

Some interesting things on experiments - the

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MY 17 MONTHS ON THE CIA WATCH

A Backstage
Journal
By Daniel Schorr

In October 1974, I started investigating the government's intelligence agencies; by February 1976, they were back investigating me.

It all started with the idea of exposing scandals. Within 17 months, the American public was being told that the only real scandal was the exposing.

Under such circumstances, it is inevitable that the reporter will be dragged into the story he's covering. And I guess that's how I got caught in the secrecy backlash.

It was never my purpose to be an advocate or an adversary, but just to find out what was going on. Whatever others may think, I see myself as an aging, rather square reporter, who can't forget his old newspaper days while rattling around televisionland, where everybody seems to end up with some kind of Image.

I have watched, bemused, the image-making process, still not quite sure how it happens. I basically don't understand how I got to be on the Top 20 list of Nixon enemies, compiled before Watergate, or how later, not having Nixon to kick me around anymore, I found Richard Helms of the CIA calling me names.

It is slowly dawning on me that, in the Media Age, people in trouble may need media enemies. If the purpose is to clamp the lid back down on secrets, one needs to point a finger at a Secret Spiller.

That's how I got entangled in the story which I had months before agreed to write for *ROLLING STONE*. The original suggestion was to keep some notes on the developing congressional investigation, and then try to pull it all together as a kind of journal. I really didn't want to write about myself until I came to realize that I had been dragged into the story quite inextricably and might as well face it.

This foreword is written in late February, after the roof has fallen in because of the publication of the suppressed report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. But the compiling of this investigative journal started in a quieter time

He has been called abrasive and difficult, but then so has the truth which Daniel Schorr has fought to uncover during his 40-year career as a newspaper and television journalist. Way before Watergate his relentless exposures of the Nixon administration earned him enemy list status and brought the FBI to his door. Now, for the past 17 months, Schorr has worked on perhaps his most important and surely most controversial story, uncovering the CIA's murderous deeds at home and abroad and the congressional investigation of that activity. Day after day he filed seamy tales that might never have been told but for his efforts. When he allowed the 'Village Voice' to print his copy of the government-banned Pike report, Schorr was relieved of all reportorial duties by CBS. Here he chronicles the events that led to this coverup.

October 2nd, 1974: My Washington bureau chief asks if I can work up a television story along the lines of Seymour Hersh's revelations in the *New York Times* about the \$8 million the CIA has poured into Chile for clandestine operations aimed at undermining Allende.

It will take a week or two to put a film story together, starting with a day of absorbing Hersh clippings. I have been at a loose end since my Watergate assignment ended with the Nixon resignation in August. Yet, somehow, these unusual leaks from a secret world once considered leakproof may, in a sense, be an extension of Watergate.

The Nixon pardon left history frustrated and incomplete, with the CIA part of what remains hidden. You peel off Watergate and you find the Plumbers and the Ellsberg break-in. Peel off the Plumbers and you find the 1970 Huston plan to use the CIA and FBI for domestic surveillance, wiretapping and break-ins. But what would you find if you peeled off another layer and had a close look at that secret world from which these things had been launched?

My immediate problem, however, is how to tell the CIA-Chile story for television when it mostly happened in secret, far from the eye of any camera. A producer starts researching Chile background film. I start looking for potential "talking heads," persons who were involved in or had firsthand knowledge of how the CIA worked to pull the rug from under Allende. I draw 100% blanks in telephone calls to CIA officers, active and retired, who were involved with Chile. A former diplomat tips me to someone who watched it from the State Department end, and who might be available.

October 4th: First film interview. Ray Cline, unavailable since he quit the State Department as intelligence chief in a fight with Kissinger, says he knows something about Chile and has decided to talk. Maybe trying to position himself as head of CIA in the next Democratic administration, Cline wants to blast Nixon and Kissinger. On film, Cline says that he always opposed getting mixed up in Chile, and so did the CIA. But the CIA was ordered into it by Nixon and Kissinger, who were operating "on an Olympian plane," enforcing some policy that only the two of them understood.

Afterward, lunch at the dowdy Cosmos Club on Massachusetts Avenue with Nathaniel Davis, who was ambassador to Chile in 1973 when Allende fell. Davis, an old pal of mine from Moscow days, who later became a Peace Corps official, wears dark suits, narrow ties and an air of seriousness and rectitude. He talks strictly for background and says the CIA was only trying to keep the democratic opposition in Chile alive, did not get involved in the truckers' strike, the "march of the empty pots," or any of the events leading to the coup. At least, says Davis, as far as he knew, and, as ambassador, he was sure he had the whole picture.

October 5th: Having asked to see Secretary Kissinger, I've been told by his secretary to wait at home on this Saturday morning for a phone call and he may be able to find a few minutes to talk to me. The call comes.

Pacing his White House office, Kissinger is upset about leaks. On top of the original Chile stories, Hersh has now disclosed that Kissinger reprimanded David Popper, current ambassador to Chile, for talking to the junta about the torture of political prisoners. That, says Kissinger, is misleading and he's helpless to correct it publicly. He says he's been dealing with the Chileans at the United Nations about easing up on the prisoners, and only got mad at Popper for crossing his negotiations. Did Popper know about Kissinger's negotiations? Well, no, ambassadors don't have to know everything. (Passing thought: so why assume Davis knew everything?)

For background, Kissinger gives me a replay of the Davis background about trying to keep the democratic opposition alive, but steering clear of anything connected with violent overthrow. Kissinger declines to say this in a filmed interview. Suppose I put a question on the subject at the news conference Kissinger is holding Monday? "Maybe I won't call on you."

I tell Kissinger about the Ray Cline interview, which blames him and Nixon for Chile, and which Cline says he opposed. Kissinger, mildly, "Did Ray say that? That isn't my recollection of his role. I'll have to look it up."

October 7th: News conference in the State Department auditorium, Kissinger playing the semicircle of reporters like a conductor facing an orchestra. He watches me at his far left from the corner of his eye, but keeps ignoring my raised hand until, finally, in the middle of someone's question, his soft aside, "All right, Dan, you will be next." Just so there's no doubt who's in charge. He answers my question about the CIA and Chile smoothly, saying the CIA should be brought under better control and implying that he didn't play much of a part in whatever happened. Well, at least we have a little Kissinger on film to fit into the story we're assembling.

Just back at my office, and there is a call from his number one aide, Larry Eagleburger: "Would you have time to drop in? Heinrich has instructed me to show you some captured documents."

Three top-secret papers, written in 1970 and 1973, listing various recommendations for getting Allende: bribing Parliament members to vote against him, subsidizing opposition parties, working with the military. There are arguments for and against these courses of action from different parts of the State Department. But they all have handwritten comments by Ray Cline, then head of intelligence and research, generally urging action and scoffing at the doubters. To those concerned about the morality of bribing the Chilean Parliament, for example, Cline writes, "In the world of

Realpolitik, sensitivities are not so tender and people are more concerned with who wins power rather than morality."

If these documents are authentic, and they appear to be, Cline has made a mistake in trying to show clean hands on Chile. And one of his gravest mistakes is to think he could attack Kissinger without Kissinger's throwing the book (and the secret files) at him. (Sy Hersh somehow learns of Kissinger's leak and, over my anguished protests, writes the story for the *Times*.)

October 11th: Appointment for background talk with CIA Director William Colby. The last time I had reason to visit the CIA was in 1958, when the agency was at its old offices near the State Department. I was invited to lunch with Director Allen Dulles after my return from Moscow, which, in those days, was considered a normal practice for a returning correspondent. Since settling down in Washington in 1966, I've worked on domestic stories until Watergate came along. So, after all these years in Washington, I finally get to see the CIA compound in the Virginia woods, between the Washington Parkway and Route 123.

At the guard post there are blinking red warning lights, but once you pass through and go down the road a bit you find just another big federal building. There are some touches, though—a statue of Nathan Hale, the founding spy, and in the lobby an honor roll with half the casualties marked only by a star, anonymous even in death.

In the lobby, also, a sign, "CBS filming." All around the grounds are security men who keep personnel, covert and otherwise, away from camera range. The area is sanitized, a frozen scene.

After filming the narration I have lunch with my CIA escorts in the Overt cafeteria. (Covert employees eat, of course, in the Covert cafeteria, and I ask if they pay a covert charge.) With my camera crew on hand, I say it would be nice if Colby would do a filmed interview. Not a chance, they say.

Up to the seventh floor in an elevator that opens to a security man's key, almost directly into the director's suite, cream walled, businesslike and unostentatious. Everything about Colby is a little less than anticipated

—slighter of build, softer of voice, lower in key. His background spiel is generally a canned-sounding recital of how covert activities sprang from the Cold War, tapered off with détente, but are still needed as a capability. I interrupt to say I can't see Colby doing himself any harm saying some of this on film, and I happen to have a camera crew waiting downstairs. He shrugs, "Okay." So we come down the elevator, past the stunned CIA underlings for history's first filmed interview with the director of Central Intelligence.

No great substance but it provides some sense of the agency absorbing the damage of the Chile revelations.

Question: "So, as a professional, you pick up the pieces and go on?"


Colby: "It's part of the hazard of the profession."

With Kissinger, Colby and Cline as "talking heads," with library film of turmoil in Chile, we expand our story into a two-part takeout, which runs on the Cronkite show October 17th and 18th.

Cronkite is happy, the producers are happy. Good-bye, CIA!

December 22nd: Again Sy Hersh, the neighbor whose kids play with my kids while he goes around dropping bombshells on my life! A long three-column lead story in the Sunday *New York Times* about how the CIA, which is only supposed to spy in foreign countries, has maintained surveillance of U.S. dissenters and left-wingers during the Sixties. Sy, whom I call to congratulate, says he's been working two years on the story. My office calls to say I should start working on it right away. After all, didn't I do that other CIA story in October?

December 23rd: From Vail, Colorado, where President Ford is skiing, it is announced that Colby has told Ford there is no *current* domestic spying by the CIA. The president asks what went on in the past and wants a report sent to him. Senator Symington, who was supposed to be watching in the CIA oversight subcommittee, says he knew nothing about it, and wants a big congressional investigation.



DANIEL SCHORR

Photograph by DIRCK HALSTEAD

On the way back from interviewing Symington, I stop for a sandwich at Barney's Delicatessen, near the federal courthouse, where the Watergate coverup trial is in progress. Run into defendant H.R. Haldeman, having lunch with his son at a back table. We have never met before, but no introduction is needed to the Nixon chief of staff who once ordered the FBI to investigate me. "I don't mean to interrupt your lunch, Mr. Haldeman. I know you can't talk about the trial. But I'm working on the CIA story, and maybe you could help me on one point."

