

MEET THE PRESS

The Proceedings of

as broadcast nationwide by the National Broadcasting Company, Inc., are printed and made available to the public to further interest in impartial discussions of questions affecting the public welfare. Transcripts may be obtained by sending a stamped, self-addressed envelope and ten cents for each copy to:

Hewlett Press, Inc. Box 2111, Washington, D. C. 20013
(*Division of Publishers Co., Inc.*)

MEET THE PRESS is telecast every Sunday over the NBC Television Network. This program originated from London, Paris and Washington, D. C.

The National Broadcasting Company Presents



MEET THE PRESS

America's Press Conference of the Hour

Produced by LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK

*Guest: GEORGE W. BALL,
Former Under Secretary of State*

Special one-hour Program (6:30-7:30 P.M. EST)
SUNDAY, APRIL 2, 1967

Hewlett Press, Inc. Printers and Periodical Publishers
Division of Publishers Co., Inc.

Box 2111, Washington, D. C. 20013

10 cents per copy

Television Broadcast 6:30 P.M. EST
Radio Broadcast 9:05 P.M. EST



Panel:

ALASTAIR BURNETT of *The Economist*, England
MELOR STURUA of *Izvestia*, U.S.S.R.
HENRI DE TURENNE of *France-Soir*, France
HANS WERNER VON FINCKENSTEIN of *Die Welt*, Germany
KAROL MALCZYNSKI of *Trybuna Ludu*, Poland
LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK of *Meet The Press*, U.S.A.

Moderator:

ELIE ABEL, NBC News-London

Permission is hereby granted to news media and magazines to reproduce in whole or in part. Credit to NBC's MEET THE PRESS will be appreciated.

M E E T T H E P R E S S

MR. ABEL: We bring you today a special intercontinental edition of **MEET THE PRESS**, coming to you live by Early Bird Satellite from Paris, London, and Washington. Our guest—in Paris—is the former United States Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball. Mr. Ball was second in command at the State Department from 1961 until his resignation last fall. He has now returned to the field of international law and banking. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was originally announced as our guest for today, is unable to be with us. Gathered in our London studio, ready to question Mr. Ball by satellite, are five leading journalists from Great Britain—the Soviet Union—France—Germany—and Poland. From Great Britain—

MR. BURNET: This is Alastair Burnet of *The Economist*.

MR. ABEL: From the Soviet Union—

MR. STURUA: This is Melor Sturua—of *Izvestia*.

MR. ABEL: From France—

MR. DE TURENNE: This is Henri de Turenne of *France-Soir*.

MR. ABEL: From Germany—

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: This is Hans Werner von Finckenstein of *Die Welt*.

MR. ABEL: From Poland—

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: This is Karol Malcuzyński of Trybuna Ludu.

MR. ABEL: And—in Washington—

MR. SPIVAK: This is Lawrence Spivak of MEET THE PRESS.

MR. ABEL: The first question now for our guest, former Under Secretary of State George Ball in Paris, from Alastair Burnet of Great Britain.

MR. BURNET: Mr. Ball, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, has just voiced his opinion that the United States should stop the bombing of North Vietnam without requiring any similar gesture from the North Vietnamese Government, such as running down the war, withdrawing troops, or thinking of going ahead towards a peace conference.

At the same time here in Britain the Archbishop of Canterbury has expressed a similar opinion. Don't you think that there is an increasing case now for the United States to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a gesture to get serious talks under way?

MR. BALL: There is nothing new about this, of course. The bombing has been stopped on previous occasions for substantial periods of time. The difficulty is that nothing results. What the North Vietnamese regime has made clear is that they are not interested in our stopping the bombing unless we make very definite that we have stopped it permanently. Now, this obviously is something that the United States Government is not prepared to do without some very clear indication that there will be reciprocity, that the other side is prepared to make some similar move, some equivalent move.

You can't, after all, negotiate unless there is a willingness on each side to move toward a reduction of the violence and a coming to the conference table.

MR. BURNET: Yes, Mr. Ball, but given that the men in Hanoi are perhaps not very smart or very quick, nevertheless, other people are in this and, for example, the Soviet Union and Poland and Britain, itself, perhaps, are very interested in seeking an agreement on this matter. Don't you think it would help, shall we say, the Russians or the Poles or anybody who has influence in Hanoi to bring them to the conference table if they can show that the United States is equally interested and concerned?

