Bundy Asks Oder-Neisse Acceptance By Chalmers M. Roberts Washington Post Staff Writer

Former White House assistant McGeorge Bundy yesterday advised West Germany to state clearly that it will accept the present Polish-German boundary when there is a European peace settlement.

That was the highlight of the urbane and peppery Ford Foundation President's testimony as a private citizen at the opening day of the Sen-ate Foreign Relations Committee's "education" hearings on NATO and the Atlantic Alliance.

Bundy's prepared remarks abounded with polished phrases and his answers to ques-tions by 11 Senators were models of restrained respect. After his appearance at the hearing, Bundy lunched with President Johnson and two White House aides, Walt W. Rostow and Robert Kintner.

His basic theme was that "NATO is not all of what we care about in Europe but nothing that we care about is possible without NATO." Much of his testimony and the questioning concerned a possible settlement of the East-West conflict in Europe which he called "the object of policy." It was in this frame that he


suggested that the Germans accept in advance the Oder-Neisse line, arguing that "the withholding of this recogni-

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BACKS NATO-Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), left, chats with former White House Adviser McGeorge Bundy prior to

an inquiry by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

advantage and only helps the German opinion is ahead of hand of those in the East who its government in a readiness

was "well and wisely—and permantly—out of the national nuclear business." proposed debates with East Germany and the suggestions of Rainer Barzel, the Bonn parliamentary leader.

Out of Date

nuclear force (MLF) was "now early end to the 20-year divi-quite clearly out of date," sion of Europe. Neither is the adding that "I am confident current danger great. We have that it will be possible for us a time which we can use to that it will be possible for us a time which we can use to to give a formal assurance on this point whenever the Soviet Government is really will be possible."

ready for a treaty of effective

Meantime, it "would be an account of the which we can use to the which we can take to the possible with the possible."

use of some of them as a strategic reserve when the Calls Trip Proper European scene is quiet is simple good sense."

and mutual confidence" in er as it is contrary to French mutual cuts in NATO and intentions." Warsaw Pact forces. But he He said that despite many warned against creating a fears, France has not unvacuum in Central Europe and leashed a new spirit of natural fears. he opposed unilateral cuts. | tionalism in Europe and that

tion gives us no bargaining! Bundy suggested that West gain from fear of Germany." "for action based on confi-Bundy said Germany, "the second power of the alliance," proposed debates with East

The former aide to Presidents Johnson and Kennedy He also stated that the made a point of stating that much contested multilateral "there is no prospect of an

But in reply to Sen. Joseph C. Clark (D-Pa.) he indicated doubt that the treaty was being held up only by the MLF issue. The Soviets, he said, also think they have an changes with the said and political expenses to the said of the sai

Paid, also think they have an interest in dividing the Western alliance.

On the matter of American forces in Europe, Bundy stressed in his prepared remarks the need for "the continued presence of major American fighting forces," adding that "the precise numbers are unimportant and the use of some of them as a factorial stress of the st

But Bundy commented that Warns Against Vacuum

Later he told Sen. Clairborne Pell (D.R.I.) that he could see some good "up to a Soviet Union. That, he added, soviet warns Against Vacuum ("That, he added, soviet Union. That, he added, soviet Union. point in (terms of) stability is "as far beyond French pow-

de Gaulle's attitude on Viet- withdrawal from the integrat-

clear weapons in an earlier de Gaulle was the General's withdrawal from the integrations with the Communists of the same and the control of crisis and the suggested, would be much the suggested, would be much the suggested, would be much the suggested with the community of the alliance, said the suggested would be much the suggested with the community of the same suggested. The same suggested would require the use of much that the community of the same suggested would require the use of much that the community of the same suggested. de Gaulle was the General's would require the use of nu-tions with the Communists.