

# Inside Report . . . By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## Bay of Pigs Lessons

THERE WAS graphic evidence at the Willard Hotel in Washington last week that Cuban exiles and U.S. officials did not fully learn their lesson from the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.

The Willard was the site for a press conference unveiling the newest exile group (called the Cuban Representation of Exiles). Among those introduced was handsome Erneido A. Oliva, 31, second-in-command at the Bay of Pigs and military commander of the new group. It was proudly announced that Oliva that day was promoted to captain in the U.S. Army before resigning his commission to join the new exile group.


Was history repeating? A veteran of the Bay of Pigs, admittedly close to the Pentagon, was organizing an overtly military campaign against Fidel Castro. What's worse, Capt. Oliva probably is backed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

ALL THIS flies in the face of the threefold lesson from the Bay of Pigs.

First, no armed force of exiles can succeed unless Castro's army defects. In short, Castro's downfall must come from within.

Second, the army will not defect unless it is sure it can survive in the new post-Castro Cuba.

Third, the army doubts that it can survive in a Cuba run by exiles of the Bay of Pigs variety, put in



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power by the Pentagon and the CIA.

This is so because the leaders of Castro's 75,000-man army—still called the rebel army—would wind up facing firing squads if Cuba reverts to the "good old days" before Castro.

The pre-Castro military clique is gone. The new revolutionary officers will defect only if they believe the revolution has been betrayed by Castro.

Many rebel army officers feel that way now. Exile circles have been buzzing for weeks about a report that a rebel army major arrived at Key West, Fla., with a bullet in his back but still alive after an attempt on Castro's life. Even skeptical Washington officials admit the "potential" for defection within Castro's army.

However, defection will not come if rebel army officers see their own destruction in post-Castro Cuba. This explains why they fought so savagely against the Bay of Pigs invaders. The rebel army knew all too well that those invaders were interested in repeal-

ing, not in cleansing, the Cuba revolution. The army is similarly suspicious about the current exile leaders.

ACTUALLY, there are signs of improvement since the Bay of Pigs. Followers of rightist dictator Batista no longer dominate the Miami exile community.

Moreover, one exile leader is capable of winning the rebel army's confidence. He is ex-Castroite Manuel Ray, whose supposed clandestine return to Cuba on May 20 set off the current round of exile activity.

A democrat of the left, Ray would oust Castro without repealing the revolution. Cuba under him would be nationalistic, democratic, and socialistic, but definitely not Communist.

The State Department has learned enough from the Bay of Pigs to know that that kind of Cuba may not be the best of all possible worlds, but is the best we can hope for (and a far-off hope, at that).

However, the U.S. is plagued by divided command. Though the State Department appreciates Ray's value, Pentagon elements label him a crypto-Communist, little better than Castro.

Indeed, the lessons of the Bay of Pigs are only dimly perceived three years later. This is one reason why Castro seems safe enough today despite all the economic chaos and potential insurrection within Cuba.