MR. BALL: But how many times do we repeat the same rather futile experiment? Because, upon the occasions where this has been tried before, nothing happens. There is no reciprocity,

there is no gesture on the other side, and as a matter of fact Hanoi has made very clear that they are not interested in a cessation of the bombing unless the United States Government on its side says the bombing is stopped permanently.

Now if that occurs without any reciprocal gesture, all one has succeeded in doing is in penalizing the one side and to the advantage of the other, without the other doing anything at all about it. This isn't negotiation, this isn't the way one moves toward settlement.

MR. STURUA: Mr. Ball, we know several proposals made by the U.S. Government, on how to end the war in Vietnam, but none of them include an unconditional stopping of the bombing of North Vietnamese cities.

Do you think that such a stopping will essentially damage or even destroy the balance of military power in Vietnam?

MR. BALL: Well, I think the bombing is a significant element in what is being done to try to stop the aggression of the North Vietnamese. Now if the United States were to undertake to stop the bombing, it should certainly be on the basis of some indication from the other side that they would make a reciprocal move, so that you could have a mutual deescalation, a mutual slowing down of the violence, and that could be the step toward the conference table which is necessary.

MR. STURUA: Mr. Ball, Senator Robert Kennedy's ideas about war and peace in Vietnam are being increasingly echoed in the United States. Can you describe which circles in the United States support his ideas?

MR. BALL: I don't know that one needs to spend too much time discussing who supports particular views and who opposes them. The fact is that the overwhelming body of American opinion, I think, is behind President Johnson and behind the Administration. Senator Kennedy has made some proposals which are certainly worthy of careful consideration. My own view of the proposals is that when he suggests a cessation of bombing, he makes it clear that he is not talking about an unconditional cessation, and the experience we have had so far would seem to indicate that Hanoi would never accept the kind of proposal which Senator Kennedy is making.

MR. DE TURENNE: Mr. Ball, we hear and we read a lot of arguments and subtleties about how negotiations for peace should start, or could start, about the war in Vietnam, but it seems to me that the French public and maybe other publics in the world have lost sight of what is the ultimate purpose of the American policy in Vietnam. Maybe this is a candid question, but I am

going to ask you, what solution, what practical solution are the United States fighting for? Are you for a Korean solution where the country will remain divided, would you accept a neutralized Vietnam, or what is really the ultimate aim of American policy?

MR. BALL: I think the American position has been made fairly clear, that is that what we are seeking is a South Vietnam that can speak for itself and that can make its own decisions.

Now once the principle is established and becomes a reality, that the people of South Vietnam can order their own destiny, if they then make the decision that they want to combine with the North, that is something which is up to them; and certainly the United States would not in any way seek to oppose that, if that decision were reached by proper democratic processes. And South Vietnam is, as you know, on the way toward developing a democratic government where the will of the people can be made quite plain and quite clear.

MR. DE TURENNE: Do you consider the present South Vietnamese Government as representative of the South Vietnamese people?

MR. BALL: As you know there is a political process going on—a constitutional convention, a constitution which has been drafted, elections which will be held—all of these things will create a condition in which the South Vietnamese people will be able to register their will in a traditional and effective manner.

COUNT FINCKENSTEIN: Mr. Ball, there is a certain feeling of frustration on the continent, especially in NATO, concerning the European-American relations. There is also certain criticism on either side. What do you think are the reasons for this?

MR. BALL: I think that to a large extent this results from the success of NATO. It results from the fact that there has been a situation created in which the Western European nations are feeling strong; they have been able to secure their economic prosperity at a level that they had never known before, and I suppose that it is normal in times when there is a feeling of security that people then begin to ask hard questions.

COUNT FINCKENSTEIN: Do you agree with Mr. Foster's thesis that the United States would have to accept a certain erosion of NATO—

MR. BALL: No.

COUNT FINCKENSTEIN:—for cooperation with the Soviets?

MR. BALL: Quite frankly, I think that was a very unfortunate and not an accurate statement.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: I am as interested as Mr. Finckenstein in European problems, but for the moment I would like to go back to the problem of Vietnam.

MR. BALL, during the last war my nation, my people fought for five long years resisting heavy bombing, shooting, and the so-called pacification. So did the British and so, I believe, would do the American people do in similar circumstances.

Referring to Vietnam, do you really believe that you can bomb into submission a fighting nation believing in its just cause, and do you think it is a proper way of encouraging negotiation?

