

This was sent to me by a friendⁿ with an international organization. I do recall the story when it broke and that neither the USSR nor the US accounts appeared to be full and credible. I also kept some of those stories but now do not recall where. While I did not really concentrate on this, reading it on commercial time of the evening news and with items I did not care to see I think I understood it clearly enough. My feeling is that this account does not improve those they issued in the past. I don't know if you want to read it. Perhaps after you have or if you decide you do not Dave might have some interest.

HW 11/10/77

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA REPORTS GERMANOV-SHADRIN STORY

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[Article by Genrikh Borovik: "They Shoot Horses, Don't They?"]

[Text] In July 1977 leading papers and magazines in America carried sensational headlines using the words "agents," "double agents" and even "triple agent." They all referred to the same person--Nicholas George Shadrin--who, the papers assured us, had been a U.S. special services "double agent" and had "mysteriously disappeared following a meeting with KGB employees" in Vienna in December 2 years previously. Here are some press reports:

"One evening in December 1975 a Russian-born American citizen, Nicholas Shadrin, left his wife in a Vienna hotel and set out for the Votivkirche, where he was to meet two KGB agents. To this day his fate and his true role in the shadowy world of espionage remain unknown..." (NEWSWEEK).

"...He was a double agent representing American intelligence and, at the same time, pretending to spy for the Kremlin...His case...is an intriguing as a spy novel...."

"The case of Shadrin, who disappeared in Austria 18 months ago, was the subject of numerous official and unofficial American-Soviet contacts..." (the Washington POST).

At KGB headquarters the author of these lines was shown materials pertaining to the case the Western press is currently writing about. These materials shed light on the true fate of the man whom the American papers call a U.S. citizen, Nicholas George Shadrin.

Washington, May 1966

It was a Saturday. A Soviet Embassy employee made a routine trip to the shopping center to buy some provisions for the family. In a remote corner of the store he was addressed sotto voce, in excellent Russian, by a tall man standing next to him.

"Excuse me, but are you an employee of the Soviet Embassy?"

"Yes."

"I have often seen you here in this store, and from your conversation I realized what you were."

The man was about 40, thin and well dressed.

"My name is Shadrin. Nicholas George Shadrin."

"I am listening, Mr Shadrin."

"I absolutely must meet one of your comrades and have a talk...I beg you.... I am a Soviet citizen...." The man was clearly upset.

"Ring the Soviet Consulate. Write down the number...."

"No, no, I can't go to the consulate... The thing is that my real name is Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov. No doubt you have heard of me...."

"Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov? No....doesn't ring a bell...."

The stranger appeared surprised at this reply....

"I was an officer on one of our--that is," he corrected himself, "a Soviet destroyer. I fled to Sweden...in 1959. Do you see? I sought political asylum there. And I have been here since then....I must talk with your comrades...and tell them how it all happened.... In Leningrad I have a wife and a son....I beg you...."

"OK, I'll tell the consulate about your request. How can I find you?"

"I live not far from here, in Arlington...but you mustn't phone."

"Don't you want to go to the consulate? If you can't be 'phoned, how will you be contacted?"

"Every Saturday between 1700 and 1705, over a period of a month, I will wait for your man near the Hecht store on Wilson Boulevard, at the parking lot. Have you got that?"

"Right, supposing I remember that," the embassy employee shrugged his shoulders, not ruling out the possibility of provocation. "But I'm not promising anything."

"I understand. But you must convey the request," the man looked anxious, beseeching.

"Please tell them of my request...For a long time I didn't dare..."

The next day, the Soviet Consulate in Washington asked Moscow for some facts about Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov, allegedly a former Soviet Navy Officer who had fled to Sweden in 1959 and sought political asylum there. The consulate also asked for a photograph of Artamonov.

