

PART IV

The intelligence service needs a man who speaks Swahili and French, has a degree in chemical engineering, is unmarried and over thirty-five but under five feet eight. You push a button and in less than forty seconds a machine—like those commonly used in personnel work—tells whether such a man is available and, if so, everything else there is to know about him. Similar machines are used in sorting and assembling intelligence data.

But this is no feat compared with the uses of technology in collecting information. The technical nature of so many targets of contemporary intelligence in itself suggests the creation of technical devices with which they can be observed. If a target emits a telltale sound, then a sensitive acoustical device comes to mind for monitoring and observing it. If the target causes shock waves in the earth, then seismographic apparatus will detect it.

Moreover, the need to observe and measure the effects of our own experiments with nuclear weapons and missiles hastened the refinement of equipment which, with some modifications, can also be useful for watching other people's experiments. Radar and accurate long-range photography are basic tools of technical collection. Another is the collection and analysis of air samples in order to determine the presence of radioactivity in the atmosphere. Since radioactive particles are carried by winds over national borders, it is unnecessary to penetrate the opponent's territory by air or land in order to collect such samples.

In 1948 our government instituted round-the-clock monitoring of the atmosphere by aircraft for detecting any experimentation with atomic weapons. The first evidence of a Soviet atomic explosion on the Asiatic mainland was detected in September of 1949, to the surprise of the world and of many scientists who until then had believed, on the basis of available evidence, that the Soviets would not "have the bomb" for years to come. Refinements in instrumentation now reveal to us not only the fact that atomic explosions have taken place but also the power and type of the device or weapon detonated.

Some targets, of course, are static and do not betray their location and nature by any activity such as bomb detonations or missile launchings, which can be traced from afar through the upper atmosphere. To observe construction of missile sites and other strategic installations one must

get directly over them at very high altitudes, armed with long-range cameras. This requirement led to the development of the U-2, which could collect information with more speed, accuracy, and dependability than could any agent on the ground. Eloquent testimony to the value of scientific intelligence collection, which has proved its worth a hundred times over, has been given by Winston Churchill in his history of World War II. He describes British use of radar in the Battle of Britain in September 1940 and also tells of bending, amplifying, and falsifying the direction signals sent by Berlin to guide the attacking German aircraft. Churchill calls it all the "wizard war" and he concludes that "unless British science had proved superior to German and unless its strange, sinister resources had been effectively brought to bear in the struggle for survival, we might well have been defeated, and being defeated, destroyed."

About fifteen years later, the U-2 marked a new high, in more ways than one, in the scientific collection of intelligence. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense at the time of the U-2 incident, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 2, 1960, that these flights furnished vital "information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production, and aircraft deployment" in the Soviet Union. These, he said, "were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer, and ours is the major interest."

To come up to more recent days, it was the high-altitude reconnaissance U-2 flights which gave the first hard evidence of the positioning in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles in late October of 1962. If they had not been discovered while work was still in progress and before the bases could be camouflaged, they might have remained for a long period as a deadly secret and an equally deadly threat. In this case reports of agents and refugees from Cuba led to the gathering of proof by aerial reconnaissance.

A technical aid to espionage of another kind is the concealed microphone and transmitter which keep up a flow of live information from inside a target to a nearby listening post; this is known to the public as "tapping telephones" or "bugging" or "miking." "Audio-surveillance"—as it is called in intelligence work—requires excellent miniaturized electronic equipment,

thing better. Hence, I use the term defector sparingly and then with apology.

If the man who comes over to us belonged to the Soviet hierarchy, he knows the strengths and weaknesses of the regime, its factions, its inefficiencies, and its corruption. As a specialist, he knows its achievements in his chosen field. Defectors are soldiers, diplomats, scientists, engineers, ballet dancers, athletes, and, not infrequently, intelligence officers. Behind the Iron Curtain there are many dissatisfied persons unknown to us who seriously consider flight. Many of them hesitate to take the final step, not because they have qualms about forsaking a detested way of life, but because they are afraid of the unknowns that await them.

The answer is to make it clear that they are welcome and will be safe and happy with us. Every time a newly arrived political refugee goes on the air over the Voice of America and says he is glad to be here and is being treated well, countless officials behind the Iron Curtain who were thinking of doing the same thing will take heart and go back to figuring out just how they can get themselves appointed as trade representatives in Oslo or Paris. Short-term visitors to the West from the Soviet Bloc would probably defect in far greater numbers were it not for the Soviet practice of keeping wives and children behind as hostages.

