proposal for a multi-lateral nuclear force will do. This disarmament committee believes that it would therefore be helpful to re-examine the whole German problem: what it is today, and how it got that way.

Eighteen years after the defeat of Germany in a long and costly war, there is still no peace treaty. Germany has become divided into two hostile camps; its traditional capital of Berlin, 110 miles inside the Eastern section, is still garrisoned by Western troops. These two unsolved problems — Germany and Berlin — have become the focal point of complicated and explosive East-West antagonisms in the Cold War. It is a testimony to the skill of the administrations in the East and West that armed conflict hasn't broken out in Berlin, even though the two blocs have repeatedly challenged each other to the utmost. The challenges, confrontations, and monotonous tensions have become an expensive burden, psychologically and financially. There are other approaches to the problems between the two Germanys and the two Berlins than the multi-lateral nuclear force scheme and the new dangers inherent in it.

"I have expressed in strong terms my view that any proposal to arm the Germans with nuclear weapons would mean the end of any hope of easing the East-West tension. That has been my opinion. But my words, strong though they may have seemed to me, pale into insignificance when compared with the vehemence with which Mr. Khrushchev expressed the same thought when we were in Moscow. *I am in no doubt at all that this really would mean the end of any policy of constructive coexistence. It would be as much a turning point in history, and as much a fateful milestone on the road to a third world war, as Hitler's march into the Rhineland was toward the last war . . .*" (Harold Wilson, head British Labour Party, July 3, 1963)

The choice of Germany for study by this disarmament group, therefore, was not haphazard. Tracing

the development of the problem since the end of the war will provide a clearer understanding of what went wrong, will lead to more precise knowledge of underlying Cold War hostilities, and will suggest possible solutions to ease tensions, making disarmament agreements between the two power blocs more possible. By focusing on what seems to be only one aspect of the Cold War, and studying it in detail, we believe we are focusing on what is actually the very cause of the Cold War in Europe.

These are the questions with which we concerned ourselves:

- With a mutual interest by the Allies in settling the German question forever after the country was defeated, why was the occupation unsuccessful? Why did negotiations for a peace treaty break down?
- Could the complicated problems of a divided Germany and an isolated West Berlin have been prevented?
- Why does the Soviet Union consider the German situation intolerable while the United States accepts it and has repeatedly stated its willingness to defend with the lives of its own citizens its right to be in West Berlin?
- Does West Germany unduly influence the policy decisions of the United States and the Western alliance?
- Is the revived power of West Germany a potential menace to the world again? Is East Germany a threat?
- Have the militarists, the big business men, and the Nazis gained power again? Is there a possibility of another coalition of these elements?
- Is reunification of Germany possible today? Do any of the parties involved really want reunification?
- Could a peace treaty be signed with West Germany and East Germany apart from reunification as a first step in settling other problems and to bring disarmament nearer?
- Can the Cold War in Europe be stopped in Germany?

The information which we found from a variety of sources — East and West — is arranged in narrative form leading from one separate section to another. It is more than a composite of the documentary evidence; it is so arranged to allow the reader to give meaning and interpretation to the facts and opinions we have collected. The detailed documentation, the chronological developments, and pertinent quotations are set apart in each section for those who want to check the sources and understand the problem in more depth. We have tried to free ourselves as much as possible from bias in our approach except, of course, our bias against the Cold War and any word or deed which tends to heighten tensions rather than reduce them.

We feel that this study will be useful for busy people who want to be more informed about Cold War problems and about Germany in particular, but who don't have the time to study all the scholarly works on the subject. For those persons who have recently become interested in the German problem, the booklet could be used as a study guide and as a first source book. If it whets your interest, follow up with reading some of the many sources we have listed at the end of each section.

We hope that after reading the book, the reader will have a better understanding of what lies behind divided Germany today, and will arrive at some definite conclusions about causes, effects, and possible solutions. Before we undertook this study, we believed that Germany was a key toward unlocking the disarmament problem. After finishing our study, we are convinced of it. We think that readers of the booklet who share our "Cold War bias" will also agree.

*The Disarmament Committee*  
Washington, D.C. *Women Strike for Peace*

MARTHA GIBBONS      MIRIAM LEVIN  
AILEEN HUTCHINSON      JOANNA VOGELSANG

"Like any other piece of machinery, our military establishment can be no better than the judgment of those who control it. In a democracy control is intended to be exercised by the people and their elected representatives. To a very considerable extent the American people are not now exercising effective control over the armed forces; nor indeed is the Congress . . ." (Senator J. W. Fulbright, April 5, 1964)






Former German territory (1948) now administered by Poland

# statistics on East and West Germany


East Germany has perhaps loomed as more formidable than statistics alone would allow. Actually she is half the size of West Germany in population and area, and her production in most commodities is far less than half, even in agriculture. She has also had serious economic setbacks in her farm program in attempting to institute a form of collectivism, and in her industry when skilled workers were scarce. However, there is no danger of East Germany's collapse. She continues to receive financial assistance from the USSR, as has West Germany and particularly West Berlin, from the USA.

▨ EAST GERMANY    ■ WEST GERMANY


**POPULATIONS**  
in millions




**AREAS**  
thousands of sq. miles




**IMPORTS (1961)**  
\$ billions




**EXPORTS (1961)**  
\$ billions




**RAILWAYS**  
thousand kilometers




**ROADS**  
thousand kilometers




**WHEAT (1961)**  
millions of metric tons




**COAL (1961)**  
millions of metric tons



**LIGNITE (1961)**  
millions of metric tons



**ELECTRICITY (1961)**  
billions of kilowatt hours



Source: Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook 1963

## background summary

# the division of Germany

"Walter Lippman once remarked that if the four occupying powers had all been angels they could not have agreed on the disposition of Germany, and Howard K. Smith brilliantly demonstrated that each of the four powers was driven by hard necessity to pursue policies in Germany which lead to deadlock, without anyone intending to dominate Germany." (D. F. Fleming in *The Cold War and Its Origins*)

## Victory, 1944-1945

The United States and the Soviet Union were at one time in complete agreement about Germany. Near the end of the war, when unconditional surrender seemed assured, the Allied powers made a series of unanimous decisions concerning the occupation and treatment of Germany while a peace treaty was in preparation.

They would divide the country into autonomous occupation zones but would administer the over-all affairs of the country jointly from the capital at Berlin. They were also in complete agreement on the nature of the new German state which would emerge after the peace treaty. The unanimity of their intentions toward Germany was revealed in one of the statements issued at the Yalta Conference: "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world." (Crimea Conference, February, 1945)

It was perhaps unrealistic to think that fundamental political differences could be ignored while pursuing a common cause in settling the German question. The animosity between the Soviet Union and the United States was never dispelled during the war. As the end of the war drew near, mutual suspicions resulted in inimical acts that were to hinder the success of the joint occupation of Germany. For example, the official historian of the United States occupation forces relates that even before the German capitulation the Political Affairs Subdivision of the U. S. forces had concluded that genuine collaboration between the U. S. and the

Soviet Union was unlikely. "Their chief activity was thereafter devoted to watching and checking the Russians" and withholding information from them. There was a secret and hasty removal of the entire German Foreign Office archives which the American forces had accidentally discovered in a section of the Russian zone before they had been officially turned over to the Soviet occupation authorities. (Zink, pp. 108-109)

Despite these forewarnings, official hopes were high that the defeat and occupation of Germany would result in a new German state and the conclusion of a peace treaty mutually satisfying to all parties.

### Agreements of the Allied Powers

*Protocol of September 12, 1944:* "Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers."

*Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, November 14, 1944:* A supreme organ of control called the Control Council was established to operate during the initial period of the occupation until further agreements were reached. Its functions were to ensure appropriate uniformity of action; to reach agreed decisions on the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole; to control the German central administration; and to direct the administration of Greater Berlin.

*Agreements of the Crimea Conference, February, 1945:* France was made a part of the occupation and adminis-

NAZI  
PARTY  
WAS  
APPROX  
BURNED  
WATT  
COUNTRY  
STEAL

tration of post-war Germany and existing agreements were amended to that effect.

Poland was to be given fair compensation in the west for the territory east of the Curzon line which had been incorporated into the Soviet Union.

*Berlin (Potsdam) Agreement, July-August, 1945:* A Council of Foreign Ministers was established "for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established."

The Control Council was given further principles by which it should be guided in the performance of its duties.

"The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination of control of all German industry that could be used for military production; "The (destruction of) the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda."

On the question of the Polish borders, the agreement stated:

"The three heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The former German territories [east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers] . . . shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."

## Occupation, 1945-1948

The Allied Control Council was activated in Berlin on July 31, 1945. Three years later when the Soviet Union withdrew, the record of achievements was spotless; nothing had been accomplished. According to the Foreign Policy Association, "efforts at coordinated administration of the four occupation zones foundered within two and a half months of the Potsdam meeting."

The growing hostility between East and West in other spheres contributed to the lack of functional agreement even after achieving far-reaching agreements in principle at Yalta and Potsdam.

But there were other factors at work. The Western Powers themselves could not agree and France, in particular, played a disruptive role from the beginning of the occupation. Although brought into the occupation as an equal partner, France, for reasons yet to be explained, was never required to sign the Potsdam Agreement as one of the conditions for her equal status. Since the Agreement provided for unanimous decisions, France, by wielding her veto power, effectively stymied the work of the Council because she didn't agree with

some of the territorial provisions of the same Agreement.

"The results of this oversight were disastrous. The French took the not-illogical position that if the no-annexation pledges were to go overboard and if there was to be a Russo-Polish land-grab in the East, then France should be entitled to annex German territory in the West. Failing to obtain the consent of the other three occupying powers, the French proceeded to veto in the Control Council every step leading to the four-power government of Germany as a political and economic entity. This obstructionism was carried to the point of vetoing the creation of nationwide political parties, labor organizations and even the issuance of uniform postage stamps throughout the four zones." (James P. Warburg, *Peace Action Newsletter*, October, 1962)

"As between Germany and Poland the settlement is just enough. The Germans were responsible for the death of some eight million Polish citizens. Poland had a higher percentage of human losses than any other participant in World War II. The Germans used every device of sadistic cruelty to torture and degrade the Polish people. If ever a people deserved restitution at the hands of their destroyer, it was the Poles." (D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, p. 241)

Regardless of their ability to agree on the joint administration of Germany, each of the Allied nations began the occupation of their own zones with varying degrees of harsh restrictions. The long war years and the atrocities which the Germans had committed had built up feelings of bitterness and the desire for revenge which were reflected in the treatment of the German people. With the Germans prevented from effectively participating in their own affairs, and the disagreements among the occupation powers, the German nation was in a state of collapse after two years of occupation.

It is interesting to note that although Austria was also divided into similar zones of occupation, the Austrians were allowed to form their own provisional government almost immediately after the war which

The attitude which Germany is taking these days in the Berlin crisis seems to me just a little bit arrogant. The German government is behaving as though it would dictate to all the other Allies what the position should be at the bargaining table of a conference at high levels. It is well to remember, I think, that Germany owes her position today to what the Allies have allowed her people to accomplish with their help—and the help has been generous.

It seems to me essential that the Allies get together on a unified policy when they come to a serious discussion of the whole settlement of Central Europe. No nation, not even Germany, can expect not to subordinate its own interests to the interests of the whole, including a satisfactory settlement between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as between all the Allies and the Soviet Union.

(Eleanor Roosevelt, *N. Y. Post*, 5-15-62)

gradually took over the administration of the country.

Not only was the occupation of Germany unsuccessful, but early attempts at drafting a peace treaty failed because of disagreement over what kind of government the new Germany should have, its boundaries, the character and extent of reparations and which of the wartime allies should participate in the drafting of the treaty. The Council of Foreign Ministers indefinitely adjourned on the initiative of the United States after two years and five fruitless sessions.

Again, although it took hundreds of meetings over a period of ten years, a satisfactory peace treaty was finally signed with Austria. Remaining neutral, the country has successfully kept out of international disputes ever since.

## Division, 1948-?

The death knell for a satisfactory solution for Germany was sounded when the United States and the United Kingdom joined their zones together in 1947. A year later, the Western occupying powers and the Benelux countries held a conference without the Soviet Union at which the main outlines for a separate West German government were established.

In explaining events leading to this development, Secretary of State George C. Marshall claimed in a speech on April 28, 1947:

"There was a reasonable possibility, we had hoped a probability of completing . . . a four-power pact to bind together our four governments to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany . . . (The) issue of the degree of centralization of the future German state is of greatest importance . . . In this case there are great and justifiable fears regarding the resurrection of German military power . . ."

"(The) unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to cooperate in establishing a balanced economy for Germany as agreed upon at Potsdam has been the most serious check on the development of a self-supporting Germany . . . After long and futile efforts to secure a working accord in this matter, the British and American zones were combined for the improvement of the economic situation . . . This merger is bitterly attacked by the Soviet authorities as a breach of the Potsdam agreement and as a first step toward the dismemberment of Germany."

"The United States was committed to the idea, long propagated by men like the late James V. Forrestal, that it was necessary to build up Germany as a military buffer to Soviet power. To accomplish this, the Western powers, under American leadership, took a fateful step that changed the whole complexion of the German situation. They established their merged Western zones into a new, separate, independent German state—West Germany. Originally the rationale for the Western powers being in Berlin was that this was necessary for quadripartite control and administration of Germany, looking toward a unified German state with Berlin as its capital. The Western action in establishing a West German state brought an abrupt end to this rationale." (Fred Warner

Neal, Claremont Summer Session Convocation Lecture, July 20, 1961)

Thereafter, events followed one another in rapid succession until the division of Germany became the symbol of East-West intransigence — politically, economically, and militarily.

1948, June —

The Soviet Union began the Berlin blockade and withdrew from the Allied Control Council when it became obvious that a separate West German government was being created. From the Soviet viewpoint, the West no longer had a valid reason for occupying Berlin or, therefore, of obtaining access to Soviet-held territory.

1949, May —

The German Federal Republic became a separate state as the Basic Law went into effect: (The Basic Law substitutes for a constitution; it claims also to apply to "those Germans to whom participation was denied, e.g., the East Germans. Article 146 states that the Basic Law "shall cease to be a force on the day on which a Constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force." The Basic Law was also not put to a popular vote. (Encyclopedia International) The Soviets lifted the Berlin blockade. A separate East German government, the German Democratic Republic, was established soon after. There were now two German states, one as valid and as legal as the other.

1950, May —

The United States accused the Soviet Union of having permitted the establishment of an East German police force of 50,000 men, large enough for an army. The Soviet Union was reminded of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements to ensure the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany.

1950, September —

The NATO Council (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a supra military body composed of the United States and West European countries) agreed to accept West Germany into an integrated European Defense Force.

1955, May —

After many delays because France refused to ratify the first agreement, West Germany was made fully sovereign and became a full-fledged member of NATO, except for certain prohibitions against manufacture and use of the so-called ABC weapons (atomic, biological, and chemical). At this point, the Eastern European countries joined together for their mutual defense in the Warsaw Pact.

1961, August —

The division between the two parts of Germany had, by this time, hardened. Between 1955 and 1961, approximately 2,021,000 East Germans had defected

to West Germany (as compared to 279,000 West Germans who had defected to East Germany). East Germany developed serious labor shortages; the Berlin wall was built by East Germany, separating the Eastern from the Western sections of Berlin, to halt the loss of man power from East Germany and to halt espionage traffic. East German citizens who crossed the border between East and West Berlin over the wall illegally have been shot by East German border guards.

## Negotiations, 1949-1961

When the Berlin blockade was lifted in 1949, there was one more half-hearted meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held at the insistence of the Soviet Union as part of the terms for lifting the blockade. In the ensuing period, there have been a few, intermittent meetings between the foreign ministers or the heads of state.

Twice, the United States speaking for the West, has submitted a plan for German reunification which the West insists must be preliminary to any discussion of a peace treaty.

The Soviet Union has submitted a number of draft peace proposals with all kinds of modifications for dealing with the two Germanys and divided Berlin, but always with the provision that the new Germany, divided or reunified, must first be prohibited from entering into military alliances such as NATO. To this, the West has never agreed.

On various occasions, the Soviets have also stated that if no agreement can be reached among the occupying powers and Germany, the Soviet Union will sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. The West would interpret this move as provoking a crisis situation because they would then be forced to recognize the existence of the East German state in order to negotiate with it for access rights into West Berlin.

There have been no top level meetings on the German question since 1959, and the situation today remains dormant. However, private, unpublicized talks

**Senator Mansfield recently proposed a united Free Berlin as an interim solution. His words were howled down in Bonn, in West Berlin and in Washington as too dangerous to consider. Is the position we now occupy less dangerous? Will the shibboleths of Konrad Adenauer, the Communists' dreams of conquest and the West's lack of imagination combine to bring on humanity's "final solution?" Surely there must be men of vision in the free world who have the daring to seek a better answer than this explosive stalemate.**

(New York Post, 6-23-61)

between the foreign ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union have taken place. The West has made no overtures, preferring to accept the "abnormal."

The Soviet Union, for its part, finds it hard to tolerate the existing situation; it has never withdrawn its threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if all else fails.

### Summary of Proposals, 1952-1961

#### 1952, March —

The Soviet Government presented the draft for a German Peace Treaty to the United States, which called for a unified state with permission to have its own national armed forces but barred from entering into any military alliance. In its reply, the United States noted that there was no mention of the international position of Germany before the conclusion of a peace treaty and said, ". . . the all-German government should be free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations . . . The United States Government is giving its full support . . . to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community . . ."

#### 1954, January-February —

At a Foreign Ministers meeting held in Berlin, the British presented a Plan for German Reunification that called for free elections but made no mention of any limitations on the new German state. The Soviets again presented a draft peace treaty — which was no different from the previous one.