Gdynia, June 1959

(From the testimony of Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, born 1934, native of Voronezhskaya Oblast, Russian, education, seventh grade)

...I have known Subcommander Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov since March 1956. In September 1958 our ship began an assignment in the Polish port of Gdynia...on Sunday 7 June 1959, around 1700, Artamonov ordered me to make a cutter ready for fishing in the estuary of the Wisla. In the evening he arrived at the cutter with a girl he knew called (Yeva) and ordered us to set off toward the Wisla. We passed the Polish border guard post and sailed into the open sea. A thunderstorm blew up in the night. Two or three times Artamonov checked to see that I was holding the right course and took a turn at the wheel....[paragraph continues]

At dawn he told me: "We're lost--we took the wrong course, the storm upset our compasses." As we were approaching shore, Artamonov changed into a dark blue civilian suit in his cabin, lowered the cutter's naval flag and disembarked with Yeva. He told me he now knew where we were; he said he would go off to get some fuel and we would return to Gdynia in the morning.... After Artamonov left two civilians came up in a car. One said "police" and signaled to me to get into the car. Several times I uttered the word "watch" to make him see that I was on watch and didn't want to go anywhere. Then the two of them twisted my arm up my back and put me into the car. They took me to a building--police headquarters, as it turned out. I demanded the right to phone the Soviet Consulate. The chief said I couldn't phone the consulate at that moment because everybody was asleep....

In the morning they took me to another police building in the center of the city. I saw Artamonov in the corridor.... He told me: "Looks like you'll be going back to Gdynia alone; I'm stuck here." I took it that, being an officer, Artamonov would be held for a while, but I told him I would wait if he wasn't going to be long.

....On the evening of the same day I was summoned for questioning by the chief of police through an interpreter--a tall, elderly man, a Russian emigre, about 60.

I was asked whether I still maintained that Artamonov had become lost and ended up in Sweden accidentally. I said that we had gone fishing and became lost, the storm having affected our compasses. The interpreter laughed maliciously and said that the storm couldn't have affected the compasses.... He picked up a newspaper from the table and translated for me something that went roughly as follows: "A Soviet officer has quit his country and fled to Sweden." There was a picture of our cutter. I said to the interpreter: "Why do your papers print lies?" He said: "Perhaps it is the truth."

...At the end of the interrogation the interpreter asked me whether I wanted to stay in Sweden. I told him I was a Soviet person, born on Soviet soil, and would continue to live there; there was nothing for me in Sweden....

It was hinted several times at the interrogation that Artamonov would be staying in Sweden, so I asked permission to see him. After the interrogation I was taken below--to Artamonov's cell. They did not let me talk to him alone.

Artamonov asked me: "Well Popov, why have you come?" I told him I had spoken on the telephone with a representative of the Soviet Consulate and that they would be coming to Kalmar at 2000. I expected Artamonov to be delighted at this news, but he just lowered his head and told me: "What do I need the consulate for now, Popov? It's waiting for me here...." And he pointed at the cell wall. I thought he meant the "wall" was waiting for him, that is, he was going to be shot. I told Artamonov that the Swedish newspaper had said that he would be staying in Sweden, and I asked him whether this was true. He bowed his head and said nothing...

I realized that he had nothing to say to me. I asked Artamonov what I should tell headquarters when I got back. He pondered and then said: "Tell them that as soon as they let me go, I will return...."

...On Sunday 14 June 1959 I flew into Moscow...."

Stockholm, June 1959

(From the papers DAGENS NYHETER and STOCKHOLM TIDNINGEN)

"...It is reported that a love affair between a 33-year-old Red Navy officer and a beautiful 22-year-old dark-haired girl led to their fleeing from Gdynia on Sunday evening. A day later, on Monday, around 2100 they arrived at Oland and landed in the eastern part of the island. The officer and the girl asked for political asylum.... According to a statement by the public prosecutor the Soviet officer, despite 3 days of interrogation, has not yet given a satisfactory explanation of his flight to the West...."

"...The commission on aliens decided on Thursday to grant the refugees political asylum...."

Kaliningrad, September 1959

(From an indictment)

"...On the basis of the facts Nikolay Federovich Artamonov is accused of betraying the motherland while carrying out a special assignment on a ship in the Polish port of Gdynia and of fleeing to Sweden, where he sought political asylum which was granted; that is, of committing a crime as stipulated by Article 1 of the law on criminal responsibility for state crimes...."

Washington, May 1966

Our consulate in Washington received materials pertaining to Artamonov and a photograph a few days following its request. He was not an imposter. He was a citizen of the Soviet Union who had committed a most grave crime against the motherland and who was abroad and seeking a meeting with a Soviet consular representative. For some reason he could not come to the consulate and he did not want any Soviet consular official to ring him at home. However, this did not change the essential nature of the case--a Soviet citizen had appealed to the Soviet Consulate. Therefore, Artamonov's request could not be ignored. And on the Saturday a representative of the Soviet Consulate arrived at the prearranged place in Washington.