"Remember the June 23rd, 1972, tape, when President Nixon said, 'Well, we protected Helms from a helluva lot of things,' and you said, 'That's what Ehrlichman says'? What was that about? What had Helms done?"

Haldeman: "I don't really know, Dan. I was just trying to hold my own in the conversation with the president, and I never did know what Ehrlichman knew about Helms."

Friendly smile. "Nice to see you again, Dan. Lots of luck!"

(A year later Ehrlichman would be circulating a novel, *The Company*, about a Nixon-like president who has evidence of complicity in an assassination by a Helms-like CIA director, who blackmails the president into destroying the documents by threatening to expose a Watergate-like political wiretap conspiracy and then goes off to be an ambassador.)

December 24th: Awakened by early call from the office. The AP is saying that James Angleton, the CIA's chief of counterintelligence, has resigned. Hersh had reported that Angleton's office was responsible for the domestic surveillance program. The start of a purge in the CIA? Okay, where does Angleton live?

When I get to the house in North Arlington shortly after eight, camera crews are already staked out in front. Nobody knows if Angleton is home. I ring the bell. A groggy-looking man in pajamas opens the door, points out I'm standing on the *Washington Post*.

"I certainly didn't expect you, Mr. Schorr, to trample on the press!"

"Ha ha! Can I come in, Mr. Angleton?"

"Well, I've been up all night, and my family is away. But I can offer you some apple juice or Sanka."

It looks like the home of a somewhat disorderly professor, books in many languages, memorabilia of Italy and Israel, a worn rug, pictures of wife and two sons. But no preparations for Christmas. Some vague words from Angleton about having sent the family away for their protection.

No pictures, he says. To be recognized would mean mortal danger. But he doesn't mind chatting, and that he does for the next four hours—rambling discursively with interruptions for phone conversations in bad French, bad Italian and a "Shalom" for somebody at the Israeli Embassy.

He talks to me mainly of a worldwide Communist conspiracy, managed by the Soviet KGB, which has successfully misled the West into accepting the fiction of divisions in the Communist camp. For example, the KGB has arranged a facade of Rumanian independence. "The Nixon-Kissinger détente bothers me deeply." (When I remind him that he has strayed from my question for the past 15 minutes, he says, "I am

not known as a linear thinker, Mr. Schorr. You will have to let me approach your question my way.") Several times he returns to something that seems immediately on his mind. From a photo taken of Yasir Arafat at the Lenin tomb in Moscow he has identified the escort of the PLO leader as an important KGB colonel. The PLO is apparently part of the Soviet conspiracy.

Interspersed in the recital are indications of how Angleton came to be sent out into the cold. (Colby later confirms the main outlines to me.) For 22 years Angleton has handled not only counterintelligence, but also the CIA's "Israeli account," which has been separated from the Middle East division, a division Angleton considers too pro-Arab. Recently he has been fighting a pro-Arab drift in the agency, for which he blames Kissinger. Colby, on a visit to Israel, canceled a visit to East Jerusalem on the request of Kissinger, who thinks it will offend the Arabs who claim the Old City.

Angleton has privately rebuked Colby for yielding to Kissinger.

Against this background, Colby called in Angleton five days ago, told him he was being removed from the Israeli desk, and that it was time to start planning the future leadership of counterintelligence. He offered Angleton the option of staying on to write a manual, or retiring. In passing, Colby mentioned that the *Times* may shortly publish an article linking Angleton to the domestic surveillance program and blowing his cover. Colby knows about it because he has talked at length to Sy Hersh—trying, of course, to keep the story out of the paper. (Angleton has agreed to retire—a fact which becomes known to the AP the day after Hersh's article appears, thus appearing to be a direct consequence.) Angleton had practically nothing to do with the surveillance program, which was run by his deputy, Richard Ober, reporting directly to Helms, who was acting under pressure of the president.

Says Angleton: "Helms was deeply victimized. He was set up as a scapegoat for Nixon."

And Angleton himself, set up as a scapegoat for whom?

Angleton says he must dress now and go to the office. I say the cameras of three networks are still camped outside and, even if he doesn't stop to talk, there's no way he can avoid being photographed. He shrugs. A few minutes later, in diplomat's black coat and fedora, he walks down the driveway, stands in front of the cameras and answers questions for ten minutes. He looks and sounds so unsteady that it will be said of him that he was drunk but what he is is shellshocked.

It seems strange now, after these hours with him, to watch him answering questions in public.

"Why did you resign?"

"I think the time comes to all men when they no longer serve their countries."

"As determined by whom?"

"By themselves and their superiors."

"Did you jump or were you pushed?"

"I wasn't pushed out the window."

And the nonlinear thinker, cover the...
stumbles into his blue Mercedes.

January 4th, 1975: In Vail, it has been announced that President Ford saw Kissinger, who brought Colby's report on domestic surveillance. Returning to Washington, and without public announcement, Ford has called in Colby for some additional briefing—something apparently too sensitive to put in the written report. Today, Ford announces a presidential commission to investigate any domestic improprieties by the CIA. It will be headed by Vice President Rockefeller, who acts as though he has just heard about it. (Later we learn that Rockefeller was drafted at the last minute when Federal Judge Henry Friendly changed his mind about serving.) It seems strange, after the way the Chilean scandal was shrugged off, that Ford is mounting this investigation pageant over the CIA's domestic snooping.

A vague recollection sends me back into White House transcripts. Nixon and Ehrlichman in March 1973, talking about how to head off a Senate investigation of Watergate. The thing to do, said Ehrlichman, is to name a special presidential commission and then ask Congress to hold their hearings "in abeyance." Is Ford starting his investigation hoping to avert a congressional one? I begin to feel that this story is developing into an assignment—the son of Watergate!

January 10th: If it's like Watergate, it must have stakeouts. The stakeout target this time seems to be Helms. I first saw him in 1973, tall, self-possessed, quick-witted, urbane, explaining to the Senate Watergate committee that he had tried to keep Nixon from using the CIA in his coverup. He managed then to convey the impression that Nixon had exiled him to Tehran for not playing ball. Now Helms is back from Tehran for congressional testimony. After a check of hotels and his friends, Helms is located staying with his wife, Cynthia, in a rented house in northwest Washington, near the Maryland line. On the telephone, Cynthia Helms says she's sure Dick will call me back, which he doesn't do.

This morning we'll try the stakeout routine. Eight

o'clock in the morning, with camera crew, I'm outside the house on Fessenden Street. A State Department car, motor idling, is waiting for Helms. I ring and the uniformed maid says Ambassador Helms hasn't come downstairs yet. A moment later the State Department fellow goes in, comes out, drives around the corner. Funny! I ring again. The maid says the ambassador has left. The back door, of course. The car has picked him up in the alley. I have been outwitted. The master spy has made a getaway. But why? Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson used to walk out the front door and smile into the camera.

January 13th: Launching of the Rockefeller commission. We are allowed to film the swearing-in ceremony in the vice-president's office, then stake out in the corridor for the next eight hours, witnessing the goings and comings of three CIA chiefs—the incumbent Colby, his predecessor, now defense secretary, James Schlesinger, and Helms, who preceded him. Helms, starting to look more and more like a defendant comes out running, and heads down the stairs of the Executive Office Building without a word.

January 14th: If the Rockefeller commission was a

ploy to stop Congress, it hasn't worked. Demands for Watergate-type select committee stir CIA oversight subcommittees out of hibernation. Helms and Colby are called before a closed session of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee. Afterward, Chairman McClellan pronounces himself "satisfied." Tomorrow the same pair are to appear before Senator Stennis's Armed Services subcommittee.

January 15th: After the hearing, Stennis, opposing any special investigation, releases Colby's prepared testimony—the first public statements from the CIA on domestic surveillance. Colby admits most of what Hersh reported: the CIA kept files on 10,000 Americans, opened mail to and from Russia and China, wire-tapped 21 Americans, broke into homes of its own people. It was wrong, says Colby, but it wasn't "continuous or massive."

While Chairman Stennis talks before camera outside the hearing room, Helms slips out, down the elevator, through the garage and out the Senate Office Building. Learning from past mistakes, I leave Stennis talking into a camera and take off with a mobile unit in pursuit of Helms, catching up with him on the street. Never faltering from his brisk pace, acting surprised that anyone would be interested in him, he says into the camera (while a cameraman is trying to walk backward as fast as Helms is walking forward) that he's sure an investigation will show he did nothing illegal.

Later, Stennis releases Helms's prepared statement. Unlike Colby, Helms admits no wrongdoing. (It's easier for Colby—he wasn't the one who did it.) Helms talks of "distortion" and "irresponsible attack." He says the CIA got involved in spying on Americans out of concern about "extreme radicalism" and "in response to the express concern of the president."

January 22nd: Still another group wants to hear Helms in closed session—the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his fourth forum. The testimony he gave at his ambassadorial confirmation hearings two years ago now seems shaky. He denied passing money to Allende's opponents in Chile. He denied any domestic CIA spying. He denied any pre-Watergate involvement with Howard Hunt. Under his urbanity, Helms is starting to look worried.

After the closed session, sources say the questioning of Helms wasn't very sharp. His testimony, sanitized by the CIA, was that he "had no intention of lying" about the \$8 million given to anti-Allende groups in Chile, but that he had misunderstood the original question. Senator Frank Church says he thinks Helms's latest explanation is "unsatisfactory." Church, as it develops, will have a lot more cracks at Helms. The word is that he will head the new Senate investigating committee.

February 6th: An organizing session of the Church committee, followed by a Church news conference. He promises it will be bipartisan, and anyone on the staff who leaks will be fired.

February 18th: The House is also getting ready to set up its investigating committee. So, the administration's attempt at preemption has failed. There are now two congressional committees with much broader man-

dates. Everything called "intelligence" is going to be looked at, which has never happened before in this country.

February 20th: Before the House Appropriations CIA subcommittee, Colby has gone even a step beyond the prepared public statement he gave to the Senate subcommittee. This time we have received his testimony in advance of delivery—another first. That gives me the idea of asking Chairman George Mahon if we can film Colby delivering it, which produces still another first—Colby testifying publicly.

Between Senate and House appearances, Colby has changed his tactics. He had hoped to call off the investigations by merely admitting that there had been wrongdoings. This did not work, so now he takes the offensive, warning that "sensational reporting" and "hysterical excitement" have "placed American intelligence in danger."

