

Democratic team.

Thompson cannot afford to underestimate Bakalis. He is by far the strongest Democrat in the field, and he's knocked off popular Republican incumbents in his two previous campaigns for statewide office. Nevertheless, you get very short odds right now on a second term for Big Jim Thompson. No one expects that he'll do as well as 1976. Bakalis, after all, is not Howlett, and at 58 percent, there's a little fat to be trimmed. But Thompson's prospects allow him to look a little bit beyond 1978, and his campaign will be a model of the prescriptions he offers Republicans nationwide. It also will fit with the program national GOP chairman Bill Brock has devised for the salvation of his party.

For 1978 and 1980, Brock has instituted a local elections operation designed to capture for the GOP a majority in at least one house of enough state legislatures around the country to stave off the disaster that is predicted for 1981, when legislative and congressional district lines are to be redrawn, if this process is left entirely in the hands of Democrats. So, Thompson personally has targeted eight suburban and downstate Illinois senate districts where he'll campaign actively in an attempt to win the Illinois senate back for the Republican party. He wants to demonstrate coattails, you see.

Brock also has begun a \$250,000 program to raise the Republican's paltry share of the black vote—usually about 10 percent. Part of the reason it remains that low

is that Republican candidates routinely concede the black vote, a pattern that Thompson declines to follow. In his last campaign, he went right to the black wards of Chicago, normally bastions of the Daley machine where the vote is mobilized by Democratic precinct captains and organization jobbers, and where Jimmy Carter was a strong attraction at the top of the ticket. Thompson wound up with 26 percent of the black vote, which is two-and-a-half times the normal Republican base.

Thompson's reelection effort will be tied closely to that of Senator Charles Percy. Both men have been big vote getters in the past, and the combination could make Illinois one of the big Republican success stories of 1978. For right-wing true believers, the ticket inevitably will have a too-liberal tinge, and Thompson surely will be saddled with Percy's heresy, on the Panama Canal treaties, for example. But Thompson's advisers figure their own campaign themes will offset the image. He has been tough on crime, has balanced the budget, has whacked welfare fraud and has not raised taxes. If he wins, he'll have run twice in a state with an electorate as complex as you'll find anywhere in the country, and governed successfully with a legislature dominated by the opposition. With all that, Thompson's supporters hope to persuade the Republican right to think about electability in 1980, and to excuse a few deviations like ERA, abortion and laetrile.

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The men who persuaded JFK it was a "life or death struggle."

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## Kennedy's Cold War

by Tad Szulc

A "top-secret eyes-only" document declassified this month casts fascinating new light on the cold-war proclivities of the Kennedy administration. It is called "the Taylor Report," after General Maxwell D. Taylor. In 1961 Taylor held the title of "military representative of the President." After the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, President Kennedy appointed Taylor as head of a "Cuban Study Group" to analyze the disaster. The other members were Attorney General Robert Kennedy, CIA director Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke, the chief of naval operations. The text of the report was obtained from the National

Archives in Washington.

The group proposed the proclamation of a "limited national emergency," review of international treaties restraining the US from all-out pursuit of the cold war and an American invasion of Cuba, because "we are in a life and death struggle which we may be losing." President Kennedy did not follow the most fevered recommendations of his Cuban Study Group, but there is good reason to believe that his 1961 decision to send US soldiers to Vietnam was directly influenced by the opinions of these advisers. And subsequent US attempts to murder Fidel Castro may have been

nurtured by this report. In general, Kennedy seemed to endorse the Taylor approach; the next year he appointed Taylor chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Taylor Report recommended that the Joint Chiefs play a key role in "Cold War" operations thereby, in effect, reducing the CIA's importance. The Report put it this way:

"In the face of the threat of the Cold War, we feel that the JCS should be brought to feel as great a sense of responsibility for contributing to the success of the Cold War as to the conventional military defense of the country in time of war. They should be encouraged to express the military viewpoint clearly and directly before the President and other high officials of the Government. The latter, in turn, should be aware of the need of getting the considered views of the Chiefs before taking important decisions affecting Cold War programs and operations."