"Our meeting lasted about 30 minutes. Artamonov told me that he had been half-drunk when he fled to Sweden. His passion for the women had gone to his head and this had led to the very grave error which he now deeply regretted. He had no other serious reasons for fleeing. Artamonov said this crime had led to another crime--in order to live abroad he agreed to cooperate with American intelligence and told a representative much of what he knew about the state of Soviet Navy. He realized that these crimes merited severe punishment. He said that all these years he had been unable to rest, thinking about the way he had betrayed his people, his family and his friends.
[paragraph continues]

Recently he had been unable to live with the thought. He believed that he was able to do something for the motherland and, in that way, at least to some extent, expiate his grave sin.

"I asked him how he intended to do this. Artamonov said that he was working as a consultant for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] and that he could give us what he thought was valuable information essential to the Soviet Union's security.

"In conclusion I told him I would report the contents of our conversation to the consulate. He thanked me and said: 'What do you think--is there a hope?' 'Of what?' I said. 'That I might be of some use.' I replied that I couldn't say anything about that. Artamonov said where he would be every Saturday between 1700 and 1715 over a two-month period, waiting to meet a consular representative...."

[Signed] An employee of the USSR Consulate in Washington.

Two weeks later Soviet representative Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov--this is the name we will use in this documentary sketch--turned up at the prearranged place to meet Artamonov.

I.A. Orlov:

What was the basis for our agreeing to make contact with Artamonov-Shadrin in 1966?

A careful study of documents--comments by Artamonov's colleagues and friends and the testimony of engineer Popov--convinced us that Artamonov's treachery and his flight to Sweden with his lover were not caused by any serious, say, ideological motives. He had many friends, a wife and a son whom he loved. Following his flight undispatched gifts wrapped for his family were found in the ship's cabin.

What happened to him? By all appearances, his rapid career had gone to his head: He had been promoted to the rank of subcommander third class at an earlier age than usual. He had begun to be affected by conceit, arrogance, egoism, a sense of "anything goes." The emergence of these qualities alienated his friends against their will; they knew him in another way. He began to seek new "friends." They were officers of foreign navies who were in Gdynia at the time (some of them, it turned out later, had links with Western intelligence). They paid him compliments and unambiguously hinted that a man with his qualities could go a long way. He came to think of himself as exceptional. This coincided with his intoxication with (Yeva Gura), who told him she was pregnant by him. He had scarcely prepared for the flight. To him it was an unexpected and seemingly easy way out of a nasty personal situation, one promising interesting adventures. Even Swedish counterintelligence was unable to understand what made a man like Artamonov leave his motherland, home and the service and flee to a foreign country without money, unable to speak the language. The Swedes even suspected that Artamonov had been sent to their country as a Soviet agent.

None of this mitigated the crime committed by the traitor Artamonov, but it gave grounds for believing that it had been committed not by a malicious, long-disguised enemy of Soviet power but by an overly self-confident, vainglorious man infatuated with a woman and above all with himself.

Yet once the man had begun to betray, he could not stop. Artamonov agreed to cooperate with American intelligence. His crime became worse. He slid down the slippery slope. However, his quest for contacts with Soviet people might have indicated that deep down there was still a germ of humanity which at some stage began to sprout again and made the moral torment unbearable. And he might have decided to make amends for at least part of his guilt.

Often people who are voluntarily cast into the capitalist world and deprived of links with the motherland begin, albeit belatedly, to realize what a terrible mistake they have made and try their best to retrieve their right to serve the motherland. Some are grateful even for a chance to confess. This word sounds strange on the lips of a traitor, yet Artamonov himself repeatedly used it in later conversations with me when he talked about his misadventures abroad.

This was one train of thought we pursued. There was another possibility: Artamonov-Shadrin could be lying to us. He was in fact no repentant at all and, on instructions from his masters, could be trying to become a so-called "double agent" in order to play a "game" with us.

At first glance it may seem strange, but when we agreed to contact Artamonov both alternatives were real. At his first meeting with me, Artamonov said he was seeking contacts with Soviet people on instructions from his American masters in order to play a "game" with us, but this assignment coincided with his sincere desire to at least go some way toward making amends to the motherland.

You will agree that the situation was somewhat unusual. But, having looked at it and discussed it from all angles, we decided to continue contacts with Artamonov. In practical terms we were not risking anything even if his assurances of sincerity were sheer provocation. Naturally, he was unable to get from us any information which would be useful to an enemy. There could, however, be a lot to gain from the contacts if Artamonov was even half-sincere. All this had to be looked into....