MR. BALL: I think you have posed the question in a very loaded manner. I don't think this is a question of a nation believing in a just cause. I think that what has happened here is that the regime in North Vietnam has launched an external aggression against the South, which is quite unjust.

The question is not one of bombing that nation into submission. The question is one of a very limited kind of bombing directed at the interruption of transport and directed at the logistics which support the aggression in the South.

Now, if there had been a desire on the part of the United States or an intention on the part of the United States to bomb North Vietnam into submission, then the bombing would have been a very different kind. It would have been directed at the urban populations, at the industrial economy of the North, and it would have been intended to smash the economic life of the people of North Vietnam. This hasn't been done at all. This has been a very limited kind of bombing.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: Mr. Ball, last autumn, or I should say last fall, a Polish field newsreel team visited North Vietnam and noticed, on the film too, that about every second Vietnamese—I mean civilian—is carrying a gun, is an armed member of civilian defense form.

MR. BALL: Is this North Vietnam or South Vietnam?

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: North Vietnam. In the South Vietnam, as far as we know, every civilian carrying a weapon is considered a suspect. Don't you think this picture doesn't quite fit with your official thesis that North Vietnamese are being oppressed and subjugated to a dictatorial rule and South Vietnamese enjoy and support a freely elected government?

MR. BALL: I think one not only has to go back to the beginning of the regime in North Vietnam and read what they themselves said, because after they had been in existence for about two years—I think it was in 1956, in fact—the General, Giap himself who indicated they had lived through a period of terror, a

period of assassination, that they had used all the instruments of oppression and that they had rather overdone it.

Now, our impression has been—and I think the evidence very much supports it—that this is a regime which is directed with an iron hand from Hanoi. To talk of democracy in North Vietnam, to talk of the people voluntarily supporting a great effort seems to me to be nonsense.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Ball, Secretary Rusk has been quoted as saying that he found "that the objectives of the American foreign policy are widely understood and respected and supported."

You know our European allies, and you have just listened to the European newsmen. Do you think that Europe understands our policy in Vietnam?

MR. BALL: I have just been in a meeting in Cambridge, England, attended by 80 or 90 people, of which a large portion were Europeans and very knowledgeable and sophisticated Europeans. I was very impressed by what seemed to me to be a rather marked evolution of the opinion of this very select but, nevertheless, very important and influential group. They seem to be moving toward a much greater sympathy and a much better understanding of the American position than I have observed in the past.

MR. SPIVAK: Why do you think our NATO allies have done so little to indicate that they support us and have done so little by way of supporting us?

MR. BALL: I think very largely because they don't feel a vital interest in the Far East. Many of them had interests in the Far East, but those were dissolved with the dismantling of the great colonial systems. I think they no longer feel vitally involved in the Far East and, therefore, don't feel any great obligation to provide active support for what the United States is trying to do.

MR. SPIVAK: You are a private citizen now and don't have to talk in diplomatic language. Will you tell us this: Do you think that our allies in NATO have an obligation, moral or other, to help us in Vietnam?

MR. BALL: I think that certain of them are members of the SEATO Treaty. The obligation is an obligation which is created by the treaty. To the extent that you know who the members of the treaty are from Europe—it is France and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has had its hands full in Malaysia; the French Government has taken a very different

view of what we have been trying to do in South Vietnam from our own view.

MR. BURNETT: Mr. Ball, are you in fact saying that you would welcome the presence of British troops in South Vietnam? Has your government ever asked the British Government for such assistance?

MR. BALL: We felt the British Government was a party to the SEATO Treaty, and it must make its own decision. It is not for us to ask them to support us. We have also been well aware of the responsibilities which the British Government has taken in defending Malaysia and the amount of effort which that has required and the large deployment of forces which that has required.

MR. BURNETT: But wouldn't in fact the SEATO Treaty cover mainland states like Siam, but doesn't necessarily cover South Vietnam?

MR. BALL: South Vietnam is a protocol state under the SEATO Treaty. It is very clear that the obligations of the treaty extend to the defense of South Vietnam.

MR. STURUA: Mr. Ball, you are an international lawyer. In my youth I tried to become an international lawyer too. Let me put this question: Do you regard the United States of America in a state of war in Vietnam?

MR. BALL: I would say that what we are doing in Vietnam is giving support to a nation which is exercising the right of self-defense. Now, whether this amounts to a state of war or not is something that the lawyers can argue about for a very long time. It is certainly a state of belligerency.

MR. STURUA: Let us switch to Europe.

