Veciana's description, have built up a picture of their gunny. "Bishop," who would now be into his sixties, was...
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QUESTION: Do you, or did you, know Maurice Bishop?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION: Was he an Agency employee?

ANSWER: I believe so.

Former Director McCone said that, although he once knew, he could no longer remember what "Bishop" actually did for the Agency. There was another intriguing development when the Committee interviewed a former CIA agent described publicly merely as "B.H." When asked if he knew Maurice Bishop, "B.H." replied that "Mr. Bishop was in the organization, but I had no personal day-to-day open relationship with him. . . ." "B.H." was vague about "Bishop," saying only that he had been a senior officer and that he had met him "two or three times" at CIA headquarters. In Miami, however, the Committee stumbled on a witness who was more specific. He had formerly been a case officer at WAVE, the headquarters in Florida for the CIA's Secret War against Castro. This officer, whom the Committee quoted under the pseudonym "Ron Cross," had handled one of the most active anti-Castro groups and was potentially well placed to have known "Bishop." His answers to the Committee questions were dramatic. Committee investigators threw not one, but three names at "Cross." The first was "Bishop," another was "Knight," and the third was the real name of an officer who had worked out of Havana. "Cross" duly pointed out the fact that the third name was the true name of somebody he had encountered in Havana. "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt. And "Bishop," "Cross" believed, was the name used by David Phillips.

Phillips, the reader will recall, is the former top CIA officer who was running Mexico City Cuban operations — at the time of the Oswald visit, and of the strange visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies by a man who may — on some occasions at least — have been an Oswald imposter. It is Phillips who was the name used by Howard Hunt, and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed. "Havana, "Knight," as he recalled it, was a name occasionally used by Howard Hunt and Bishop, "Cross" believed.
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The Assassinations Committee inquiry, faced with the suggestion that Phillips was "Bishop," took into account certain coincidences between Phillips' career and "Bishop" as well as evidence that Phillips had contacts with Belgian industrialists. There is evidence that the CIA has indeed used Belgian identity papers for secret operations abroad.

The Anglo-American Directory of Cuba for 1960 carries an entry for Phillips as a "Public Relations Councillor." Phillips, however, says he was out of Cuba by early March 1960. Before the "mid-1960" period when Veciana says he was recruited by "Bishop," this author's research, for this Edition, has produced some corroboration that Phillips did cease to be active in Cuba after the mid-1960s. Phillips has been seen in Paris in 1966 and New York in 1967, suggesting that he might have moved to Europe.

Phillips has mentioned by Veciana. The CIA's liaison in the Castro regime was one of Veciana's closest associates, and Phillips knew him. Veciana says it was "Bishop" who incited him to take part in a plot to murder Fidel Castro, while Phillips says he was "persuaded" to do so.

Veciana has claimed that "Bishop" was involved in a much later plot to assassinate Castro in 1971 in Chile. He also says that "Bishop" played an important role in efforts to overthrow the regime.

The Assassinations Committee inquiry faced with the evidence of Phillips' activities in Cuba and his contacts with Belgians concludes that there was a link between Cuba's assassinations and the CIA, which coordinated the operations with Phillips. The CIA's involvement in Cuba is further supported by the finding that Phillips was awarded the Order of the Legion of Merit by the United States government in 1967, which is not a common practice for non-US citizens.

The committee also notes that Phillips' activities in Cuba and his contacts with Belgians, including the use of Belgian identity papers, suggest a pattern of activity that is consistent with the CIA's methods of operation.

These findings, combined with the testimony of witnesses and the newspapers, suggest that the CIA was involved in the Cuba assassinations. The Assassinations Committee recommends further investigation to uncover the full extent of the CIA's role in these events.

Aftermath

The result of the Assassinations Committee's findings and recommendations is a renewed focus on the role of the CIA in Cuba. The committee's report is used as evidence in subsequent investigations, including the House Select Intelligence Committee's investigation of the CIA's role in the Cuba assassinations.