Some have gone from our side over to theirs. Their fate would not serve as a particularly good advertisement for further defections in that direction. Some of them recently have talked to Western visitors and have admitted, without prompting, that their lot is an unhappy one and that they have no future. The scientific defectors, like the atomic physicist Pontecorvo, who continue to be useful to the Soviets in their technological efforts, seem to fare better than the others. The Burgesses and Macleans, the Martins and Mitchells, have had their day of publicity and now eke out a dull living sometimes as "propaganda advisors." Some of them still hope one day to be able to return to the West.

Some defectors from the Communist side are not exactly what they seem. They have been working "in place" as agents for long periods of time before they defect and only come out because they or we feel that the dangers of remaining inside have become too great. Some who come over from the Soviet Bloc have never been "surfaced" and for their own protection must remain unknown to the public.

People who volunteer "in place" have many ways of doing so, even though the isolation, the



ERICH LESSING-MAGNUM

Budapest 1956. After the revolt, the West reaped an intelligence harvest from refugees.

physical barriers, and the internal controls of the Soviet Bloc are all supposed to prevent this kind of thing from happening. It is possible, also, to communicate safely with the West in a number of ways, surprisingly enough, even by mail, as long as the address of the recipient looks harmless and the identity of the sender within the Bloc remains concealed. Soviet Bloc censorship cannot possibly inspect every piece of mail passing to and fro over their borders since the volume is too great. Even if a letter is censored or intercepted, it need give no clue whatever to the sender if proper security precautions are followed. Various radio stations in Western Europe that broadcast to the Soviet Bloc solicit comments and fan mail from listeners and usually supply a postbox to which such mail can be sent. They receive letters by the thousands from behind the Iron Curtain. If a volunteer who has mailed out information succeeds later in reaching the West, he then of course has his credentials on file there.

People—whether "agents," "sources," "informants," or "volunteers"—are not the only tools of clandestine intelligence collection. It may also use machines because there are machines today that can do things human beings cannot do and can "see" things they cannot see.

the years has proved that this system really works. There was not a single instance during my service as Director when I failed to reach the President in a matter of minutes with any intelligence I felt was of immediate importance.

The CIA has also set up a Board of National Estimates within the Agency, on which sits a group of experts in intelligence analysis, both civilian and military. The board prepares initial drafts of most estimates, which are then coordinated with USIB representatives. To deal with highly technical subjects, such as Soviet missiles, aircraft, or nuclear programs, competent technical subcommittees of USIB have been established. And, in certain cases, experts outside of government may be consulted.

Obviously, the procedure of preparing and coordinating an initial draft, passing it on to the USIB, formulating the final report along with any dissenting opinions, and submitting it is time-consuming. There are times when "crash" estimates are needed. One of these occasions was the Suez crisis of November 1956. I had left Washington to go to my voting place in New York State when I received early on election eve a telephone message from General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of the CIA. He read to me a Soviet note that had just come over the wires. Bulganin was threatening London and Paris with missile attacks unless the British and French forces withdrew from Egypt. I asked General Cabell to call a meeting of the intelligence community, and immediately flew back to Washington. The USIB met throughout the night, and early on election morning I took to President Eisenhower our agreed estimate of Soviet intentions and probable courses of action in this crisis.

The contents of this and other estimates are generally kept secret. However, the fact that this mechanism exists and can operate quickly should be a matter of public knowledge. It is an important cog in our national security machinery.

When, on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the secret Soviet buildup of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, the intelligence community had already been receiving reports from agents and refugees indicating mysterious construction of some sort of missile bases in Cuba. It was a well-known fact that for some time past, Castro—or the Soviets purporting to be acting for Castro—had been installing a whole series of bases for ground-to-air missiles. These, however, were of short range and their major purpose apparently was to deal with possible intruding aircraft. Since the reports received

—Where, When, What Kind—

The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.

—*President Truman's Memoirs*

came largely from persons who had little technical knowledge of missile development, they did not permit a firm conclusion to be drawn as to whether all the missiles on which they were reporting were of the short-range type or whether something more sinister was involved.