February 27th: For more than a month I have been haunted by a potentially big story but I need more details and corroborative sources. I have heard that, last month, at a White House luncheon with the publisher and top editors of the *New York Times*, President Ford indicated that he had discovered CIA involvement in assassination conspiracies, and was determined, in the national interest, to try to cover them up.

As the story came to me, one *Times* editor had criticized the fact that the composition of the Rockefeller commission (Rockefeller, Reagan, etc.) lacked credibility. Ford said he had to choose the members very carefully because, from what he had just been told by Colby, there was the danger that the commission would trip over matters a lot more sensitive than domestic surveillance.

"Like what?" asked the editor.

"Off the record, like assassinations," said the president.

The stunned *Times* people, I'm told, tried, and failed, to get it put on the record and finally agreed to accept the confidence.

Today, after a month, my request for a background talk with Colby at CIA headquarters finally comes through. After a half-hour of chitchat about Watergate and the CIA's pre-Watergate involvement with Howard Hunt, I tell Colby I have heard that President Ford is afraid that something concerned with assassinations may leak.

I ask Colby directly, "Has the CIA ever killed anybody?"

His reply is quick and even. "Not in this country."

Who?

"I can't talk about it."

Hammarshjeld?

"No, of course not."

Lumumba?

"I can't go down a list with you. Sorry."

He does volunteer that assassination plots have been banned since 1973, when they figured in an internal CIA investigation prepared by their own inspector general. He does not deny that the information was kept from President Nixon and, until recently, from President Ford. He is impatient now to end the interview but is still cordial and smiling at the end.

February 28th: I have been up much of the night speculating about possible targets. At the office, I try brainstorming with desk editors and anybody I can trust. We recall that ex-president Lyndon Johnson had talked, in an interview, about the U.S. running a "damned Murder, Inc., in the Caribbean." That brings up names like Che Guevara, Trujillo, Duvalier. Political editor Martin Plissner, with a gleam in his eye, says, "How do we know it wasn't someone believed to have died from natural causes? De Gaulle? Churchill?"

It's getting silly and we end the session.

Through the afternoon I stew about an assassination

story I cannot write for lack of a corpus delicti. Suddenly, it hits me that I'm missing the point, that I don't need to know *who* was killed. Isn't it really enough of a story that President Ford *knows* about assassination plots, that he is worried about them and trying to steer investigations away from them?

My script now writes itself. "President Ford has reportedly warned associates that if current investigations go too far they could uncover several assassinations of foreign officials involving the CIA. . . ."

Photographs by DIRCK HALSTEAD, (top and right); UPI, (left 2)

It is one of those scripts that is studied by everybody in the Cronkite shop and every news executive available. But there seems to be no question in deciding that we must go with it. So, for more than two minutes on the Cronkite show, I tell about the CIA and assassination plots, wondering what the reaction will be.

On the way to a seminar at Duke University, it strikes me that President Ford has blown his own game plan. It is clear now that the whole panoply of the Rockefeller investigation was to keep attention focused on the CIA's domestic surveillance, which had apparently leaked from the 1973 internal report of the CIA, hoping to keep under wraps other more dangerous parts of the same report.

But, by candidly indicating to trusted editors what he was trying to hide, Ford will end up getting the credit for the exposé.

At midnight, from Durham, North Carolina, I call

Washington to ask what the White House is saying. The official reaction is not only no comment, but, "There will be no comment."

March 3rd: Every Monday now the routine with the Rockefeller commission is about the same. We are allowed in while silent film is shot of the commissioners gathered around the vice-president's conference table. Then, through the day, witnesses slip in and out, some under such deep cover that we aren't given their names. No longer under cover is Jim Angleton, who comes out blinking unhappily into the lights and making courtly apologies for not saying anything. Then, at the end of the day, Rockefeller comes to the door of his office to speak pompous generalities, without apologizing.

March 8th: Colby will go anywhere! He turns up at a weekend conference in Hot Springs, Virginia, where jurists and journalists are discussing the limi-



"KILLER" SCHORR AT A BRIEFING (ABOVE) AND AT HOME (RIGHT); (LEFT) FORMER CIA DIRECTORS HELMS (TOP) AND COLBY (BOTTOM)

tations of press freedom. One topic involves a hypothetical case of an investigative reporter who has gotten some documents that would blow a CIA network in Europe and endanger a spy in the Hungarian cabinet. Colby argues suppression for national security. I argue that what a reporter can get, hostile intelligence can get, and maybe journalists perform a service by testing the CIA's security. Colby is not persuaded.

It is the first time I have seen Colby since I broke the "assassination" story. He says it has created "quite a stir." A very cool fellow, this Colby!

March 16th: For the past week or so there have been indications that the assassination story has jolted the Rockefeller commission off in some new direction. For one thing, suggestions from members and staff that the original three-month term will have to be extended. For another, word that Helms is being called back again. Today, there are specific reports that President Ford has asked the commission to explore the issue of CIA involvement in foreign assassination plots. If so, it will take some contortions since the commission's guidelines were narrowly written precisely to keep it away from such matters.

To make sure, I go out to National Airport on this Sunday night to meet Rockefeller, flying in from his weekend. Standing in the rain, he does confirm it, in his own muddy way. He has talked to President Ford, he says, and there could be matters connected with assassinations presenting "a possibility of deviations from the domestic code, in which case we would have responsibility."

So, I gather, the commission will turn its "domestic" mandate on its head and investigate foreign assassination plots that were organized from the U.S. But that gets the assassination monkey off Ford's back, which seems to be the idea. I can just see Ford saying, "Nelson, better you than me!"

March 18th: For weeks there has been talk about a mystery ship, the *Glomar Explorer*, crammed with machinery and sophisticated electronic gear that can do things on the sea bottom and heaven knows what else. Papers stolen from a Howard Hughes warehouse in Los Angeles indicate it's operated by Hughes for the CIA.

Barry Lando, CBS's *Sixty Minutes* producer, calls the CIA, quoting the stories and asking if any more information is available about the ship. In the afternoon, amazingly, Colby arrives at our office, prepared to give a complete briefing, but with a request that the story be held up in the national interest.

He says the *Explorer* last year raised part of a Soviet nuclear missile submarine off Hawaii. The plan is to go back next summer, when weather permits, and try to finish the job, which is why the news media are being asked to cooperate in keeping the story secret until then. The project is all CIA—Howard Hughes is just acting as a cover. Colby does not ask any promise of secrecy as a condition for the briefing—just expresses the hope it will be kept under wraps. He indicates he has given the same briefing to others.

There would barely be time to prepare the story for the Cronkite show this evening, but I hesitate, suspicious, deciding it needs another day.

A few hours later Jack Anderson breaks the story, and the embargo is off. I tell the story on radio at 11 p.m., still wondering whether Colby was really pushing the story while saying he was trying to squelch

it.

March 31st: Rockefeller announces he has asked another two months—until June 7th—to file his report.

April 3rd: President Ford, who was a member of the Warren commission, says at a news conference he still sees no evidence of a conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, but "it's my understanding the Rockefeller commission may, if the facts seem to justify it, take a look at that problem."

What problem?

April 7th: After his Monday hearing, Rockefeller says, yes, he is looking at the problem, "in relation to any possible relationship to domestic CIA activities." But he doesn't mean that there were CIA "activi-

ties" in the Kennedy assassination. What is Rockefeller trying to say or *not* to say?

April 24th: A source in the Rockefeller commission says a whole task force is working on CIA plots to kill Castro that went on for years—before the Bay of Pigs and during the period when Kennedy was assassinated. And now all the double talk begins to become clear.

Richard Bissell, who managed the Bay of Pigs, has been before the Rockefeller commission, and he tells me the Warren commission was never told about the plots against Castro because no one thought they were relevant.

But Joe Califano, who was President Johnson's chief of staff, tells me LBJ was convinced the Kennedy assassination was revenge—because Castro believed Kennedy was trying to get *him*. And now, it turns out, the CIA, at least, *was*—whether on Kennedy's orders, we don't know yet.

I didn't know what I was starting when I opened up the question of "assassination" but now lights are going on.

Rockefeller announces that Colby is being recalled and Helms is coming back from Tehran again.

April 28th: Helms before the Rockefeller commission for four hours after two days of questioning by the staff. It must be hot and heavy about plots against Castro. I am waiting in the corridor when he comes out. I offer my hand but suddenly he starts cursing me, "You son-of-a-bitch! You killer! You cocksucker! Killer Schorr! That's what they should call you!"

I am flabbergasted. Helms proceeds to the press room to face the cameras. Standing next to him, trying to recover my own composure, I question him.

"Has the commission, in effect, opened a kind of side investigation into matters peripheral to the assassination of President Kennedy?"

Helms: "I don't know whether this was a side investigation or a major investigation or what. I must say, Mr. Schorr, I didn't like what you had to say on some of your broadcasts on this subject. And I don't think it was fair and I don't think it was right. As far as I know, the CIA was never responsible for assassinating any foreign leader."

"Were there discussions about possible assassinations?" asks another reporter.

Helms: "I don't know whether I stopped beating my wife, or when you stopped beating your wife or . . . talk about discussions in government, there are always discussions about practically everything under

the sun."

"Of assassinations?"

Helms: "Of everything under the sun."

"But you never answered my question."

Helms: "Well, I'm not trying to answer your question."

I pursue Helms down the hall, determined to try to find out what provoked his outburst. For a while he keeps walking, saying, "Get away from me! Killer!" But he pauses when I say, "There are things you don't know." And then I tell him that it was not I, but President Ford, who, in effect, opened up the issues of assassination. Helms, calmer now, says that, actually, he has admired most of my reporting, but one sentence in one of my reports got under his skin. He can't remember just what it was. But it's been rankling him for a long time. Maybe, he says, he shouldn't have blown up that way, but anyway it was in private conversation, before he got to the press room. I tell him that the AP and UPI reporters heard it and that it may not remain private. We shake hands. Our conflict is over.

But as far as the public is concerned, it hasn't started yet. The AP and UPI stories start moving. The film runs on the evening news on all the networks. A quarrel which has already been privately settled is now publicly broadcast.

(I later go back and read all my scripts on assassination. The original February 28th story on assassination ended this way: "Colby is on the record as saying, 'I think that family skeletons are best left where they are—in the closet.' He apparently had some literal skeletons in mind." Maybe that was what set Helms off.)

April 29th: Telephone call from retired Air Force colonel Fletcher Prouty, saying he used to do Air Force-CIA liaison and is so angry about Helms's abuse of me that he's willing to disclose a story he has never told before. A check with the CIA confirms Prouty's credentials. So he comes in for an interview in which he says that in 1960 he provided a small plane to fly two Cubans from Eglin Air Force Base to the outskirts of Havana to try to kill Castro. He says the man in charge of the operation was assistant deputy director for plans—Richard Helms.