The Assassinations Committee's report also sets the stage for future investigations into the role of the CIA in other countries, including the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. The report's findings are used as evidence in subsequent investigations, including the House Select Intelligence Committee's investigation of the CIA's role in the Kennedy assassination.
Lions he recalled with Phillips' assistant, Doug Gupton. Gupton, says "Cross," would often say something like, "Well, I guess Mr. Bishop will have to talk with him," and "Cross" would know he was referring to his boss, David Phillips. At this point, however, the Assassinations Committee inquiry faltered. The Committee traced Gupton, who confirmed that he was in daily contact with "Cross." However, he said he "did not recall whether either Hunt or Phillips used the cover name "Knight," nor did he remember Phillips using the name "Maurice Bishop." Faced with "Cross' " recollection of his having referred frequently to Phillips by the name "Bishop," Gupton said, "Well maybe I did, I don't remember." He said he did not recognize the artist's impression of "Bishop" drawn from the description by Veciana. He did say, however, that Phillips "used many of his old contacts from Havana in his personal operations." During the search for "Bishop," Antonio Veciana was shown photographs of David Phillips. He reportedly stared at one picture for a long time, and then said, "It is close.... Does he have a brother?" Finally, though, Veciana said, "No, it's not him.... But I would like to talk to him." Soon, Veciana had an opportunity to observe David Phillips in the flesh — at a luncheon of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Afterwards, according to a published account of the confrontation, Veciana repeated his denial that Phillips was "Bishop," saying, "No, he's not him.... He looks like him."

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Congress' Assassinations Committee pursued the declaration by Miami case officer "Ron Cross," that Phillips and Howard Hunt had operated under the names "Bishop" and "Knight" respectively — using what appears to be a chess analogy. It found a sort of corroboration, which also contains a contradiction. Hunt, who has written several novels and a non-fiction work about the Bay of Pigs, has used pseudonyms in his books. For example, although Hunt claims he did not meet Frank Fiorini/Sturgis until the Seventies, a character very like him appears under the name Hank Sturgis in a novel written as early as 1949. The fictional character is an ex-Marine turned gambler and soldier-of-fortune, a career which sounds similar to that of the real-life individual who legally took the name Frank Sturgis in 1952. In his book about the Bay of Pigs, Hunt refers to his old associate Phillips, then propaganda chief for the operation, as "Knight." In his 1977 memoirs, for his part, Phillips makes much of this identification, commenting that he was "the ultimate accolade — people who have worked in CIA will recall that pseudonym belonged to one of the Agency's most senior officers, a legend — people who have worked in CIA will recall that pseudonym belonged to one of the Agency's most senior officers, a legend." The most senior officer was Hunt himself, according to the Assassinations Committee. Councilman said that Phillips actually used that name was because of the controversy that surrounded him. During the search for "Bishop," Antonio Veciana was shown photographs of David Phillips. He reportedly stared at one picture for a long time, and then said, "It is close.... Does he have a brother?" Finally, though, Veciana said, "No, it's not him.... But I would like to talk to him." Soon, Veciana had an opportunity to observe David Phillips in the flesh — at a luncheon of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Afterwards, according to a published account of the confrontation, Veciana repeated his denial that Phillips was "Bishop," saying, "No, he's not him.... He looks like him." Councilman said that Phillips actually used that name was because of the controversy that surrounded him.
In the end, Congress' Assassinations Committee was not satisfied with the responses by either Veciana or Phillips. Its Report said that the Committee "suspected Veciana was ... founder of Alpha 66, especially since the officer had once been deeply involved in Agency anti-Castro operations ..."

There is no evidence that the "retired officer," Phillips, had any part in a conspiracy to murder the President. Moreover, whatever the true identity of "Bishop," Veciana's account ... help fabricate a false story about an Oswald link with Cuban diplomats. That, clearly, must be exhaustively investigated.

The Assassinations Committee has left the "Bishop" affair unresolved and under-researched. Its inquiries had been stymied by confusing responses to its questions about "Bishop" ... to "Bishop" in its files, one-time Director McCone said he must have been mistaken when he told the Committee he did remember "Bishop." "B.H.," the former covert operative believed by Committee staff to have been used on assignments involving violence, stuck to his ... be a red herring designed to confuse the trail. He tends to believe McCone's instinctive initial reaction, and also the replies of "Ron Cross" about Hunt and Phillips. The feeling remains that somebody in the CIA, or who was formerly in the CIA, is playing chess with the Kennedy inquiry.

In its closing months, with the evidence about possible Mafia connections with Oswald in New Orleans building up, the Committee veered in that direction to the exclusion of other ... As we have seen, vital leads remain unchecked. So, too, does another of Veciana's efforts to help the investigation ... there was indeed a "Bishop," and believe it is of paramount importance that he be unmasked. Clearly this is right.