#### 1955, July —

The meetings at Geneva of the heads of state produced a statement "that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

#### 1955, October-November —

The meetings of the Foreign Ministers revealed that despite the statement of the previous summer, there was no change in the respective positions of the contending parties.

#### 1958, November —

With the situation still unchanged, the Soviet Union proposed that both German states be recognized by all the nations involved and that they be urged to form a confederation for the conclusion of a peace treaty and gradual reunification.

At the same time, the Soviets also declared that the Control Agreements of 1944 were no longer valid as far as Berlin was concerned, since the Potsdam Agreement had long since been abrogated by the Western powers. To ease the situation, it was proposed that

West Berlin be converted into a demilitarized, free city (pending unification). If there should be no agreement on this proposal after six months, the Soviet Union would make a separate agreement with the German Democratic Republic.

1959, January —

The Soviet Union submitted a new draft for a peace treaty that would recognize the two Germanys and proposed to settle with both of them on the same terms as were outlined in the previous draft proposals. The West proposed a conference of Foreign Ministers to discuss the German problem.

1959, May —

After a three and a half year lapse, the foreign ministers met at Geneva, at which time the West presented a peace plan that proposed an independent, reunified Berlin through supervised elections — but with the continuation of Four Power military occupation; the establishment of a committee of the two Germanys to draft a law for free elections to reunify the country; and the gradual reduction of armed forces within Germany. Again, no mention was made of actual treaty arrangements with a reunified Germany.

The Soviet Union again insisted that, first of all, a peace treaty with the two German states should be concluded, after which the Germans themselves would determine their political status; accordingly, once again the Soviet Union presented its draft of a peace treaty.

During the course of these meetings, the Soviet Union presented several modifications of its proposal concerning the status of Berlin, but always insisting on time limitations after which, if no agreement was reached, a separate peace treaty with East Germany would be concluded, thereby ending the occupation rights of the Western nations in Berlin.

The meetings ended on a friendly note but with no agreement in sight.

1960, May —

Summit meetings were scheduled to consider the problem once again when the U-2 incident occurred and shattered whatever accord had been built up over the past year.

1961, June —

After the Kennedy administration took office, the Soviet Union further modified its proposals for a peace treaty by guaranteeing freedom and neutrality for West Berlin. The flexible proposal called for signing a peace treaty with each of the two German states, or separate treaties with one or the other, or both. Neither of the German states would need to withdraw from military alliances immediately, and "token" troops of all four occupation powers, and/or neutral troops under the UN could be stationed in West Berlin to safeguard its freedom. Access rights to West Berlin would be assured for all peoples and all countries who wanted them.

### Bibliography

*Encyclopedia International*, 1st ed., N. Y., Grolier, 1963.

Fleming, D. F. *The Cold War and its Origins*, N. Y., Doubleday, 1962.

Neal, Fred Warner. *War and Peace, and Germany*, N. Y., Norton, 1962.

Neal, Fred Warner, Claremont Summer Session Convocation Lecture, July 20, 1961.


U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961*, Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office.

Warburg, James P. *Peace Action Newsletter*, October, 1962, 144 Constitution Ave., N.E., Washington, D. C.

Zink, Harold. *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*, Princeton, van Nostrand, 1957.

Bonn's seeking atomic equality is "distasteful to Washington and most of the NATO partners because Bonn's defensive conception, in case of war, provides for immediate use of atomic weapons. On this basis every combat action in West Germany would neces-

sarily result in nuclear catastrophe. All those who know the explosive situation between the two German states, which virtually live in a state of civil war, must regard such a perspective with horror." (Heinz Aboesch, *The Nation*, July 13, 1963)



**Cross-Section** (1920) George Grosz

A German soldier in World War I, **GEORGE GROSZ** (1893-1959) became famous in the 1920's for his biting satires of the military, Junker, and wealthy classes. A devastating critic of the moral collapse of Germany's postwar society, Grosz's art was outlawed by the Nazis who forced him to flee to New York in 1933. After Hitler's defeat, Grosz returned to Germany.



# the spectre of the past in the new West Germany

"In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs . . ." (Potsdam Agreement, Part II, Germany, Economic Principles, Article II, August, 1945)

## Rearmament

Five years after a defeated Germany was disarmed, the inexorable logic of the Cold War dictated that West Germany was essential to the defense of Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression. Rearming of Germany, admittedly, was a great risk, but those persons in the United States government responsible for initiating this policy argued that the risk was worth taking because the stakes were so high. They reasoned that the Soviet Union would over-run Western Europe unless deterred by military might.

The plan was to admit West Germany into NATO, where its military activities would be controlled by the United States. While Great Britain and France reluctantly yielded to this opinion, their lingering fear of German aggressiveness prompted them to restrict West Germany's participation in NATO by prohibiting it from manufacturing or using nuclear weapons or other powerful armaments.

While West Germany rearmed with deliberate slowness it was able to take advantage of the economic difficulties of the other nations and the manufacturing restrictions which they had placed upon it. Other member nations found themselves competing for the huge defense contracts which West Germany had to offer. From this enviable position, it could purchase judiciously while bargaining effectively for concessions and dispensations in its rearmament program. The Germans waited until weapons development reached a point of economic feasibility before making their de-

mands for the manufacture of those weapons themselves. All of their requests have been granted by the Western European Union, the agency set up as a watchdog in these matters.

West Germany has thus been able to assume a dominant role in NATO, while the other European members have been hard pressed to fulfill their military commitments. As the military burdens increased, West Germany was not only permitted, but urgently requested to contribute its fair share in the mutual defense.

It has become increasingly clear in recent years that both because of and despite NATO, West Germany could easily become another nuclear power. Because it has participated with the other NATO countries in the research and development of the latest nuclear weapons, West Germany is in a position to design and produce those weapons within its own territory at any time it chooses. The country has already been called "an atomic force in being." Although the prohibitions to such manufacturing are still in effect, the imminent dangers are that they will be lifted like the other ones were, ignored, or become unenforceable.

In an attempt to head off the development of such an independent nuclear force, the United States has been impelled to suggest changes in the structure of NATO which would give more power to all the member countries in nuclear strategy. The latest proposal — for a multilateral nuclear force — would at last give the West Germans nuclear parity in strategy and participation within the NATO command.

However, the offer of equal access to nuclear weapons within NATO did not prevent West Germany from

concluding a separate and historic alliance with the French for their mutual aid and defense. Their joint military policy will naturally include atomic weapons, for the French bomb and weapons have now become Franco-German bombs and weapons.

West Germany has carefully hedged its rearmament program by pursuing two methods at the same time: (1) the offering of large arms purchasing contracts to the West and (2) receiving permission to produce its own arms as it gets its factories rebuilt. With its arms returned to it, will West Germany continue to act in the strict interests of the Western alliance and/or of world peace and disarmament? Does it seem inevitable that West Germany will become another atomic power in its own right, despite prohibitions, despite the proposed MLF scheme in NATO to share nuclear control?

### **Chronological Developments in West German Rearmament**

*1954, October —*

Before West Germany was admitted into the newly formed Western European Union and NATO, it agreed without reservation not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons. It was also prohibited, subject to amendment by the Western European Union, from manufacturing long-range missiles, guided missiles and influence mines; large warships; bomber aircraft for strategic purposes. (Protocol No. III on the Control of Armaments in the Paris Protocols Amending the Brussels Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954; Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954)

*1955 —*

The Federation of German Industry went on record as opposing the creation of a West German armaments industry. (Freund, p. 164) Because of NATO restrictions and this decision, West Germany began purchasing the arms necessary to fulfill its NATO defense commitment from the other members of the Alliance. (Pol)

*1956 —*

West Germany was already producing 40% of its arms at home while purchasing the other 60% abroad. (Freund, p. 163)

*1956-1958 —*

West Germany began breaking some of the arms restrictions, and asking and receiving dispensations from others. (Freund, Pol, Prague Institute)

West Germany participated with other nations in weapons research and development. A tri-partite committee of France, Italy, and West Germany was organized to co-ordinate the armaments production of the three countries in Rome. As a member of Euratom,

West Germany received fissionable material for conducting experiments and carrying out its own nuclear research. In addition, West Germany began to make its own weapons in outside countries, such as Switzerland. (Freund, Prague Institute)

*1957 —*

In reply to a Soviet note accusing the Federal Republic of adopting a policy designed to secure atomic weapons, Foreign Minister von Brentano reiterated Adenauer's statement that the Federal Republic neither possessed any type of atomic weapon nor had requested any supplies of such weapons. He went on to say, "The Federal Republic is the only country in the world to have . . . renounced the manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and thus already to have made an effective contribution to atomic disarmament." (Documents on Germany, Note, May 23, 1957.) After victory in the national elections, Adenauer and his party openly declared themselves in favor of the army's atomic armament. (McClellan, p. 77)

*1958 —*

A controversy developed between Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss and the then Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard on the question of armaments production. Erhard warned that heavier domestic arms expenditures would give significant influence over the economy to the generals. He wanted investments to continue to go into civilian production. Strauss wanted to develop the arms industry at home as cheaper in the long run and enabling West Germany to catch up in modern technology. (Freund, p. 163)

*1959 —*

Erhard gave in to Strauss on domestic arms production, under the influence of the industrialists who had come round to the Strauss position. West Germany was now manufacturing 60% of its arms requirements at home. (Freund, p. 164)

During this time, the Soviet Union noted with alarm that the United States was preparing to give nuclear and missile weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany, among other NATO countries. The American replies defended the position that all NATO countries should have the most advanced weapons. (Documents on Germany, Soviet Notes of April 21, May 23; American replies of May 8, May 25, 1959.)

Strauss also remarked at this time that if France continued the development of an H-bomb, he could not guarantee that the German Federal Republic would not be "sucked in." (Freund, p. 155)

*1960 —*

The Soviet Union complained again that the United States intended to arm West Germany with aggressive weapons. They cited reports, not denied by the U. S., that United States Secretary of the Army Brucker announced, while he was in Bonn, that the United

States intended to give "Polaris" rockets to the West German army. (Documents on Germany, Soviet Note of July 19, 1960)

The Soviet Union called notice to a German "Generals' Memorandum" that openly demanded the transfer to the West German army (Bundeswehr) of all types of modern weapons, including nuclear-rocket weapons and bomber aircraft; the unrestricted creation of a navy; and the deployment of armed forces in NATO territory outside Germany. (Documents on Germany, Joint Statement by Soviet Union and others, October 10, 1960)

1961 —

Strauss argued that West Germany should produce and use atomic weapons without waiting for permission from the United States (Pol).

The United States declared in a note to the Soviet Union: "The [German] Federal Republic does not seek, or intend to develop, an independent nuclear capability or the transfer of nuclear weapons to its national jurisdiction." (Documents on Germany, U. S. Note, July 17, 1961)

1962 —

Strauss repeatedly asked for nuclear arms as a "symbol of national sovereignty." (Abosch)

It was estimated that 80 percent of the arms used

by West Germany were made at home. The Western European Union has continued to grant concessions to the prohibition of the manufacture of ABC weapons, and the Germans, are, some believe, secretly manufacturing the last of the prohibited item. (Neal, p. 65-66)

In June, West Germany agreed to purchase from the United Kingdom, during 1962-1964, about £53,000,000 worth of goods, mostly arms, over and above normal imports. West Germany was already committed to buying \$1,250,000 worth from the United States in 1962-63 and owed the United States \$75,000,000 for arms delivered in 1955-60. (1963 Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year)

1963 —

West Germany and France signed a Treaty of Cooperation covering, among other matters, foreign policy and defense. The treaty provided for consultation before any decision on all important questions of foreign policy, and joint planning for military production and finance. A few months later, the Germans inserted a preamble to the document which asserted that it in no way affected other international obligations, such as NATO. (*Washington Post*, Jan. 23 and April 5, 1963)

The NATO Council agreed, without a vote, to limited integrated nuclear forces, which was a modification of the permanent multi-lateral forces which the United States had been proposing. This decision finally made West Germany an official partner in nuclear strategy of the Alliance. (*Washington Post*, May 23, 1963)

1963, June —

West German government spokesmen revealed that a military aid program to other nations had been in operation for two years. Six African nations, along with India, Greece, Turkey, and two un-named countries have been receiving military equipment and training assistance. (*Washington Post*, June 13, 1963)

1963, March —


The newspapers began reporting that German nuclear scientists, most of them formerly from the German wartime rocket center at Peenemunde, had been found in Egypt developing rocket missiles for Egypt, and equipping the missiles with warheads containing radioactive material. (*Washington Post*, March 24, 1963)

1963, April —

West Germany now has tactical fighter jet aircraft equipped with United States nuclear warheads; (*New York Times*, April 3, 1963.)

1963, December —

A West German rocket firm announced that it had signed a contract to deliver missiles to an unnamed foreign country. The West German government responded by saying that the issuing of export licenses to sell military rockets abroad is not contemplated. Within one month, at the request of Chancellor Erhard,



the West German rocket firm ceased the production of missiles for foreign export.

"You [Americans] are urging us to build up our army faster and faster, but at the same time we are still making reparations payments for the damages our last army did. Some of you still accuse us of horrible crimes, while others of you do business with the criminals . . . We're still paying out millions each year in reparations and restitution to Jews and other victims of the Nazi terror, but the terrorists are collecting other millions in the form of pensions . . ." (a German journalist who was an anti-Nazi during WWII, quoted in John Dornberg, *Schizophrenic Germany*)

"Rearmament is unpopular among the German people."—West German Counselor in Washington, D. C. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein to WSP delegation, March 5, 1964.

## Remilitarization

"All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations . . . shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism . . ." (Potsdam Agreement, Part II.)

1949 —

The Brotherhood of former German General Staff Officers, formed almost immediately after the war—in violation of Allied law—sent a message to Adenauer reminding him that he could not expect to have a strong Federal Republic without an army. Adenauer's reply was that Germany should wait until the Allies asked it to form one. (Pol)

(During 1948-50 a Peoples Police force was raised in East Germany; by 1950 it had reached the size of 55,000 men including air police. While this was too large for a police force, it was not actually an army since it was equipped with machine guns and rifles only.)

1950, March —

Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons, did ask that Germany be rearmed. (Pol)

## Bibliography

- Abosch, Heinz. "The Adenauer Years," *The Nation*, July 13, 1963.
- Bourdet, Claude. "The Wrong Europe," *The Nation*, March 9, 1963.
- Freund, Gerald. *Germany Between Two Worlds*, Harcourt, 1961.
- Editors, Encyclopedia Britannica, *Book of the Year 1963*. Institute for International Politics and Economics. *Beware! German Revenge Seekers Threaten Peace*, Prague 1959.
- McClellan, Grant S., Editor. *The Two Germanies*, Wilson, 1959.
- Pol, Heinz. "NATO Joins the Wehrmacht," *The Nation*, July 29, 1961.
- Neal, Fred Warner. *War and Peace and Germany*, WW Norton, 1962.
- U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Documents on Germany 1944-1961*. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office.

1950, September —

The Korean War began. West German and United States officials stated their fear of invasion of Germany from the East, comparing the division of Germany to the division in Korea. At a New York meeting with the United States, Britain, and France, German rearmament was again suggested to combat this fear. France and England were hesitant, and would not agree. (Pol)

1950, November, December —

The Pentagon and Secretary of State Acheson stated flatly that the defense of Western Europe depended on West Germany rearming. At the Brussels Conference of the Atlantic Council, England and France finally agreed to begin technical negotiations with West Germany. (Pol)

The West German government appointed Generals Heusinger and Speidel to the task. They asked for 12 new German divisions and a 2000-plane air force. (Neal) Their original goal was for the new German army to consist of 500,000 men. In order to be able to even begin to fill that goal, Adenauer had to release former Wehrmacht officers and SS men from their prison terms as convicted war criminals. (Tetens)

(By 1951 the Peoples Police was armed with tanks, howitzers, and anti-aircraft guns. The air police was equipped with old YAK fighters from the Soviet Union. The sea police, a new group, got minesweepers. "The decision to rearm West Germany certainly inspired the Soviet Union to push ahead its plan to rearm East Germany, even if it did not originate these plans." (Prittie)

1955, May —

West Germany joined NATO as an independent sovereign power. (The Peoples Police was increased to

110,000 men.)

1956 —

West Germany began military conscription to fulfill her NATO commitments. There was a violent and spontaneous popular reaction against the new draft call (for 19 year olds). 65% of the German population was opposed to military service and to a new German army, according to a public opinion poll. (Dornberg, p. 66-69)

1957 —

General Speidel was nominated commander of NATO ground forces in Central Europe. (Pol)

(By 1957 the Peoples Police had been decreased to 95,000 men because of the severe shortage in the East German work force, caused by defections to the West.)

1959 —

A new public opinion poll showed now that 53.5% of the West German population was *in favor of* the new army. A second draft call was put out asking veterans from the second World War to re-register (37 year olds). Again there was violent resistance, not so much on the part of the general public this time, but rather from the veterans individually. (Dornberg, p. 66-69)

The new German army, the Bundeswehr, was intended to be a democratically run army. Reforms were instituted to prevent it from becoming a state in itself, by giving the Bundestag a great amount of control over army appointments and policy.

Training methods were very humane; almost no drill was used, no KP, and even new recruits were allowed a pass each night. The company commander was also an adviser for his troops and his office was made available at any time. (Dornberg)

However, many democratic reforms have gradually been put aside in favor of a return to the old German army ways. The new uniform was remodeled back to resembling the old Wehrmacht uniform, soldiers were allowed to wear their medals from World War I and II (with swastikas removed), (Dornberg), and "Deutschland Uber Alles" again became the national anthem.

1960 —

Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss asked the Spanish government for the privilege of using Spain for training bases for the new German army. He was put down by other NATO nations because Spain was not a member of NATO.