May 1st: Assassination has become topic A for the Rockefeller commission and apparently for Church's new Senate investigating committee. President Ford has made it official by confirming at a news conference that he got a full report from CIA director William Colby "on the operations which have been alluded to in the news media." What he didn't say is that the CIA never thought to tell him about assassination plots until he asked. Nor did the CIA ever tell Nixon, presumably fearing that he might use such information to blackmail the agency.

I go to see the Rockefeller commission's executive director, David Belin, in his office on the top floor of a converted town house on Jackson Place, across from the White House. Belin, a Des Moines lawyer, was brought here by President Ford, with whom he served on the Warren commission. His bright Main Street bow tie contrasts strangely with a sinister leer, the result of a facial tic. The leer goes well with elliptical answers to my questions. I am trying to get be-

yond "assassination" as an abstraction and find out just who the targets were. I know that former CIA officials have been questioned about the deaths of the Congo leader, Patrice Lumumba, and the Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo. But the major target seems to have been Castro. Because somewhere this ties into the Kennedy assassination inquiry, Belin is fascinated.

"I am absolutely sure," says Belin, "that Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin of President Kennedy, though we are rechecking every allegation that this may not have been so. But I have never been satisfied that we understood Oswald's motivation." The flutter of the eyelid makes it seem very significant.

May 5th: Henry Kissinger comes out of a closed hearing of the Rockefeller commission, saying, "Where's Schorr? I have a new name for him." (That's an allusion to my cussing out from Richard Helms.) Before the cameras Kissinger says that no assassination missions have been assigned since he's been there.

John McCone, who was CIA director after the Bay of Pigs, comes out, saying *he* authorized no assassinations. I walk down the hall with him, asking for background whether he at least knew the conspiracies were going on while he was in charge. "No," he replies. "When I came into the CIA, I made it clear that assassination was against my principles, and I would not approve anything like that. So I was unwitting!"


What a lovely word that, "unwitting." Like, "If you do it, I don't want to be told."

May 7th: Frank Church, as the head of the Senate investigating committee, meets with Vice President Rockefeller to ask for all the data his commission has collected. By now, Church has read a lot of secret documents. Coming out of Rockefeller's office he stands in front of the cameras and says, "When Helms said that the CIA never killed any foreign leader, that statement was correct, but not necessarily complete." That leads to a dozen questions, none of which Church will answer.

May 9th: I have heard that the Warren commission had the FBI report of a Soviet KGB defector who talked about Oswald's activities while in the Soviet Union. But it was not mentioned in the 1964 testimony of McCone and Richard Helms, then McCone's deputy. A chance call to the National Archives strikes pay dirt. They have just declassified the FBI report and I can have it for the cost of Xeroxing.

And here it is, after 11 years: the FBI report on the debriefing of Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Nosenko. He had handled Oswald's file for the KGB in Moscow, and defected to the United States in Geneva ten weeks

AN "AGING, RATHER SQUARE REPORTER," IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE



Photograph by DIRCK HALSTEAD

after the Kennedy assassination. Nosenko said the KGB considered Oswald mentally abnormal, possibly an American agent, and decided not to try to recruit him. Also, that when Oswald turned up in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September 1963, trying to get a Russian visa, the KGB vetoed it. Also, that after the Kennedy assassination, party chief Nikita Khrushchev ordered a crash KGB investigation to find out if Oswald had been sent back to the U.S. with any Soviet instructions, and was relieved to find that he hadn't been.

McCone happens to be in Washington. I interview him and ask why he didn't mention the Nosenko report in his Warren commission testimony. McCone says because the coincidental defection looked so suspicious that the CIA didn't trust him at first.

"It took some time," says McCone, "to prove the

bona fides of the man. . . . Today, I believe it's the position of the agency that the information given by Nosenko was correct."

I have a chance to check this further at a previously arranged lunch today with Jim Angleton, who, despite his noisy firing last December as chief of counterintelligence, is still quietly on the CIA payroll as a consultant. At his insistence, I have arranged a table in the back corner of a French restaurant so no one can pass behind him.

Angleton expresses surprise that the CIA has certified Nosenko as authentic. Angleton still thinks he may have been a KGB plant to spread a story clearing the Russians of any complicity in the Kennedy assassination.

"We spent a lot of time with the colonel and got to know him a lot better than the FBI," says Angleton.

"We only turned him over to the FBI to be debriefed for the Warren commission."

But Angleton will not say what he knows, or where Nosenko is.

(Later, I learn that the CIA indeed spent a lot of time with Nosenko. He was held incommunicado for three years, from 1964 to 1967, at Camp Perry, Virginia, cited, without name, in the Rockefeller commission report as a gross example of mistreatment of a defector. He is still a subject of controversy in the CIA. Colby has officially accepted Nosenko's Oswald story but others in the agency say Colby has to do that to avoid stirring new doubts about the Kennedy assassination.)

May 23rd: Colby has been before the Church committee for three days, talking about covert operations and assassination plots. After each day's session, Church has a line-of-the-day for the cameras. Yesterday it was that Colby's testimony was "candid, but chilling." Today: "It is simply intolerable [deep breath] that an agency of the United States government may engage in [pause] murder!"

Colby has brightly pointed out to the committee that assassination plots have been banned by CIA directive since 1973. Church says he wants the ban written into law.

May 28th: After six months of CIA stories, we seem to be at some milestone. The Rockefeller commission is finished, its report due in a few days. Then the in-

vestigative scene will shift to Congress, where the Senate committee is already at work, the House committee trying to settle its internal squabbles so it can go to work.

It seems a good day for a summing up on the Cronkite show. No longer admitted into the CIA compound to film a stand-up, I stand in front of the gate. An ostentatiously disinterested CIA security officer listens while I tell into the camera how "three waves of sensation" have rolled over the agency in the past half year—"how it tried to upset foreign governments, like Chile's . . . how it spied on dissident Americans . . . how it targeted foreign leaders, sometimes in alliance with organized crime.

"From all of this," I say, "will come proposals to ensure that what the CIA has officially stopped doing—spying on Americans, plotting against foreign governments and the lives of their leaders—it will never do again."

June 5th: Fitful stirring in the House Intelligence committee. An open session is called, goes into closed session, then spends an hour debating whether to fire Chairman Lucien Nedzi. A majority opposes him because he headed the oversight subcommittee on CIA that overlooked more than it oversaw. He did nothing in 1973, when briefed about the CIA's internal report on assassination plots and all the rest. He thought the information too secret to pass on to anyone, and besides, he'd been told the situation had been corrected. After an hour Nedzi comes out of the meeting, looking flushed, saying, "I'm still the chairman!" But not, I would bet, for very long.

Surprise, meanwhile, from the Rockefeller commission. It turns out to be that the report, going to President Ford tomorrow, won't be out this weekend, as scheduled, but will be "subject to the president's decision." Also it will not contain a chapter on assassination plots. What does all that mean? It looks like Ford, back from Europe, has slapped down Rockefeller for some reason.

June 6th: Stake out Rockefeller on Capitol Hill. He says the assassination section is being omitted only because there wasn't time to finish that investigation right, but President Ford will presumably turn over the material to the Senate committee.

"So," I ask, "is it reasonable to conclude that instead of stealing the Senate's thunder, you're passing the thunder to the Senate?"

Rockefeller thinks that's funny. "A very reasonable conclusion!"

June 7th: I have finally cut through the curtain of confusion and deception about the Rockefeller report. Two problems got mixed up with each other. First, President Ford decided two weeks ago that the assassination chapter, involving unsettled links to former

[Cont. from 38] and even had a CBS vice-president on its payroll. (I report this on the Cronkite show, as it's generally agreed within CBS News that I must. But long internal investigation fails to turn up any such vice-president, nor is one mentioned in the committee's final report.)

Another leak from the committee staff has it that for years the CIA penetrated the White House and government agencies until 1973, when Colby issued orders that the "CIA will not develop operations to penetrate another government agency, even with the approval of its leadership." The penetration is supposed to be described in the 1973 report of the CIA inspector general, which said CIA officers had been placed in "intimate components of the office of the president." CIA "spooksmen" Thuermer phones in a somewhat agitated reaction: "Any agency personnel on duty at the White House were detailed there with the knowledge of the White House."

With the knowledge of whom in the White House? Spooksmen sayeth not.

July 10th: A resolution to abolish the House committee is going to the floor, but Chairman Nedzi, who wants to kill his committee, now seems on the defensive.

The inspector general's report is being interpreted back and forth, but no part of it has yet surfaced. I argue to Nedzi that if the portion about CIA employees in the White House has been exaggerated, the only way to prove it is to produce the original. After presumably checking with the CIA, Nedzi agrees to read to me, on camera, a page of the IG report.

It appears that what was involved was a practice of "detailing" CIA employees to the White House—a practice, says Nedzi, that was perhaps questionable, but not the same as infiltrating an unwitting White House.

While I am in the House Radio-TV gallery working on this story, a message is relayed that Colonel Prouty, the old Air Force/CIA liaison who blew the whistle on Helms last April, has called. Once again, he says when I call back, he

feels forced by the hypocrisy of what's going on to reveal something he has concealed all this time. It is that another retired Air Force colonel, Alexander Butterfield, was known to him as the CIA contact at the White House.

Butterfield? The man who disclosed the White House taping system and started Nixon on the road to ruin? Unbelievable! And my mind leaps back to all the hints and rumors that the CIA pulled the plug on Nixon. It is the most mind-blowing notion I've ever heard. I ask Prouty to remain available while I finish the Nedzi story and look for a film crew.

But I really need time to try to check this out with Butterfield—even if I'm not sure I'll believe his denial. I ask a researcher at my office to spend the afternoon trying to find him. The Cronkite show has passed us by and no sign of Butterfield. His home number in Virginia has not answered for hours. At 9 p.m. I finally call Prouty. He says he's right then being interviewed by Ford Rowan for the NBC *Today* show. I tell this to a producer across the desk. He says, "Ask him to come in at seven o'clock tomorrow morning and do an interview live on our morning news." Prouty agrees to do that, which will enable us to catch up with NBC.

July 11th: Prouty, always prompt, has been waiting a quarter-hour in the CBS reception room when I arrive at 6:45 a.m. As makeup is put on us, microphones pinned to our ties, lights adjusted, I tell him that we haven't been able to reach Butterfield, that I hope that Prouty understands the seriousness of what he's going to say. It's going to lead the show.

