

Wife of Soviet Defector Says the C.I.A. May Have Caused His Death

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WASHINGTON, May 24—The wife of a Soviet defector has asked President Carter and the Senate Intelligence Committee to investigate disclosures that have led her to suspect that her husband's life may have been needlessly sacrificed by the Central Intelligence Agency in a counterintelligence operation.

In letters prepared by her lawyer and sent to Senator Birch Bayh, the Indiana Democrat who heads the intelligence committee, and President Carter, Eva Shadrin, the defector's wife, said that in the two and a half years since her husband disappeared in Vienna she had received information that contradicted official versions of the case given her by the C.I.A., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the White House.

Mrs. Shadrin says that she has recently received information that indicates the C.I.A. may have used her husband to help solidify the position of a Soviet agent in the Soviet intelligence service despite the fact it strongly suspected the Russian was an agent provocateur.

If this is true, she said in an interview, this would have been a needless and cynical use of her husband's life. Mrs. Shadrin, who has been trying to find out what happened to her husband since his disappearance, told officials of both the C.I.A. and F.B.I. about the information through her lawyer in April. She was advised that the two agencies had told her all they could under national security regulations and that they did not know what had happened to Mr. Shadrin.

In her letter to Mr. Carter, she renewed her appeal for an audience and entreated him to help her find her husband or the truth about his fate.

The request for an investigation has brought renewed attention here to the murky world of defectors and double agents.

Nicholas G. Shadrin is the American name of Nikolai F. Artamanov, commander of a Soviet Navy destroyer who defected to the United States in 1959. Mr. Shadrin disappeared in Vienna on Dec. 20, 1975, ostensibly while on the way to meet with Soviet intelligence agents.

Contradictions Are Noted

Mrs. Shadrin, who accompanied her husband on the Vienna trip, said she was told later by the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and the White House that at the time of his disappearance her husband was serving as a "double agent" for the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.

She said that the agencies had told her that he had become a double agent in 1966 after he reported that members of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, had tried to recruit him while he was living here and working as a consultant for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

But Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer, Richard D. Copaken, said that new information, in press reports and from sources they had interviewed, sharply contradicted this version.

Mrs. Shadrin said that she believed that her husband might have been sacrificed to aid the C.I.A. in its dealings with a



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Eva Shadrin

Soviet official named Igor, who first approached the agency by calling the home of its director in May 1966 and offering his services to penetrate the K.G.B. He held out the promise that he could be the C.I.A.'s man in the higher echelons of the Soviet intelligence service.

Part of the story of Igor was published two weeks ago in Time magazine and independently confirmed by The New York Times.

According to former intelligence officers, one of the tidbits Igor offered to get the relationship under way was the charge that a longtime Soviet operative for the C.I.A. code-named Sasha was in fact a K.G.B. plant. By this time Sasha

had been brought back from foreign assignment and was living in Virginia under the name Alexander Orlov.

Igor told his C.I.A. contacts that to prove his value to his superiors and to obtain a permanent assignment at the Soviet Embassy here, he needed to recruit Mr. Shadrin as a double agent.

Mrs. Shadrin and her lawyer said they believed that this was the real reason that in June 1966 Adm. Rufus W. Taylor, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, urged Mr. Shadrin to take on the risky assignment. They charged that the next nine years, during which Mr. Shadrin kept in contact with Soviet agents at the instruction of the C.I.A. and F.B.I., were a waste because the American authorities had strong suspicions that Igor was a K.G.B. plant.

The Times has confirmed independently that C.I.A. and F.B.I. officials were deeply skeptical of Igor's "bona fides," the information by which they seek to verify the legitimacy of defectors and penetration agents.

If the American intelligence services doubted Igor, Mrs. Shadrin said in an interview, they should never have allowed her husband to come under Soviet control on two trips to Vienna, one in 1972 and the other in 1975 when he disappeared.

Several present and former intelligence officers told The Times that the publication of Igor's name and the details of his case endangered "his life and others," as one source put it, and was detrimental to United States security.

Yet the Russians themselves seem aware of many of the contradictions in the Shadrin story. On Aug. 17, 1977, in response to the first press report here about Mr. Shadrin's plight, a well-known Soviet journalist, Genrikh Borovik, published the Soviet side of the story in an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, a weekly newspaper.

The article was unusual in that it is rare for Soviet publications to discuss their intelligence operations or refer to K.G.B. files. Mr. Borovik uses as the pseudonym for the K.G.B. agent in the article the name Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov.

This seems to couple the Igor of the telephone call with the named used by the agent called Sasha since Sasha is a short form for Aleksandr.

C.I.A. Complicity Suggested

The article suggests that instead of Soviet agents capturing Mr. Shadrin, the C.I.A. may have had complicity in his disappearance to avoid the embarrassment of his returning to the Soviet Union and publicly denouncing C.I.A. methods. Mrs. Shadrin said that the Igor matter

was not the only contradiction she had found between her own investigations and the official information given her. She said that when she accompanied Mr. Shadrin in his flight from Poland in 1959, she believed that his defection was an impromptu act to permit them to marry and live in the West.

She said she had now received information that her husband was in fact recruited for the C.I.A. by Indonesian Navy officers who were being trained by Mr. Shadrin and others at the Polish port of Gdynia.

In her letter to the Senate committee, she said this factor placed a whole new complexion on her husband's decision in 1966 to work as a double agent and suggested that he had little choice but to take on the assignment.

There is no firm indication of Mr. Shadrin's fate since his disappearance. The C.I.A. has said it believes that he was killed or kidnapped by the K.G.B. The

Borovik article in effect charges that the C.I.A. killed him.

The only indication that he may be alive and in Soviet hands came last year when Wolfgang Vogel, the East German lawyer who has negotiated the exchange of prisoners between East and West, entered preliminary discussions about an exchange involving Mr. Shadrin. According to Mrs. Shadrin's lawyer, Mr. Vogel did not affirmatively state that Mr. Shadrin was alive or in Soviet hands.

The Senate Committee on Intelligence may be the only source from which Mrs. Shadrin can receive accurate information

about how the case was handled. Spokesmen for the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. have refused to make any public comment on the ground that the case involves too many sensitive national security matters. The committee, however, has the power to command reports and evidence from the intelligence services for study in secret by its members.