

WIDE WORLD



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Springboard to Controversy—

An expert spells out a strategy for putting Castro out through the same door by which he entered—using revolutionist tactics which have proved successful around the world

A PLAN TO FREE CUBA

Condensed from
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WHAT PLAN can we follow to free Cuba? It being generally conceded in North, Central and South America that Castro and his government must go, the big question is "How?"

One solution would be for the United States to declare war on Cuba, run up the flag, sound the bugles and charge! That is the old-fashioned way. But such an invasion would necessitate reneging on many popularly accepted American principles. It presents the picture of the big imperialist beating up a little fellow. More to the point, direct intervention might force the Soviets into what neither they nor we desire—all-out, worldwide atomic war. I personally don't think that such an outcome is likely—nevertheless, it is a risk.

What are the alternatives? Blockade of Cuba can help; sanctions will handicap Castro. But only force can make his government fall. We should turn against him at least some of the modern devices of revolution and counterrevolution that he and other revolutionaries have successfully used to gain power and to stay in power.

Many of today's revolutions and counterrevolutions do succeed, even against the forces of a modern government, and it behooves Americans to find out why. So, let us have a cold,

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rational look at the rules of this new game as it is being played in many parts of the world.

The Need for Leadership. To start with, there must be strong, determined, implacable *leadership*. Though the motivations of the revolutionary leaders differ, they are united in their determination to succeed at any price. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana probably was driven to his determination by the "black man" treatment given him during his student days in the United States. "Bury me alive if I do not free my people," he wrote home. Ahmed Ben Bella, premier of Algeria, may have been stirred to his uncompromising quest for power by having been denied promotion in the French army.

The Need for Sanctuary. Given leadership, a modern revolution then needs a *sanctuary*. The revolutionary force must have a place from which it can raid and return, where it can be armed and trained, from which its propaganda to the world and to the masses can be broadcast. During the Algerian revolution seven years ago, for example, Habib Bourguiba was giving sanctuary in Tunisia to the revolutionary force attacking the French in neighboring Algeria. Passing through the Tunisian sanctuary to the rebels were leadership personnel from the army general staff of Egypt and modern arms from Czechoslovakia.

In 1954, I visited Guatemala two weeks before the successful counter-revolution against the communist-

infiltrated government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. This revolution could not have succeeded without the sanctuary of Honduras, from which supply planes flew and where the little armed band of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas had its beginning.

It was for lack of a sanctuary that the French Secret Army (OAS) failed in Algeria. The regular troops of the French government effectively sealed off blocks in the cities of Algiers and Oran and mopped them up.

Guerrilla Tactics. After selecting a sanctuary from which the revolutionary forces can operate, it is then a matter of choosing for conquest a chunk of neighboring territory suitable for *guerrilla warfare*. This should be a spot where the terrain handicaps the opposing police and military, where communities are scattered, and where a small band of revolutionaries can upset the economy and create piecemeal destruction. The jungles at the mouth of the Congo River, the impossible terrain of Laos, the thickly wooded Sierra Maestra of Cuba are perfect examples.

Popular Support. Another factor in successful revolution is that of choosing a means for gaining the *support* of the people, either through intimidation or promises. Promises usually consist of offers of material goods, conquest of females, alcohol, narcotics, equality, freedom from work and taxes—in some cases even heavenly rewards for killing infidels.

If the first steps have been success-

ful, an important phase is ready—the occupation of a small *toehold* in the country being conquered. From this small territory comes a great cry to the world for recognition of the revolutionary bands as a national army of liberation. Close upon the heels of recognition comes announcement of a provisional government in the seized territory, or of a government in exile if the seized terrain is not too secure.

Negotiation. Next comes a demand to settle by reasonable discussion the dreadful situation that has resulted from the conflict between the revolutionary forces and the existing government. Negotiations are very useful on these counts: first, while the government's representatives negotiate, its military operations against the revolutionaries normally stop—meanwhile, the latter's forces regroup and strengthen their position; second, at the conference table, concessions may be won to advance the rebel cause. The revolutionaries endeavor through a promise of peace to gain political control of the entire country or at least part of the country.

Furthermore, the very fact of negotiating is a propaganda victory for the revolutionaries. It amounts to public recognition by the established government that their claims have some merit and that the revolutionary leaders are the proper authorities with whom to discuss those claims.

And Now Cuba. How can these revolutionary techniques be used

against Cuba? Of course we, being Americans, will not stoop to all of them. But *sanctuary* is another matter.

We should give, to a new grouping of Cuban freedom fighters, sanctuary, either in the lands of our friends in Central America or in the United States. There we should organize, recruit, train, equip and “beef up” a fighting force that is sufficient to liberate Cuba, giving it our complete and absolute support so that there will not be another amateur-directed Bay of Pigs fiasco.

As quickly as possible, the liberating army should be transported by the United States to an appropriate spot in Cuba where a foothold can be established in the name of the newly established government of liberation.

The amount of “beef up” from the U.S. military forces will depend entirely upon the force necessary to assure immediate success. If it takes a mighty force, let it be a mighty force, so long as it is always a “Cuban Liberation” force under the “Free Cuban Government-in-Exile”—with any other nationals serving as volunteers.

As soon as the new government has established itself on the island of Cuba, we should promptly recognize it as the legitimate representative of all the people of Cuba and get as many other governments as possible to do the same. Then, on the invitation of the new Cuban government, we should give it

whatever support is called for.

This can include overt participation by the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force to protect it against the unrecognized government of Fidel Castro—a government that has betrayed the Cuban people on behalf of foreign interests and a hostile ideology; a government that has not been chosen by Cuban elections; a government that, by its actions of terror and murder, has forfeited all rights to recognition as a civilized government fit

to be in the Western Hemisphere.