In Europe there is an excitement about the growth of neo-Fascism in West Germany. I am referring to the success of the National Democratic Party in the recent elections.

As one of the powers which signed both the agreements, the United States took the obligation to prevent such a development. What are you doing now to fulfill this obligation?

MR. BALL: I think the anxiety over the growth of neo-Fascism in Germany is enormously exaggerated. After all, you talk about the success of this party. This was a fringe party which registered a very small minority of the vote, and every country has its lunatic fringe. This is perfectly normal. I wouldn't suppose that this is any indication of the growth of neo-Fascism in Germany. I think the German society is much sounder and healthier than you indicate.

MR. DE TURENNE: Mr. Ball, I am sorry; I want to go back to Vietnam, but I'm afraid it is an obsession with us Europeans as it is with you Americans.

I want to talk about the escalation. The escalation has been going on for three years now, and at the origin we will explain the theory of escalation as a two-sided thing—one side going up and the other side going up. And for three years now it seems that the escalation has been going up mostly on one side. And I wanted to ask you whether there is a limit to this escalation—

MR. BALL: I don't know why you should say it is going up only on one side. There has been a very great development of the deployment of main elements of the North Vietnamese forces into the South. This is a change from the war in its earlier stages where there were largely Vietcong composed of agitators that had been infiltrated from the North, individual fighting forces that came from the North, not main force units that were brought down by modern logistic means. I think this has been a very big change, so that I wouldn't at all accept the statement that the escalation has been largely on one side. This has been a two-sided escalation.

MR. DE TURENNE: Well, they haven't bombed the South yet, have they?

MR. BALL: They have been bombing—well, they have been using the weapons at their command on the South in a very brutal fashion from the beginning.

MR. DE TURENNE: I have the figures here, military intelligence figures here, about the number of North Vietnamese regiments. I read that in Newsweek, the issue of March 27th. They claim that out of 280,000 people fighting in South Vietnam, only 50,000 are coming from North Vietnam, which is a minority.

MR. BALL: Well, even the Vietcong, of course, is composed to a very considerable extent of people who came down earlier from the North. I think what the 50,000 refers to is the main force units that have been brought down and identified as such.

MR. DE TURENNE: You haven't answered my question, which was: Is there a limit to the escalation and, if there is one, what is it?

MR. BALL: Well, I suppose the limit to the escalation is when one side or the other makes a decision, a political decision not to go forward and so far as the United States is concerned that political decision will have to come from Hanoi.

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: May I go back to a European problem, Mr. Ball, as Vice President Humphrey just said in Geneva, the American administration puts its very interest in the nonproliferation treaty and considers the treaty a very urgent subject.

Do you think a compromise could be found in the control question which would leave the EURATOM set-up alive and, if so, what could it look like?

MR. BALL: I think a compromise can be found; I think a compromise will be found. I don't want to indicate what I think it may be because this is a matter for serious private discussion between governments at the moment. But I am perfectly satisfied that a compromise can and will be found on the EURATOM issue which will leave intact the principle of inspection by EURATOM.

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: Would you think that the American administration should be ready to accept the same control mechanism on the American peaceful nuclear research and on the American industry as the non-nuclear countries are required to under the treaty?

MR. BALL: I think as far as the control in the United States is concerned that nothing could be more public than what the United States is doing with its nuclear development.

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: Do you think the United States should accept such control if the Soviet Union does not accept it on her part?

MR. BALL: I think the Soviet Union has made very clear that it won't accept it, and I think there should to the greatest extent possible be some reciprocity in these matters, but as far as the United States is concerned, as I say, we live in a glass house, and there is very little that we do that isn't publicly known.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: Mr. Ball, I am referring to the last questions of Mr. Finckenstein. Your country and its permanent spokesman on many occasions stated that a nonproliferation treaty is a matter of great urgency and importance, and I have quoted Mr. Dean Rusk from March the sixth of this year. And we all know about different objections against such a treaty from different European countries, among others the Federal Republic of Germany, which claims that such a treaty—such as is drafted now—would discriminate against non-nuclear countries. What is your opinion about these objections?

MR. BALL: Well, I think what the Federal Republic has been concerned about is several different things. First, that there

be an option left open for the European people as such, if they ultimately organized themselves into some kind of a federation, to share in the management of nuclear power. I think this is a reasonable position on their part.