The evidence that had been accumulated was sufficient, however, to alert the intelligence community to the need for a more scientific and precise analysis. Reconnaissance flights were resumed and the concrete evidence was obtained on which the President based his report to the nation and his action. This required, of course, not only the most careful intelligence analysis but immediate intelligence judgments. As the President stated, the air reconnaissance established beyond a doubt that more than anti-aircraft installations were being constructed on Cuban soil. This was a case, incidentally, in which it was obviously necessary to give publicity to intelligence conclusions. Khrushchev's subsequent statements and actions testified to their accuracy.

Most of the estimating can be done on a more ordered basis than in such situations, although today there is a sense of urgency in the whole field of intelligence.

Few fields have proved more difficult of analysis than that of certain Soviet weapons systems. In 1954, for example, there was evidence that the Soviet Union was producing long-range intercontinental heavy bombers comparable to our B-52s. At first, every indication, including the 1955 fly-by I have described, pointed to the conclusion that the Russians were adopting this weapon as a major element of their offensive strength and planned to produce heavy bombers as fast as their economy and technology permitted. Certain estimates of the buildup of this bomber force over the next few years were called for by the Defense Department and were supplied by the intelligence community. These were based on knowledge of the Soviet aircraft-manufacturing

industry and the types of aircraft under construction, and included projections concerning the future rate of buildup on the basis of existing production rates and expected expansion of industrial capacity. There was hard evidence of Soviet capability to produce bombers at a certain rate if they so desired. At the time of the estimate, the available evidence indicated that they did so desire, and intended to translate this capability into an actual program. All this led to speculation in this country as to a "bomber gap."

However, production did not rise as rapidly as had seemed likely; evidence accumulated that the performance of the heavy bomber was less than satisfactory. At some point, probably about 1957, the Soviet leaders apparently decided to limit heavy-bomber production drastically. The bomber gap never materialized. Meanwhile evidence of

progress in the Russian intercontinental missile program was beginning to cause concern. The Soviets saw—probably earlier than we did—the significance of the missile as the weapon of the future and the potential psychological impact of space achievements. They had carefully followed the progress made by the Germans with their V-1 and V-2 missiles in World War II and gathered together as much of the German developmental hardware and as many German rocket experts as they could get their hands on while they were conquering Eastern Germany. They also hired a considerable number of German experts in addition to those they seized and forcibly deported.

It is a mistake, however, to credit their missile proficiency today largely to the Germans. The Soviets themselves have a long history in



WIDE WORLD

The Cuba crisis of October 1962 focused nationwide attention on U.S. intelligence, particularly aerial surveillance. These photographs were released in November. Above a U.S. destroyer checks the cargo on a Soviet freighter which (below) pulls away with a missile-like object uncovered.

this field and developed high competence quickly. They never took the Germans fully into their confidence but pumped them dry of knowledge, kept them a few years at the drawing boards and away from the testing areas, and then sent most of them back home. While these people proved to be a useful source of intelligence, they had never been brought into contact with the actual Soviet development and could tell little beyond what they had themselves contributed.

In the first decade after the end of the war we had only a scant knowledge of Soviet missile progress. Drawing boards are silent, and short-range missiles make little commotion. As the techniques of science were put to work and the U-2 photographs became available after 1956, "hard" intelligence began to flow into the hands of the impatient estimators. Their impatience was understandable, for great pressure had been put on them by those in the Department of Defense concerned with our own missile programs and missile defenses.

Thus, early figures of Soviet missile production had to be developed on the basis of estimated production and development capabilities over a period in the future. Once again we had to decide how the Soviet Union would allocate its total military effort. How much of it would go into missiles? How much into developing the nuclear potential? How much into the heavy bomber, as well as the fighter planes and ground-to-air defense to meet hostile bombers? How much into submarines? And, in general, how much into elements of attack and how much into those of defense?

It was due to this measure of incertitude during the late 1950s that the national debate over the so-called missile gap developed. Then, based on certain proven capabilities of the Soviets and on our view of their intentions and overall strategy, estimates were made as to the number of missiles and nuclear warheads which would be available and on launchers several years in the future.