Thus began my regular meetings with Artamonov.

From conversations with him we soon learned the details of his life abroad.

In July 1959, that is, just 1 month after fleeing, Artamonov was approached by Americans who suggested cooperating with U.S. intelligence. For this he was guaranteed transport to the United States, financial assistance and, subsequently, permanent work. He agreed. In September he was taken to the FRG and kept for 1 month in a small detached house belonging to U.S. intelligence near Frankfurt-am-Main. His physical and mental condition was checked, and ideological indoctrination was carried out. Conversations were held with him by the traitor Brodskiy, who had worked in Leningrad before the war and gone over to the Hitlerites.

Artamonov was then taken to the United States (now under the name of Nicholas George Shadrin) and given accommodation in Alexandria near Washington, where people began systematically and painstakingly extracting information about our armed forces from him. I did not ask him what he told the Americans; there was no point in asking. We simply believed that he had revealed to them everything he knew, and of course, a senior [as published] naval officer's knowledge could do us palpable harm when handed to the enemy.

Having pumped Artamonov dry, they surrounded him with a gang of traitors, who henceforth were to be company for him. One Nikolay Kozlov was appointed his guardian.

From information on N.V. Kozlov:

"...Born in 1918. In 1943 he went over voluntarily to the side of the Hitlerites. In May of the same year he graduated from a school for propagandists near Berlin. Served as chief of staff of the 2d Regiment of the 1st Russian Liberation Army Division. After the war he was in (Shlyasgaym) prisoner-of-war camp, where he participated in preparing false documents for Russian Liberation Army employees. In 1948 he became a secret employee of U.S. intelligence. Employed in selecting and training cadres for the CIA with a view to getting them into the Soviet Union's territory. A profoundly immoral and unprincipled person. Feared and despises Americans, conceals from the bosses the fact that he has a mother in the Soviet Union, fearing that this fact could damage his position in the special services. Detests the Soviet Union...."

I.A. Orlov:

Nikolay Kozlov reported regularly to his bosses on his "ward's" frame of mind. But Kozlov was just one of the people surrounding Artamonov. There was, for example, one Sergey Gordeyev, who was morally thoroughly corrupt and who fled to the Americans from West Germany in 1952. Both the Russians and the Americans knew that this individual was, on top of everything else, paranoid.

Artamonov observed these people and was gradually seized with horror, as he put it: He was becoming--if he had not already become--the same as they were. But he was not free to choose a different society for himself. And he had to keep company with such as Kozlov and Gordeyev. The danger of irretrievably losing everything human was, in his words, growing.

In the mid-sixties Artamonov was appointed DIA consultant on the Soviet Armed Forces. His function was to read Soviet newspapers and make use of the information supplied to him by the Americans to analyze the situation in the USSR Navy, to prepare reports for his bosses and to give lectures on these subjects for U.S. naval officers.

He was quite well off, above all thanks to (Yeva) (They were unlawfully married, despite the fact that he was not divorced from his wife, who was living in the USSR, who had a dental practice.) The Shadrings had no children.

He knew nothing of his wife and son. Only once--in September 1965--did he manage to convey to a female relative in Leningrad through an American lady tourist (Artamonov was afraid to send her to his wife) the fact that he was "alive, well and missing the family."

It was against the background of all this that Artamonov, as he put it, was increasingly coming round to the idea that he had to seek a way out of the conditions under which he placed himself. And, however, strange it may seem, the Americans themselves facilitated the decision to come to us by setting him the task of seeking contacts with us.

From N.V. Artamonov's statement to the USSR Supreme Soviet:

"...The years after I committed the very grave crime served as a hard lesson for me... I was never a deliberate, inveterate enemy of my motherland. At the same time it is necessary fully to recognize the whole gravity of the crime and its results, which are in no way different from the actions of the USSR's foreign enemies. While in no way freeing myself of responsibility for what I have done, I beg to be given the opportunity to expiate my guilt, to help my motherland in some way if I can, and when to return home...."

I.A. Orlov:

Artamonov handed me this statement at one of our meetings. It was Artamonov's dream, to use his words, to return home. He realized he would die if the Americans found out about this.