It is certainly possible that a renegade element in U.S. intelligence manipulated Oswald — whatever his role on Nov. 22, 1963. That same element may have fabricated some of the evidence that led the Committee to ... that with a Belgian passport. Veciana noted the name "Bishop" with "B.H." and his relationship with "Bishop" ... "Bishop," he states that, in the very earliest days of his relationship with "Bishop," he noted that his American contact had with him a Belgian passport. Veciana noted the ... our source of information. We had to proceed with ... that he was a useful source of information. "B.H." was a useful source of information with whom he had contact to provide the Committee with ... where we began to suspect that "B.H." could be a red herring designed to confuse the trail. He tends to believe McCone's instinctive initial reaction, and also the replies of "Ron Cross" about Hunt and Phillips. The feeling remains that somebody in the CIA, or who was formerly in the CIA, is playing chess with the Kennedy inquiry.

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tration, and so did some of those in the CIA whose views clashed with the President's. The time of the Bay of Pigs, when the President "betrayed" the cause of the anti-Castro movement, was coincidental with the Kennedy onslaught on the Mafia, including, specifically, the forcible eviction of Carlos Marcello. Over Cuba, or the Mafia and the exiles nursed the same resentments as many in the CIA. There were those in the CIA, steeped in an everyday aura of deception and violent action, who exercised unconscionable power. The signs are that, at least from the time of the unauthorized raids on Soviet shipping after the missile crisis, some individuals in intelligence encouraged actions designed to sabotage the President's search for peace. This cannot be dismissed as unfounded speculation. Congress' Assassinations Committee noted that, even at the time of the Bay of Pigs debacle, a senior CIA officer reportedly incited Cuban exiles to disobey Presidential policy. Before the invasion, the CIA director of operations, working under the cover name of "Frank Bender," assembled exile leaders at their Guatemala training camp. According to the authoritative history, "Bender" told the Cubans that "There were forces in the administration trying to block the invasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe (Pepe San Roman, the exile commander) remembers Frank's next words this way: 'If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners.'... Frank then laughed and said, 'In the end we will win.'"

Many months later, during the missile crisis, Robert Kennedy was appalled to discover that — as the world waited in fear of a nuclear holocaust — one CIA officer had conceived on his own the project of dispatching ten commando teams to Cuba. Three groups had already set off. The President's brother investigated the matter and found that top CIA officials knew nothing about it. The officer responsible for this idiocy was William Harvey, the CIA operative said by an official of the Cuban Special Group to "The officer's real name was reportedly 'Droller' (Thomas Powers, op. cit., p. 107)."

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have hated Robert Kennedy "with a purple passion." Before his eventual removal to a foreign posting, Harvey's expertise was harnessed to two familiar projects. One was the "Executive Action" scheme, in which Harvey had been dabbling even before the Bay of Pigs. Its purpose, as the CIA has admitted, was to research means to overthrow foreign leaders, including a "capability to perform assassinations." To that end, Harvey contacted O.x/wm, the as yet unidentified CIA "asset" whom Harvey used to canvass the underworld for "an available pool of assassins." From late 1961 until 1963, Harvey headed another operation — the CIA machinations with the Mafia to kill Fidel Castro. He was actively involved in the field and in that capacity had meetings with the gangster John Roselli, the link-man to Santos Trafficante in the Castro assassination plots.

Harvey's desperate folly during the missile crisis, and "Bender's" apparent incitement to mutiny during the Bay of Pigs operation, are both recorded by distinguished chroniclers. These episodes are evidence, if evidence is still needed, that some in the CIA were ready, even eager, to flout the wishes of President Kennedy. While the Assassinations Committee rightly concluded that the CIA as an agency had no part in the assassination, it is wholly possible that mavericks from the intelligence world were involved.

After his brother's death in Dallas, Attorney General Robert Kennedy confided such suspicions to a family friend, then Director of the CIA, John McCone. The younger Kennedy later recalled, "You know, at the time I asked McCone ... if they had killed my brother, and I asked him in a way that he couldn't lie to me. McCone said the CIA had no knowledge of the assassination. He was the only person in the government besides the President who could have helped me."

In the ensuing investigation, the CIA was the subject of extensive questioning by the Assassinations Committee. The CIA director, James Schlesinger, was questioned in his capacity as Secretary of Defense. The committee gave the CIA a "thorough and fair" hearing, but it was clear that there were"individuals in the intelligence community who continued to harbor doubts about the CIA's role." The committee's report concluded, "We cannot be certain that the CIA was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, but we cannot be certain that it was." The report was critical of the CIA's handling of information and of its relationship with the Mafia. The committee recommended that the CIA be reorganized and that its activities be more closely monitored by Congress.