There's nothing wild in Prouty's manner. He has a big, open, face, an even tone that seems to conceal nothing. He is what TV producers, watching him on monitors, instantly call "credible." And he proceeds to unreel these incredible allegations, which fall into two main parts. One, that before coming to the White House, Butterfield had CIA

clearance and performed CIA missions. Two, that in the White House he was the CIA's contact. How did Prouty know that? Well, in 1971, Prouty, needing help on a problem concerning prisoners in Vietnam, some of whom were CIA officers, had gone to see Howard Hunt and Robert Bennett in the Mullen publicity firm, which was a CIA front. And Hunt had referred him to Butterfield as "our contact in the White House."

Before we are off the air, Mrs. Butterfield has called in to say that it's "ridiculous." Butterfield, she says, is on his way to the West Coast and cannot be reached for comment all day by us or by anybody. The CIA says Butterfield had special CIA clearance, but never worked for the agency in any capacity.

July 12th: Mike Wallace tracks me down at Roger Mudd's home, where my wife and I are having dinner. *Sixty Minutes* has made arrangements to fly Butterfield to New York from the West Coast and he'll be interviewed tomorrow. Wallace wants my help with the background of the story.

July 13th: I get a transcript of the Butterfield interview before it goes on the air. His denials of any CIA connection—other than routine clearance to read its documents—are categorical. Prouty, on the telephone, holds his ground. "I did not claim that Butterfield was a spy, agent or infiltrator. I only said I was told by those who should know that, in the Air Force, he fulfilled missions for the CIA, as I did and that, in the White House, he was known as the CIA's contact. Certainly, Howard Hunt seemed to consider him that way."

Big farewell party for Sy Hersh, who is moving to New York because his wife is entering medical school. I tell Sy that he got me into all this CIA stuff, and what a time for him to get out of town!

July 15th: Howard Hunt, interviewed by Ed Rabel of CBS in prison at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, says, "At no time

did I ever mention Alex Butterfield who, in fact, I didn't know."

Prouty says that maybe it wasn't Hunt but Bennett who mentioned the name of Butterfield in that 1971 conversation. Bennett, now a vice-president of Howard Hughes's Summa Corporation on the West Coast, says he couldn't have mentioned Butterfield because, at that time, he had never heard of him.

So, there we are. Prouty's story is denied by everyone who might be in a position to confirm it. Which might also happen if it were true. But how is one ever going to know?

(This will trouble me for a long time. Butterfield will later tell me that he never heard of Hunt before Watergate, which strikes me as strange. I will dig out at least three times when Butterfield could, or even *should* have heard of Hunt. But Butterfield remains firm: "I'm 99% sure I never saw Hunt's name before Watergate.")

July 18th: Senator Church's word for the week: "The agency [the CIA] may have been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage." This, in one of his briefings after the closed-door hearings on assassination plots, is supposed to mean that maybe presidents shouldn't be blamed, just the CIA itself. How comfortable it would be for Church, now pretty obviously thinking of a presidential flyer, if he could pin it all on Helms and his cloak-and-dagger band.

July 20th: On *Face the Nation*, with Senator Schweiker, I ask about the "rogue elephant" theory and he disputes Church. "... I think it's only fair to say that there was no direct evidence that *exonerated* presidents from assassination attempts. ... They [the CIA] basically either believed they had the authority or did, in fact, have the authority to attempt assassination plots and plans. ... It's hard for me to conceive that someone higher up didn't know."

July 22nd: Bella Abzug's House privacy subcommittee (which is also investigating CIA activities) produces, as a witness, Lawrence Houston, who

was the CIA's general counsel from its birth in 1947 until his retirement in 1973. In a filmed interview with me, Houston says that in 1962 he went to brief Robert Kennedy, then attorney general, about the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro, and that Kennedy didn't react at all to the assassination plans as such, only said that "if we were going to get involved with the Mafia again, please come to him first because our involvement with the Mafia might impede his drive against the Mafia in general crime busting."

July 29th: The Senate committee, which seemed almost finished gathering evidence in its assassination inquiry, is having a spurt of renewed activity. It has received from Kissinger and Helms material indicating that, in 1970, Nixon ordered the CIA to do anything necessary to stop Allende from coming to power in Chile. The CIA saw standing in its way Chile's army commander, General Rene Schneider, who had promised to support Allende, if legally elected. The CIA had links to a Chilean military group planning to kidnap Schneider. The plot miscarried and Schneider was killed. What is the line of responsibility from Nixon's tantrum to Schneider's death? Kissinger will be called as a witness and indicates his irritation about that summons. The committee also talks of calling Nixon. Senator Tower says he talked to Nixon on the phone and that maybe he could be interviewed at San Clemente.

July 30th: A more unlikely duo to figure in the same story on the same day I couldn't imagine. But early this morning Senator McGovern, back from Cuba, holds a news conference to release a Castro book recounting 24 plots against him, all allegedly CIA-inspired, the last in 1971, when Castro visited Chile. Confessions of would-be killers are quoted, mostly Cubans. The weapons range from dynamite to a gun hidden in a television camera. McGovern says [Cont. on 83]

[Cont. from 81] that since many of the plots were hatched after President Kennedy's post-Bay of Pigs promise to avoid violence against Cuba, either the CIA acted on its own, or President Kennedy broke his promise.

Today's other character is Robert Maheu, who has finally told his story, under an immunity grant, to the Senate committee, and is ready to tell it at a crowded news conference in the photographers' lounge in the Senate Office Building. Maheu, the one-time Howard Hughes aide, one-time FBI agent, acts like W. C. Fields playing con man. But his story boils down to about this:

On the CIA payroll since 1954, Maheu was asked in 1960, as part of the planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion, to contact John Roselli of the Mafia to help remove Castro. With Roselli and Sam Giancana, holed up in the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami Beach, a plan was laid—later aborted—to try to get a poison pellet to Havana to be administered to Castro by someone close to him. But it didn't work. It all sounds so silly that one wonders what kind of nitwits there were at the CIA. For his services, Maheu got \$500 a month from the CIA for six years, though he adds that his real motive was patriotism.

But, under questioning, something maybe more interesting begins to emerge. In 1966, when he went to work for Howard Hughes in Las Vegas, his new employer told him to set up a big covert operation for the CIA. Hughes "felt that he wanted this kind of protection from the government in case he ever became involved in any serious problem with any agency of government."

Hughes did run cover for the CIA—including the *Glomar Explorer*. He also had a lot of problems with the government, on which he got a lot of help—from Attorney General John Mitchell when he wanted to buy another Las Vegas hotel without running afoul of the antitrust laws, on ending nuclear testing in Nevada, on the purchase of Air West. We had

thought that subsidies like the Hughes-Rebozo "contribution" represented the quid pro quo. The idea that Hughes would contrive to be able to blackmail the government by threatening to blow sensitive covert operations under his control—that was an interesting new wrinkle in the "intelligence-industrial complex."

(Six months later, in his farewell interview as CIA director, William Colby will tell me that all Howard Hughes did was offer patriotic cooperation to the CIA.)

July 31st: The House Intelligence Committee has been through death and resurrection—abolished and reconstituted with a new chairman, Otis Pike. And today, about five months late, it finally holds its first public hearing. Pike vows that, in the face of all the budget secrecy, his committee "shall find out" where the intelligence dollar goes. The first witness, Comptroller-General Elmer Staats, Congress's financial watchdog, testifies that the General Accounting Office tried for 20 years, and just gave up in 1962.

August 4th: The House committee has spent two more days hassling with Budget Director James Lynn and CIA Director Colby about how much money and where it goes. Colby says he can't even tell publicly the total amount spent. Representative Ron Dellums explodes: "What makes you the person who believes that you can play God?" Colby, very quietly: "Mr. Dellums, I am not playing God. I am only enforcing the laws . . . to protect the very free society that you and I want to protect."

September 9th: In 1970, violating orders from President Nixon, who was trying to fulfill a treaty commitment, it seems that the CIA scientists squirreled away 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 8 milligrams of cobra venom—these tiny amounts apparently enough to kill thousands of people. Church says hearings will be held next week, describing the

issue as whether a president can get his instructions obeyed by the CIA.

September 11th: The House committee has some of the secret CIA intelligence estimates before the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Nobody from the administration will come to testify, and with good reason: the analyses of the intelligence community were abysmal. A day before the outbreak of war: ". . . they do not appear to be heading for a military offensive against Israel." And, even after the assault had started: ". . . no hard evidence of major coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive."

September 12th: Big explosion in the House committee: seems that yesterday the committee, voting to release those faulty intelligence estimates over CIA objections, included four words (we don't immediately know what words) which were very dangerous to disclose. So, Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee appears in open session to read a statement saying President Ford wants all his secret papers back, and won't provide any until the committee swears not to release any secrets in the [Cont. on 85]

[Cont. from 83] future without permission from the executive branch.

Without secret papers, obviously, a congressional committee can't do business, so this is a first-class showdown. Chairman Pike thunders, "The executive branch is telling this committee of the House that it may not continue to operate!" He pounds the gavel and recesses the hearing, and I walk up with a microphone, asking, "Mr. Chairman, where does this leave your investigation?"

Pike: "Well, at the moment, it obviously has come to a screeching halt!"

In the afternoon Colby holds an unprecedented news conference in the CIA's auditorium, which is separate from the main building and under less stringent security. He says the four

words are very important, and that the issue is whether a congressional committee can "unilaterally decide" what should be released. In fact, as I think of it, it has never been clear whether a congressional committee can decide, on its own, that what an executive agency calls "secret" won't be kept secret. The decision has never been faced mainly because, in the past, congressional committees have been so cooperative.

So, those four little words represent, symbolically, a big confrontation over who has the ultimate control over that "secret" stamp. I soon learn, incidentally, what the four words are, and then have a hard time convincing my superiors that it won't be treason to reveal them on the air, especially because a half-dozen other reporters now know.

The four words appear in an intelligence summary of the Defense Intelligence Agency for October 6th, 1973. They are not readily apparent. Here is the text of the paragraph:

"Egypt—The (deleted) large-scale mobilization exercise may be an effort to soothe internal problems as much as to improve military capabilities. Mobilization of some personnel, increased readiness of isolated units, and greater communication security are all assessed as part of the exercise routine . . . there are still no military or political indicators of Egyptian intentions or preparations to resume hostilities with Israel."

The four words are "and greater communication security."

Presumably, if the Egyptians know, even two years later, that we knew of their greater communications security, then they may get to know something about how we knew.