Another question that they have been concerned about is EURATOM and the control issue. This, as I say, is something that I think can be decided. I think that apart from these issues, the matter is being now fully discussed with the Federal Republic, and I think a solution will be found which will be completely acceptable to the Federal Republic government.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: Mr. Ball, if I understand you, you answered my question from an economical point of view, an industrial point of view. Some politicians, including Mr. Strauss, for instance, or former Chancellor Adenauer, approached this problem from a political point of view as well. They said it will be a sort of new nuclear Versailles. What is your opinion on that?

MR. BALL: I think that implicit in the problem of the management of nuclear power is that either it becomes freely available for every country in the world to develop its own national nuclear system, which I am sure you wouldn't want and I wouldn't want, or there has to be some arrangement of a limitation of proliferation. Now if there is an agreement on the limitation of proliferation this means some countries are going to be nuclear powers and some are not. I don't know how else one manages it. Ultimately, I would hope that the nuclear powers themselves will be able to take serious steps toward the reduction of their own nuclear capability, leading toward a kind of general disarmament. That is something the United States would like very much to see, and if the Soviet Union would agree, I think progress could be made in this direction.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Ball, there are some people in the United States, and I imagined in Europe and Asia as well, who believe that if President John F. Kennedy had lived, American combat troops would not have been committed to the same extent in Vietnam. You were Under Secretary under Mr. Kennedy. Will you give us your opinion on that?

MR. BALL: I don't believe it. I think we would have come to very much the same position. I think the fact that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, for example, have been advising President Johnson, as they were advising President Kennedy, that Mr. McGeorge Bundy for a considerable period of time was advising President Johnson as he was advising President Kennedy. I think this would have—I think that President Kennedy himself made the hard decisions in the fall of 1961, when Maxwell Taylor came back from his mission to South Vietnam, to

increase the number of advisors, and this started the United States in a certain direction which has led to the present situation. And I think that it would have occurred if President Kennedy had lived.

* * * * *
(announcements)

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Ball, there was a time when one of our major interests was to seek reunification of Germany. Can you tell us whether it still is?

MR. BALL: Of course it is. I think it is a very definite aspect of American policy that there will be no real stability in the Western world and in the world in general until the great unfinished business of the war, left over from the war is taken care of and the biggest piece of unfinished business is the division of Europe, the division of Germany. Obviously this is something that has to be in the forefront of any nation's policy.

MR. SPIVAK: Are we doing anything new or significant toward that end?

MR. BALL: The final decision, of course, about reunification is not a decision we are going to make. It is going to be a decision that the Soviet Union will make, because it has been the power which has prevented reunification. What we are doing is to encourage the building of bridges to the East, the setting up of relationships with the Soviet Union, the development of relationships that can lead to an easing of tensions. The Federal Republic on its side is beginning to exhibit a good deal more flexibility in its relations with Eastern European nations, and as the Soviet Union, I think, comes to the realization that its maintenance of the division is not for its interests any more than it is for the interests of other nations, that something effective can be done. It isn't going to be done overnight. It is going to take an awfully long time.

MR. BURNETT: Mr. Ball, would you agree that you were personally identified with the previous American policy towards Central Europe and that in the past year or so American policy seems indeed to have altered, that America is seeking first an understanding with the Soviet Union? Is it not possible now that there are a growing number of people in West Germany who think that the alliance with France rather than the alliance with the United States is the better protector of what they think are West Germany's interests?

MR. BALL: I think this is one of the kind of myths which become prevalent from time to time that don't really reflect reality. I don't think there has been a change in the United States position toward Europe. I don't think there has been a

change in the priorities which we have. Obviously there has over time to be some settlement between East and West if we are going to have a stable world. I think the people of Western Europe have as much or almost even a greater stake in this than the United States. I think the United States Government is working very hard to present to the Soviet Union a combined, a consolidated view of the Western world, and certainly there is no inclination whatever on the part of the United States to neglect the interests of its European allies in order to seek some kind of detente with the Soviet Union.

Now you ask me the question as to whether there may be some people in Germany who were seeking an alliance, or a strong working relation with France on the assumption that France will be a better protector of Germany's interests with the Soviet Union. I don't understand this kind of thinking, if it exists, because it isn't a matter of a choice between France and the United States, it is a matter of the Western world working together from a position of strength to try to find some kind of solution of the tensions which divide East and West.

MR. BURNETT: Well, I would be one who would like to see a joint Western approach on these matters, and indeed I think most people in Great Britain would. I think there is growing tendency here to think that there is a tussle of power going on, almost, between Washington and Paris for the West German alignment. I put it to you again: Don't you see evidence of this in the world now?