In August, the Bundeswehr High Command issued a White Paper demanding nuclear weapons for Germany immediately, stating that they could not guarantee the defense of West Europe without them. At Adenauer's intercession, this demand was toned down. (Pol)

1961 —

West German forces have become larger than those of any other NATO member, excluding the United States; they had a striking force equal to if not superior to the

United States force in Europe. (Pol)

General Heusinger became chairman of the NATO Military Committee in Permanent Session in Washington. General Heusinger has championed the West German cause to secure nuclear weapons control and he has criticized Secretary of State Rusk for allegedly deemphasizing the role of atomic weapons. (Prevent World War III, #58)

1962, October —

Defense Minister Strauss was dropped from the Cabinet as a direct result of his management of *Der Spiegel* affair when he caused the arrest of the editors and authors of an article on West German armaments status.

1963, April —

West Germany's army at this time had 11 divisions of 253,000 men, a Navy of 177 ships and 28,000 men, and an Air Force of 90,000 men. (Pell)

1963, May —

The new defense Minister Kai Uwe von Hassel, described the accomplishment of the NATO conference in Ottawa as "remarkable" in the decision for a limited nuclear command as the first step to multilateral command of nuclear missiles and submarines.

1963, August —

Defense Minister von Hassel announced plans to build, by 1966, a 50,000 man volunteer territorial army — the first West German force not under NATO control. (*Washington Post*, August 6, 1963)

1964, April —

General Heusinger has retired, leaving his NATO position in Washington.

In parting, General Heusinger proposed that the NATO Standing Group (which is the highest military authority of the alliance manned by the United States, Britain, and France), be given a permanent staff, including a director, on which members of other nations would serve. "This staff, and particularly its director, would acquire significant influence in long-range planning and strategic decisions."

West Germany has nominated a former Wehrmacht General Staff officer for the job, Brig. General Ernst Ferber (who was an intelligence expert with General Gehlen). "The post for which he has been proposed was conceived as a means of granting European countries, particularly West Germany, a larger voice in the alliance's strategic direction." (*New York Times*, April 15, 1964)

1964, April —

It has been announced that 336 sailors from seven NATO countries including 49 West German sailors will go aboard the United States missile destroyer BIDDLE in Norfolk, Virginia. United States sailors will

make up 51% of the contingent; West German forces will be second largest. "The ship will put to sea early next year to participate in the NATO maneuvers with the U. S. Second Fleet. Later she will join the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean." (*New York Times*, April 1, 1964)

### Bibliography

Dornberg, John. *Schizophrenic Germany*, N. Y., Macmillan, 1961.

Neal, Fred Warner, *War and Peace and Germany*.

Pell, Sen. Claiborne. Senate statement April 11, 1963.

Pol, Heinz. "NATO Joins the Wehrmacht", *The Nation*, July 29, 1961.

*Prevent World War III*, #58, Summer 1961. Soc. for the Prevention of World War III.

Tetens, T. H. *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*, N. Y., Random House, 1962.

*Washington Post*, (AP) August 6, 1963.

(*Sen. Wayne Morse, Cong. Record*, 4-10-61)

### ON THE HEUSINGER APPOINTMENT

However, let the State Department thoroughly understand that I do not buy the argument that in order to build up the military strength of West Germany it is necessary to put a Nazi general in a position of high command. I certainly do not support the argument that we can justify putting a Nazi general in a NATO military position where he will have influence, authority, and power in determining the combined military policy to which the United States is a party. This Nazi general unquestionably must bear his share of the responsibility for the death of thousands of American boys. . . .

What about our memories? Are they that short? . . . It is up to a free Germany to make perfectly clear to the Western World that Nazi psychology has really been brought to an end in West Germany. It will never be very persuasive by elevating Nazi generals to high positions of military power.

## Recartelization (Deconcentration)

"At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements." (Potsdam Agreement, Part II, Germany, Economic Principles, Article 12, August, 1945)

"The history of the use of I. G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. Defeat of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons of economic warfare." (Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, September 6, 1944)

The deconcentration program for West German industry was doomed to failure from the start, along with the other economic restrictions imposed by the Potsdam Powers. Even before the war ended, the Western Allies had mixed feelings about the future role of Germany. There was outright disagreement among officials in the American occupation forces about the feasibility of stripping the country economically.

The policy gradually changed from one of harsh restrictions, dismantling, and deconcentration, to one of aid in rebuilding the economy because in its unproductive and restricted state, West Germany would

be a heavy financial burden on the economies of the other Western countries. Dismantled plants proved to be useless and the decentralization of huge combines into smaller but workable units proved to be a technical and financial nightmare.

Any remaining objections to rebuilding Germany waned as the Cold War increased in intensity. By the time West Germany was accepted as a partner in the defense of Europe against the Soviet "threat", the country was not only permitted but expected to be economically independent and efficient.

This explains why reconcentration was taking place — sometimes even before the complicated orders breaking up the combines were finally issued. Faster than one hand undid, the other hand rebuilt. The vacuum so laboriously created was quickly filled with almost identical owners and combinations. In the name of the Cold War and efficiency, deconcentration orders were rescinded or quietly overlooked.

Some of the combinations eventually became more powerful and concentrated than ever before. These business organizations naturally exert great influence on the government to pursue policies which will bring them the greatest financial gain.

At the present time, German industrialists are benefiting while pursuing two divergent policies. They have resisted any change in East-West relationships with regard to Germany. They give lip service to reunification, but have no strong economic motives for restoring national unity. In a unified state, the Eastern section might bring on some economic hardships to the West. They prefer to benefit from the increasing trade with East Germany without recognizing its existence.

By insisting on maintaining the status quo, the in-

dustrialists can continue to strengthen their economic and military ties with the Western Alliance while pursuing more active political and economic policies toward the East. They seem to be waiting for the time when their increased industrial and military capacities can be used to their own advantage as a bargaining lever between the two super-powers.

Will their decision on whether it is more advantageous to remain with the Western Alliance, to seek rapprochement with the East, or to independently impose their own policies, disproportionately determine the direction of West German official policy?

### **Chronological Developments in the Recovery and Reconcentration of the West German Economy**

(Particular emphasis is given to the firm of Alfried Krupp which was one of those specially marked by the Allied Powers for the deconcentration process.)

#### *1945, April —*

Based on the decisions made at the Quebec Conference in 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States issued a policy directive (JCS 1067) which was to be used by the American occupation forces as a guide in the administration of German affairs. Regarding business operations it said, "You will prohibit all cartels or other private business arrangements and cartel-like organizations." In addition, it specifically prohibited American aid in rebuilding the German economy. (Martin, p. 14; Zink, p. 94)

#### *1945, August —*

The Potsdam Agreement placed severe limitations on German post-war industrial production. The over-all level of production was to be restricted to a fixed percentage of 1938 production, and many industries were prohibited altogether. (Zink, p. 258)

About this time, a British administrator told the gathered Krupp directors, "The firm of Krupp is simply going to cease to exist." (Prittie, p. 284)

#### *1946, September —*

Secretary of State James Byrnes extended a "hand of friendship to Germany" in a speech made at Stuttgart. Recognizing the deteriorated state of the German economy, he said, "There should be changes in the levels of industry agreed upon by the Allied Control Commission." (Documents on Germany, p. 55)

#### *1947, November —*

Germany was included in the Marshall Recovery Plan. Explained Secretary of State George C. Marshall, "The restoration of Europe involves the restoration of Germany. Without a revival of Germany economy there can be no revival of Europe's economy." (Zink, p. 97)

#### *1949, May —*

With the formation of the separate West German gov-

ernment, the revised occupation statute removed most of the controls on the German economy; "there was little or no emphasis placed on . . . denazification, dismantling, and the like." (Zink, p. 98)

Before he left office, General Lucius Clay, the American Military Governor, modified the confiscation order of the Krupp properties by directing the other military governors to take responsibility for the confiscation of the Krupp properties in their own zones. After General Clay had been told that the Soviet Union, as part of the Allied Control Council, would have been entitled to one-quarter of the Krupp holdings in West Germany, the property was not confiscated. As it turned out, the Soviet Union did not make a claim on Krupp property in West Germany. (Prittie, p. 285; Sawicki, p. 140)

#### *1950 —*

German production was estimated to have reached pre-war levels. (Zink, p. 258)

"Allied regulation 35 permitted those various enterprises which had hitherto been severed from their cartel connections and set up separately, to enter anew into understandings and unifications, to become 'independent and economically viable companies.'" (Sawicki, p. 414)

#### *1951 —*

The United States High Commissioner, Mr. John McCloy, released Krupp from prison and repealed the order confiscating his properties stating that it was "repugnant to our American concepts of justice." (Prittie, p. 285)

#### *1953 —*

The Master Plan for the dismemberment of German combines was finally published after reconcentration had been going on for some time. The German Iron and Steel Federation decided that "vertical trusts should be reconstituted." After that, the Coal and Steel High Authority permitted mergers of German firms which did not disturb the balance of industry. (Prittie, p. 288)

By the terms of the Master Plan, Krupp had to promise to sell all his coal, iron, and steel properties within at the most 6 years, and never to reenter these industries in Germany again. (Prittie, p. 286; Sawicki, pp. 141-146)

#### *1955 —*

The German Federal Republic became fully sovereign, and the occupation officially ended. The Allied High Commission issued Order 84 which amounted to final abandonment of the decartelization aim. (Sawicki, p. 412) At the same time, the West German government passed legislation in which it pledged itself to enforce the anti-cartel laws.

By the end of the occupation, the West German economy had received more than \$3.5 billion in direct economic assistance from the United States. This did not include the vast sums spent in indirect assistance in the

form of military spending, contributions, capital investment, technical and materiel assistance, and counterpart funds. (Zink, p. 263)

1957 —

Adenauer asked that West Germany be excused from anti-cartel obligations arguing that reconcentration had become so pronounced that enforcement would be turning the clock back. (McClellan, p. 56)

1958 —

Krupp had continued to operate his business without regard to the terms of the Master Plan. He expanded horizontally into other interests and invested abroad. His company's pre-war steel capacity was doubled by a merger which involved a company that should have been sold under the terms of the agreement which he had signed. (Prittie, p. 293 and Ch. 11)



1959 —

The deadline arrived for the break-up of the Krupp trust with only one property having been sold. Krupp announced his intention of regrouping some of his coal and steel properties since he had been unable to sell them. He argued that he should be allowed to enjoy the same conditions as the other big combines in the new European Common Market. No objections were heard then or since. (McClellan, p. 58; Prittie, p. 294)

1960 —

Recently, it was reported that United States Senate investigations had revealed that an anonymous group of West German industrialists had hired a public relations firm in the United States just before the scheduled meetings between Eisenhower and Khrushchev to promote "the cause of West Germany in the summit conference," and to wage a campaign to inform the American people of the "serious problems facing Germany if there should be any compromise with the Soviets." (*Washington Post*, May 15, 1963)

1961 —

Although West Germany refused to recognize the existence of East Germany, trade between the two sections amounted to \$400 million. In the same year, West German trade with the Soviet Union also came to \$400 million. (*Mansfield Report*, p. 11)

1963 —

The West German industrialists had been complaining for some time that they were underrepresented in the government; still, it is reported that their business and lobbying associations exert a constant stream of pressure making them the most powerful voice in the Bonn regime. Their own representative, Ludwig Erhard, was chosen to replace Adenauer as head of the government. (Neal, p. 60; Thayer, p. 111)

## Extent of Concentration of the West German Economy

Reconcentration proceeded at such a rapid pace that in a few short years, the old combinations or similar ones had more financial power than in the pre-war years. The big companies, those with more than 100 million marks capital, represented less than 26% of all issued stock in 1938. By 1954, the figure was almost 33%, and in 1958, it was 46%. By that time, seventeen monopoly groups controlled 80% of West German capital. (Prague Institute for International Politics and Economics, p. 7)

In the steel industry where decartelization was to have been most effective to eliminate the control of 8 pre-war trusts of 94% of steel production and 51% of hard coal output, the situation in 1959 was only a little less concentrated. Six survivors plus two new companies controlled 78% of steel and 40% of coal. Three of the firms alone controlled nearly 50% of total steel production. (Prittie, p. 296)

In 1959, Krupp alone controlled 16% of the total steel capacity and 6% of the coal of West Germany. He had built several plants throughout the world as part of his "Point Four and One-Half Program" for underdeveloped countries. His firm was estimated to be 70 to 80 per cent larger than before the war. (Prittie, p. 295)

In the case of the giant I. G. Farben trust, the Allied Powers had proposed to split it into at least 80 independent companies, then reduced the number to 30, and finally created 5 successor companies. By 1959, 90% of the old Farben interests were in the hands of 3 new companies all working closely together. (Prittie, p. 297)

One new factor in post-war German industry is the increased American capital investment. Right after the war, American firms were given the right to buy out part of the old companies for a 5 year period. "There were representatives of business firms in the U. S. who managed to get official employment in military government and whose chief effort was to look after the interests of these private enterprises." (Zink, p. 75)

By 1951, American firms owned 20% of hard coal, 20% of coke, 18% of pig iron, and 27% of steel in West German companies. (Sawicki, p. 152-153) At the present time American interests control some German cartels and over 150 companies have plants in West Germany. (Neal, p. 85)

## Bibliography

- Freund, Gerald. *Germany Between Two Worlds*, N. Y., Harcourt, 1961.  
 Institute for International Politics and Economics. *Beware! German Revenge Seekers Threaten Peace*, Prague, 1959.  
 Martin, James. *All Honorable Men*, N. Y., Little, Brown, 1950.



McClellan, Grant S. *The Two Germanies*, N. Y., Wilson, 1959.

Mansfield, Senator Mike. *Berlin In a Changing Europe 1963*, Report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office.

Neal, Fred Warner. *War and Peace, and Germany*, N. Y., W. W. Norton, 1962.

Pell, Senator Claiborne. *Report to the United States Senate on the Berlin Situation April 1963*, Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office.

Prittie, Terence. *Germany Divided*, N. Y., Little, Brown, 1960.

Sawicki, Jerzy. *From Nuremburg to the New Wehrmacht*, Warsaw, 1957.

Thayer, Charles. *The Unquiet Germans*, N. Y., Harper, 1957.

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Documents on Germany 1944-1961*, Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office.

Zink, Harold. *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1957.

## Renazification

"Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objective shall be arrested and interned.

All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings." (from the Potsdam agreement)

The American occupation authorities approached the de-Nazification problem more earnestly than did any of the other occupying powers, the Russians not excepted. They at first tried to do too thorough a job in too little time. Disgruntlement began to grow as 2 million persons (narrowed down from 13 million) had to wait their turn to appear before the tribunals. The inevitable cumbersomeness involved in setting up tribunals to try so many cases allowed many of the higher-up influential Nazis who had money and connections to escape trial. Those lesser figures with no means were left to take their punishment alone.

Then in 1946 after de-Nazification proceedings had been turned over to German tribunals, it was discovered that very few judicial personnel were not guilty themselves of more than nominal Nazi affiliations. (It has been estimated that out of 11,500 judges in West Germany today, 5,000 were active under Hitler. By the end of Adenauer's administration, approximately 140 judicial personnel had been dismissed because of exposed Nazi affiliations, including the Chief Prosecutor for the West German government. (Arendt)

On their first try, the Germans eliminated nearly four-fifths of the cases before them without trial. General Clay asked the Germans to start again. Finally, out of 2 million persons charged by the Americans, the Germans brought to trial just under 1 million. Of

these, 1500 were found guilty as major war offenders. Most cases tried in German courts got short sentences of from four to six years. Those SS men tried and sentenced to death by the Allies, soon found their sentences commuted to life, then paroled.

By 1958, the fact was faced that each new trial inevitably brought out information to indict many more persons, and so a Central Agency for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes was set up. Within one year, the Agency's investigations had led to the filing of charges against 200 more persons. This, despite the fact that German witnesses would not cooperate with the Agency, nor would local courts prosecute on the basis of the Agency's information. (Dornberg, p. 27-29, and Arendt)

"The scandals arising out of the German administration of the denazification program were numerous and frequently sensational . . . It was commonplace for judges, prosecutors, and investigators to be charged by responsible persons with accepting bribes . . . Perhaps the worst aspect of the entire denazification program, both as carried out by the American military government and the Germans, was that it permitted some of the most notorious Nazis to escape." (Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany*)

Evidence regularly appears to show that there were Nazis who not only managed to escape trial, but who wield some influence again, and in some instances demonstrate that their political and ethical attitudes have not changed.

The Nazi Party in exile has its main headquarters in Madrid, welcomed there by Franco who asked them to consider Spain their second fatherland. (Tetens, p. 72-3)

"Observers in Bonn have traced the increasing activity of former Nazis who travel between Germany and the main centers of the (fascist) International—Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Egypt, and Argentina. They often work for import-export firms and agencies and for German motor manufacturers . . ." (*Washington Post*, May 6, 1956)

In March 1963, the newspapers began reporting activities of German nuclear scientists, most of them from the wartime rocket center at Peenemunde who had been found in Cairo working on rocket missiles for Egypt, equipping the missiles with warheads containing radioactive material.

" . . . it is known that the hard core of the German scientific colony in Egypt are unrepentant Nazis, many of whom

fled here after the war with the avowed aim of helping the Arab world with the scientific know-how to 'continue the fight against the Jews.'" (*Washington Post*, March 24, 1963 quoting Anthony Terry from the *London Sunday Times*)

What of former influential Nazis who remain in Germany, who have found their way to Bonn? Some of Dr. Adenauer's cabinet ministers had past Nazi affiliations of more than nominal participation: two of them still hold ministerial positions. Former Nazis have not found it difficult to find jobs in the ministerial offices of these men. Adenauer was often called on the number of Nazis in his government, both by the Social Democrats and by a popular German magazine *Der Spiegel*. Adenauer admitted publicly on October 23, 1962 that more than 60% of his Foreign Office was made up of former Nazis. (Tetens, p. 48)

Adenauer's administration also had to concede that there were 400 to 500 SS men in the new West German army, though he insisted none had actually been concentration camp guards. (Under Allied de-Nazification procedure, all members of the SS were automatically classified as major war criminals.) Three of West Germany's top NATO administrators, General Heusinger who represents NATO in Washington, General Speidel who heads NATO ground forces in Central Europe, and General Foertsch who is the Deputy Chief of Staff in NATO, were also top generals in Hitler's army. (General Heusinger retired in April 1964.)