Pike has, for the first time, clearly enunciated the doctrine that Congress has as much right

to control secrets as the president has.

September 16th: The day of the dart gun. Eight months is a long time for a Senate committee to stay behind closed doors. We are in the Senate Caucus Room, where the Watergate hearings were held, as though to underline that this investigation is, in so many ways, the son of Watergate.

Toxins make a strange opening subject, and what comes through, among other things, is the pitiful cost ineffectiveness of the exotic poisons. Colby testifies that it took ten years and \$3 million to develop them and the only time the shellfish toxin was ever used was concealed in a silver dollar that Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, carried with him on his 1960 flight over Russia and never thought of using.

But then there was the nifty poison dart gun that each senator posed with (Colby's lawyer, Mitchell Rogovin, later gleefully noting that he had made sure no one would ever get a picture of Colby holding it). Didn't the dart gun indicate that there were other uses for the shellfish poison than suicide? Colby readily agreed that the poisons represented "a weapons system," meant basically to kill.

Sitting in the audience all day listening is Helms, who is testifying tomorrow. I happen to be present when Helms meets Colby walking down the stairs. Colby has been testifying about how Helms had records destroyed. But spy chiefs don't quarrel in public. Colby says, "Good luck, Dick!" Helms says, "Thanks!" And they walk off in different directions.

September 22nd: The Kennedy assassination again. The Senate committee has evidence that the FBI destroyed a letter from Oswald threatening the FBI if it didn't leave his wife alone. New things keep coming up, none essentially affecting the conclusion about the assassination, but all pointing to the prodigious capacity of the CIA and FBI for coverup. So, Church says a subcommittee will investigate what the CIA and FBI told—and didn't tell—the Warren commission.

By an ironic coincidence,

Senator Edward Kennedy testifies before the committee today as a kind of character witness for his dead brothers. He says he's "morally certain" neither of them had any role in the plots against Castro.

September 23rd: Having heard for three years of the "Huston Plan," we see Huston in the flesh for the first time. Tom Charles Huston of Indianapolis is the witness in the Senate Caucus Room. And, if he has the slight- [Cont. on 86]

[Cont. from 85] est reservation about his scary 1970 plan for surveillance, eavesdropping and break-ins, he doesn't show it today. Thin, earnest, intense, Huston makes the argument that the plan wasn't really his, but a plan that intelligence agencies sold to the White House. And what surprised him, he said, was to discover that what they were proposing to do, they were mostly doing already—and continued doing after Nixon withdrew the plan. In fact, he said, if he had known of the CIA's Operation Chaos and the FBI's Cointel (counterintelligence) program, and how ineffective they were, it could conceivably have changed the minds of people in the White House.

"I didn't know," said Huston without blinking an eyelash, "that we were starting down the road that would lead to the Plumbers and Watergate."

September 24th: Today Chairman Church has staged a series of revelations from CIA files about the 20-year mail opening program, with eye-popping details of names like Martin Luther King, Arthur Burns and Senator Edward Kennedy whose mail was opened. To cap that, Church reveals that they opened a letter he sent to his mother-in-law on his 1971 trip to Moscow. With so many willing to alibi and apologize, it is almost refreshing to see one of the old crowd stick to his guns. Such a one is Jim Angleton. Under medication for an active ulcer, Angleton's speech and reactions are slowed, but when asked by Senator Church why the mail-opening program was concealed from President Nixon, he says firmly, "I have

no satisfactory answer to your question." Angleton has no regrets and won't pretend any. When asked whether mail privacy isn't sacred, he answers that, in fact, the impression of mail privacy was useful since it could induce Communists to send their secrets through the U. S. mails.

During this hearing a new note is heard. Senator Howard Baker, warning of possible revolutionary activity in 1976, says that strong intelligence agencies will be needed. And Senator Tower suggests a law to legalize the kind of FBI surveillance that has been conducted illegally until now.

"There are signs," I say in my broadcast, "that the pendulum may have started swinging again. Two recent attempts on President Ford's life have helped return the minds of Americans to the idea of security."

September 26th: A summit conference is called this morn-

ing on what may be the overarching issue of all these investigations: who controls the secrets. When the Pike committee, on its own, declassified four little words, President Ford reacted as though the CIA's vaults had been emptied. Clearly it was a matter of principle. Until now, Pike has been asserting that Congress has as much right as the president to say what should be kept secret and what can be disclosed. There the White House has drawn the line.

So Ford sits down in the Oval Office with Pike, Robert McClory, the committee's top Republican, Kissinger, Colby and others. In the afternoon I interview Pike and McClory. They talk of "compromise" but I read the compromise as a confrontation in which Pike—meaning Congress—blinked.

McClory tells me about the new system: when the committee and the CIA are in dispute about declassifying something, the committee will be able to declassify unless the president certifies that it would be against the national interest, after which the committee can still go to court. It seems to me that, since a court test would take too long to have any effect, the committee has surrendered on the issue of the president's ultimate authority.

And, when I put this to Pike, he's not inclined to dispute it. It's, he says, the best he could do.

On the issue of who controls that "secret" stamp, Pike has marched farther up the hill than anyone in Congress before, but he has marched down again.

September 29th: The Pike committee wants to go after other intelligence failures. Now it's asking for the intelligence estimates before the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, and some are being refused. So the committee votes, ten to three, to declare them "necessary" to its work, which is the formal preliminary to a citation for contempt against Kissinger and Colby. After yielding to the administration over the issue of what the committee can make public, the Pike committee must now face the issue of what it can get at all, even in secret.

October 1st: The Tet "crisis" is resolved. Colby sends over most of the papers the Pike committee has subpoenaed.

October 2nd: The Senate committee is back with a public hearing to spotlight aid to intelligence agencies by the Internal Revenue Service—that Senator Church calls "a lending library of tax information." On the stand is IRS commissioner Donald Alexander. It turns out that the IRS had a "Special Services Staff" that in-

vestigated political activists—8000 individuals and 3000 organizations. They included organizations from the American Library Association to the NAACP, and individuals from Mayor John Lindsay to rock singer James Brown. (Alexander, from the witness stand, comments dryly, "Some of our people didn't like rock music.") And the IRS also sent information, for nontax investigations, to the FBI, the CIA and just about any government agency that wanted it. Vice Chairman John Tower, seldom exercised about surveillance, explodes about "invasion of the taxpayer-citizen's rights."

October 5th: Colby's debut on *Face the Nation*. I question him to see how far he'll go in acknowledging the trouble he's in. When I ask him what the pressures are against him in the administration, he says, "There

are those who wish that we didn't have to say anything at all. . . ." And, when I press him on whether he really hasn't been declared expendable and is on the way out, Colby says, "At any time that either the president or I thought that the intelligence business would be better off with someone else, why I would clearly withdraw, or I would be asked to."

In a broadcast commentary tonight I say that Colby "came as close as he ever has to indicating his belief that he is on the way out."

October 9th: Senator Church has suffered his first defeat on a vote in his committee. By six to four, the committee decides to put off scheduled public hearings on the National Security Agency and electronic surveillance. And, though efforts are made to keep the vote secret, I learn that two Democrats have voted against Church, one of them freshman Gary Hart of Colorado, who ran the 1972 McGovern campaign.

October 17th: During the relative calm of a congressional recess, lunch in the Senate dining room with Dick Schweiker, who's been quietly working on that subcommittee investigating Warren commission angles. It begins to look as though the FBI had a lot more connections with Oswald than it owned up to. J. Edgar Hoover's affidavit said a search of FBI records disclosed Oswald was never an informant. But Schweiker notes the FBI had a policy of destroying records in order to be in a position to make such technical disclaimers. Also, Hoover's testimony made it look as though the FBI first contacted Oswald in August 1963, after he was arrested in New Orleans. Actually, the FBI had first interviewed him a year before that, and its interview report said Oswald promised to cooperate

with the FBI. Which maybe explained why Oswald, when arrested in New Orleans, said he didn't want to see a lawyer but an FBI agent.

October 21st: The Senate intelligence committee opens three days of public hearings on mail opening. About 3 million envelopes were scanned and 216,000 opened over a period of 20 years. And, though CIA officials say they knew it was

illegal and not producing very much, it went on until 1973. Howard Osborn, the tough-looking former CIA chief of security, testifies that it was only stopped because of Watergate. And then this colloquy with the committee counsel, F.A.O. Schwarz III:

Schwarz: "How did the Watergate climate persuade the CIA finally, after 19 years, to knock off the program, which you knew to be illegal?"

Osborn: "I think it's because we realized it would be a tremendous embarrassment to the agency, particularly in light of the Watergate climate."

Schwarz: "So we can say, 'Thank God for Watergate' on this occasion, can we?"

Osborn: "I'm not gonna say that. You said it."

October 22nd: The files show when the CIA, in 1961, for the first time told a postmaster general what it was doing in the post office, J. Edward Day, a Kennedy appointee, was quoted as saying that it was okay but he didn't want to know details.

Now, side by side sit three former postmasters general: Day, who served under Kennedy; John Gronouski, in the Johnson administration; and Winton Blount, who served under Nixon. And none of them will admit ever knowing the mail was being opened. Anyway, says Blount, he thought that *whatever* was happening was approved by the attorney general, John Mitchell.

Helms says that, in 1971, he briefed Mitchell on the opening of Moscow mail and got his approval. Mitchell, the old stonewaller, returns to the Caucus Room, scene of some of his best stonewalling, and denies it. "I'm telling you today that was not so."

The postmasters didn't know. The CIA said it had authority from above. "Above" evaporates into thin air.

October 23rd: Bella Abzug is ready to rush in where Church's committee fears to tread. She calls a session of her privacy subcommittee to bust open one of the secrets of electronic surveillance. Attorney General Levi turns up, and takes Abzug into a room to plead with her not to do it. She won't listen. She walks into the hearing room, big hat flapping furiously, bangs the gavel and starts reading a statement fast,

as though she's afraid someone is going to gag her:

"... The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency have regularly intercepted and copied personal telegrams and cables for the last 30 years without court order and probably in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the criminal law, the Communications Act, and the privacy of American citizens. . . ."

Details are withheld while the subcommittee votes subpoenas for those involved. But a summary of staff interviews, which I obtain, indicates that this is the story:

Western Union was visited daily by Joe Craig, FBI agent, who borrowed cables and later returned them. The NSA maintained its own copying machine at Western Union International, photographing all foreign embassy cables. The FBI obtained the teletype channel numbers used by foreign missions, so that the NSA could plug into them directly. RCA Global Communications was visited at 3 a.m. daily by an NSA or FBI agent, who would read through all international cables, photographing some of them. Agent Craig visited ITT World Communications about 11 a.m. daily, picking up all cables to a selected list of about 50 countries, communist and noncommunist. Israel and Mexico were the most recent additions to the list.

