

Paul H. Stombaugh/Nicholas Daniloff/ Nigel West's "Names of Intelligence 8/10/92

When Daniloff was arrested in Moscow for delivering messages to Stombaugh the name Paul H. Stombaugh caught my attention because it is the name of a man who had been in the FBI Laboratory as a hair and fibres expert. As I now recall he has a son of the same name in the Spartanburg, SC area and Gerry and I had some correspondence about this,

It is I think a fair measure of West's book that he does not connect the attached pages 23 and 30 from his book. In the first of these pages he identifies Stombaugh as a US spook and in the second he reports the arrest and swapping of Daniloff without connecting the two. *On explaining the arrest.*

I do not know that the spook Stombaugh is the same as the former FBI lab agent Stombaugh but the less than common last name and the same middle initial do suggest it.

FBI SA Robert Rrazier, firearms expert and liaison with and witness before the Warren Commission on matters of which he had no personal knowledge, when we deposed him in CA 75-226 testified that when he examined the shirt collar in the JFK case he asked Stombaugh, as a hair and fibers expert, to file a report after making an examination of the damage to the shirt collar. No such report of any such analysis was ever ~~made~~ ^{provided} and the judge let the FBI get away with the clear fraud of saying an unrelated report was that report when it obviously was not. Could not have been.

West provides no sources; no end notes, few footnotes and none on these two items.

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Games of Intelligence

Nov 1989

Bogaty, the KGB's acting *Resident* who disappeared with his wife Larissa and two sons from the Soviet embassy in Morocco in September 1982, complained about debts they had accumulated since their resettlement in Falls Church, Virginia. Ludek Zemenek, a KGB illegal 'turned' by the FBI in May 1977, wants to return to his native Prague, citing his continued commitment to Marxism and his desire to bring up his two sons in a non-materialistic society. Zemenek, who called himself Rudolf Herrmann while under cover, first as a delicatessen operator in Toronto and then as a photographer, was regarded as an important coup by the FBI. His principal meal-ticket was the identity of another KGB illegal, Professor Hugh Hambleton, who was eventually prosecuted in England in 1982. The FBI resettled Zemenek as a house builder in Hartsdale, New York, and put him on their payroll at \$35,000 a year. His business thrived, and now Zemenek and his wife Inga are quite wealthy, at least by Czech standards, but they still want to return home.

In spite of the shock waves caused by Yurchenko and felt throughout the West's counter-intelligence community, the CIA has continued to attract high-grade intelligence defectors. Oleg Agrayants of the KGB defected from Tunis in June 1986 and was followed in December the following year by Andrei A. Remenchuk, a GRU officer under translator cover at the Soviet consulate in Montreal. There have been others, perhaps as many as four senior intelligence defectors during 1988, whose details have yet to be disclosed.¹¹ This has to some degree compensated for an era of ceaseless failure, and the CIA's demonstrable inability to run successful operations in the so-called denied areas behind the Iron Curtain.

Edward Howard, the CIA traitor denounced by Yurchenko, is in part responsible for the latest defeats suffered by the CIA's Moscow Station. Before his dismissal for petty theft and drug abuse, Howard had been selected for an assignment to Moscow. Although it is surprising that someone so inexperienced could be chosen for hazardous duty in his first posting overseas, the CIA prefers to use unknown personnel in Moscow so as to reduce the chances of their being compromised instantly by the local security apparatus. The old hands, who have been on missions across the world, may have the advantage in terms of tradecraft and knowledge but, inevitably, they are also more likely to be spotted for what they really are

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by the KGB. Accordingly, Howard was selected for Moscow and underwent a special training course at Rosslyn, Virginia, in preparation for his transfer. During this period he was briefed on a number of current operations, including that of Adolf G. Tolkachev, an aeronautical engineer then supplying the CIA with secrets. In June 1985, Tolkachev was arrested while attempting a rendezvous with his case officer, Paul M. Stormbaugh, who had operated under second secretary cover at the US embassy. Soon afterwards, two other cases went badly wrong. In March 1986, another CIA officer, Michael Sellers, was declared persona non grata for espionage and, on 7 May, his colleague Eric Sies was expelled for the same reason. Within a year three important operations, which had taken years of painstaking preparation by the Moscow Station, had been destroyed and, it has been alleged, no less than five of the CIA's local assets were shot because of Howard's treachery.