It is important to mention here Dr. Hans Globke, State Secretary and chief adviser to Chancellor Adenauer for ten years, from 1953 to 1963. He exerted strong influence in the reorganization and remanning of the new West German government. In spite of his retirement, his influence still affects West German official policy.

Dr. Globke's administrative powers had been exceptional for an office holder in a democratic government. He originated and personally controlled the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (similar to the FBI). He had the final word on administering the activities of the Gehlen organization (a semi-private secret service group left over almost intact from Hitler's SS and specializing in espionage in the East). He had final control also over the Federal Press Office. Appointments of former Nazis to ministerial jobs have been done by his suggestion or approval. (Tetens)

Three times there had been an effort made to depose Dr. Globke because of his past Nazi affiliations, led by the Social Democrats in West Germany. In every responsible book and article that has been written dealing with Nazis still in power, questions about the right of Globke to his position were put forth.

(During his Nazi years, Dr. Globke acted as chief legal adviser in the Office for Jewish Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. He drafted and wrote the Commentary (an interpretation) to the infamous Nuremberg Laws for the Protection of German Blood

[of September 15, 1935 in which Jews were declared no longer citizens, could not vote, had no civil rights, might not marry an Aryan . . .] When Globke's superior resigned at the Nazi's decision to begin mass extermination of the Jews, Globke took his place. (Tetens, p. 37-39)

It was recently reported, since his resignation, that the Swiss government had denied Dr. Globke permission to live in Switzerland for reasons of his past activities.

The special organizations he encouraged and manned which still function in West Germany will bear mentioning.

1) The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution created and administered by Dr. Globke until his resignation succeeded in having passed certain laws called the "Muzzle Laws" to broaden its powers. The third law in the group "provides a prison term for anyone who makes or spreads false or grossly exaggerated statements in order to hinder others from entering military service or to hinder the Federal Armed Forces from fulfilling their mission." (Dornberg)

Another provision of the law states that if the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Bonn declares any matter reported in a newspaper a state secret, the paper's entire edition is confiscated, and preliminary proceedings on a treason charge are initiated against the authors of the article in question. (Institute for International Politics and Economics, Prague)

Presumably it was under this law that the October 1962 arrests were made of *Der Spiegel* editors because the facts they had printed in an article on Germany's armed forces were subsequently called state secrets.

2) The Gehlen organization was also under Dr. Globke's control. General Reinhard Gehlen is an old personal friend of Globke, and through him had access to Chancellor Adenauer on a 24-hour basis. General Gehlen had been Nazi Chief of the Enemy Armies East Department in SS Intelligence. With the collapse of the Nazis, Gehlen hid his men, equipment, and files in the Alps until he could surrender to General Patton, at which time he got an interview with the OSS and was flown to Washington. As a result of his interviews, the American CIA helped Gehlen rebuild his organization and met his annual budget of \$5 million until the West German government was formed. (Tetens, p. 42-43)

When NATO needed suggestions on who should head the new Germany army, Gehlen suggested Generals Heusinger and Speidel. The West German *Abwehr* (military secret service) was also provided several



## NAZIS IN OFFICE

The periodic appearance of former Nazis in various Government positions continues to plague the West German Republic like a recurrent sickness.

Just a few days ago, Chancellor Erhard accepted the resignation of Hans Krueger, Minister for Refugee Affairs, who had been accused of presiding over a Nazi court in occupied Poland. Then Dr. Erhard's own security chief, Ewald Peters, was charged by the West German Interior Ministry with misdeeds against Jews in southern Russia, and has now committed suicide in jail. The Adenauer administration frequently was haunted by the discovery of ex-Nazis within its fold. Partly because of laxity on the part of investigating authorities, partly because of their large numbers, many active Nazis eluded the net of justice after the war. That they are brazenly walking the streets in freedom is bad enough. That even a few of them should find their way into responsible public posts is intolerable.

Apart from the moral considerations, the presence of prominent supporters of the Hitler terror in the Bonn Government offers obvious propaganda material to the Communists and weakens the moral posture of the free world. We can hope that Dr. Erhard will not permit misplaced magnanimity to deter him from cleaning house. (*N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1964*)

hundred specialists by Gehlen. (Connell, p. 221-223)

In 1950 the West German government was allowed its own secret service, the already referred to Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Gehlen provided its original personnel and its deputy head. The British insisted on naming its first chief, Dr. Otto John, who did not get support or cooperation from Gehlen, Globke, or Adenauer. He was considered as not to be trusted because he had worked against his country's government (during the war when he headed an anti-Hitler resistance movement).

Dr. John became obsessed with fear of the Nazis he saw coming back to power. He defected, or was taken involuntarily — it has never been known which — to East Germany where he broadcast his fears. Within a short time he escaped back to West Germany, and in a gesture meant to demonstrate his sincerity in wanting to come back, turned himself over to police authorities.

"It is particularly worrying that Mr. Allen Dulles and his agency should be maintaining close contacts with General Reinhard Gehlen's West German secret service. Though it can be counted as a NATO intelligence organization, we think there is great need for caution in our dealings with it. It is extremely unlikely that General Gehlen has any warm feelings for us . . . we have reason to believe that General Gehlen does not confine his interests to the East. The German secret service never has done so." (British Labour M.P. Edwards quoted in *The Nation* in an article on the CIA, June 24, 1961)

3) The Federal Press Office under the direct supervision of Dr. Globke was charged in the West German Bundestag with paying journalists for favorable political

"analyses" and charged with subsidizing "friendly" publishers. (Tetens, p. 116)

On June 3, 1961, the *London Daily Telegraph* reported that a propaganda campaign had been launched in Britain and the United States to keep sympathies aroused for those German expellees who had claims on territories beyond the Oder-Neisse border in Poland. The campaign was managed by the expellees' organization, but its cost — some £170,000 — was paid by the Federal Press Office. This was confirmed by the Press Office.

Nor is East Germany immune to the influence of former Nazis who seek positions again today. After the general election in 1958, forty-nine former Nazis found seats in the Volkskammer (parliament). The chief justice of the East German Supreme Court was a former Nazi. The head of the East German Academy of State and Legal Science was a former SS man. Ernest Grossman, a member of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Party (SED) and a personal friend of Walter Ulbricht was formerly an SS guard at Sachsenhausen concentration camp (Dornberg, p. 126-7). The Chief of Staff of the East German army, General Vincenz Muller was on Hitler's General Staff.

"There is no denying it. The GDR also has its political skeletons in its public closet, but far fewer than West Germany. The Soviet zone officials have exploited the propaganda value of this fully. Many of the ex-Nazis in West German officialdom have been "exposed" . . . by hard-hitting, well-aimed, and carefully timed press announcements and research reports. Nearly half of all the West German political "exposes" and "scandals" have had their origin in documentation supplied by the GDR or other satellite countries. Although the motives for the publication of this documentation are more than obvious, that has thus far failed to detract in any way from the accuracy of the charges and allegations." (John Dornberg, *Schizophrenic Germany*)

### Some 10 Million Barriers to a Peace Treaty

At the end of World War II between 8 and 14 million Germans living beyond the Oder-Neisse border in territory now under Polish administration, were expelled from their homes and pushed back into Germany. These people had to find new homes, jobs and food in Germany when it hardly begun to recover from its defeat. Many of the expellees, after years of difficulty and suffering, did manage to start new lives in their new locations. Some still, however, are unassimilated, and they are not particularly encouraged to assimilate. They are appealed to for votes by every political party in West Germany, with promises that their old homes will someday be returned to them. They make up 15 to 20% of the electorate. They are kept unassimilated by default.

"To assimilate the refugees would be to recognize the *fait accompli*, to recognize the legality of the Oder-Neisse border. Everything suggests . . . that the possibility of

refugees returning someday to their home is doing service both as a reason and as an excuse for the delay in assimilating them." (Alfred Grosser, *The Colossus Again*)

The expellees are organized into *Landsmannschaften* (homeland clubs from "lost" areas like Pomerania, Silesia, East Prussia, the Sudetenland). These clubs publish elaborate booklets recalling to the expellees the beauty of their lost homelands and stress that their homes and cultures have been lost to the "barbarous East." The leaders and manipulators of the expellees thus systematically exploit the anti-Communist attitudes of the average German, dispossessed or not.

The expellees are also organized into their own political party (headed by Dr. Walter Becher and Dr. Richard Sallet, both ex-Nazis) called the BHE (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten) which means League of the Homeless and Dispossessed. Since the expellees make up such a large part of the electorate, their cause gets at least lip service from the government. In past years, at Whitsuntide, the *Landsmannschaften* have held rallies that were attended by 200,000 to 500,000 persons. They were addressed by a representative of the West German government and, in the past, received a great many wires from conservative United States Congressmen who also voiced sympathy with their cause. (Tetens, p. 138)

This is the group that by virtue of its large number of votes and the popularity of its quest for "lost" lands, was supported by Adenauer's administration in its denial of the legality and reality of the Oder-Neisse border. As early as 1953, Adenauer said in Bonn, "But instead of reunification, let us talk rather of liberation (Befreiung) — the liberation of our brethren in slavery in the East. That is our aim, and that we shall achieve, but only with outside help." (Alister Horne, *Return to Power*)

The existence of the expellees and their untenable claims seems to fit in well with the interest of the Nazi Party in exile. "The millions of expellees must be regarded as a valuable trump card in our policy toward the restoration of German power . . . The distress of the refugees has created a common political ground among all Germans regardless of political affiliation. The demand for the restitution of the stolen German territories keeps our political agitation alive. The militant elements among the refugees are working according to the best traditions of National Socialism, whereas the broad masses among the expellees are kept close together in well-disciplined homeland organizations . . ." (From a confidential statement of 1953 from the Madrid headquarters of the Nazi Party in exile, quoted in *Germany Plots with the Kremlin* by T. H. Tetens). The direction and manipulation of the expellees' cause by unrepentant Nazis is perhaps the most flagrant example of the influence of Nazis on West German official policy — and eventually then on United States policy in Europe.

Former Nazis have not limited their influence to the higher offices, but may be found right down through the civil service ranks through all the provinces. (Tetens, p. 37-55). Neither are they forcing themselves again upon an entirely unwilling population. There are neo-Nazi publishing houses which have enjoyed great success in publishing the memoirs of such Nazi "heroes" as Rosenberg, Hess, von Ribbentrop. There are neo-Nazi newspapers and magazines with a circulation of 100,000. (Tetens, p. 83) There are a number of neo-Nazi political and quasi-political organizations. Former Nazis receive pensions from the West German government (by Federal Law #131) which was designed to compensate them for their suffering under the occupation and under de-Nazification procedures. (Connell, p. 134). While in contrast, "more than a million survivors (50%) . . . of Nazi persecution — inmates of concentration camps, those whose property was stolen, whose livelihood was destroyed — have not received a penny up to the moment of this writing (1961.)" (Tetens, p. 213)

It is discouraging to anticipate continuing the effort to check Nazi influence, still, almost twenty years after World War II. It is a task which many of the Germans are not enthusiastic about carrying out and with which responsible Germans, who will still work to check Nazi influence, would seem to need any support they can get. Some of the efforts of these responsible German citizens are listed in the next section.

### Bibliography

- Allen, Charles. *Heusinger of the 4th Reich*, N. Y., Marzani and Munsell, 1963.
- Arendt, Hannah. "Eichmann in Jerusalem," *The New Yorker*, Feb. 16, Feb. 23, March 2, March 9, and March 15, 1963 issues.
- Connell, Brian. *A Watcher on the Rhine*, New York, Wm. Morrow, 1957.
- Cook, Fred J. "The CIA," *The Nation*, June 24, 1961.
- Dill, Marshall. *Germany, a Modern History*, Ann Arbor, U. of Michigan Press, 1961.
- Dornberg, John. *Schizophrenic Germany*, New York, Macmillan, 1961.
- Grosser, Alfred. *The Colossus Again*, New York, Praeger, 1955.
- Horne, Alister. *Return to Power*, N. Y., Praeger, 1955.
- Institute for International Politics and Economics, Editors, *Beware! German Revenge-Seekers Threaten Peace*, Prague, 1960.
- Prittie, Terence. *Germany Divided*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1960.
- Society for the Prevention of World War III, *Prevent World War III* (bi-annual magazine).
- Tetens, T. H. *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*, New York, Random House, 1961.
- Tetens, T. H. *Germany Plots with the Kremlin*, N. Y., Schuman, 1953.
- Zink, Harold. *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1957.

# democratic influences in West Germany:

## the other Germany

"... what we lack here is an organized fusion of all anti-Nazi forces to build a sturdy dam against the secret and underground attacks which undermine our as yet not too solidly established society." (Bishop Kampe of Limburg, 1959, quoted in John Dornberg, *Schizophrenic Germany*, p. 278)

"This third Germany consists of a number of Social Democrats and trade unionists, certain far-sighted intellectuals and those Christians who support Niemoller."

(Heinz Abosch, *Menace of the Miracle*)

Some intellectual leaders who have opposed re-Nazification and remilitarization:

*Dr. Gustav Heinemann*, a Protestant leader, in 1951 resigned his cabinet ministry position in protest against Adenauer's autocratic methods of leadership and to protest against German rearmament. He formed a "Peace League" which became a basis for West Germany's pacifist movement. (Prittie, p. 316)

*Dr. Ernst Hessenauer*, State Commissioner for Youth Guidance in Schleswig-Holstein told a students' meeting he "regarded it as unwholesome to the democratic process to permit former Nazi officials to run for public office or be appointed to official positions." He was reprimanded by the Minister in his district. (Tetens, p. 157)

*Erich Lueth* in 1951 launched a "Peace in Israel" campaign to collect money for Jewish charity organizations, to plant trees in Israel, and to tend Jewish cemeteries. Leaflets were also distributed to inform the Germans of the facts of Nazi persecutions. Mr. Lueth made several trips to Israel in attempts to begin to build a German-Jewish friendship. In 1957 he organized a mass pilgrimage in which 5000 children laid wreathes on graves at Belsen. (Prittie, p. 262 ff.)

In the spring of 1957, *18 W. German atomic scientists* published a manifesto warning against the use of atomic bombs and giving their solemn pledge not to take part in any research or production of nuclear weapons. Dr. Adenauer responded by saying that arming West Germany with atomic bombs was "a political

question which should be of no concern to scientists because they are not qualified to judge such matters." (Tetens, p. 159)

In the spring of 1962, another manifesto was put out signed by *eight German Protestant intellectuals*, (including Prof. Werner Heisenberg, Nobel Prize winner, and Klaus von Bismarck), calling for wide social, economic, and educational reform for West Germany, for recognition of the Oder-Neisse border by West Germany, and against nuclear armaments for their country. (*New Republic*, May 28, 1962)

Some other intellectuals who have consistently opposed re-Nazification and remilitarization are *Dr. Eugen Kogon*, editor of *Frankfurter Hefte*; the religious leaders, *Rev. Dr. Gruber*, *Pastor Niemoller* and *Bishop Kampe*; and pacifists, *Dr. Klara-Marie Fassbinder*, *Fritz Kuester*, and *Otto Lehmann-Russbuehd*.

Some writers and writers groups who have opposed re-Nazification and remilitarization:

As early as 1952 *Michael Mansfeld* revealed in an article that the West German Foreign Ministry was staffed by many former Nazis, many of them war criminals. Adenauer denounced his expose, in a speech in the Bundestag saying, "Such snooping in the Nazi records must be stopped." (Tetens, p. 158)


And in 1954 *Mansfeld* along with *Helmut Hamerschmidt* produced a short radio program showing how laws for financial compensation to ex-Nazis for suffering under occupation or internment were much more efficient and favorable than those compensation laws for

the Nazi's victims. (Prittie, p. 255)

*The Grunewalder Circle*, a writers group, has consistently exposed neo-Nazi publishers and writers. Especially in a series of articles by *Thomas Gnilka* called "They Have Learned Nothing" documenting the widespread influence of neo-Nazi organizations. (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, June, Sept., Nov. 1959)

*Erich Kuby*, a leading West German writer, depicted retired General Ramcke in a radio play as an example of the criminal nature of Hitler's *Wehrmacht* in Ramcke's sacrificing the lives of 10,000 men in a last ditch stand at Brest. Ramcke attempted a libel suit, but was unsuccessful after some 270 witnesses testified for Kuby's allegations. (Dornberg, p. 252-3)

Some independent newspapers and periodicals which regularly plead for democracy: *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Frankfurter Hefte*, *Der Monat*, *Der Spiegel*, *Simplicissimus*, and the more conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, *Deutsche Zeitung*, *Die Welt*, *Michael*.



*The Widow* (1923) Kathe Kollwitz

Two private citizens' recent protests against re-Nazification:

*Dr. Elmar Herterich* took it upon himself to investigate officials of his own town of Wurzburg. He discovered that the head of the administrative court and the mayor had both been Nazi sympathizers. He asked for their removal, and subsequently implied that the local attorney was delaying the process to eliminate the Nazis he'd uncovered. The Wurzburg court then fined and sentenced Dr. Herterich, and other former Nazis began to sue him.