The Assassinations Committee's report was widely criticized, particularly by those who believed that the CIA had played a role in the assassination. The report's conclusion that the CIA was not involved in the assassination was widely seen as a cover-up for a government agency that had long been accused of misconduct. The report's recommendation that the CIA be reorganized was also met with skepticism, as the CIA continued to operate as it had in the past. The Assassinations Committee's report was widely seen as a failure to adequately investigate the role of the CIA in the assassination of President Kennedy.
As this book was being completed, one indefatigable American reporter found that his carefully researched stories on the Kennedy case were not getting into print. On appealing to his editor, he received a memorandum regretting that he was still "posing questions that are unanswerable." He should instead, wrote the editor, "carefully point out that the Assassinations Committee's demise is reflective of the general public's feelings for the moment — 'Let it rest.' " When the Committee's final report was published, the most powerful organs of the American media echoed that sentiment. Some decried the significant achievements that the Committee had produced. Long before their reporters could possibly have studied the monumental verbiage of the report and its accompanying volumes of evidence, Time, Newsweek, and the New York Times delivered their verdicts. They gave space to articles ranging from the caustic to the openly sarcastic. One distinguished commentator "declined to accept" the findings of the Committee, claiming that the latest inquiry had performed the welcome service of disposing of the many fantasies that had surrounded the case. I started work on the Kennedy case with the apprehensive expectation that I would be sifting more than a dozen years of intensive investigative reporting. But to my surprise, I found myself the first reporter to interview relevant witnesses. After the Assassinations Committee reported, one American editor opined that the Committee had done no service to history and should never have met at all if the best it could do was prolong public confusion. Its writer claimed with assurance that...
few Americans are very fervent these days in their desire to know the single, burning, absolute truth about the assassination of President Kennedy. Between hysteria and the cement of history there is that essential to any civilized society — justice. The reporters who mocked the latest assassination investigation also produced disturbing quotes from law-enforcement authorities. One Justice Department official was reported as saying, "We are in the midst of a major investigation, and we are following the evidence wherever it leads." Another official, the outburst is at odds with his responsibility as a trusted public official.

As for the CIA, its arrogance toward the civilian administration is recorded time and again in these pages. For Congressmen on the Assassinations Committee, its performance was as disappointing as a spokesman prepared to discuss the role of that central figure — Lee Oswald. In conclusion, the Congressman turned to Shakespeare to ask the question he posed to the American people about the CIA. He asked, quoting Julius Caesar, "Upon what meat doth this, our Caesar, feed That he is grown so great?"

"Perhaps," Dodd concluded, "it is the meat of our indifference. If so, we can afford to be indifferent no longer."

The Chief Counsel of the Assassinations Committee, Professor Robert Blakey, is a meticulous lawyer. He has a reputation for extreme caution and a painstaking regard for hard evidence. Since the Committee issued its Report he has broken his customary silence to emphasize that the fact that there were at least two gunmen in Dallas, and thus a conspiracy, is "a fact that cannot be denied."

Because statutes of limitation do not apply to murder, certainly murders of men like John F. Kennedy.... Justice

The Chief Counsel is right, and his forthright comments lead to the aspiration with which justice is inextricably entwined — morality. In mid-1979, at a low point in his own life, former Senator John Kennedy, President Jimmy Carter, addressed the nation on what he called "the crisis of the spirit in our country." He listed the ills of an America endangered from within — a nation in which only a third of the people even bother to vote in national elections, in which the government is seen as corrupt and indifferent — to the crisis. They were, he said, the executions of national figures which began with the killing of President Kennedy. In a schizophrenic era, the assassination of President Kennedy has reflected the best and the worst hallmarks of the American character. The murder itself, enacted on a wide screen of global attention, was somehow intrinsically American, as seminal...
CONSPIRACY to the Sixties as the broadcast dramas of Vietnam, the revolution of international youth, and the landing on the moon. ... its parents. In the Seventies, the reopening of the Kennedy inquiry was a response by the lawmakers to a national doubt that questioned far more than the manner of one man's passing. In 1981 it is conceivable that the concepts of justice and morality may surface from a sea that had been colored instead to rob shimmering treasure. That is why I am here."