The Taylor proposals grew out of the Report's conclusion that the Bay of Pigs invasion by an American controlled force of Cuban exiles was "a marginal operation" that should have been less covert, and should have involved the Pentagon. "A paramilitary operation of the magnitude of Zapata [the invasion code name] could not be prepared and conducted in such a way that all US support of it and connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed. . . . By about November, 1960, the impossibility of running Zapata as a covert operation under CIA should have been recognized and the situation reviewed. The subsequent decision might then have been made to limit the efforts to attain covertness to the degree and nature of US participation, and to assign responsibility for the amphibious operation to the Department of Defense. In this case, the CIA would have assisted in concealing the participation of Defense. Failing such a reorientation, the project should have been abandoned."

A theme running through the Report is that the whole operation was uncoordinated. Thus: "The operation suffered from being run from the distance of Washington. At that range . . . it was not possible to have a clear understanding in Washington of events taking place in the field. This was particularly the case on the night of D-plus-1 [April 18, the second day of the invasion, when the Castro air force had already sunk or scattered the invaders' ammunition ships] when an appreciation of the ammunition situation would have resulted in an appeal for US air cover and an all-out effort to supply the beach by all available means." The question of American air cover for the invasion was one of the most controversial aspects of the operation. Kennedy had refused it as a matter of principle although he did authorize a one-hour cover by Navy jets on the morning of April 19, when the invasion force was already in retreat on the Cuban beaches.

The Taylor group disapproved of Kennedy's last-minute decision to cancel planned attacks on Cuban

airfields, at dawn on April 17, the invasion day, by B-26 aircraft belonging to the exile force. This "eliminated the last favorable opportunity to destroy the Castro Air Force on the ground. . . . The cancellation seems to have resulted partly from the failure to make the air strike plan entirely clear in advance to the President and the Secretary of State, but, more importantly, by misgivings as to the effect of the air strikes on the position of the US in the current United Nations debate on Cuba. Finally, there was the failure to carry the issue to the President when the opportunity was presented and explain to him with proper force the probable military consequences of a last-minute cancellation."

Another weakness in the plan, according to the Taylor Report, was that Kennedy and his advisers were wrongly assured that, if necessary, the invaders could turn into a guerrilla force. This notion has not been disclosed previously. The Report said: "With this alternative to fall back on, the view was held that a sudden or disastrous defeat was most improbable. . . . The guerrilla alternative as it had been described was not in fact available to this force in the situation which developed."

In sum, the group concluded, "the Executive Branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense, and USIA (United States Information Agency). Top level direction was given through ad hoc meetings of senior officials without consideration of operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for recording conclusions and decisions reached."

It was this chaos over the Bay of Pigs that led the Taylor group to its broader conclusions regarding the approach to future "Cold War" operations. The Report said: "We are of the opinion that the preparations and execution of paramilitary operations such as Zapata are a form of Cold War action in which the country must prepare to engage. If it does so, it must engage in it with a maximum chance of success. Such operations should be planned and executed by a governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, in addition to military and covert techniques, all other forces, political, economic, ideological, and intelligence, which can contribute to its success. No such mechanism presently exists but should be created to plan, coordinate and further a national Cold War strategy capable of including paramilitary operations."

To direct "Cold War" planning, the Taylor Report recommended the creation of a permanent "Strategic Resources Group" composed of representatives of under-secretarial rank from the State and Defense departments and the CIA "under a full-time chairman reporting directly to the President." It also proposed a "Cold War Indications Center" to "undertake the development and recommendations of Cold War plans and programs for those countries or areas specifically

assigned to it by the President for that purpose." The "Cold War Indications Center could, if fully developed, eventually serve as the governmental command post for the Cold War, organized and staffed to operate around the clock." This "Center," among other things, would be charged with "the timely determination of 'criticality,' that is, where and when there is a danger of defeat or opportunity for victory in a given country or area." The report added that "when a country is determined to be 'critical,' it would normally be assigned by the President to the planning and coordination jurisdiction of the Strategic Resources Group."