Dr. Herterich stated, "When Hitler came to power, the civil service went over 95 percent to the Nazis. Now, all the denazification is over and the past is supposed to be wiped out, they all say, and so the civil servants are creeping back and it is one large clique with everybody protecting everybody else." (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 28, 1963)

*Dr. Richard Weyl*, an Israeli lawyer, returned to West Germany in 1963 to pursue compensation and restitution claims. Dr. Weyl discovered former members of the Nazi Party in the West German judiciary, and former SA and SS men serving on the highest German Compensation Court in Karlsruhe.

Dr. Weyl was recommended for disbarment when he made a public statement of these facts and pointed out that the law which would exclude former Nazis from the courts is ignored entirely in West Germany. (Bertrand Russell in *London Observer*, Dec. 8, 1963)

The Political Party which has consistently opposed re-Nazification and remilitarization:

*The Social Democratic Party (SPD)* under Kurt Schumacher emerged after the war as the only German party with a solid and continuous democratic tradition. However, as a Socialist party, it was not trusted by the Allies, even though Schumacher kept his party completely independent of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), which was later confined to East Germany.

Ironically, the Social Democrats were also unable to gain the trust of the German people who had lived under Hitler, just because the Social Democrats' most prominent leaders had spent the war years away from Germany, in exile, refusing Hitler's rule.

The Social Democrats' activities have been most noticeable in their steady but unsuccessful work against German rearmament, and in their consistently exposing high ministerial officials who have incriminating Nazi backgrounds.

The Social Democratic Party also has a strictly nationalistic and anti-Communist policy.

### **A Brief Chronology of SPD Activity**

1952 —

Kurt Schumacher died. His successor was Erich Ollenhauer. The SPD lost the next three elections, and resigned itself to being the largest opposition party.

However, it was not included in any of Adenauer's coalitions.

1955 to 1957 —

The SPD with the trade union organizations, organized a large anti-militarization campaign, using the slogan *Ohne Mich!* (Count Me Out!) that had powerful impact; that is, it almost succeeded. "Adenauer had to turn for support to his American allies — who were the most insistent in urging German rearmament — and to those sections on the German Right who did not reject rearmament . . ." (Mander, p. 52)

A German opinion poll revealed that 65 per cent of the Germans were opposed to military service and to the building of a new army. There were 100,000 active, dues-paying members in the three major conscientious objector groups. (Dornberg, p. 66-69)

New anti-Semitic incidents were beginning again in Germany. Matching the tone of popular sentiment, evidently, large sections of Adenauer's party (CDU) and the FDP (Free Democratic Party) *opposed* ratification of the Israeli Debt Agreement in the Bundestag. Only by the support of 150 Social Democrats did it become possible to put through the agreement, allowing restitution payments to Israel by Germany.

1958 —

The SPD organized an anti-atom-death campaign. It was fully supported by the unions; a general strike was threatened. Ollenhauer said a nuclear war would create an "all-German cemetery." Adenauer replied that West Germany had no intention of manufacturing or producing nuclear weapons. West Germany just needed nuclear tactical weapons, he said, which were really just a simple extension of conventional weapons.

German public opinion now showed that only one person in four was opposed to rearmament. The campaign failed to change the administration policy. Nevertheless, the SPD has continued to alert public opinion to the dangers and implications of the West German arms build-up.

In October of this same year, the SPD published a list of influential ex-Nazis who were receiving pensions often 12 times as large as the pension of those they had victimized. (The average old age pension is \$22 per month; the average ex-top-Nazi pension was between \$300-\$600 per month.)

1960 —

The SPD forbid members to contact the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED). The SPD also stated that they would enter into no agreement with any existing Communist organization.

1963 —

With the death of Ollenhauer, Willy Brandt, mayor of West Berlin, assumed the leadership of the SPD.

### Bibliography

- Abosch, Heinz. *Menace of the Miracle*, N. Y., Monthly Review Press, 1963.  
 Dornberg, John. *Schizophrenic Germany*, N. Y., Macmillan, 1961.  
 Mander, John. *Berlin: Hostage for the West*, Penguin Books, 1962.  
 Prittie, Terence. *Germany Divided*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1960.  
 Tetens, T. H. *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*, N. Y., Random House, 1961.

"An entirely unhealthy number of men who served under Ribbentrop have found their way back into the Bonn foreign ministry. The list could cover pages. The story in many other ministries is no better. Everywhere in the federal and even more in the state administrations, the names of innumerable former Nazis can be picked out. Perhaps many of them have reformed, perhaps many more only joined the party in order to keep their jobs under Hitler . . . The fact remains that they are there, and it is never possible to be free of the nagging suspicion that their ultimate loyalty is not necessarily to the government they at present serve." (Brian Connell, *A Watcher on the Rhine*)

When President Kennedy visited West Germany and West Berlin in June 1963, some of the citizens of Hanau-Gelnhausen presented him with a letter which said in part:

"Permit us, Mr. President, to refer to the unsolved German question in which there is the ever present danger of open conflict. Nowhere in the world has the cold war been carried closer to hot war than in Germany, where one spark may be enough to set afire the entire world. In order to overcome this danger, bilateral negotiations are necessary between the interested parties. We are convinced that increased tensions in Germany must be avoided by all means . . ."



Pillars of Society  
(1924)  
George Grosz



# the unsolved problem of Germany

"... I think we should give our present policy toward Germany a critical reexamination with a view toward acceptance of the fact that Germany is divided as long as we have not reached the millennium of a world and a time when we can achieve a unified, unarmed Germany . . . Nor does . . . de facto acceptance of a divided Germany give the Communists control over a single additional person or square inch . . . (but) what we must gain in any resolution

of the Berlin problem is a clearly defined corridor of land access to West Berlin . . . a gain of what we have never had . . . backed up by ironclad guarantees for the freedom of West Berlin. . . . To achieve these ends, we can afford to acknowledge the continuing existence of the two German Governments and agree upon the Oder-Neisse frontier . . ." (Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, *Congressional Record*, June 19, 1963)

## The Unique Problem of Berlin

West Berlin, occupied by Western troops, although located 110 miles inside East Germany, has become the focal point and the number one danger spot of the Cold War; over no other question can the passions of both sides be so easily aroused. The very fact of a divided Berlin, where the forces of East and West confront each other at very close range, invites conflict. Nuclear war could begin there.

This dangerous situation has grown worse in the past 15 years. There have been many pronouncements and much posturing on both sides, but no agreements have been made, no treaties have been signed. Instead, the access rights of the Western Allies into East Germany are still informally and precariously obtained; the East Germans have built a wall separating the two parts of Berlin, a visual symbol of the enmity and complete lack of agreement between the two sides; West Berlin is still occupied by foreign troops.

When the occupation agreements were drawn up before the end of World War II and Berlin was made the seat of the four-power administration of Germany, the Western Allies failed to obtain written guarantees of free access at all times into the Western sectors of Berlin.

Ever since, procedures for crossing East Germany into West Berlin have taken on the character of some sort of mysterious game, with no set rules. An illustration of the peculiarities of the travel procedures was demonstrated by the events on the Autobahn in No-

vember, 1963. (See *I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly* of Nov. 25, 1963)

When it became obvious that a separate West German government was being formed, the Soviet Union considered the Potsdam Agreement abrogated and proceeded to close off the access routes of the Western Allies to West Berlin. The Berlin Blockade — and its counterpart, the Berlin Airlift — lasted for a year, but produced no agreement on the disposition of Berlin.

Having created the West German government, the United States also proved that it could keep West Berlin in its camp. Refusing to recognize the new East German government, it insisted on continuing to deal with the Soviet authorities rather than with East German government authorities whom the United States does not recognize. The Soviet Union gave in to this demand and has continued to do so to the present day, although it continues to protest the arrangement. The East Germans control all civilian traffic in and out of Berlin.

The Western nations have refused to discuss Berlin as a problem separate from a peace treaty with a reunified Germany. In recent years, the Soviet Union and the East Germans have wanted to settle the status of West Berlin by legal agreement, regardless of the unification situation. The perennial "Berlin crisis" stems from this pressure by the Soviets for a Berlin agreement and, failing that, their threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This would throw the Western Allies into a quandary about how to maintain access rights through a country which they do not recognize.

For some years, Berliners were free to travel back

and forth between the two parts of the city; this was stopped when the East Germans built a wall preventing exchange between the two. The Soviet Union had claimed that Berlin was being used as a center for Western espionage and anti-Communist propaganda and for luring skilled Eastern workers into West Germany. From their point of view, the Berlin Wall achieved the desired purpose of stopping the alleged spying and the traffic to the West; but it also created in Western minds another "crisis" — and a still greater determination to defend West Berlin from the Communists. President Kennedy identified the United States completely with West Berlin when he said in the summer of 1963, "Ich bin ein Berliner."

Today, West Berlin with a population of 2.2 million people is closely tied to West Germany, although it is not actually part of it. It participates in the West German economic system, but carries on trade with both East and West. West Berlin in the last ten years, has been one of the most flourishing cities in the world. Heavily subsidized by West Germany and the United States, it has been the showplace of the "free world" and a source of irritation to the East. However, as Senator Mansfield pointed out in his report on Berlin, its phenomenal economic expansion is coming to an end, while East Berlin continues to grow. The economic gap between the two Berlins is bound to narrow, and other differences between them as well.

## The Official West German Position

Germany, divided for 15 years, appears further away from unification than ever, but present West German politics have been based on reunification and on the recovery of the lost territories to the East. At the same time, West Germany has tied itself economically and militarily to the West. The two positions are contradictory and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has adamantly maintained that it will never agree to a reunified Germany that is tied to NATO, or to any Western military alliance. Neither will the Soviet Union or Poland return the lands east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers given to them by the Potsdam Agreement. Even France, in addition to the rest of Europe, recognizes the permanence of the Oder-Neisse frontier in the European situation of today.

Nevertheless, West Germany refuses to recognize the Oder-Neisse border, or the fact that an official division took place 15 years ago, or the fact that there is another country in the East called the German Democratic Republic. Having taken this position, the West German government maintains that no other government should recognize East Germany either. Diplomatic relations were broken with Yugoslavia in 1957 and with Cuba in 1963 because of their recognition

of East Germany as a viable government.

The West Germans have opposed every suggestion of compromise with the Soviet Union over the question of a peace treaty and the disposition of Berlin. They say that there can be no compromise on Berlin because Berlin is actually a part of West Germany. There can be no separate peace treaties, involving two Germanys, because Germany is really one, and the West Germans speak for all the German people. (See Fred Warner Neal, *War and Peace and Germany*)

As Heinz Abosch relates, (in *Menace of the Miracle*) the official West German attitude toward the Russians has been a carry-over of the extreme anti-Bolshevism of the Hitler period. Officially, "Russia remains, as ever, the incarnation of evil." Therefore, they reason, in order to protect itself from the Communist menace, West Germany has every right to join military alliances for the common defense, to remilitarize, to rearm and to acquire nuclear weapons.

Any plans to solve the tensions in other ways — such as the demilitarization of Central Europe under the Rapacki Plan — are rejected out of hand.

The West Germans have striven to ensure United States adherence to this militaristic — but unrealistic — position. Some observers feel that, in fact, West Germany dominates American policy in Europe. Any possibility of a detente with the Soviet Union is met with cries of alarm that the United States is contemplating deserting West Berlin and Germany.

The Germans also exert pressure within the United States. They attempt to influence policy with a public relations firm, lobbyists in Washington, organizations of Americans of German ancestry, and a political organization closely related to Eastern European anti-Communist emigré groups. (See Fred Warner Neal, *War and Peace and Germany*)

## The Realities of the Two Germanys

Yet, in spite of the official West German position, the fact of a divided Germany has been widely accepted — even by West Germans — and there is little indication that anyone really wants a reunified Germany. As Walter Lippman said on June 29, 1961, "There is no visible chance of reuniting the two Germanys. They have been divided for 15 years and in that time almost all of Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain has acquired vested interests which oppose the reunion of Germany. . . ." (*Washington Post*)

To the consternation of former enemies on all sides, West Germany is today the strongest nation in Europe economically — and militarily as well if the Soviet Union is excluded. It dominates the Common Market. Among the non-American members, it dominates NATO with 12 divisions of men, equipped with the

latest weapons. German reunification under these circumstances is not wanted by the rest of Europe, East or West. Marquis Childs reported on June 21, 1961 in *The Washington Post*, "The French do not want to see a reunified Germany, nor the British. A united Germany would be an even more formidable rival than the powerful nation that, with a population of 50 million has gone so far toward outstripping all its European competitors."

Senator Pell of Rhode Island on April 11, 1963 said to the Senate of the U. S., "Whenever the question of a rearmed and reunified Germany is discussed there looms like a cloud in the back of our minds, the recollection that Germany has engaged in three aggressive wars within the past 100 years. Unfashionable as it is to mention it today, this is a fact very much in the European mind. It is one of the reasons, too, for the general acceptance of the fact that Germany should not have nuclear weapons . . . The present actual impossibility of unifying Germany is perceived by nearly all Europeans, Western and Eastern, many Americans, and quite a few Germans, though this is rarely uttered in public."

Many Germans are willing to forget reunification and accept the actual situation. In fact, the Social Democrats in 1959 advanced the Deutschland Plan which accepted the Oder-Neisse frontier. And more recently, Klaus von Bismarck, grandson of the famous "Iron Chancellor," and seven other leaders of German public opinion, advocated, for the time being, the acceptance of the present West German boundaries. The West German government itself, while not officially recognizing East Germany — and "punishing" those governments who do — carries on trade with East Germany, regulated under official agreements between the two countries, which amounts to several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

According to Charles Bartlett in the *Washington Evening Star*, July 9, 1963, "More than any country in the Western Alliance, West Germany is pressing now for trade relations with the East European countries. She is eagerly seeking the commercial fruit of Communist trade, while declining to abandon her myth that East Germany does not exist."

If West Germany really wants reunification, the Oder-Neisse boundary line between East Germany and Poland must be recognized. Eldon Griffiths had this to say in *The Washington Post*, on March 30, 1963: "It would not be easy for any West German government to renounce all claim to the provinces where many of its present citizens were born — yet it is surely best to face facts. The only foreseeable way of altering the status quo in East Europe is by an act of war. Only madmen can contemplate that."

The important fact for the Germans is that reunification can be achieved only if the Soviet Union is willing to permit it. The Soviet Union has something to give;

the United States does not. Consequently, West Germany established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955 despite its official refusal to compromise in any way with Communist regimes. Maintaining relations with the Russians keeps the door open for agreements.

There is always the possibility of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which would serve very well the German interests for reunification and trade with the East, and would leave the West in the lurch.

## The Western and Soviet Positions on Germany

"The United States Government fully concurs with the Soviet Government that a peace settlement is long overdue." (U. S. Note to USSR, July 17, 1961)

"Would not the signing of a peace treaty in the present situation be a concrete expression of the recognition of the German's right to decide themselves the road of their national development?" (N. Khrushchev, Note to Adenauer, Jan. 28, 1960)

The Western — or, really, *American* — official position has always been that Germany should be reunified and free to join any military alliance before a peace treaty can be negotiated. The Soviet Union has always agreed to reunification on the condition that the reunified state be barred from joining military alliances. The decision to rearm West Germany and make it a part of the NATO Alliance made reunification virtually impossible. Thus the basis of American policy on Germany has been in direct conflict with the basis of Soviet policy on Germany.

Holding to the concept of ultimate German reunification, the Western Powers have never recognized the legality of the division of Germany nor of Berlin. They continue to espouse the ultimate objective of a peacefully unified Germany on the basis of self-determination. In practice, however, the Western Allies created a separate and sovereign state, West Germany, which has been legally joined to the Western Alliance for some time. At the same time, they have refused to recognize East Germany, which came into being as a necessary concomitant of the creation of West Germany.

The Soviet Union has come to accept the division of Germany as permanent; it recognizes the West Ger-



man state and maintains diplomatic relations with it. It wants the existence of the East German state to be at least stabilized, if not legally recognized. It has proposed that the problem of reunification be left to the Germans themselves to decide. In the meantime, the USSR wants to conclude peace treaties with both German states. This would mean recognizing the *de facto* existence of East Germany and the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland. In return, the Soviet Union has promised to guarantee the freedom and neutrality of West Berlin, to allow Western troops to remain there, and to allow free access to West Berlin to everybody.

In an obtuse sort of way, the United States has always reacted to these proposals as if, instead of being asked to recognize East Germany, it were being asked to get out of Berlin. It also contends that the Soviet proposals would not guarantee the freedom of West Berlin, but would destroy the freedom which the

West is now protecting. The West considers any change in the status of Berlin, even neutralization, as a gain for the Soviet Union.

Every president of the United States since World War II has deemed the defense of West Berlin critical to the security of the United States and, therefore, of the Western world. They stand officially pledged to defend the freedom of West Berlin by whatever means may be necessary. Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that "the United States is ready to use atomic weapons in Germany to protect its vital interests." (*New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1962)

When Chancellor Erhard visited the United States in December of 1963, he was asked by President Johnson to develop new approaches to solving East-West problems over Germany. *The Washington Post* reported that Erhard did come up with new suggestions "that have been called the first proposals on German reunification that any West German government has made spontaneously." Details were not known, but it was reported that the proposals were more attractive to the East than anything that's been proposed by West Germany before. (*Washington Post*, January 31, 1964)

Finally, in April 1964,

"... In a broad survey of West German foreign policy (Foreign Minister Gerhard) Schroeder expressed a cautious attitude toward the Soviet Union. In his remarks addressed to Eastern Europe, Mr. Schroeder strove to allay fears, which he attributed to Soviet propaganda, that West Germany desired to reconquer its eastern territories lost after World War II.