Our only limitations placed upon the new provisional government should be that it hold free, democratic elections at the first opportunity. Our military forces should then be withdrawn, leaving the Cuban people and the Cuban government to manage their own affairs. And we of North and South America will be safe in the knowledge that Cuba, free of tyranny, is no longer a threat to the security of all of us.

What We Learned From the Bay of Pigs

Condensed from LIFE

TOM FLAHERTY

AFTER THE Bay of Pigs fiasco President Kennedy appointed a committee to investigate the Central Intelligence Agency and its role in the disaster. The committee's members: Gen. Maxwell Taylor, later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Allen Dulles, then director of the CIA, which had planned and supervised the invasion; Adm. Arleigh Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations; and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the President's brother. Their report has never been published.

The President himself is known to believe that the operation fumbled as a consequence of many grievous miscalculations. The most serious: 1) underestimating the

number of troops required for the invasion; 2) overestimating the ability of the invasion brigade's own B-26's to provide air cover and support; 3) erroneously assuming that the landing would be the catalyst for a popular uprising; 4) erroneously assuming that, even if the landing somehow failed, the troops could go into the hills and wage effective guerrilla warfare until popular support could build up behind them.

In the White House view, these errors were inherent in the plan. The administration's assessment of its own responsibility, then, is that the President listened to bad advice and failed to spot the fatal errors in advance.

Pentagon and intelligence officials who were prominently involved in the operation disagree. They still believe the plan could have succeeded if it had been carried out as intended. They argue that:

The original plan, to which they gave a good chance of success, called for a landing 100 miles east of the Bay of Pigs, near the town of Trinidad. It was a more desirable beachhead militarily, but there would have been risk to the many civilians nearby. When the administration ordered the landing site changed, the planners chose the less populated Bay of Pigs area, where the prospects of success were diminished but still reasonably high.

The tactical plan called for three air strikes on successive days by Cuban-manned B-26's. Their most important assignment was to wipe out Castro's air force on the ground before the invasion began. President Kennedy ordered U.S. advisers to reduce the number to two air strikes—and eventually to one. Castro therefore had enough planes left to control the air over the beachhead.

The first pre-invasion air strike, on Saturday morning, April 15, was only partly successful, and it can be argued that this early strike did more harm than good. That same afternoon Castro's U.N. delegate, Raul Roa, accurately denounced the attack as a prelude to invasion. Nervous neutralist and Latin American delegates began to ask questions. Faced by diplomatic pressure, President Kennedy on Sunday ordered

cancellation of the air strike by the brigade's B-26's that was scheduled to coincide with and support the Monday landing.

Meanwhile, Castro—forewarned by the pre-invasion bombing—arrested some 100,000 Cubans who might have joined the invaders, nullifying the chance of a general uprising. (The 1400 invaders who made up Brigade 2506 were expected only to seize and hold a beachhead, which would become the focus for support by tens of thousands of sympathizers and volunteers already in Cuba.)

When word reached Washington of the deteriorating situation, the planners repeatedly asked the President to unleash the U.S. forces standing offshore: carrier-based jet planes, Navy gunfire, combat Marines. He refused—a decision consistent with his pre-invasion stipulation that no U.S. forces were to take part in the fighting. Finally, however, he did agree to let the Navy fly a reconnaissance mission over the beachhead and take photographs. When the three swept-wing Navy jets passed overhead, the embattled brigade cheered—but in vain.

On this major point, the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA are agreed: at no time did the government promise support by U.S. forces of any kind. This was made amply clear to the Cuban exile leaders and to the officers of the brigade. At his news conference five days before the invasion, Kennedy said,

"There will not, under any circumstances, be an intervention in Cuba by U.S. armed forces." In view of this record, the President insists that Brigade 2506, while it was defeated, was not betrayed.

Yet the men of the brigade were told, "The air will be ours." Washington's interpretation: it was indeed expected that the brigade's own B-26's would control the air; it may be that the Cubans misunderstood, or perhaps their advisers in the field

made promises without authorization.

It has been argued, it is being argued, it will be argued for years, that there is at least a part of truth in the differing points of view of all who played a part in the debacle. But the largest and most important truth springs from two indisputable facts. The men of Brigade 2506 believed, until the end, that the United States would not let their invasion fail. They were wrong.



"Togetherness"

PLAYWRIGHT Arthur Kober once stayed in a Hollywood hotel with thin walls. He was awakened in the middle of the night by a sleepy voice saying, "Would you get me a drink of water, dear?"

He got up, stumbled to the bathroom and came back with a glass of water before he realized he was sleeping alone.

—Amy Porter, quoted by Allen Rivkin and Laura Kerr in *Hello, Hollywood!* (Doubleday)

WHEN my wife and I moved into our new apartment I discovered a convenience men expect to find only in hotels: a slot in the medicine cabinet for the disposal of used razor blades. But about two weeks later the woman in the apartment next to ours asked my wife to please tell me to stop using the slot.

The used blades were dropping right into her medicine cabinet.

—Contributed by Richard Kwartler



Red Intelligence. A Russian pathologist visiting our modest pathology department at Georgetown University Hospital had been boasting of Soviet advances that appeared to make all our work obsolete. Their stains did not precipitate crystals as ours did; their laboratory rats were friendlier than ours; they were doing wonders in cancer research. But he did credit us with one small triumph.

As he was leaving, he noticed in our parking lot the name signs that reserve spaces for staff members. With frank admiration, he conceded superiority to our clever bourgeois system for checking on comrade doctors who hadn't shown up for work.

—Gaston Herrera, M.D., in *Medical Economics*