If there was an error, which is always unfortunate in intelligence, in this case it was possibly fortunate that we erred on the side of overestimating the opponent. There is no doubt that tests of Soviet missiles in 1957 and afterward showed a high competence in the ICBM field. Soviet shots of seven to eight thousand miles into the far Pacific were well advertised, as, of course, was the orbiting of the first Sputnik. Their testing in the intermediate fields must also have been gratifying to them. But would they use their bulky and somewhat awkward "first

generation" ICBM—effective though it was—as the missile to deploy, or would they wait for a second or third generation? Were they in such a hurry to capitalize on a moment of possible missile superiority that they would sacrifice this to a more orderly program? The answer, in retrospect, seems to be that they chose the more orderly program. As soon as this evidence appeared, the ICBM estimates—as in the case of the bombers—were quickly revised downward.

Today, after the Cuba incident, one may well ask whether their present actions do not indicate some change of attitude toward their missile program. In any event, the intelligence collected on Soviet missiles has been excellent as to the nature and quality of the potential threat. Our intelligence was also both good and timely as to Soviet production of high-thrust engines and the work on Sputnik. And all of this intelligence spurred us to press forward with our own missile and space programs.

Yalu, Suez, the Bay of Pigs

When one turns from the military to the political field, the problems for the estimators are often even more complex. Analysis of human behavior and anticipation of human reactions can never be assigned to a computer, and sometimes they baffle the most clever analyst.

More than a decade ago, in the autumn of 1950, this country had to face in North Korea the difficult decision of whether or not to push forward to the Yalu River and reunite Korea. If we did so, would the Chinese Communists answer with a direct attack? Or would they stay quiescent—if, for example, Korean rather than U.S. and UN troops formed the bulk of the advance, or if we did not disturb the Chinese sources of electric power in North Korea?

At that time, we had good intelligence as to the location and strength of the Chinese Communist forces on the far side of the Yalu. We had to estimate the intentions of Moscow and Peking. We were not in on their secret councils and decisions. In such cases it is arrogant, as well as dangerous, for the intelligence officer to venture a firm opinion in the absence of tell-tale information on the positioning and moving of troops, the bringing up of strategic supplies, and the like. I can speak with detachment about the 1950 Yalu estimates, for these were made just before I joined the CIA. The conclusions of the estimators were that it was a tossup, but they leaned to the side that under certain circum-

stances the Chinese would probably not intervene. In fact, we just did not know what the Chinese Communists would do, and we did not know how far the Soviet Union would press them or agree to support them if they moved.

One cannot assume that a Communist leader will act or react as we would or will always be right in his estimates. For example, normally one would not have estimated that Khrushchev would choose the opening day of the Unaligned Nations Conference at Belgrade in September of 1961 to announce to the world, without forewarning, that he was breaking the gentleman's agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Yet, this is exactly what he did. In Cuba in October of 1962 Khrushchev presumably estimated that he could sneak his missiles into the island, plant them and camouflage them, and then, at a time of his own choosing, face the United States with a *fait accompli*. Certainly here he misestimated—just as some on our side had misestimated that Khrushchev would not attempt to place offensive weapons in Cuba, right under our nose.

Whenever a dramatic event occurs in the foreign-relations field—an event for which the public may not have been prepared—one can usually count on the cry going up, "Intelligence has failed again." The charge may at times be correct. But there are also many occasions when an event has been foreseen and correctly estimated but intelligence has been unable to advertise its success.

This was true of the Suez invasion of 1956. Here, intelligence was well alerted as to what Israel and then Britain and France were likely to do. The public received the impression, however, that there had been an intelligence failure; statements were issued by U.S. officials to the effect that the country had not been given advance warning of the action. Our officials, of course, intended to imply only that the British and French and Israelis had failed to tell us what they were doing. In fact, United States intelligence had kept the government informed but, as usual, did not advertise its achievement.

On other occasions the press and the public have been mistaken about the actual role of intelligence in certain situations. Take, for example, the Bay of Pigs episode in 1961. Much of the American press assumed at the time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and successful popular revolt in Cuba. Those who had worked, as I had, with the anti-Hitler underground behind the Nazi lines in France and Italy and in Germany itself during World War II and those who watched the tragedy

of the Hungarian patriots in 1956 would have realized that spontaneous revolutions by unarmed people in this modern age are ineffective and often disastrous. While I have never discussed any details of the 1961 Cuban operation and do not propose to do so here, I repeat now what I have said publicly before: I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would or should be touched off by the landing.