A multitude of citizens, not only in the United States, would certainly agree with that sentiment. The Assassinations Committee Chief Counsel, in a remarkable statement, has expressed his belief that it is not necessarily too late to see justice done. He has declared that there are living people who could have been present on 11 September 1956, but who were never heard from again. He has said, "I think I could come close to it." And the President of the United States, in delivering the annual State of the Union Address, referred to the assassination of Malcom L. 1963. It was a reminder of the continuing debate about the nature of American life. Perhaps that hope will not, only three years away from 1984, draw conditioned derision. It is fitting, perhaps, to close with the words of one who was not yet an American citizen when President Kennedy was assassinated. In 1978 Silvia Odio, the Cuban exile whose chilling testimony is the work of the Warren Commission, after hearing her son's words, wrote: "I am here, and that is why I am here."

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That statement, from a distinguished and responsible counsel, should not go unheeded in a functioning democracy: In its final Report, the Assassinations Committee asked, "Is it truly beyond belief that in a criminal justice context, to move this towards trial ... The Chief Counsel warned that he could not be sure of bringing an indictment, that he could not be sure of bringing an indictment, that the case would be closed. He was expressing, as he wrote, "I do not think it is necessary to see justice done."

I think it is necessary to see justice done, and that is why I am here. But I think it is necessary to see justice done, and that is why I am here. For, as he wrote, "I think I could come close to it."
David Phillips, the former CIA officer considered by the Select Committee on Assassinations as a possible candidate for the true identity behind the cover name "Maurice Bishop," reacted strongly when this book was published in the summer of 1980. He contacted top executives in newspapers and television, making himself available to counter passages in Conspiracy concerning him. As a result, he took part in discussions with Phillips on prominent television programs.

In the course of these approaches to the press, Phillips contacted the editor of the Washington Post. Subsequently, when a reporter was assigned to the story, Phillips revealed the real identity of former CIA officers whose identities were protected by pseudonyms in Assassinations Committee reports and in my book. Phillips observed that "Cross," the case officer who believed Phillips had used the name "Bishop," was a heavy drinker, implying that he was prone to getting his facts wrong. Shortly after, "Cross" was visited at home by a reporter, and Phillips called him to discuss the matter. Although "Cross" was former a heavy drinker, implying that he was prone to getting his facts wrong, Phillips revealed that he had been on the phone to "Cross" at the same time. Whatever had passed between them, "Cross" stood by his assertion that the name "Bishop" had been used in the Miami CIA office, and that he believed it to be David Phillips. He former CIA officer considered by the Select Committee on Assassinations as possible candidate for the true identity behind the cover name "Maurice Bishop."
The Washington Post reporter was also able to talk to Phillips' former Miami assistant, "Doug Gupton." He said, much as he had said to the Committee, "I never used the name 'Bishop,' to my recollection." Finally, the reporter visited "B.H.," the former CIA covert operative who told the Committee he had met "Bishop" in the past, but whose testimony prompted a skeptical reaction from the Committee investigator. "B.H.," a short, dark man of Cuban origin, is belligerent—not least about the way the CIA has been treated in recent years. He told the Committee that Phillips was "a personal friend," an officer he worked with closely on a "day-to-day" basis on Cuban operations between 1960 and 1964. Interviewed by the Washington Post in 1980, B.H. stated that after Phillips testified to the Committee, but before he himself was formally interviewed, he discussed the Committee inquiry with Phillips. In his Committee interview "B.H." was asked simply whether he had known anybody named Maurice Bishop. After replying that he had, "B.H." responded to Committee questioning, "Mr. Bishop was in the organization but I had no personal day-to-day open relationship with him. Phillips, yes; Bishop, no. I knew them both." "B.H." appeared in his replies to be stressing that he remembered "Bishop" as being somebody other than Phillips.

There are notable discrepancies between what "B.H." told the Committee and what he said to the Post. He told the Committee he encountered "Bishop" "two or three times." He told the Post he met him only once. He told the Committee that he encountered "Bishop" between 1960 and 1964. In his Post interview, he said it was probably after 1964—after the time most relevant to the Veciana allegations. "B.H." told the Committee he worked closely with Phillips between 1960 and 1964. In the conversation with the Post, he claimed he did not work with Phillips until after 1964. "B.H." accounts for these differences by claiming that his comments were "wrongly recorded."