Of course, intensive surveillance is an accepted occupational hazard in Moscow and, like most Allied organizations, the CIA has found the task of running an agent in the Soviet Union exceptionally difficult. Most of the agents recruited have come to a sticky end. Aleksandr D. Ogorodnik, a regular diplomat recruited in Bogota, only survived twenty months before being arrested in 1977. He succeeded in committing suicide with a lethal pill supplied by the CIA.¹² Anatoly Filatov, another Foreign Ministry official run for a long period by the CIA, was eventually caught and executed in July 1978. Similarly, Major Piotr Popov was arrested in October 1959 and thrown live into a furnace before an audience of his GRU colleagues. The event was filmed and subsequently screened to new recruits *pour encourager les autres*. In short, a combination of ruthless deterrents, strict supervision and an oppressive scrutiny of suspect foreigners makes Moscow a daunting environment in which to mount agent operations. Naturally, the solution is to concentrate such activities in more congenial surroundings, which is why the overwhelming majority of successful cases are developed or serviced in neutral or Allied countries. Thus, the famous Oleg Penkovsky underwent his debriefings during visits to London and Paris while he was supposedly attending trade negotiations. In the case of Vladimir N. Sakharov, who eventually defected from Kuwait in July 1971, clandestine contact was largely restricted to the countries in the Middle East where he had been posted as a regular Soviet diplomat.

quietly dropped and he was allowed to return home as a gesture of goodwill. The case is far from unique. Igor A. Ivanov, the KGB officer implicated when John Butenko was caught in 1963 passing him secrets of Strategic Air Command's communications system, stayed out of gaol through clever legal manoeuvres even when Butenko had been convicted and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Ivanov was subsequently allowed to travel to Moscow. More recently, in August 1986, Gennadi F. Zakharov was arrested for receiving classified jet-engine blueprints from an FBI double agent, Leakh N. Bhoge. A week later an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, was taken into custody in Moscow and then swapped for Zakharov. Also caught in the fall-out was the CIA Station Chief in Moscow, Murat Natirboff, who was withdrawn discreetly.

Not all cases come to court, or even come to the attention of the public. An USAF sergeant was intercepted in 1973 while on his way to the Soviet embassy on Washington's Sixteenth Street with a package of top-secret, counter-intelligence documents. Nothing more was heard of the affair and the sergeant's name was never disclosed. It may well be that the Justice Department was inhibited from taking public proceedings against a suspect for fear of compromising further information. In 1954, an agreement was reached between the CIA and the Justice Department allowing the Agency discretion to drop the charges where more damage might be done if the evidence was made public. This policy was terminated when William Kampiles was prosecuted in 1977, revealing a number of appalling security lapses committed by the Agency. An unknown number of cases have been allowed to lapse under the threat from defendants to reveal sensitive information in court. Three years later, Congress approved the 1980 Classified Information Procedures Act, which enabled lawyers, at the discretion of the judge, to study very secret evidence in private without the requirement to put it all on the public record. However, even the CIPA's provisions failed to give adequate protection to the ultra-secret NSA in the trial of Ronald Pelton in 1986. The NSA, whose initials are sometimes believed to stand for 'No Such Agency', was exceptionally cautious about public disclosures of its activities, and it went to great lengths to avoid statements in open court regarding its operations. The only previous incident of this kind led to the conviction in 1948 of an employee of the Armed Forces Security Agency (the NSA's predecessor), William Weisband, for contempt, not espionage.² In

1978, the prosecution against a black American USAF non-commissioned officer, formerly based with the 6950th Electronic Security Squadron at RAF Chicksands in Bedfordshire, who had volunteered his services to the GRU, was dropped because of its sensitivity. The British Security Service was reluctant to disclose their tapes, which had recorded the man's telephone conversations with the Soviet military attaché, and the trial might also have revealed details of the highly secret work undertaken at Chicksands. In another case involving the CIA, in which the CIPA was invoked, R. Craig Smith insisted that his contacts with Soviet intelligence officers had been part of an authorized operation and Smith was acquitted.

The rate of court hearings or the number of PNGs in any given period cannot be used as anything but the vaguest guide for the level of activity in a particular country. And, by definition, they are only likely to be of limited value in determining past reputation rather than giving a valuation of the current position. With these caveats in mind, we can now turn to look at the US experience in dealing with the intelligence threat to its security.

The exact scale of the threat is difficult to quantify, but the number of Eastern Bloc diplomats is closely monitored. At present it stands at 4,250, of whom 2,100 come from Warsaw Pact countries. The CIA regularly releases its own analysis of Soviet commercial representation and, in 1980, this showed a total of 148 trade officials resident in the US.³ Soviet diplomatic establishments in the capital include the new embassy and residential complex on Mount Alto, the old embassy on Sixteenth Street, the consulate at 1825 Phelps Place and the Soviet military office at 2552 Belmont Road NW. There is also an information centre on Eighteenth Street NW, a trade office at 2001 Connecticut Avenue, a fisheries section on Decatur Street NW, a marine attaché at 1555 L Street NW and a forty-acre estate at Pioneer Point, in Centreville, Maryland. Elsewhere there are the consulates on East 67th Street, New York, and 2790 Green Street, San Francisco; the UN mission in Manhattan and the Glen Cove compound on Long Island. About two hundred or so of the Soviet diplomats based in Washington are regarded by the FBI as KGB or GRU professionals. In addition, there are about 140 diplomats accredited to the UN, plus a similar number of international civil servants employed by the UN based in New York.