So, this was the big secret that the White House has been moving heaven and earth to keep under wraps. Now Senator Church's committee changes its mind and decides it will, after all, hold public hearings on this subject.

October 28th: There is now, says Church, wide-ranging administration pressure to stop any more exposure of wrongdoing by intelligence agencies. In executive session this morning, Colby has opposed the holding of public hearings on the covert operation in Chile. The White House is still fighting open hearings on electronic surveillance. And, says Church, the White House is now opposing the release of the completed report on assassination plots—the subject that President Ford last June tossed from the Rockefeller commission to the Senate

committee.

October 29th: I don't know why it is that Big Brother always comes on looking like Little Brother! The witness is General Lew Allen Jr., who looks and sounds like a meek professor in uniform. He is the head of the National Security Agency. And, revealing for the first time in public any of the supersecret activities of the NSA, General Allen testifies that, from 1967 to 1973, the agency monitored [Cont. on 88]

[Cont. from 87] the foreign phone calls and other communications of some 1700 Americans on a "watch list" provided by the CIA. The investigations, he said, were in connection with the protection of the president, drug smuggling and antiwar dissidents.

October 31st: Kissinger is before the Pike committee today and refuses to discuss covert operations in public. The committee goes into closed session, but before doing so, it adopts a resolution to release reports on unidentified covert operations. The resolution is made by Jim Johnson, a young Republican maverick from Colorado, that few reporters in the room are listening to. But I am puzzled by these words: "The American people have a right to know when their government commits their resources and name in an armed conflict or a paramilitary operation in another nation."

Afterward, Johnson tells me he can't talk about what "armed conflict" or "paramilitary operation" because getting authority to disclose is precisely the problem. Some buttonholing of other committee members and staffers produces little more help, except the hint that a famous friend of Nixon's is involved.

A helluva unsatisfactory note on which to end the week!

November 1st: It's Saturday, I should be spending time with the kids, but I can't get my mind off "arbitrary power" and "armed conflict." After a great deal of work, I think I have at least one of those operations pieced together.

Nixon, visiting Tehran in 1972, promised the shah to provide arms for Barzani's Kurdish rebels in Iraq, a country that the shah was trying to keep

off balance for bargaining purposes of his own. The CIA and State Department were against getting into it. But Nixon, working only with Kissinger, ordered the CIA to conduct the operation, and sent former treasury secretary John Connally to Tehran to bring the good news to the shah. So that they couldn't be traced, the arms were Soviet and some even Chinese. But when the shah got the agreement he wanted with Iraq, he pulled the rug (Persian and American) from under the Kurds, allowing their insurgency to be crushed.

November 2nd: While at a cocktail party at the neighbors', James and Sally Reston, the word comes that *Newsweek* is reporting a cabinet shakeup, with Colby fired. So, off to the office and the telephone. Colby, on the phone, sounds as shaken as I've ever heard him, so it must have been sudden. De-

fense Secretary Schlesinger is also out, and Kissinger has lost his White House hat, but stays as secretary of state. White House sources try to make it look like Ford visiting plagues evenhandedly on both Kissinger and Schlesinger houses. But it's Kissinger who has survived and Colby who's gone.

(Coming out of the Oval Office this Sunday morning, I later learn, Colby meets Schlesinger on his way in. Schlesinger asks what's up. Colby, thinking he shouldn't be the one to tell Schlesinger he's getting fired, replies that President Ford is upset about a Dan Schorr report last night on the arming of the Kurds. And, at the Schlesinger home in the afternoon, Colby drops in for a sort of wake. Schlesinger says, "Well, Bill, it looks as though Dick Helms outlasted all of us.")

November 3rd: Senator Church announces that President Ford has sent a letter to the committee saying the assassination report should not be issued. There is no doubt, says Church, that "concealment is the order of the day" and that Colby has been fired for being too candid. Church says his committee has unanimously voted to release the report after giving it to the Senate in secret session.

Colby stops off at our camera stakeout on his way to testify.

He says he thinks he may go into law practice. I ask him if he thinks he shouldn't have given so much information to congressional committees. "No, I don't think so," he says. "I think the best was to get rid of the past and start a transition to a future structure of intelligence under the Constitution."

November 4th: Church is building up a head of steam, maybe even seeing a campaign issue. For the Colby firing, he blames Kissinger, saying he's "the prime minister, the president taking care of ceremonial functions." Church says he'll oppose the confirmation of George Bush to succeed Colby. Senator Goldwater makes a speech on the floor saying that all investigations of the CIA should be halted.

The House committee meets, all upset about the report on the Kurds. Pike, motioning toward me, says ironically, "Mr. Dan Schorr, who shares membership on this committee from time to time, had a very interesting story on television last Saturday night. . . . It is possible that we do have a leak on this committee. It is also possible that somebody else who wants to make it appear that we have a leak on this committee did, in fact, provide the source or was, [Cont. on 90]

[Cont. from 88] in fact, the source. . . . I can only say that it bothers me greatly and I am sure that it bothers most, if not all, the members of the committee."

After some more discussion, Pike asks, "Mr. Schorr, I don't suppose you would want to reveal your source or method at this particular time?" I reply, "No, thank you."

David Treen, Louisiana Republican, then moves to have me called before the committee in executive session. Pike says, "My guess is that Mr. Schorr is one of those reporters who would rather go to jail than reveal his source, and I think that would be a relatively meaningless operation, unless, of course, you want to put Mr. Schorr in jail."

The committee votes to table the Treen motion. I find myself sweating.

This evening a source calls

to tell me a singular thing: Colby, fired last Sunday and ready to move out of his office tomorrow, has been asked to come and see President Ford tomorrow. It seems that Ford, in his impulsive display of "I'm in charge," forgot that Bush is still busy in Peking trying to put together a Ford trip, that Colby has appointments to testify until December 18th, and that if Colby leaves now, the testimony will have to be given by his deputy, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, who used to be Nixon's foreign language interpreter.

Ford will ask Colby to stay on until Bush is confirmed, which may take another couple of months. And Colby, always the pro, will agree to stay on.

November 6th: The Pike committee votes seven new subpoenas for documents, most of them aimed at Kissinger, the most important one attempting to smoke out whether the U.S. has been condoning Soviet cheating on arms control.

Colby is before the committee in the afternoon, testifying on CIA and the media. In open session he says only things that tantalize. Like this exchange with Pike:

"Do you have any people paid by the CIA who are working for television networks?"

"This, I think, gets into the kind of getting into details, Mr. Chairman, that I'd like to get into in executive session."

Colby also says the CIA no longer has full-time American correspondents on its payroll, just stringers and other part-time people.

November 9th: On *Face the Nation*, Senator Church says that Colby has been made "the fall guy," and that Bush is too political to be his successor, but doesn't seem ready to commit

himself to a fight against confirmation.

November 19th: The Church committee's assassination report is at the printer, due to be sent to the Senate and released tomorrow. The committee at the last minute deleted one name—Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who was involved with the preparation of the poison meant for Lumumba of the Congo—

because he has gone to court and Church feels that could delay the whole report. Today Colby calls one of his rare news conferences to demand the deletion of 11 more names. He says, "Exposure of our people to hostile and irrational retaliation is not within the tradition of our country." Church refuses. But Colby is obviously setting the stage for some kind of maneuver in that secret session tomorrow.

November 20th: While I wait for the secret session of the Senate to end, I learn some of the names that Colby has been fighting to delete—names like Maheu and Roselli. But, when you work with the Mafia and promise to try to protect them, I guess you have to go down the line with them. The maneuver in the Senate to block the report fails.

Most of the committee (Tower, Goldwater, Baker stay away) assembles for a big news conference. I'm interested when Senator Mondale says that "we're not good at assassinations, and thank God!" And we really weren't very good. Where we tried to kill people—Castro and Lumumba—we failed. Where people got killed, it was because things got out of control—Trujillo, Diem, General Schneider. I stand up in front of the camera as the news conference ends to ad lib what will be the close of my piece for the Cronkite show this evening. And all I can think to say is, "It turned out, as Helms said, that no foreign leader was directly killed by the CIA. But it wasn't for want of trying."

November 21st: Kissinger is back before the Senate committee, now working in closed session on a Chile report. And when he comes out to face our cameras, he gives his usual line that the U.S. had nothing to do with the military coup in 1973 that unseated Allende. But, because the assassination report indicates that the U.S. role went back to 1970, when Nixon ordered a coup to stop Allende, I ask Kissinger, "What about 1970? That was the issue in the report—not 1973."

Kissinger says, "That report is another matter," and abruptly turns and walks off.

November 24th: I learn from the White House that President Ford has banned any testimony

by his officials—Kissinger, Colby or whoever—when the Senate committee holds open hearings on Chile next week. Colby has written to retired CIA officers that this applies to them.

November 25th: I learn that Nixon has offered to testify, on Chile and other matters, under certain conditions—at San Clemente, not under oath, before Senators Church and Tower only, for four hours only, unless he agrees to continue. I call Tower in Texas, who seems flabbergasted that I have the story. (“Where the hell did you get that?”) Then he says he thinks the Nixon offer is “reasonable.” I reach Senator Church in Portland, Oregon. He says Nixon’s conditions aren’t acceptable to him.

December 4th: The subject that got me started on this assignment—the CIA and Chile—is up today. The Senate committee is putting out its Chile report and will then have a hearing, to be attended by the only people it can get to testify—former ambassadors. Though Colby refuses to testify on Capitol Hill, he does choose this moment to appear at a public forum in an uptown hotel. There he denies any connection with the anti-Allende coup.

“We made a conscious decision,” he says, “that we did not want to bring about a military coup, and we separated ourselves from the leaders of the military who did lead the coup. But they were driven to the wall in the summer of 1973 and they did—on their own—carry out the coup that overthrew Mr. Allende.”

Like Kissinger, Colby focuses on 1973, not 1970. And it is meaningful that he talks of having “separated ourselves” from the coup leaders, meaning that they had been connected.

The Senate report concedes there is no evidence of direct involvement in the coup, but it describes this chain of circumstances:

1. In September 1970, Nixon ordered the CIA to organize a coup that failed after the shooting of General Schneider.

2. For the next two years, the CIA aided the military,

“walking the thin line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it.”

3. In the weeks before the coup, the CIA received reports from planners of the coup that “went beyond the mere collection of information.”