The Assassinations Committee investigator of the "Bishop" case suspects that the "B.H." scenario may be a red herring, designed to confuse the trail. Such justifiable suspicions might have been resolved had the Committee management given the "Bishop" case the attention it deserved. Sadly it did not. While Phillips did testify, the Committee failed to take testimony on oath from "Cross," "B.H.,” or "Gupton." "Cross," who told two investigators he believed "Bishop" was Phillips, was not even subjected to formal interview. There were no systematic interrogations of relevant CIA officers who might have further confirmed the use of the name "Bishop." The Committee failed to follow up on a key lead provided by Veciana months before the Committee wound up its inquiry. Veciana had spoken, from the start, of a go-between whom he used during his association with "Bishop." He explained that, in line with intelligence tradecraft, "Bishop" had always initiated their clandestine meetings, either by telephoning direct, or through a third person who always knew where to reach Veciana. Veciana was long reluctant to identify this third party, but finally did so—providing an old, invalid address in Puerto Rico. In 1980 I did follow up the lead, and tracked down the Veciana–"Bishop" go-between. This proved to be the first independent corroboration that Veciana really was in touch with somebody called "Bishop."

The person who helped arrange meetings between "Bishop" and Veciana is a woman, a prim grandmother in her fifties, who works as a minor functionary in a U.S. government department. She has requested anonymity, and will be identified here only as "Fabiola," a Cuban exile who left Havana in autumn 1961. She worked, until that year, as Veciana's secretary at the Banco Financiero, and was there at the time Veciana claims he was recruited by "Bishop." While she says Veciana never mentioned a CIA contact, both Veciana and "Bishop" were aware of the existence of the Banco Financiero, and will be remembered by Veciana in the Committee's opening address in 1980. The Committee never tried to trace a vital witness whose name was provided by Veciana months before the Committee wound up its inquiry.
CONSPIRACIES. He once produced the huge sum of half a million dollars, which he asked her to safeguard until he retrieved it. Veciana has always said he worked with "Bishop" on a "program that resulted in the destabilization of the Cuban currency." In Cuba, Fabiola decided not to ask Veciana awkward questions. Politically, she sympathized with him, and later— in exile — collaborated actively when Veciana became leader of Alpha 66. He asked her to act as answering service for him when he was traveling, and in the months to come Fabiola became familiar with the name of a caller from the mainland United States. The name was "Bishop." When I interviewed Fabiola I threw out a number of names, including that of "Bishop." "Bishop" was the only name to which she responded, and it stirred in her the memory of another name. "Bishop" is firmly linked in Fabiola's mind with a second person — "Prewett." For her, the two names are so definitely associated that at first she had difficulty remembering which was which. Fabiola says both individuals telephoned Veciana over the same period, and she understood that they were associated with one another. She believed both "Bishop" and "Prewett" were connected with an American news publication, based on the East Coast. Finally, she recalls that "Prewett" was female. A check of American press directories turned up Virginia Prewett, a Washington journalist who has specialized in Latin American affairs all her life. She has written extensively about the struggle between Fidel Castro, whom she has characterized as a "betrayer," and the Cuban exiles, whom she describes as "patriots." In 1963 Prewett attended a conference on Cuba co-sponsored by Freedom House and the Citizen's Committee for a Free Cuba. Her report on the conference, later inserted in the Congressional Record, began by quoting a call from Freedom House: "to remove both Fidel Castro and the Soviet presence from Cuba without delay." For many years, she wrote for the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), a syndication organization founded by Prewett's friend Ernest Cuneo, also a member of the Committee for a Free Cuba. It was Cuneo, a veteran of the CIA's forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services, who arranged for Prewett to work for NANA. In 1963 NANA was severely criticized in a Senate Committee Report for syndicating pro-Chiang Kai-shek propaganda written by a paid American lobbyist.

VA NA was severely criticized in a Senate Committee Report for syndicating pro-Chiang Kai-shek propaganda written by a paid American lobbyist. NANA, which was established in 1912, has a long history of providing news services to newspapers across the United States. The organization was founded by a group of journalists who wanted to provide an alternative to the established press, which they believed was biased against American interests. NANA's founders included several prominent journalists and politicians, including Senator Robert La Follette and Representative John Collier. The organization was initially supported by a group of wealthy patrons, including John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie. In the early years of its existence, NANA was known for its investigative reporting and its support of progressive causes. However, in recent years, the organization has been criticized for its lack of transparency and its reliance on a small group of wealthy patrons. In 2020, NANA announced that it would be closing its doors after 108 years of operation.