EXAMPLE: BOUT IN BEACH HEAD
ESTABLISHMENT?

Not an Exact Science

Clearly, our intelligence estimates, particularly in dealing with the Communists, must take into account not only the natural and the usual but also the unusual, the brutal, the unexpected. Actions and reactions can no longer be estimated on the basis of what we ourselves might do if we were in Khrushchev's shoes because, as we have seen at the United Nations, he takes off his shoes. Often Soviet moves seem to be influenced by the theories of Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the famous Russian physiologist who induced certain reflexes in animals and then, by abruptly changing the treatment, reduced the animals to a state of confusion. The Pavlovian touch applied to humans can be seen in Khrushchev's abrupt changes in attitude and action. The scuttling of the Paris Summit Meeting in 1960, when he had for years known about the U-2, the surprise resumption of nuclear testing just at the time the nonaligned nations were assembling in Belgrade in 1961, even the famous shoe-thumping episode, were staged so that their shock effect would help produce certain results.

The willingness of a country to accept unpopularity in defense of its vital interests can be an element of strength. Often, I feel, because of our desire to be loved, this element has been lacking in American foreign policy, but that does not mean that we should emulate the brutal techniques of a Khrushchev.

Of course, one rarely has knowledge of all the factors bearing on any given situation. No one can predict with assurance the workings of the minds of the leaders whose decisions make history. As a matter of fact, if we were to set out to estimate what our own policy decisions would be a few years hence, we would soon be lost in a forest of uncertainty. And yet our estimators are called upon to decide what others will do. Unfortunately the intelligence process of making estimates will never become an exact science.

But at least progress has been made in assem-

bling the elements of a given situation in an orderly manner so as to assist our planners and policy makers. It is possible, often, to indicate a range of probabilities or possibilities and to isolate those factors which would influence Kremlin or Peking decisions. In any event, we have come a long way since Pearl Harbor and the somewhat haphazard system of intelligence analysis which prevailed at that time.

Danger at the Doorstep

So-called wars of liberation, guerrilla wars, political penetration, subversion, and "popular fronts" are Communist methods for achieving piecemeal what they hesitate to attempt by direct military action. In such campaigns, their objectives are openly declared; but many of their methods, particularly in the important early period of any attempted takeover, are largely secret. Rakosi, the Moscow-trained dictator of Hungary in Stalin's later days, in boasting of the communization of Hungary, called these methods "salami tactics." This is truly descriptive of their slice-by-slice techniques.

Initially we met the many-sided Communist thrust chiefly with open measures of economic and military aid such as the Marshall Plan and NATO and by building up our own defenses. When there was open military mischief as in the Berlin Blockade, the airlift was the answer. In Korea, direct armed intervention was needed. In Vietnam today guerrilla warfare by North Vietnam against the non-Communist South is supported by outside Communist aid. Here again there can be military action—something short of direct military intervention, but military aid, training, and assistance.

But what are we to do about the secret, underground, creeping techniques such as were used to take over Czechoslovakia in 1948 and Cuba in recent years under the cloak of a Castro? Because Castro in one of his rambling and incoherent speeches has boasted about early Marxist views, the "wise ones" are now saying that this should have been recognized years ago and action taken. Exactly what action, they do not specify except for those who advocate open military intervention. But thousands of the ablest Cubans, including political leaders, businessmen, and the military, who worked hard to put Castro in and were risking their lives and futures to do so, didn't suspect that they were installing a Communist regime. Today they are in exile or in jail.

This is not the place to argue out the Cuban

issue, except to point out that it is an example of a situation somewhat like that in Czechoslovakia, where the Communists, through subversive Cold War tactics, were able to effect a take-over before the means of effective action could be developed. It is a challenge to intelligence to give the early warnings that are necessary for such action.

The outcome has been quite different in countries where there was timely and effective organization of the anti-Communist elements. Notable victories were achieved, for example, against the threat of the Huks—the Philippine Communist guerrillas. They are no longer a serious menace to Philippine freedom. In like manner the Malayan Communist guerrilla movement was practically eliminated during the mid-1950s. Mossadegh, who was on the road to turning Iran over to the Communists, was overthrown in 1953; and Arbenz, the Communist leader of Guatemala, fled the country in 1954.

Communist parties in most Free World countries are more divided over policy today than at any time in the past decade. The Communist World is no longer monolithic. Even little Albania made Khrushchev hastily withdraw his forces from that country.