'The expulsion of millions of East Germans from their homeland was a grave injustice,' he said. 'But we will not retaliate with new injustice. We do not want to open old wounds. We wish to live in peace with our eastern neighbors.'" (*N. Y. Times*, April 4, 1964)

"... any lessening of the Russian peril menaced the very fabric of the alliance. Built on alarm and nourished by emergency, NATO developed a vested interest in the preservation of that very state of emergency. We began to treat every Soviet action not in terms of its real effect upon the power balance but upon its significance for NATO. If the Russians were willing to pull their troops from central Europe,

it was only to catch the West napping. If they proposed a non-nuclear zone, it was to confuse us. If they offered a nonaggression pact, it was only to seduce us. We could not imagine that they might be willing to compromise, and if they did, we could not admit it lest NATO be weakened as a result." Ronald Steel, former Foreign Service officer, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, March 28, 1964.

## conclusions

# where is the solution ?

When our brief wartime alliance with the Soviet Union ended with the reappearance of pre-war mistrust between the East and West, a name was found for it: the Cold War. The prohibitive destructive power of nuclear weapons created the Cold War by making a hot war obsolete. Can the East and West continue to think in terms of "winning" the Cold War, as they would "win" a hot war? Perhaps this new kind of war demands new resolutions. Where do we start?

### **What we have to work with: the Germany we have made**

We have listed previously the four conditions which the World War II allies agreed to rid Germany of at Potsdam. We have found that the allied powers have, instead, encouraged and aided in the rearming of the two Germanys, the remilitarization of their two armies, the recartelization of West Germany, using the help of former Nazi officials to accomplish the reverse of the Potsdam agreements. The rearming of the two Germanys has always been an integral part of the arms race between the East and West in the waging of the Cold War.

The East and West German armies, as members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, are the strongest in Europe. Overarmed, by their sponsors, they stand eye to eye, always mindful of their duty as frontline defenders for the East and West, but not forgetful of their own private grievance at being denied reunification.

Against this background, the United States, at the urging of West Germany, is pressing for West German share of nuclear weapons control through the instrumentation of the multi-lateral nuclear force scheme, stating as its reason that it is better to share nuclear weapons and retain some control thereby, than to watch West Germany and other countries develop their own nuclear forces unchecked. Should the multi-lateral nuclear force become operational, West Germany is very likely to further urge that the United States surrender its present veto power over use of the nuclear

weapons jointly controlled in NATO.

Harold Wilson, Britain's Labour Party leader, has told the House of Commons that the Labour Party is "completely, utterly, and unequivocally opposed, now and in all circumstances, to any suggestion that Germany — West Germany or East Germany — directly, or indirectly, should have a finger on the nuclear trigger or any responsibility, direct or indirect, for deciding that nuclear weapons are to be used." (*The Washington Post*, February 27, 1963)

The Soviet Union has not permitted the East European countries under its influence to have nuclear weapons. Drew Pearson reported (*The Washington Post*, March 28, 1963) that the United States ambassador in Moscow had cabled the United States State Department "warning that if the West German army receives or develops nuclear weapons, the Red Army will probably attack . . ." Mr. Pearson adds, "President Kennedy was willing to risk war over nuclear weapons in Cuba, and the Russians are equally willing to risk war over nuclear weapons in Germany."

This is a most serious confrontation our government is considering. It involves three frightening risks (as expressed to us by Fred Warner Neal). (1) West Germany could use its dominant position in NATO to involve the United States in a conflict with the Soviet Union (this is what the Soviet Union fears). (2) The risk of giving nuclear weapons control to Germany allows the possibility that unscrupulous leaders would use them as a threat, particularly in regard to exerting claims over East German territories. Germans act primarily for German, not American, interests. (3) The risk of "brinkmanship" thinking; hazarding the destruction of the world to test Soviet reaction to a nuclear armed West Germany.

### **The necessity for a solution!**

United States advisers and United States money have effected the rebirth and nurturing of West Germany to make it Europe's strongest power. Its power surpasses that of the United States in many very important

aspects: financial stability, high employment, modern factory systems. The United States has been willing to serve Germany so well because it needed Germany's strength in its show of force throughout the Cold War. West Germany has been willing to serve the United States so well because it welcomed the opportunity to rebuild its forces — an opportunity denied it if it had not been an ally in the Cold War.

Now, however, the United States has reached the point of diminishing returns, and while West Germany grows stronger and more insistent in its demands on the United States — for reasons of its own — the United States begins to feel the drain on its resources more and more.

Clearly, the time has come when the United States must take the advantage if tension areas between the two Germanys and the risks and burdens of further arms build-ups and subsidies to West Germany are to be eliminated. Conservative West German leaders will always oppose steps by the United States or the Soviet Union to reduce tension in Germany; that would mean the end of any further build-up of their military and political powers by the United States.

However, "From the point of view of the United States, it is clearly in our interest to welcome negotiation on Berlin, on Germany, or indeed, on any and all European problems in which we are involved. In the absence of a more stable situation at Berlin, and, hence, in Europe the prospects at best can only be for a continued drain on our resources for many years without clear indication of when or how this drain will eventually be ended. The drain has already begun to hurt in an international financial sense and it will hurt more if it continues." (Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by Senator Mike Mansfield)

The United States must begin to negotiate now for the sake of its own financial, economic and psychological survival. The Cold War has become as expensive and as dangerous as a hot war, and has kept the East and West in a state of debilitating fear for almost 20 years.

### **Some imperatives that need to be considered**

1. *No nuclear weapons for West Germany under any scheme, for any reason.* With the United States and the Soviet Union just beginning to seriously negotiate on ways toward mutual disarmament, it is senseless and unrealistic to arm Germany further. Control of Germany's own nuclear weapons development is guaranteed by still existing prohibitions. Surely, concerted efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union would be successful in continuing the enforcement of the prohibition. West and East Germany are also signers of the Test Ban Treaty; they have no dependent areas in Africa or the Pacific to conduct official tests.

2. *A treaty or agreement must be negotiated between the two Germanys and the Allies.* Such an agreement would have to guarantee United States access rights to West Berlin through East Germany, thus eliminating immediately the first tension-making area in Germany and making impossible any further macabre confrontations at Checkpoint Charlie.

East Germany, as one of the parties to the agreement, will not gain diplomatic recognition necessarily, but can gain *de facto* recognition (which is simply recognizing that it exists). *De facto* recognition would guarantee the Oder-Neisse border and thus eliminate the second tension-making area by putting an end to demands from West Germany that the United States must support her in her quest for return of lands beyond the Oder-Neisse.

3. *Reunification* of the two Germanys is the third tension-making area. The United States and the Soviet Union are at an impasse on reunification, because the Soviet Union will agree to it only if West Germany leaves NATO, and the United States will agree to reunification only if West Germany stays in.

However, the two Germanys could, conceivably, safely work out reunification plans between themselves at a later time in a less explosive atmosphere. Many liberal Germans have already seen the necessity of achieving the first two goals listed.



**"Let us continue. . ."**

President Johnson has stated that the United States is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, others in the United States government consider giving nuclear weapons control to West Germany in NATO. With this possibility in the offing, it is no longer safe to simply stand firm in Berlin while no full effort is being made to reach a settlement.

We question the right of German or American or Soviet officials to threaten nuclear confrontation in Germany, to risk the destruction of the world, over their narrow national interests and rigid policies in Europe. We therefore insist on the grounds of urgency, reason, and decency that our government continue to withhold nuclear weapons from Germany, and that the United States and the Soviet Union begin immediately to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the German problem. ❁

# appendix

## proposed solutions to Berlin and divided Germany

There is no shortage of nor lack of variety in plans put forth to solve the problems of Germany. They range from dealing with solutions for Berlin alone, to proposals for the denuclearization of the whole area of Central Europe. The West has presented plans usually as a body representing the United States, Britain, and France. The East has presented frequent and separate plans from the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany. The significant official plans are given below. For complete transactions, please refer to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations book, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961*. President Kennedy had asked United States citizens and citizens' groups for ideas on solving the German problem. Many of them are summarized here. President Johnson has asked West Germany to develop a plan to solve the German problem. Details of the West German plan are not yet public.

### Official Proposals

**Western Peace Plan,  
Presented at Geneva by the  
Foreign Ministers of France,  
the United Kingdom, and  
the United States,  
May 14, 1959<sup>1</sup>**

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are convinced of the urgent need for a settlement of the German problem. They desire to seek, in such a settlement, progressive solutions which would bring about German reunification and security in Europe. Moreover they believe that progress on each of the problems of general disarmament, European security and a political settlement in Europe affects the degree of progress possible in the solution of each of the other problems.

They accordingly propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an agreement between the Four Governments which would include the measures outlined below relating to a general settlement of the problems at issue. The measures envisaged are closely interrelated and the present proposals are therefore to be regarded as an inseparable whole. They would come into effect progressively at the stages indicated.

#### STAGE I

##### *Reunification*

1. The Four Powers would establish suitable arrangements for consultation among the parties to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to settle any disputes which might arise before the conclusion of a peace settlement with a reunified Germany.
2. With regard to Berlin, the Four Powers would agree that:
  - (a) Berlin is one city and belongs to all of Germany. East and West Berlin should, therefore, be united through free elections held under quadripartite or UN supervision. A freely elected Council would be formed for the whole of Berlin until German

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1959, p. 179.

**Western Peace Plan***continued*

reunification was achieved and as a first step towards it. Thus Berlin would be retained as the future capital of a reunified Germany.

(b) Subject to the supreme authority of the Four Powers (with voting procedures as adopted by the Allied authorities in Vienna), the freely elected Berlin Council would be free to administer the city.

(c) The freedom and integrity of the united city of Berlin and access thereto would be guaranteed by the Four Powers who would continue to be entitled as at present to station troops in Berlin.

(d) The Four Powers would take the necessary steps to carry out during Stages I and II of the "Phased Plan" the measures described in (a) to (c) above.

*Security*

3. In a common declaration, with which other interested states would be invited to associate themselves, they would undertake to:

(a) settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which they may be involved with any other party;

(b) refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) withhold assistance, military or economic, to an aggressor.

4. In order to facilitate further the solution of political problems and the improvement of international relations, the Four Powers would, in an appropriate forum, initiate discussion of possible staged and controlled comprehensive disarmament measures.

5. The Four Powers would arrange discussions to develop procedures for exchanging information in Stage II on military forces in agreed areas of Europe.

**STAGE II***Reunification*

6. Bearing in mind the complex issues involved in reunification, a transitional period would be agreed. The Four Powers would set up a Mixed German Committee.

7. The Mixed Committee would consist of 25 members from the Federal Republic of Germany and 10 members from the so-called "German Democratic Republic". These members would be appointed by the Federal Government and the authorities of the so-called German Democratic Republic respectively.

8. The Mixed Committee would take its decisions by a three quarter majority.

9. The Mixed Committee would be entrusted with the task of formulating proposals:

(a) to coordinate and expand technical contact between the two parts of Germany;

(b) to ensure the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany;

(c) to ensure and guarantee human rights in both parts of Germany;

(d) for a draft law providing for general, free and secret elections under independent supervision.

10. The Mixed Committee would transmit any proposals made by it under subparagraphs (a) to (c) inclusive of paragraph 9 above to the appropriate authorities in both parts of Germany. Such proposals, if no objections are raised with respect of them, should be implemented as appropriate in both parts of Germany.

11. (a) Any agreed proposal for an electoral law in accordance with sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 9 above would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany.

(b) If within one year no such draft law had been formulated by the Committee, the group of members from the Federal Republic on the one hand and the group of members from the so-called German Democratic Republic on the other would each formulate a draft law approved by a majority of its members. These two draft laws would then be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. The electoral area for each draft law would consist of both parts of Germany.



(c) If any proposal for an electoral law obtained a majority of valid votes in each of the two parts of Germany, it would acquire the force of law and be directly applicable for the entire electoral area.

(d) The Four Powers would, at the time of signature of the agreement, expressly authorize the competent German authorities to promulgate any electoral law so approved.

(e) The Four Powers would adopt a statute providing for the supervision of the plebiscite.

12. If all-German elections had not been held on or before the termination of a thirty months' period beginning on the date of the signing of the agreement, the Four Powers would determine the disposition to be made of the Committee.

#### *Security*

13. An exchange of information on military forces in the areas referred to in paragraph 5 above would be undertaken.

14. The Four Powers would restrict or reduce their armed forces to agreed maximum limits, for example, United States 2,500,000; Soviet Union 2,500,000. During this same period, these states would place in storage depots, within their own territories and under the supervision of an international control organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

15. The Four Powers would be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments to become effective in Stage III subject to:

(a) verification of compliance with the provisions of paragraph 14 above;

(b) agreement by other essential states to accept limits on their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits of the armed forces and armaments of the Four Powers;

(c) installation of an inspection and control system to verify compliance with all agreed security measures.

16. Measures of inspection and observation against surprise attack, helped by such technical devices as overlapping radar systems, could be undertaken in such geographical areas throughout the world as may be agreed by the Four Powers and other states concerned.

17. Since in 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the production of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the Four Powers will make such arrangements as might be appropriate to secure similar measures of renunciation in the remainder of Germany and in other European countries to the East.

18. Inspection systems would be worked out for ensuring compliance with the appropriate security measures envisaged in Stage III.

#### STAGE III

#### *Reunification*

19. Not later than two and a half years after the signature of the agreement elections for an all-German Assembly would be held in both parts of Germany under the terms of the electoral law drafted by the Mixed Committee, approved by the Four Powers and adopted by the German people in a plebiscite (in accordance with the provisions in Stage III above).

20. The elections would be supervised by a supervisory commission and supervisory teams throughout all of Germany. The Commission and teams would be composed of either (a) United Nations Personnel and representatives of both parts of Germany, or (b) representatives of the Four Powers and representatives of both parts of Germany.

21. The all-German Assembly would have the task of drafting an all-German constitution. It would exercise such powers as are necessary to establish and secure a liberal, democratic and federative system.

22. As soon as an all-German Government has been formed on the basis of the above-mentioned constitution it would replace the governments of the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic and would have:

(a) full freedom of decision in regard to internal and external affairs, subject to the rights retained by the Four Powers as stipulated in paragraph 23 below;





GROSZ

(b) responsibility for negotiating, as soon as possible after its establishment, an all-German Peace Treaty.

23. Pending the signature of a Peace Treaty with an all-German Government formed on the basis of the all-German constitution, the Four Powers would retain only those of their rights and responsibilities which relate to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including reunification and a peace settlement and, as now exercised, to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security.

#### *Security*

24. Implementation of the following security provisions would be dependent upon the establishment of effective control and inspection systems to assure verification and upon the agreement, where appropriate, of the all-German Government to the security measures called for in Stage III.

25. Upon the establishment of an all-German Government, the Four Powers and such other countries as are directly concerned would agree that in a zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on either side of a line to be mutually determined, agreed ceilings for the indigenous and non-indigenous forces would be put into effect.

26. After conclusion of the Peace Treaty, no party would station forces in any country in this area without the consent of the country involved. Upon the request of the country involved, any party so stationing forces would withdraw them within a stated period and would undertake the obligation not to send forces to that country again without the consent of the government of that country.

27. Should the all-German Government decide to adhere to any security pact:

(a) there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations in the area which lies closest to the frontiers between a reunited Germany and countries which are members of another security pact;

(b) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements in additional mutual obligations, covering especially the obligation to react against aggressions;

(c) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements herein described in giving an assurance that they would not advance their forces beyond the former line of demarcation between the two parts of Germany.

28. Providing that the limitations and conditions set forth on armed forces and armaments in Stage II are met, the Four Powers would further limit their armed forces together with corresponding reduction on armaments to agreed maximum levels, for example U.S. 2,100,000; and U.S.S.R. 2,100,000. Reductions in the armed forces and armaments of other essential states to agreed levels would take place at the same time in accordance with paragraph 15 of Stage II.

29. After verified compliance with the above limitations, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations would be undertaken on further limitations (for example, U.S. 1,700,000; and U.S.S.R. 1,700,000) together with corresponding reductions on armaments. The levels of armed forces and armaments of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiations with them.

30. The measures provided for above would be harmonized with general disarmament plans so as to be included in a general framework.

31. All of the security measures of the "Phased Plan" would continue in force as long as the control system is operative and effective and the security provisions are being fulfilled and observed.

#### STAGE IV

Since a final Peace Settlement can only be concluded with a Government representing all Germany, it should be concluded at this stage. The Settlement should be open to signature by all states members of the U.N. which were at war with Germany. The Settlement should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by Germany.

## The United Kingdom Plan on Observation Posts, March 1964,

is a general plan proposing observation posts to be manned by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on an "adversary" basis at first, with their own communications systems "at appropriate locations" (main railway junctions, road networks, airfields, major ports) in Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union, to give warning of large-scale movements of troops and arms. The plan does not go into specifics as to where and how many observation posts should be established, nor how much personnel should man them. The plan was designed to help prevent war by accident, by miscalculation, or surprise attack.

## Aide-Memoire from the Soviet Union to the United States, June 4, 1961<sup>1</sup>

[Department of State translation]

1. The years-long delay in arriving at a peace settlement with Germany has largely predetermined the dangerous course of events in Europe in the post-war period. The major decisions of the Allies on the eradication of militarism in Germany, which once were considered by the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. as the guarantee of stable peace, have been implemented only partially and now are actually not being observed in the greater part of German territory. Of the Governments of the two German States that were formed after the war, it is only the Government of the German Democratic Republic that recognizes and adheres to those agreements. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany openly proclaims its negative attitude to those agreements, cultivates subterranean militarism and advocates the review of the German frontiers and the results of the Second World War. It tries to establish a powerful military base for its aggressive plans, to kindle a dangerous hotbed of conflicts on German soil, and to set the former Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition against each other.