The Taylor group took in 1961 an extraordinarily alarmist view of the international situation. The Report urged Kennedy "to express to his principal assistants and advisers his sense of the need of a changed attitude on the part of the government and of the people toward the emergency which confronts us.

"The first requirement of such a change," the Report said, "is to recognize that we are in a life and death struggle which we may be losing, and will lose unless we change our ways and marshal our resources with an intensity associated in the past only with times of war." To achieve such a change, the Taylor Report proposed that the administration give "immediate consideration" to the following measures:

- "The announcement of a limited national emergency."
- "The review of any treaties or international agreements which restrain the full use of our resources in the Cold War."
- "The determination to seek the respect of our neighbors, without the criterion being international popularity."
- "A policy of taking into account the proportioning of foreign aid to the attitude shown us by our neighbors."

The Report said that "in the light of the strained situation in Laos and the potential crisis building up over Berlin, we should consider at once affirmative programs to cope with the threat in both areas." It recommended "a reexamination of emergency powers of the President as to their adequacy to meet the developing situation." Finally, the Report urged Kennedy to "conclude . . . that any Cold War operation, once started, must be carried through to conclusion with the same determination as a military operation."

Concerning Cuba, the Taylor group reported a "general feeling that there can be no longer-term living with Castro as a neighbor." It added: "There are only two ways to view this threat: either to hope that time and internal discontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures to force its removal. Unless by 'time' we are thinking in terms of years, there is little reason to place reliance on the first course of action as being effective in Castro's police state. The second has been made more difficult by the April failure and is now possible only through overt US participation with as

much Latin American support as can be raised. Neither alternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first. While inclining personally to a positive course of action against Castro without delay, we recognize the danger of dealing with the Cuban problem outside the context of the world Cold War situation. Action against Castro must be related to the probable course of events in such other places as Southeast Asia and Berlin which may put simultaneous claims on our resources."

Kennedy never established a Strategic Resources Group, as recommended in the Taylor Report. Instead, all covert operations were run from the White House by the so-called "Special Group" headed by Robert Kennedy. The "Special Group" coordinated all the anti-Castro endeavors, including the assassination attempts against the Cuban leader.

There are strong indications that President Kennedy's thinking on Vietnam was considerably influenced by the Taylor Report as well as by General Taylor himself. Kennedy made his secret decision to send the first 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other American military advisers to Vietnam in mid-May, just as the Taylor group gave him its oral report that was followed a month later by the written study. The Pentagon Papers thus noted that the dispatch of advisers "signaled a willingness to go beyond the 685-man limit on the size of the US mission in Saigon, which, if it were done openly, would be the first formal breach of the Geneva agreement." Thus is followed the Taylor Report's recommendation to "review . . . international agreements" that stood in the way of waging the Cold War.

On the same day Special Forces were sent to Vietnam, Kennedy also ordered clandestine warfare against North Vietnam by South Vietnamese agents directed by the CIA and Special Forces. This fitted perfectly into General Taylor's concept of "Cold War" covert paramilitary operations. Kennedy simultaneously ordered penetration by South Vietnamese forces into southeastern Laos to locate and attack Communist bases. In October, the President issued secret orders for "ground action, including the use of US advisors if necessary" against Communists in the southern Laos panhandle. In November, Kennedy further expanded the US military advisory mission in Vietnam, authorizing American advisors to go into combat. According to the Pentagon Papers chronology, General Taylor then recommended a 6000 to 8000-man US combat force in Vietnam. Defense Secretary McNamara estimated at the same time that the maximum US ground-force requirement "will not exceed six divisions." In 1962, General Taylor became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In January of that year, there were already 2646 American military personnel in Vietnam. By October 1963, the total had risen to 16,732 men. Then Lyndon Johnson took over.