MR. BALL: Not serious evidence. I don't believe this. I don't think that Washington is competing with Paris in any sense for the support or the allegiance of West Germany. I think this is one of those rather curious myths that gets into common currency, but it is quite a mistaken idea.

MR. STURUA: Mr. Ball, recently there has been much discussion in the British press about Senator Javits' proposal for an Atlantic free trade area. What is the opinion of the United States government with regard to this idea?

MR. BALL: I don't think an Atlantic free trade area is a very useful idea. That is my personal view, but I don't think that the United States government is seriously contemplating anything of this kind. Obviously a free trade area is a discriminatory regime of commercial policy which is discriminatory against the other nations of the world, and I would be very much surprised to find the United States Government ever looking with great favor on a proposal of this sort.

MR. STURUA: In connection with the latest events and in

particular the discussions in Geneva about the Kennedy Round and steps taken by the British government to enter the European Economic Community, there is a feeling in Europe that now the United States has become much cooler toward the Common Market. On the other hand some people think that the United States doesn't want to create additional difficulties in the British way—in the British entry into the Common Market. What is your opinion about it?

MR. BALL: I think it is nonsense to suggest that the United States has become less interested in British entry into the European Economic Community. It has been a tentative American policy for a very long time, that the community will be complete and will be really effective only when the United Kingdom is playing its proper role within Europe, and this hasn't changed at all. So that I really don't understand how this particular idea has become talked about, because it doesn't seem to me there is any basis for it whatever.

MR. DE TURENNE: Mr. Ball, the American policy in Europe seems to be based on—still based—on the situation which prevailed twenty years ago. I mean the cold war, and so on. And, in view of the fact that lately many things like the departure of General deGaulle out of the Alliance—not out of the Alliance, but out of the NATO set-up—and the detente with the Russians and so on have shaken the NATO set-up, and the treaty will expire in '69. Don't you think it would be a good chance to sort of re-evaluate our general policy in Europe?

MR. BALL: Well, I don't again understand what you mean by saying that the cold war is a thing of the past, or what you imply, if you haven't said it explicitly, or that there has been a detente. I don't think there has been a detente. I think we have been able to find some areas of common interest with the Soviet Union, which have gone a small ways to relieve the tension; but there are still very considerable problems between east and west which are unresolved.

Now, again, I don't understand what you say, which I hear often, but seems to me to be one of these phrases which becomes current without having any reality, that the United States is pursuing a policy that was appropriate 20 years ago. I think what the United States is doing is to continue to provide security for Western Europe, which seems to me to be essential.

It seems to me to be essential, also, that there be an alliance which is an effective one, which assures to the people of the Atlantic world that they will be secure; and if you suggest that in 1969 the NATO Treaty will expire—it won't actually expire, all that will happen in 1969 is that any government can elect

to withdraw if it chooses to do so, but it doesn't expire. That it might be a good time for revision . . . I would certainly hope that there will be a kind of constant look at the NATO Treaty—1969 has no special significance—to make sure that it does reflect the realities of today. I think the treaty, as it is now drafted, is pretty good. I wouldn't change it very much.

MR. ABEL: Mr. Ball, would you not acknowledge, however, that there has been a change in Europe since 1949 and '50? The very fact that so many Europeans are no longer afraid of the war which we are trying to deter through NATO; the fact that Europeans on both sides don't expect such a war, consider it remote. Doesn't that in itself create a new kind of psychology which makes fixed troop dispositions and permanent, integrated military headquarters seem less necessary, more disposable?

MR. BALL: No. I talked with a political leader not very long ago who told me that in his constituency they had voted to build a bridge because of the large number of traffic accidents that were occurring on a particular road, and after the bridge had been in existence for about four years a petition was circulated suggesting that they now tear down the bridge because it wasn't esthetically very desirable, since it was now clear that there weren't as many traffic accidents as there had been in the past. I think there is a little bit of this psychology here, that NATO has been successful and therefore, since it has been successful, we don't need it.

I would say that over time, I would hope, there can be a reduction of troop strength, but it has to be on both sides. It is no good having a unilateral reduction on the western side. If the Soviet Union wants to talk seriously about a reduction of forces, then I think the United States Government would be interested, but this has to come about gradually and it has to come about on a reciprocal basis. This is the way a detente is created, not by unilateral actions; it is created by agreement on both sides.