It is hard to believe someone who has committed a grave crime against his own people, and it is perfectly natural that we certainly could not trust him completely. He sensed our mistrust, felt it deeply and tried to do everything possible to prove his sincerity.

Of course, the Americans did not give him important secrets. But we were able to judge from his information where the Americans were directing their efforts in order to fill in gaps in their knowledge of our armed forces. Thanks to Artamonov, we received important information on many people working in U.S. intelligence, particularly in those sections dealing with deserters from the Soviet Union, on their work methods, on the organizational structure and so forth. Of course, he also brought us the information which has been compiled for him beforehand by his U.S. bosses so that he could play his "game" with us. And several times we indirectly "allowed" the Americans to come to the conclusion that we were "taking seriously" the information which Artamonov was bringing us on their instructions.

What were the Americans' intentions in sending Artamonov to meet us? For they were perfectly well aware that Artamonov would obtain no information on the Soviet Union during these meetings. So why did they play this game? First, with a view to the misinformation which, as they thought, they could send us through Artamonov. Second, so that Artamonov, by gaining our confidence, could seek out an opportunity--albeit after a long period of time--to draw some conclusions on "the work of Soviet counter-intelligence." And, third, Artamonov was maintaining in his bosses the illusion that with time we might assign him to meetings with a Soviet "secret agent" ["nelegal"] on U.S. territory.

In this complex situation Artamonov acted at considerable risk to himself, perfectly well aware that the U.S. special services would deal with him on his very first mistake. The strain and the constant danger in which he found himself told on him. In the last years it was increasingly felt that Artamonov was tired. He frequently spoke of missing his motherland and family and remembered his naval service.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES

When we learned in the fall of 1975 that Artamonov would be able to come to Austria, we agreed on a meeting with him in Vienna to discuss questions of his return home. The meeting was fixed for a place near the Votivkirche. This place is directly opposite the U.S. Consulate. Artamonov, as he had warned us, had informed the Americans about this meeting. Perhaps we were photographed. Of course, this troubled neither him nor me.

Vienna, 18 December 1975

Orlov and Artamonov met near the huge cathedral building, as agreed, at precisely 2000.

Despite the rather cold weather, Artamonov was hatless--Orlov had never seen him in head-gear--and scarfless, although his topcoat was neatly buttoned right up.

He smiled with joyful relief, went up to Orlov and could not restrain himself from embracing him:

"I've escaped at last!... How afraid I was that we wouldn't meet!"

Crossing the square, they turned into one of the streets, went several blocks, turning now right and now left, and finally stopped by a car which was waiting for them. No one "led" [vel] them. The snow-covered streets were deserted. They got into the car, executed several control maneuvers to lose any possible "tail" and headed for the part of the city where the conversation was to take place.

"...Artamonov complained of fatigue. This difficult operation was also tugging. He said his work for U.S. intelligence was a burden to him. He once again mentioned his statement addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet. He very keenly raised the question of returning home. I said that the solution of this question was drawing to an end and that I would obviously be able to inform him of official permission at one of our subsequent meetings. Artamonov continued to press me. I replied that I would do everything possible. We agreed to meet on 20 December."

[Signed] I. Orlov

Vienna, 20 December 1975

"...Artamonov did not show up at the appointed time for the meeting in the agreed place on 20 December."

[signed] I. Orlov

I.A. Orlov:

And there was no signals from him on subsequent days. We had already decided to organize a search, using our possibilities, but on 30 December the Foreign Ministry received notification from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow....

Moscow, 30 December 1975

At 1530 the USSR Foreign Ministry consular administration was visited by Counsellor Clifford Gross, chief of the consular section at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who handed over the following note: "As has become known, Nicholas George Shadrin, who is now a U.S. citizen, met with two Soviet officials in Vienna on 18 December.... He again met with them in Vienna on 20 December but did not return after this meeting and has been missing since that day...."

I. A. Orlov:

I do not know to what extent the Americans suspected Artamonov or when mistrust of him began to predominate in their assessment of the "double agent."

Latterly he was filled with a sense of gratitude toward us for having definite faith in him and because he now had the prospect of returning home and justified hope that his severe sentence would be reconsidered. A few careless phrases attesting to a change in the mental state of Shadrin-Artamonov, and the specialists surrounding him might have suspected that the "double agent" of the U.S. special services had come under our influence. We had foreseen this danger and warned him of it. But I am not sure that he could have coped and followed our advice to the end. Perhaps Artamonov made some tragic mistake after 18 December and the CIA, learning of his upcoming return home, realized that the game was lost and that it was a scandalous failure, hastened to remove Artamonov and accused the other side to cover the traces. I would not like to think the worst but, knowing the CIA's methods, I find it hard to assume that he is being kept prisoner; it is too dangerous for them....