The Western Powers have allowed the Federal Republic of Germany to start accumulating armaments and setting up an army, which are clearly in excess of defense needs. The NATO Powers took new, dangerous steps when they gave the Federal Republic of Germany permission to build warships of up to 6 thousand tons displacement and also to use the territory of the United Kingdom, France and Italy for military bases of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The Soviet Government is earnestly striving towards removing the sources of tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and to proceed to constructive, friendly cooperation. The conclusion of a German peace treaty would allow the two countries to come much closer to the attainment of this goal. The U.S.S.R. and the United States fought together against Hitlerite Germany. Their common duty is to conclude a German peace treaty and thereby create a reliable guarantee that German soil will never again give birth to forces that could plunge the world into a new and even more devastating war. If the desire of the Soviet Union to consolidate peace and to prevent the unleashing of a new world war in Europe does not run counter to the intentions of the United States Government, then it will not be difficult to reach agreement.

3. Proceeding from a realistic evaluation of the situation, the Soviet Government stands for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The question of a peace treaty is one that concerns the national security of the U.S.S.R. and of many other States. The time has already passed for allowing the situation in Germany to remain unchanged. All the conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty matured a long time ago and this treaty must be concluded. The point is who will conclude it and when, and whether this will entail unnecessary costs.

4. The Soviet Government is not pursuing the goal of harming the interests of the United States or other Western Powers in Europe. It does not propose to change anything either in Germany or in West Berlin in favor of any one State or group of States. The U.S.S.R. deems it necessary in the interests of consolidating peace formally to recognize the situation which has developed in Europe after the war, to legalize and to consolidate the inviolability of the existing German borders, to normalize the situation in West Berlin on the basis of reasonable consideration for the interests of all the parties concerned.

In the interests of achieving agreement on a peace treaty the Soviet Union does not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO. Both German States could for a

certain period, even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, remain in the military alliances to which they now belong.

The Soviet proposal does not tie the conclusion of a peace treaty to the recognition of the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany by all the parties to this treaty. It is up to each Government to decide whether or not to recognize this or that State.

If the United States is not prepared to sign a joint peace treaty with the two German States, a peaceful settlement could be achieved on the basis of two treaties. In that case the States that participated in the anti-Hitlerite coalition would sign a peace treaty with two German States or with one German State, at their own discretion. These treaties need not be completely identical in wording but they must contain the same kind of provisions on the most important points of a peaceful settlement.

5. The conclusion of a German peace treaty would also solve the problem of normalizing the situation in West Berlin. Deprived of a stable international status, West Berlin at present is a place where the Bonn revanchist circles continually maintain extreme tension and organize all kinds of provocations very dangerous to the cause of peace. We are duty-bound to prevent a development where intensification of West German militarism could lead to irreparable consequences due to the unsettled situation in West Berlin.

At present, the Soviet Government does not see a better way to solve the West Berlin problem than by transforming it into a demilitarized free city. The implementation of the proposal to turn West Berlin into a free city, with the interests of all parties duly taken into consideration, would normalize the situation in West Berlin. The occupation regime now being maintained has already outlived itself and has lost all connection with the purposes for which it was established, as well as with the Allied agreements concerning Germany that established the basis for its existence. The occupation rights will naturally be terminated upon the conclusion of a German peace treaty, whether it is signed with both German States or only with the German Democratic Republic, within whose territory West Berlin is located.

The position of the Soviet Government is that the free city of West Berlin should have unobstructed contacts with the outside world and that its internal regulations should be determined by the freely expressed will of its population. The United States as well as other countries would naturally have every possibility to maintain and develop their relations with the free city. In short, West Berlin, as the Soviet Government sees it, should be strictly neutral. Of course, the use of Berlin as a base for provocative activities, hostile to the U.S.S.R., the G.D.R. or any other State, cannot be permitted in the future, nor can Berlin be allowed to remain a dangerous hotbed of tension and international conflicts.

The U.S.S.R. proposes that the most reliable guarantees be established against interference in the affairs of the free city on the part of any State. Troop contingents of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. could be stationed in West Berlin as guarantors of the free city. The U.S.S.R. would have no objections, either, to the stationing in West Berlin, for the same purpose, of military contingents from neutral States under the aegis of the U.N. The status of free city could be duly registered by the United Nations and consolidated by the authority of that international organization. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss any other measures that would guarantee the freedom and independence of West Berlin as a free demilitarized city.

All this considered, the settlement of the West Berlin problem should naturally take into account the necessity of respecting and strictly observing the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic, which, as is well known, has declared its readiness to adhere to such an agreement and respect it.

6. The Soviet Government proposes that a peace conference be called immediately, without delay, that a German peace treaty be concluded, and that the problem of West Berlin as a free city be solved in this way. If for any motives the Governments of the United States or other Western Powers are not ready for this at the present time, an interim decision could be adopted for a specified period of time.

The Four Powers would appeal to the German States to come to an agreement in any form acceptable to them on problems relating to a peace settlement with Germany and its reunification. The Four Powers would declare in advance that they would recognize any agreement achieved by the Germans.

In the event of a favorable outcome of the negotiations between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. a single German peace treaty would be agreed upon and signed. If the two German States fail to reach agreement on the above-mentioned issues, steps would be taken to conclude a peace treaty with the two German States or with one of them, at the discretion of the States concerned.

To avoid delaying a peace settlement it is essential to fix a time limit within which the Germans should seek possible ways for agreements on problems within their internal competence. The Soviet Government considers that not more than 6 months are needed for such negotiations. This period is quite sufficient for the G.D.R. and F.R.G. to establish contacts and to negotiate, since an understanding of the necessity of putting an end to the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe has matured during the sixteen post-war years.

7. The Soviet Government is prepared to consider any constructive proposals of the United States Government on a German peace treaty and on normalizing the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet Government will show a maximum of good will in order that the question of a German peace treaty may be settled by mutual agreement between the U.S.S.R., the United States, and other States concerned. The

<sup>1</sup> Handed to President Kennedy by Premier Khrushchev during their meeting at Vienna; text from Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1961, p. 231.

signing of a German peace treaty by all the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the settlement of the question of a neutral status for West Berlin on this basis would create better conditions for trust among States and for the solution of such important international problems as disarmament and others. But, if the United States does not show that it realizes the necessity of concluding a peace treaty, we shall deplore it because we shall be obliged to sign a peace treaty, which it would be impossible and dangerous to delay, not with all the States but only with those that wish to sign it.

The peace treaty would specifically define the status of West Berlin as a free city and the Soviet Union, just as the other parties to the treaty, would of course observe it strictly: measures would also be taken to ensure that this status be respected by other countries as well. At the same time, this would mean putting an end to the occupation regime in West Berlin with all its implications. In particular, questions of using the means of communication by land, water or air within the territory of the G.D.R. would have to be settled solely by appropriate agreements with the G.D.R. That is but natural, since control over such means of communication is an inalienable right of every sovereign State.

8. The conclusion of a German treaty would be an important step towards the final post-war settlement in Europe for which the Soviet Union is persistently striving.

### **"German Peace Plan" Submitted in the People's Chamber of the East German Regime, July 6, 1961<sup>1</sup>**

The GDR People's Chamber endorses the statement by the chairman of the State Council on the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states and the solution of the West Berlin question. The GDR People's Chamber declares, in the awareness of its national responsibility:

In order to ward off the serious danger of atomic war from Germany and the world, and for safeguarding a peaceful future for the German people, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has become an urgent necessity. Sixteen years after the termination of World War II, the removal of all of its remnants has become a command of national self-preservation to the German people. The GDR People's Chamber therefore declares the conclusion of a uniform peace treaty with both German states to be the supreme task of the German nation.

Should the conclusion of such a peace treaty fail due to the opposition of the Western powers and West Germany, the GDR will conclude the peace treaty with all those states of the anti-Hitler coalition that are prepared to do so at the peace conference.

The GDR People's Chamber welcomes the proposals for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and for a settlement of the West Berlin problem submitted by the Premier of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, to U.S. President Kennedy, at their Vienna meeting. The GDR People's Chamber sees a historic opportunity for the German nation in the Soviet memorandum, according to which the four powers will declare from the very outset that they will recognize any agreement reached by the two German states jointly on those questions that affect a peace settlement with Germany and German reunification.

In this hour, the Germans are called upon to act themselves in their own interests for a peace treaty and reunification. In fulfillment of its national duty, the People's Chamber approves the German peace plan, which it submits to the Government and the Bundestag of West Germany and to the German people in both German states.

#### *Establishment of a German peace commission:*

The governments of the two German governments will immediately agree to establish a German peace commission to be composed of representatives of parliament and the governments of the GDR and the German Federal Republic. It is the most urgent task of the German peace commission to conduct negotiations and to reach agreement on the working out of German proposals for a peace treaty, on a concord of good will aimed at an immediate improvement of relations between the two German states.

#### *Concord of good will:*

The concord of good will, to be prepared by the German peace commission and to be recommended to the two German governments and parliaments for conclusion, may have the following contents:

1—That both German states agree on a renunciation of the nuclear armament of their armed forces and on an immediate end to armament;

<sup>1</sup> Translation from text read by August Baeb, as broadcast by East Berlin domestic television, July 6, 1961. Walter Ulbricht discussed this plan the same day in a lengthy speech broadcast by East Berlin domestic radio service.

<sup>2</sup> The East German Deutschlandsender broadcast at 9 p.m. GMT July 6 substituted "pending" for "through."

2—That both German states agree through<sup>2</sup> the conclusion of a disarmament agreement on the strength, equipment, and stationing of their armed forces;

3—That both German states agree to prohibit war or revanchist propaganda on their territory;

4—That both German states consider a decision in regard to the social order an act of self-determination of the population of the GDR and of the German Federal Republic. They shoulder the commitment to abstain from interference on questions concerning the social order of the other German state;

5—That both German states advocate the conclusion of an agreement of nonaggression between the states of the Warsaw Pact and the states of NATO as well as the establishment of a denuclearized zone in central Europe;

6—That both German states commit themselves to undertake measures serving the expansion of trade between them. They agree on a widening of cultural and sports relations among their citizens and institution, and in taking steps for alleviating and improving travel between them.

In the peace commission, the principle is to be sure that neither side exerts its will upon the other, but rather that a step-by-step understanding is reached. This also means primarily the working out of proposals for a German peace treaty which must be aimed at facilitating the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty and in clearing the road for a peaceful solution of the German question.

#### *German proposals for a peace treaty:*

It is the most important task of a German peace treaty to make an essential contribution to the safeguarding of lasting peace on the basis of the U.N. Charter. The peace treaty must prevent another war from ever again starting from Germany. It must forever secure peace and full equality for the German nation in the family of nations.

Therefore, German proposals for a peace treaty should encompass the following:

1—The two German states will commit themselves to renouncing in international relations any threat of force or the application of force; to solve international conflicts only through peaceful means and to cooperate actively in the shaping of peaceful coexistence among the nations and states.

2—The two German states will advocate the creation of a militarily neutral Germany. The main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition will assume the guarantee for the inviolability of this neutrality. The strength, arming, and stationing of the armed forces of the two German states required for defense will be defined. They will renounce equipping their armed forces with nuclear weapons and support general and total disarmament.

3—The two German states and the other partners to the peace treaty will confirm the existing German borders; the inviolability of the sovereign territory of the two German states will be guaranteed.

4—Any kind of war and revanchist propaganda is prohibited. All Nazi, revanchist, militarist organizations and groups are prohibited. Persons having committed crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes may not hold leading positions in public life.

5—The partners to the peace treaty fully recognize the sovereignty and independence of the German nation, including the right, at its own discretion and without alien interference, to take the road to German reunification as a peace-loving state.

6—The partners to the peace treaty will support the German people's claim to equal participation in the United Nations and other organizations. Until German reunification, they will support the admission of both German states to the United Nations.

7—To both German states, full freedom in the development of their peace economy, in maritime navigation, and their access to the world markets will be guaranteed.

#### *Settlement of the West Berlin question:*

On the basis of the peace treaty, the West Berlin question, too, will be settled. The peace treaty stipulates that West Berlin will receive the status of a neutral free city until German reunification. From the demilitarized Free City of West Berlin, no espionage, diversionist or subversive activity of any kind may proceed, nor hostile propaganda against other states. Any form of war agitation or activity on the part of militarist or fascist organizations will be prohibited.


To the residents of West Berlin, the inviolability of the status of the neutral free city and the decision on its internal and external affairs will be guaranteed. The communications of the neutral free city will be guaranteed on the basis of corresponding agreements with the GDR.

#### *German confederation:*

The peace treaty safeguards peace and clears the road to German reunification which, in view of the existence of two German states with differing social orders, can be accomplished only via the establishment of a confederation.

The aim of such a confederation is cooperation between the two German states on the basis of peaceful coexistence in order to prevent a further allocation within the German nation and to create the prerequisites for its reunification as a peace-loving, democratic and neutral state.

## The Rapacki Plan of the Polish People's Republic



"Pretty soon there'll be enough of us for a volleyball game!"

The bodies of the German confederation will deliberate and decide on recommendations to the two German governments for safeguarding security in Europe, for a rapprochement between the two German states, and their peaceful unification. They recommend, among others, measures pertaining to the following questions:

- 1—Implementation of the provisions of the peace treaty in the whole of Germany.
- 2—Step-by-step rescission of the commitments resulting from the membership of both German states in military groupings, severing of relations with these military alliances, withdrawal of foreign troops, and dissolution of their bases.
- 3—Agreement on the military neutrality of both German states as a basis for the coming militarily neutral, reunified Germany.
- 4—Completion of general and total disarmament in both German states as a German contribution to world disarmament.
- 5—Shaping of the foreign relations of both German states in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter. Membership of the two German nations or the confederation in international organizations and conventions. Understanding on all questions resulting from the membership of the two German states in international economic associations.
- 6—Granting of assistance to economically underdeveloped countries, combined with the repudiation of any form of colonialism.
- 7—Development of relations between the two German states in the field of economy, trade, culture, science and technology, and sports. Creation of conditions for unimpeded travel.
- 8—Preparation of a democratic constitution for a reunified Germany in which service to peace will be the foremost duty of any citizen. Preparation and implementation of general, free, and secret democratic elections for an all-German parliament in the whole of Germany.
- 9—Establishment of an all-German government of a peace-loving neutral and democratic German state with Berlin as its capital.

The peace plan of the German people points the way to a peaceful and happy future for Germany. The GDR People's Chamber deems it a command of sincerity to call the attention of the whole German people to the fact that the road to German reunification can be cleared only by overcoming revived revanchism and militarism in West Germany. The safeguarding of the peaceful future of the German nation calls for a further strengthening of the GDR, the safe home of peace and of security in Germany. Every German of good will in the East and the West of our fatherland is charged with the national duty to do everything in his power to make the German peace plan become a reality.

Berlin, 6 July, the People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic, SED faction, LDP faction, CDU faction, NDP faction, GDF faction, FDGB faction, FDJ faction, faction of the Democratic Women's League of Germany, faction of the Association of Cooperatives, faction of the German Cultural League, faction of the Mutual Peasants' Aid.

I. The proposed zones should include the territory of: Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. In this territory nuclear weapons neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.

II. The contents of the obligations arising from the establishment of the denuclearized zone would be based upon the following premises:

1. The states included in this zone would undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their territories installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

2. The four powers (France, United States, Great Britain, and U.S.S.R.) would undertake the following obligations:

(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the territories of states included in this zone neither to maintain nor to install on the territories of these states any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

(B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons—to governments or other organs in this area.

3. The powers which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.

Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear weapons should not be used.

4. Other states, whose forces are stationed on the territory of any state included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or to other organs in this area. Neither will they install equipment or installations designed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment, on the territories of states in the zone nor will they transfer them to governments or other organs in this area.

The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obligations could be the subject of detailed mutual stipulations.

III. In order to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of the obligations contained in Part II, paragraph 1-2 and 4, the states concerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its functioning.

1. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, could also be established.

The details and forms of the implementation of control can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as well as on the basis of proposals submitted by various states in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone.

The system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of broader disarmament agreement.

"The great danger in failing to insist upon a prompt correction of some of the present imbalances in burdens as between ourselves and the Europeans is that we may lose contact with the realities of a changing Europe. We may place too great a reliance on the words of cooperation even as the *substance* [our emphasis] of cooperation eludes us. And we will continue to carry the inequitable burdens until we find ourselves eventually in relationships of increasing irrelevance, until our capacity to exert a constructive influence on events may be imparted. In that direction lie serious international financial difficulties and, perhaps, sudden, popular disaffection and dangerous retreat to the Western Hemisphere." (Senator Mike Mansfield, *Berlin in a Changing World*)

2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the proposed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established. There could participate in it, for example, representatives appointed/not excluding additional personal appointments/by organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or representatives of states, which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also participate in it.

The procedure of the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs can be the subject of further mutual stipulations.

IV. The most simple form of embodying the obligations of states included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. To avoid, however, implications, which some states might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that:

1. These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral declarations, bearing the character of an international obligation deposited with a mutually agreed upon depository state.

2. The obligations of great powers be embodied in the form of a mutual document or unilateral declaration/as mentioned above in paragraph 1/.

3. The obligations of other states, whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declarations/as mentioned above in paragraph 1/.

On the basis of the above proposals the government of the Polish People's Republic suggests to initiate negotiations for the purpose of a further detailed elaboration of the plan for the establishment of the denuclearized zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as well as of the means of implementation of the undertaken obligations.

The government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the states included in the zone.



Mother with Child (1930) Kathe Kollwitz

## "The Gomulka Plan"

### Polish Government Memorandum on Nuclear Armaments,

as made available in English March 5, 1964 by  
the Polish mission to the United Nations.

I. The Polish Government proposes that the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments include in principle the territories of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with the respective territorial waters and airspace.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic sees the possibility of extending that area through the accession of other European states.

II. The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and delivery.

III. Parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the proposed freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

IV. To insure the implementation of those obligations, an appropriate system of supervision and safeguards should be established.