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: Mr. Ball, in his last State of the Union Message, President Johnson said that the U.S. Administration was going to maintain an integrated common defense in NATO. He then continued, "But we also look forward to the time when greater security can be achieved through methods of arms control and disarmament and through other forms of practical agreement."

Would you please explain what "other forms of practical agreement" the President was referring to?

MR. BALL: Well, I don't know what he specifically had in mind at that point, but the thing I have just mentioned, the

possibility of some reciprocal withdrawal of forces over time would seem to me to be within that category. I think that what the President is concerned with is that obviously it is an unnatural situation for such large forces to be deployed on each side of the Iron Curtain, and that if and as we move towards some better understanding between East and West, and if and as the East demonstrates its will toward the maintenance of a peaceful Europe and a peaceful world, then we should have a mutual reduction in forces, we should scale down the arms which are possessed on either side, both conventional and nuclear, and we should try to move toward a situation in which there isn't as much anxiety as there is today.

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: You think a withdrawal of forces could only be done on a mutual basis?

MR. BALL: I don't think it would make very much sense for the West to withdraw its forces if the East maintains the same number of divisions in the same position of alertness as it does today.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: Mr. Ball, lively debate is taking place in Europe about a system of security on this continent. Would you agree, sir, that we should rely on one problem—that is the acceptance of status quo in Europe as it emerged out of the Second World War?

MR. BALL: I don't quite understand your question. Are you asking me if I think that security can be assured by the maintenance of the status quo?

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: Every system of security in Europe relies on acceptance of the status quo in Europe.

MR. BALL: I don't think this precludes at all our moving toward some new understanding with the Soviet Union and with the states of Eastern Europe, and certainly I think that we have got to get on at some point with the settlement of the great unfinished business left over from the war, which is the division of Europe, because I don't see a stable world in which this division persists over a long period of time. And, as I have indicated earlier, this decision rests much more in Moscow than it does in the West.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: If I can follow up this question, in particular what I meant by status quo was, for instance, the recognition of the present state frontiers by all—almost every European, and I believe, American statesman, was saying in private on many occasions that, for instance, a Polish Government frontier on Oder-Neisse, is a final and definitive one. And

don't you believe, sir, that an official and clear statement, or rather repetition of what has been said in private, by your government too, would contribute to the security in Europe?

MR. BALL: I think that this ought to be a part of a very much larger settlement. This is one element. I don't disagree with your statement that the Oder-Neisse line will be a permanent frontier. I think it will be. But to say this officially, by my government or the government of the Federal Republic, or to embody it in any kind of a final agreement, this is something that ought to go into the hopper when we work out a final solution to these hard problems.

There is no point in trying to make decisions on the bits and pieces of the problem. We really ought to face the whole problem, and that includes the very difficult and dangerous situation that results from the division of Europe.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Ball, you said a minute ago that we ought to face the problem.

Don't you think we ought to face the problem of NATO? Don't you agree with Mr. Nixon and Vice President Humphrey that NATO probably is in the weakest position it has been since it was established?

MR. BALL: I don't really know what—I haven't seen either statement because I have been in the Far East for two weeks but—

MR. SPIVAK: Well, nothing new has happened in these two weeks. You know the situation in France, I think, and you know the situation in Europe probably better than most people, and you have known it for a long time.

Don't you think NATO really is in a very serious condition?

MR. BALL: I wouldn't say it was in a serious condition. I would say that so far as providing for the security of the West, which is the purpose of NATO, the security is being provided for. That is the important thing.

MR. SPIVAK: You don't think NATO is protecting the West? Do you think if we withdrew our nuclear support NATO would be worth two cents?

MR. BALL: I think that what is protecting the West is the combination of the forces of the NATO powers with the American strategic deterrent, and I think these things operate well together.

MR. BURNETT: Could I put to you a dilemma of the British Government, Mr. Ball? You know that we are under some eco-

nomie pressure to withdraw troops from overseas to save some money. Now, would you rather we withdrew those troops from Europe or from east of Suez? Which would you prefer?

MR. BALL: I speak purely as a private individual. I would say I think it would be a great mistake for the United Kingdom to withdraw its troops in the British Army on the Rhine. I think they should not be reduced. I think this would be a mistake.

The East of Suez question involves a whole other set of situations. Quite frankly, speaking personally, I don't feel strongly about the maintenance of British forces east of Suez.

MR. BURNETT: You are a "Europe first"?