From the author:

I did not know Artamonov, and so I have tried to set down this story in such a way as to exclude the author's subjectivity as far as possible and to reduce to a minimum the retelling of this man's tragic fate "in my own words." I was familiarized at the KGB with the documents relating to this case. I spent many hours in conversation with Igor Aleksandrovich Orlov, who is now in Moscow, listening to his story, a small--but, in my view, very significant--part of which has been cited in this feature.

In conclusion, however, I would like to share with the readers some of my own thoughts, which do not require special knowledge just logic.

I, like Orlov, have no doubt that the "disappearance" of Shadrin-Artamonov was the handiwork of the CIA. It was hardly revenge against him--the CIA is a powerful enough organization to allow itself to disregard emotions. No, it was an essential--from the CIA's viewpoint--measure and the only one which could save the already dishonorable organization from another scandal. For almost 10 years--starting in the spring of 1966--the CIA, the FBI and the DIA reported to the top leaders of the U.S. administration (first Democratic, then Republican) on Shadrin's "vigilant" operation against Soviet counterintelligence. And it suddenly turns out that their "most valuable agent" is nurturing the idea of returning home. And, God forbid, he will do so at a time of emotion uplift [dushevnyy poryv]!

Imagine for a moment the faces of CIA, FBI and DIA leaders at the thought, for example, that on returning to the USSR Artamonov would address a press conference at which he would describe how everything happened in actual fact. After all the scandals and exposures which had recently rained down on the heads of the CIA and the FBI this would be a new, shameful failure for them, and on the eve of the 1976 presidential election, moreover!

...On 20 December 1975, as the U.S. press reports, Artamonov set out at the agreed time from the Hotel Bristol, where he was staying in Vienna, for his meeting with Orlov (immediately after the previous meeting on 18 December Artamonov--once again as the U.S. press reports--had informed his CIA guardian of the upcoming meeting). But he did not turn up for the meeting: He was kidnaped on the way by a special group of the CIA or the FBI (I do not know which of these establishments had come out in front in fulfilling the last mission regarding the "double agent"), and the U.S. administration was informed that Shadrin, who had set out for a preplanned meeting with a KGB employee in Vienna, "did not come back" and had thus been "kidnaped by Soviet intelligence."

This, or something like this, might be a representation of the operation against Shadrin-Artamonov which, according to its authors' plan, was supposed not only to allow U.S. special services to protect their innocence but also to make capital out of it. Of course, this is only supposition, and scarcely anybody, apart from a very limited number of people in the American special services, can confirm its authenticity. But the logic of the events inexorably leads one to believe that this was how it happened, more or less.

There is indirect evidence of this:

--For 18 months the American authorities did not publicize the events connected with Shadrin-Artamonov. Yet the United States always makes the best of an opportunity to fan an anti-Soviet campaign, particularly for the purpose of spy mania. The U.S. State Department even expressed regret at the fact that it had been unable to avoid the publication of the materials on the Shadrin case despite all the measures it had adopted;

--(Yeva Gura), whom the American special services had brought out of Vienna immediately after 20 December 1975, was "recommended" not to talk to anyone about Shadrin's disappearance. The American press got hold of this information only recently, thanks to the activity of (Yeva Gura's) lawyer;

--And, finally, the American special services have for a long time been resorting to killing people who are a threat to them, and not only political enemies but also their own servants who for some reason have become a nuisance. The Artamonov case fits into this train of thought. Are the world and the Americans themselves really not aware that the CIA and other U.S. special services have repeatedly deceived their own administration, not to mention Congress? The recent investigation of the CIA's activity by the Church Senate committee was a fine illustration of this.

Lastly, Artamonov committed the gravest sin against the motherland--treason although later, by all appearances, he tried to find a way out of his predicament. Nobody deprived him of his Soviet citizenship. Artamonov did not cease to be a USSR citizen because U.S. Congress declared "Nicholas George Shadrin" an American citizen. His wife and son are in the Soviet land. We have a right to join them in demanding a reply from the American authorities: Where is Nikolay Fedorovich Artamonov, and what has become of him?