The supervision over the implementation of other obligation not to produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons covered by the freeze would be exercised in plants which are or could be used for such production.

To insure the implementation of other obligations, control would be established to be exercised in accordance with an agreed procedure in proper frontier railway, road, waterway junctions, sea and air ports.

The supervision and control could be exercised by mixed commissions composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of the North Atlantic Treaty on a parity basis. Those commissions could be enlarged to include also representatives of other states. The composition, structure and procedure of the control organs will be the subject of detailed arrangements.

Parties whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the armaments freeze and which have at their disposal nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would exchange at periodical meetings of their representatives all information and reports indispensable for the implementation of the obligations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments.

V. Provisions relating to the implementation of the proposal submitted above should be embodied in appropriate documents.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to enter into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties to reach an agreement on the implementation of these objectives.

The Polish Government will give due attention to all constructive suggestions which would be in accordance with the objectives of the present proposal and would aim at the freezing of armaments in Central Europe.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic expects a favorable attitude to the proposal submitted hereby.

## Independent Proposals

45

### The French proposals,

introduced by Premier Mendes-France in 1959, suggested three parallel zones on both sides of the Iron Curtain; Zone 0) perhaps 30 miles wide, would be totally disarmed and policed by the U.N.; Zone 1) (on both sides of Zone 0) would contain only national forces of those countries, armed with conventional weapons; Zone 2) next to Zones 1 would contain NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, fully armed.

Jules Moch, French delegate to the U.N. Disarmament Commission, privately suggested a modification of the Mendes-France plan to take the form of concentric rings in stages from full disarmament to totally armed forces, centering out from Berlin rather than from the border between the two Germans.

### The British Labour Party

under Hugh Gaitskill in 1958 offered a disengagement plan calling for: 1) a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from the two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; 2) no nuclear weapons would be permitted these countries and conventional forces would be limited; 3) German reunification; 4) a security agreement guaranteeing the frontiers of the neutral zone countries by the Great Powers; 5) German withdrawal from NATO and the other countries from the Warsaw Pact.

### The West German Socialist Party

in 1959 proposed: 1) a disengagement zone to include East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; 2) a limitation of arms and forces in the zone and a balanced withdrawal of foreign troops of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 3) no atomic or hydrogen weapons in the zone; 4) neutral zone nations to give up membership in NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 5) ground and air inspection systems to guarantee withdrawal; 6) security of the zone would be guaranteed by interested nations including the United States and the Soviet Union. The SPD also put forth a 3-part plan for German reunification.

### James P. Warburg

in 1962 proposed that if the Soviet Union could establish a more moderate government in East Germany (Walter Ulbricht cannot be dealt with), the West could put forth the following proposals. 1) *De facto* recognition of East Germany and recognition of the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line; the two Germanys' admittance to the United Nations and that they be given 10 years to reunify. 2) During the 10 year period *all* Berlin could be considered as the potential capital of Germany and be placed under United Nations protectorship; that present troops in Berlin become United Nations troops; that the new non-Stalinist East German government guarantee Western access to West Berlin, and the NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces guarantee that Berlin shall no more be used as a propa-

ganda or espionage center. 3) At reunification, West Germany would leave NATO and East Germany would leave the Warsaw Pact *provided that a reunited Germany would not join any military alliance whatsoever.* 4) If reunification does not come, leaving Berlin in a permanent East Germany, West Berliners who do not want to become citizens of East Germany shall be freely allowed to move to West Germany and be compensated for immovable property, and that publicly owned parts of West Berlin be also compensated for by the East German government.

### Senator Mike Mansfield

in 1961 disagreed with Khrushchev proposals and suggested: 1) creation of the free city of Berlin to include both East and West Berlin, to be guaranteed by international police teams as would be the access rights to Berlin. The free city of Berlin would be held in trust until reunification, and its interim status would be guaranteed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

### Senator Claiborne Pell

proposed in 1964: "The Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn be ceded to West Germany as an unlimited corridor of access to West Berlin. In exchange, recognition by the United States of the Oder-Neisse frontier line and of the East German government." By this exchange the West would gain something they have never had without yielding territory to the East that is not already under the East's control.

### Professor Fred Warner Neal

*West Part of Germany, proposed internationalizing*  
in his book *America In Hiding* in speaking of our reliance the United Nations to West Berlin. "Such a move would go far toward guaranteeing West Berlin's autonomous, internationalized and neutralized status over the long run and at the same time minimize it as a source of tension. If this were actually undertaken the possibility might arise that Berlin could be reunited and all Berlin—East as well as West—be put into the autonomous, internationalized and neutralized category, permanently or until such time as in the future reunification would permit it once again to become the German capital."

### Arthur Waskow *Stanley Newman*

*then?*  
in his new book *America In Hiding* in speaking of our reliance on counterforce strategy to protect Berlin says: "One possible way of protecting Berlin without counterforce weaponry might be to set up a demilitarized strip of land in Central Europe, including some of Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well as parts of East and West Germany. By treating such a zone as an experiment in total inspected disarmament for study by the U.N. Disarmament Commission (rather than as an item in a European political settlement) and by avoiding special discrimination against Germany, we might be able to make such a zone palatable to the West German government. By including Berlin in such a zone and by staffing the whole zone with a UN police force, it should be possible to keep Berlin free and even perhaps to relieve the pressures on a great number of East Germans. Such a development would both advance the prospects of world-wide disarmament and leave the United States free to abandon counterforce strategy in favor of non-military offensives."

# Independent Proposals

## The French proposals,

introduced by Premier Mendes-France in 1959, suggested three parallel zones on both sides of the Iron Curtain; Zone 0) perhaps 30 miles wide, would be totally disarmed and policed by the U.N.; Zone 1) (on both sides of Zone 0) would contain only national forces of those countries, armed with conventional weapons; Zone 2) next to Zones 1 would contain NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, fully armed.

Jules Moch, French delegate to the U.N. Disarmament Commission, privately suggested a modification of the Mendes-France plan to take the form of concentric rings in stages from full disarmament to totally armed forces, centering out from Berlin rather than from the border between the two Germans.

## The British Labour Party

under Hugh Gaitskill in 1958 offered a disengagement plan calling for: 1) a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from the two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; 2) no nuclear weapons would be permitted these countries and conventional forces would be limited; 3) German reunification; 4) a security agreement guaranteeing the frontiers of the neutral zone countries by the Great Powers; 5) German withdrawal from NATO and the other countries from the Warsaw Pact.

## The West German

in 1959 proposed: 1) a limitation of arms and withdrawal of foreign troops; 2) no atomic or hydrogen zone nations to give up the Pact; 5) ground and air drawal; 6) security of threatened nations including the SPD also put forth a 3-part plan for German reunification.

## James P. Warburg

in 1962 proposed that if the Soviet Union could establish a more moderate government in East Germany (Walter Ulbricht cannot be dealt with), the West could put forth the following proposals. 1) De facto recognition of East Germany and recognition of the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line; the two Germanys' admittance to the United Nations and that they be given 10 years to reunify. 2) During the 10 year period all Berlin could be considered as the potential capital of Germany and be placed under United Nations protectorship; that present troops in Berlin become United Nations troops; that the new non-Stalinist East German government guarantee Western access to West Berlin, and the NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces guarantee that Berlin shall no more be used as a propa-

ganda or espionage center. 3) At reunification, West Germany would leave NATO and East Germany would leave the Warsaw Pact provided that a reunited Germany would not join any military alliance whatsoever. 4) If reunification does not come, leaving Berlin in a permanent East Germany, West Berliners who do not want to become citizens of East Germany shall be freely allowed to move to West Germany and be compensated for immovable property, and that publicly owned parts of West Berlin be also compensated for by the East German government.

## Senator Mike Mansfield

in 1961 disagreed with Khrushchev proposals and suggested: 1) creation of the free city of Berlin to include both East and West Berlin, to be guaranteed by international police teams as would be the access rights to Berlin. The free city of Berlin would be held in trust until reunification, and its interim status would be guaranteed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

## Senator Claiborne Pell

proposed in 1964: "The Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn be ceded to West Germany as an unlimited corridor of access to West Berlin. In exchange, recognition by the United States of the Oder-Neisse frontier line and of the East German government." By this exchange the West would gain something they have never had without yielding territory to the East that is not already under the East's control.

## Professor Fred Warner Neal

in his book *America In Hiding* in speaking of our reliance the United Nations to West Berlin "Such a move would go

ERRATUM: Pg. 45 after Fred Warner Neal, substitute the following first line: in his book War and Peace and Germany, he proposes transferring the United Nations to West Berlin.

ERRATUM: Pg. 45, after Arthur Waskow add, Stanley Newman.

in his new book *America In Hiding* in speaking of our reliance on counterforce strategy to protect Berlin says: "One possible way of protecting Berlin without counterforce weaponry might be to set up a demilitarized strip of land in Central Europe, including some of Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well as parts of East and West Germany. By treating such a zone as an experiment in total inspected disarmament for study by the U.N. Disarmament Commission (rather than as an item in a European political settlement) and by avoiding special discrimination against Germany, we might be able to make such a zone palatable to the West German government. By including Berlin in such a zone and by staffing the whole zone with a UN police force, it should be possible to keep Berlin free and even perhaps to relieve the pressures on a great number of East Germans. Such a development would both advance the prospects of world-wide disarmament and leave the United States free to abandon counterforce strategy in favor of non-military offensives."



**Professor Quincy Wright,**


from the University of Virginia, a legal authority, in the *American Journal of International Law* (Vol. 55) states: "Perhaps a return to the Potsdam Agreement providing for a disarmed and neutralized Germany should be considered. This solution, however, would mean the permanent withdrawal of West Germany from NATO, inspected disarmament for the whole of Germany, and acceptance by the West of the Oder-Neisse line and the de-facto governments of both Germans."

**William Randolph Hearst, Jr.**

proposed a reunified, unarmed Germany; NATO and Warsaw Pact troops, withdrawal to Germany's borders, with German citizens allowed free choice as to which force they would join for military service. Berlin could become headquarters for the United Nations, and Germany could pay for the maintenance of the United Nations police force, since, being unarmed, she would not have the burden of maintaining her own forces.

Harold Wilson, July 3, 1963 reports an interview with Premier Khrushchev

"I have expressed in strong terms my view that any proposal to arm the Germans with nuclear weapons would mean the end of any hope of easing the East-West tension. That has been my opinion. But my words, strong though they may have seemed to me, pale into insignificance when compared with the vehemence with which Mr. Khrushchev expressed the same thought when we were in Moscow. I am in no doubt at all that this really would mean the end of any policy of constructive coexistence. It would be as much a turning point in history, and as much a fateful milestone on the road to a third world war, as Hitler's march into the Rhineland was toward the last war . . ."

**Organization Proposals****The Women's International League for Peace & Freedom**

proposes that the West and East negotiate access rights for the West to an unaligned West Berlin, the route to be guaranteed by the United Nations with the United Nations also administering forces in West Berlin; recognition of East Germany as a party to the agreement on the status of West Berlin; explicit recognition of the Oder-Neisse line; eventual reunification to be worked out by the two Germans within a framework of neutralization; acceptance of the Rapacki Plan for denuclearization as a possible first step toward reunification.

**SANE**

proposes a Berlin Authority in an arms-free Germany to administer a neutral Berlin guaranteed by the United Nations, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact forces. A proposed German Authority would create an arms-free Germany by prohibiting nuclear weapons for East and West Germany; effecting the withdrawal of all forces from Germany and their replacement by United Nations troops; permanently establishing the Oder-Neisse frontier.

**The Friends Committee on National Legislation**

suggests that instead of the United States depending on defense buildups, they should offer to discuss with the Soviet Union the following: 1) recognition of East Germany in exchange for access to and independence of West Berlin; 2) placing Berlin under international control until a solution can be found; 3) a Western pledge not to give nuclear arms to West Germany; 4) guarantees to ensure human rights, free travel, and cooperation between the citizens of the two Germans; 5) permanent establishment of the Oder-Neisse line; 6) demilitarization of both parts of Germany and the inclusion of Germany in an arms-free, nuclear-free zone of Central Europe.

**Sources:**

*Documents on Germany 1944-1961*, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961.

*Disengagement: A Plan for Area Disarmament*, a fact sheet prepared by Jack C. Voelpel for the Committee for World Development and World Disarmament, 345 East 46th St., New York 17, N.Y.

*What to Do About Berlin* by James P. Warburg, Current Affairs Press, 34 East 70th St., New York 21, N.Y.

THE WASHINGTON POST *Monday, April 27, 1964*

### *Talking to Moscow*

If proof were needed that the United States Government cannot afford, in the light of its responsibility to the cause of world peace, to renounce the privilege of private communication with the Soviet government, such proof would now be presented in the alarm and discontent voiced in official circles in Bonn over the fact that modest progress has recently been made in clearing away individual Soviet-American difficulties.

One may sympathize with the reasons why estimable people in the German capital experience such anxieties, but the very fact that they do experience them should make us wary of conceding to them any sort of veto either over our communication with other governments or over specific actions on our part which fall within the normal prerogatives of independent

policy and which, while not detracting significantly from the strength of NATO, could be depended upon to have an effect in reducing tensions.

It is possible that the best road to peace may turn out to lie not in the field of formally-negotiated engagements but precisely in the field of reciprocal unilateral action which could serve to increase mutual confidence and good will. If such possibilities are ever to be developed, someone must have the courage and initiative to explore them and to initiate their exploitation. No one is in a better position to do this than the leaders of our Government.

For a decade and a half we have borne a major burden in maintaining the strength and morale of the western coalition. The Germans and our other allies in Europe have had ample opportunity over these years to satisfy themselves not only of the se-

riousness and sense of responsibility with which we have applied ourselves to this task generally, but also of the understanding and respect American statesmen have shown at all times for the special dangers and requirements of Germany's situation.

One would like to feel that this had entitled us to that minimum of confidence which they will have to accord to us if we are now to move forward constructively.

Germany has no less need than the rest of us for a more secure world order. It would be not only sad but disturbing if her leaders came to take so parochial a view of Germany's own security as to identify it with the maintenance of a state of dangerous tension in world affairs generally.

GEORGE KENNAN.

Princeton, N.J.



The signed treaty for a partial ban on nuclear testing is the first step toward complete and controlled disarmament. The second step should be a complete ban on all nuclear testing and non proliferation of nuclear weapons.

---

This book goes to press on the day of the good news (April 20, 1964) that President Johnson and Premier Khrushchev simultaneously announced substantial reductions in the production of nuclear weapons material; (the United States will cut plutonium production by 20% and uranium production by 40%, the Soviet Union will close down 2 nuclear reactors). President Johnson termed the actions as another step toward the day when men can "live without wars."

---

**W**e hope that each one of you who reads this booklet  
will be encouraged to write to the President, to your  
Congressman, and to other people of influence to let  
them know why you believe it is of the most urgent  
importance that there be a peaceful settlement of the  
German problem now — before it is too late.

---

**THIS BOOKLET  
AND THE  
WOMEN  
strike for  
PEACE**



**CAMPAIGN FOR  
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT  
HAVE WON  
WORLD-WIDE SUPPORT.**

**AMONG STATEMENTS  
WHICH HAVE BEEN  
RECEIVED ARE:**

Let me say that I think you are to be congratulated on having the idea of doing a study on the German problem. It is, as you state, the focal point of the Cold War. Both the problem and the inadequacy of our policy need to be dramatized, and I do think the Women's Strike for Peace is a proper organization to undertake the task.

**FRED WARNER NEAL**, Professor of International Relations and Government, Claremont Graduate School

"A brief message of solidarity to the American women in their fight for peace. I cannot, to my great regret, participate in the rally or the demonstration at the Hague. But I wish to assure the women of the 'Strike for Peace' of my solidarity. As a French woman, I disapprove of the deterrent policy pursued by the French government and I belong to a movement which is opposed to it. I align myself with all the women who are campaigning against the American project of establishing a multilateral force within NATO. Together with them, I call for the ending of nuclear tests, general and controlled disarmament and a plan for a peace-time economy. I hope that the government's will listen to their voice which is that of reason. Let humanity at last establish peace and consecrate itself to the tasks from which it has been tragically deflected by the preoccupations of war preparations."

**SIMONE de BEAUVOIR**, internationally known author

Outstanding scientists, religious leaders, educators and statesmen from many countries, including a number of Nobel Award winners support the meeting of NATO women. Signers of the petition appealing "To the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to protect our children's future by taking immediate steps to halt the spread of nuclear weapons" include:

**SIR JULIAN HUXLEY**—British—biologist and writer

**NORMAN THOMAS**—American—Socialist Party leader

**OTTO HAHN**—German—scientist. Nobel prize winner

**MAX BORN**—German—scientist. Nobel prize winner

**C. J. P. REYMANS**—Belgian. Univ. Prof. Nobel prize winner

**SIR C. V. RAMAN**—Indian—physicist. Nobel prize winner

"The Women Strike for Peace campaign deserves the support of all people in all lands."

**L. HOGBEN**, British Guiana

"... The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is the next crucial step (after the test ban treaty) . . . each of you must be a spokesman for a hundred thousand of the next generation who have a right to live but who have no voice yet."

**BENJAMIN SPOCK**

"To hell with ALL arms, excepting those grandly grafted to our human bodies, given to do noble and useful work! These arms are all we need to give glory to God and all honor to man."

**SEAN O'CASEY**

"There is no more dire threat to the prospect of disarmament than the spread of nuclear weapons. In this respect the plan to grant nuclear weapons to NATO members under the heading of "multilateral nuclear force" is designed to destroy the possibility of a serious disarmament agreement. I am pleased to endorse the campaign of the Women's Strike for Peace against this dangerous prospect."

**BERTRAND RUSSELL**