But Moscow and Peking are still hopeful of new conquests. We cannot always wait to have a formal, public invitation by a threatened country, documenting the Communist subversion. The invitation may come too late or not at all if the danger is not clearly perceived by governments all too prone to say, "This can't happen to us." Or power can slip into the hands of a leader who is interested in playing the Communist game, as

— Communist Party Pains —

The indigenous Communist parties are torn between local nationalistic issues and the overall policies of communism. It is hard for them to shift as fast as Moscow does. One day they must bow down to a Stalin; then Khrushchev tells them that Stalin is a blood-stained tyrant. They preach Moscow's peaceful intentions and then have to explain the brutal crushing of the Hungarian patriots, just as earlier, in 1939, their strong appeal as an anti-Nazi force was dissipated overnight by Moscow's alliance with Hitler to destroy Poland—a country which Molotov once described as "the ugly duckling of the Treaty of Versailles."

Castro plays it. We must help to build up both the will and the confidence in the ability to resist long before the Communist penetration reaches a point of no return. Ferreting out Communist objectives in a given country, indentifying the guiding personnel within it, their targets and timetables, are tasks primarily for the security and intelligence services of the threatened country. However, many of the countries most immediately in jeopardy do not have adequate internal-security services to do this job. They need help which they can get only from a country like the United States, which has the resources in funds, personnel, and techniques to aid them. Most governments in such countries affected welcome this help and, over the years, have profited greatly by it.

Fortunately for us, because of the nature of the subversive activities in which the various Communist parties—more than seventy of them outside the Bloc—are engaged and the large numbers of untrained personnel involved, it is difficult for them to maintain adequate security and secrecy. It is revealing no secret to report that many Communist parties and front organizations throughout the world have been penetrated. Dra-

matic information has already been published about the effective work of the FBI in neutralizing the Communist party and its appendages in the United States.

Obviously it is more difficult to deal with Communist activities in other parts of the Free World because this depends upon the willingness of the local authorities to cooperate. Often local publicity in the early stages of a planned "putsch," pinpointing the plotters, tying them to Moscow and Peking, has proved effective. This has been particularly useful in dealing with Communist "front," "youth," and "peace" organizations and their highly advertised meetings and congresses. Here a free press is a great asset.

Formidable as is the Communist subversive apparatus, it is vulnerable to exposure and to vigorous counteraction. But to act effectively one must have timely intelligence about the plot and the plotters and the technical means, overt and covert, which are being employed. Both in the collection of information as to the peril that threatens and in the field of covert action, our intelligence services have an essential role to play—one that is new to this generation perhaps, but none the less vital.

PART VII

From time to time the charge is made that an intelligence or security service may become a threat to our own freedoms; that the secrecy under which such a service must necessarily operate is in itself vaguely sinister; and that its activities may be inconsistent with the principles of a free society. There has been some sensational writing about the CIA's supposedly supporting dictators, making national policy on its own, and playing fast and loose with its secret funds.

Harry Howe Ransom, who has written a study on *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Harvard, 1958), puts the issue this way:

CIA is the indispensable gatherer and evaluator of world-wide facts for the National Security Council. Yet to most persons CIA remains a mysterious, super-secret, shadow agency of government. Its invisible role, its power and influence, and the secrecy enshrouding its structure and operations raise important questions regarding its place in the democratic process. One such question is: How shall a democracy insure that its secret intelligence apparatus becomes neither a vehicle for conspiracy nor a suppressor of the traditional liberties of democratic self-government?

It is understandable that a relatively new organization in our government's structure like the CIA should—despite its desire for anonymity—receive more than its share of publicity and be subject to questioning and to attack. In writing this analysis of intelligence, I have been motivated by the desire to put intelligence in our free society in its proper perspective. As I have already indicated, CIA is a publicly recognized institution of government. Its duties, its place in our governmental structure, and the controls surrounding it are set forth partly by statutes, partly by National Security Council directives. At the same time, as in many other enterprises of government, much about its work must be kept secret.

Our government in its very nature—and our open society in all its instincts—under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights automatically outlaws intelligence organizations of the kind that have developed in police states. Such organizations as Himmler's Gestapo and Khrushchev's KGB could never take root in this country. The law which set up CIA specifically provides