MR. BALL: I think from the British point of view—I mean I think this ought to be looked at from the point of view of the United Kingdom's ultimate objectives. I think that the destiny of the United Kingdom lies in its playing an effective role of leadership in Western Europe, and I think that this is far more important on the scale of priorities from the British point of view than the maintenance of positions in the Far East.

MR. BURNETT: And yet just a little while ago on this program, Mr. Ball, we were talking about whether British troops and European troops should not be active in the Far East. Now, which does the United States want?

MR. BALL: When you ask about the United States, you are asking for a statement of the position of the United States Government. I think the United States Government has indicated that it puts great importance on the maintenance of British forces in Singapore and in the other positions in the Far East. I was expressing a purely personal view that I don't think this is all that important.

What I was talking about, the question of the obligations of European powers with regard to the Vietnamese War—I pointed out that I thought the United Kingdom Government had carried very heavy responsibilities in its deployment of forces to defend Malaysia and that this was something which one had to take into account when one considered the kinds of obligations which it might assume under the SEATO Treaty.

MR. STURUA: Mr. Ball, do you think that the Vietnam question can become the major international question during the future presidential elections?

MR. BALL: I think it is an important question. Whether it will be the major international question in the elections or not, I don't know. I think the American people, by and large, fully

support the Administration's position. I think this is shown by every indicator.

Now, there is a vocal minority of American opinion which does not, but this is an expression of a kind of democratic system that we have, which is not abnormal—I wouldn't suppose.

I think the fact that there is a war continuing in South Vietnam, if that is indeed the case when the election occurs, will be an element in the decision, but I wouldn't want to predict at this point just what part it will play or what influence it will have on American voting. I think it could well be that the American people will feel that it is quite undesirable to want to have a change of regime in the middle of a war. This has happened before.

MR. ABEL: Gentlemen, we have less than four minutes remaining, so let's try to keep them short.
Monsieur de Turenne.

MR. DE TURENNE: Mr. Ball, Communist China is going through lots of trouble which seems to keep her busy at home at the present. Do you think it might be a good time to admit this country in the United Nations and that it might help find a general solution in Asia?

MR. BALL: Well, to admit her into the United Nations in what way? I mean, to have a two-China policy, to suggest that the government in Taiwan, which has a position in the Security Council as well as a membership in the United Nations—that that represents one China and that Peking represents another. This is a position which the government in Peking has never been prepared to accept.

To admit it on a basis where it means the expulsion of the government in Taiwan? This is a position which I don't think the United States would be prepared to accept, and I would doubt that other nations would be. So the problem is a complicated one, and I don't think that just because China is in trouble that this means—that it is having great internal turbulence—that that means it is useful to get it into the United Nations. I don't know what the United Nations could do about its internal domestic problem, and these seem to be internal and not external problems that it is having at the present time.

COUNT VON FINCKENSTEIN: May I come back again to the non-proliferation. Which guaranties could the nuclear powers give to the "non-nucs" against blackmail?

MR. BALL: I think this is a matter which is going to have to be sorted out and developed over time. Just how these guaranties will be expressed, I don't know. It seems to me quite

important that there be guaranties to the non-nuclear powers if they are going to be willing to take a self-denying ordinance so far as the development of nuclear weapons is concerned.

MR. MALCUZYNSKI: Mr. Ball, do you think that the Vietnamese conflict and American involvement in it influence American activity in Europe?

MR. BALL: No, I wouldn't think so. I think that the United States policy toward Europe is the same policy that it has pursued for a very long time. I don't think it is influenced by the Vietnamese war.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Ball, few Americans know France as well as you do. Do you think anything can be done to improve Franco-American relations as long as President de Gaulle is in charge?

MR. BALL: I think we should continue to work at it.

MR. SPIVAK: That wasn't the question, Mr. Ball.

MR. BALL: Well, I don't know. I think Franco-American relations are not as bad as they are sometimes reported to be. I think that on a great many fundamental things there is no difference between ourselves and France.

MR. SPIVAK: Do you think there is anything the United States can do to improve relations?

MR. BALL: I think we are doing all that we can and should do.

MR. BURNET: Do you really mean that, Mr. Ball? Do you not think most questions in Western Europe are now awaiting President de Gaulle's departure in one way or another?

MR. BALL: I think that is an overstatement, actually. I think that President de Gaulle is pursuing a nationalist policy for France, which is creating problems within the alliance and in his relations with other countries, but—

MR. ABEL: Mr. Ball, I am sorry to interrupt but our time for questioning is up.