You have to read the fine print to put all this together. The senators have watered down the conclusions. But, my closing line on the Cronkite show is, “So it all comes down to the question [Cont. on 92]

[Cont. from 90] of whether the coup that President Nixon ordered in 1970 happened all by itself in 1973.”

December 12th: The steam is starting to go out of both Senate and House investigations. The Pike committee has marched up the hill again with a contempt citation against Kissinger—actually getting as far as reporting it to the House floor—then marched down again with a compromise that gives it some of the documents it wanted.

More amazing is what happens with Senator Church. In the morning, papers are filed with the Federal Election Commission creating an “exploratory” Church for President Committee. In the afternoon Church, who has pledged not to get into politics while investigating the CIA, comes out of a session of the committee announcing that the investigation is over.

What about the public hearings tentatively scheduled for January? Canceled.

What about the Nixon testimony? His terms are not acceptable.

What about Kissinger, who has agreed to testify in January? Not really needed.

I know what all this is about, having already broadcast that Church must “get off the investigation train before it passes his station.” But I can’t resist putting it to him.

“Why, with such unseemly haste,” I ask, “are you dumping the most important witnesses you’ve yet had?”

Church: “I don’t think that

—that question seems to be like, ‘Why did you, why have you stopped beating your wife?’”

It doesn’t help Church’s consistency that he announces at the same time that he’s going to oppose the confirmation of George Bush unless Bush takes himself out of the running as a 1976 potential candidate.

December 16th: Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Bush has said he’ll not seek the vice-presidential nomination, but can’t absolutely promise to turn it down if offered. Senator Jackson, influential member of the committee, says it’s up to Ford to rule Bush off the ticket. After the session Bush tells me he wouldn’t mind if Ford did that.

December 17th: At a pre-Christmas party of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Goldwater passes the word that President Ford will write a letter tomorrow giving firm assurances that Bush will not be his ’76 running mate. This must be a bitter pill for both Ford and Bush, but Senator Jackson tells me that otherwise Bush would have lost.

December 18th: Colby, in a closed session of the Pike committee, opposes the issuance of three draft reports on covert operations. One is the arming of the Kurds. Another is the operation in Angola, which has already started surfacing in the Senate. The third has to do with CIA intervention in some undisclosed West European election.

December 19th: A tie vote in the Pike committee kills the report on the Kurds. The other two reports go to President Ford, under the September arrangement, to be reviewed.

I learn some more about what’s in that report on the election. It seems that in 1972, the CIA, with President Nixon’s approval, funneled about \$10 million into Italy, trying to get “our” candidates elected.

December 24th: Richard Welch, CIA station chief in

Athens, has been killed in an ambush outside his home. I remember that a list of CIA agents has been published in a magazine called *CounterSpy*, published by a group of disaffected former intelligence officers. So, I arrange to interview them in their little office near Dupont Circle. Their leader, Tim Butz, says they didn't want CIA agents killed, only "neutralized," but "if it happens, it's not our fault."

For the "other side" I call David Phillips, who was Welch's friend and his superior when he worked in Latin America. Phillips now heads the organization of CIA retirees. At his home in suburban Bethesda, with his many children looking on, Phillips, a former actor, expresses great indignation, "... sordid business ... unnecessarily exposing intelligence operators."

And Colby, coming closer than he ever has to acknowledging one of his agents, even when dead, issues a statement about the "paranoiac attack on ... Americans serving their country ..."

I have a sense that Welch, dead, still has one more service to render the CIA. He will be turned into a symbol in the gathering counteroffensive against disclosure.

December 29th: I tape an interview with a former CIA employee, unidentified on request, who has been working for nine years on a "Who's Who in the CIA." He says he plans to go ahead with the project, containing 7500 to 8000 names. Why is he doing it? "I think it is probably the most efficient way we can get the agency to stay out of interfering in foreign politics." And if someone on his list gets killed? "It is the agency's responsibility to withdraw these people from the scene and remove them from

positions overseas where they could be in danger."

A CIA spokesman says, "The American public will judge the motives of persons who do this sort of thing."

(I get a lot of angry mail and phone calls about the broadcast.)

December 30th: I go out to Andrews Air Force Base before dawn for the arrival of Welch's body. The public relations people explain that the big cargo plane, already overhead, will stay in a holding pattern and land at 7 a.m. so that it will be "available" for live televising on network morning news programs. We do, in fact, carry it live on the *CBS Morning News*. The ramp is one where presidents and foreign heads of state are welcomed. Never before has a dead secret agent returned such a public hero. The coffin is accompanied by his Marine officer son. There is an Air Force honor guard. Colby is there, and President Ford's counsel, Philip Buchen.

There are no speeches but David Phillips is on hand for interviews, live or taped. Phillips says that American intelligence agents today are in less danger from the KGB than from "moral primitives" who "condemn by label."

In a commentary I say, "Welch, in death, may have started the rollback that President of Secretary Kissinger

and the whole CIA seemed unable to accomplish."

January 3rd: The Pike Committee is told it will get a letter from President Ford next week vetoing the release of its reports on Angola and the Italian election. After Welch, the administration should be able to get away with that.

January 5th: President Ford will attend Welch's funeral tomorrow and he has waived a lot of red tape to permit burial of a civilian in Arlington National Cemetery. The CIA says the Welch family won't let the press into the chapel, holding it at least partly to blame for his death.

January 6th: Shivering outside the chapel, we hear the funeral ceremony on a loudspeaker. Symbolic retribution against the press for what the press is supposed to have done. A notable absence of representatives of Congress, and especially the investigating committees. And after the chapel ceremony we watch—and film—one of those funerals with full military honors—the same caisson that carried the body of President Kennedy, the folded flag given to the widow by Colby. It is the CIA's first public national hero.

January 7th: There is an intensifying feeling against leaks and yet there is another big leak. It seems [Cont. on 95]

[Cont. from 92] 1972 was not the end of the CIA's involvement in Italian elections. Colby has told a House international relations subcommittee of plans for \$6 million to aid anticommunist parties in preparation for the next election. Ambassador John Volpe urged the program, Kissinger supported it, Ford certified it as necessary—which he must do under a law passed a year ago.

"There is," I say, while reporting the story, "expected to be an explosion from the Ford administration over this leak."

Representative Leo Ryan of California, one of those who denounced the project in the closed committee session, disclaims responsibility for the leak, but says he's glad to see it aborted. "It's better," he says, "than becoming the political pimp of the world."

January 13th: I learn that President Ford's aides have told members of the Senate Intelligence committee, working on oversight legislation for the future, that if Congress hopes to get secret information, it will have to set penalties, up to expulsion from Congress, for leaks on covert operations.

Colby, getting ready to retire, gives me a swan song interview in his office. He hits hard at the point of secrecy. "I just don't believe that it's possible for us to conduct secret operations by sharing them with large numbers in Congress . . . Congress has a very poor system of keeping secrets . . . Congress has to take the position that it represents the American public and isn't just a conduit of every secret. . . ."

January 16th: The Pike committee gets that letter from President Ford saying it can't publish the reports on Angola and Italy. And, just to make the point, the letter itself is stamped "secret." A frustrated Pike tells me he'll try to get some of the material into the committee's final report. I don't quite understand how he expects to get away with that, having lost the battle of declassification in September.

January 20th: The Pike committee meets in secret to look at a draft of its final report. It's about 340 pages, and full of long footnotes. I learn that An-

gola is in it, and Italy (not by name) and even the Kurdish story (not by name).

It estimates annual intelligence costs at \$10 billion and says the country isn't getting its money's worth, citing intelligence failures in Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, the Middle East, Portugal, Cyprus and India. Hush-hush though this draft is supposed to be, I can even learn details like a bizarre footnote about a pornographic film made by Robert Maheu (name deleted) for the CIA. It was sup-

posed to show Indonesian president Sukarno in bed with a woman in the Kremlin and get Sukarno to believe the film was made by the KGB. The film was titled *Happy Days*.

Why does nobody seem upset that so much of this report is leaking?

January 21st: The committee tentatively approves its report, eight to four, and Pike comes out of the meeting: "To say that this committee of Congress can't write a report and file a report without clearing it with the executive branch is just preposterous." But the top Republican, Robert McClory, warns that "it would be a violation of our agreement with the White House and with the intelligence agencies if we were to use the materials which were submitted to us under an agreement of confidentiality."

The committee agrees to give the administration one last chance to argue for changes. The CIA sends the committee—and leaks to me—a letter calling the report "biased, pejorative and factually erroneous . . . all the flavor of the *National Enquirer*." That is a cover letter for 80 pages of specific objections to items in the report. Pike says he's not impressed by most of the objections.

January 23rd: The Pike committee votes, nine to four, final approval of its report after making some of the changes demanded by the CIA, Pentagon and State Department, but rejecting about 150 others. It goes to the government printing office, to be released before the committee's January 31st dead-

line.

I wonder if there is any news left in it after all the leaks. Maybe, now that it's been approved and so many copies are in circulation in so many places, I can get to see the report.

January 24th: Sam Jaffe, whom I knew years ago on the CBS news desk and later rattling mysteriously around East Europe for ABC, has caused a great stir by suggesting a lot of news people worked for the CIA. He has been questioned about all this at length by the Pike committee staff, and Staff Director Searle Field has told me that among those Jaffe named as CIA informants were Walter Cronkite, Marvin Kalb and myself. Field says the committee checked with CIA and elsewhere and concluded, "Jaffe is not a credible witness." But however cockeyed he is about names, there is one element in his story that ties into other indications: Jaffe was told, when he went to work for CBS, that arrangements would be made with CBS to have him sent to Moscow. Wayne Phillips, when recruited by the CIA, was told to go to work for the *New York Times* and arrangements would

be made to send him to Moscow.

Fascinated with allegations of who, in the media, may have worked for the CIA, we are perhaps missing the bigger story of the institutional arrangements that made such things possible. I call James Angleton, who says that wasn't part of his territory, but in the Fifties it was known around the agency that Frank Wisner specialized in media manipulation. Wisner was deputy director for covert operations and is now dead.

"You check on the publishers and broadcasting executives who graced Wisner's salon," says Angleton, "and you will be on the track." Must get time to get back to this story.

But the immediate problem is access to the Pike report. That should be easier, now that it's been finally approved.

January 25th: I have the Pike report! I look for a new story that can be aired immediately. That story, I decide, is a long

footnote, a CIA memo that says that in February 1973, Senator Jackson gave the agency "extremely helpful" advice on how to handle a threatened investigation by Senator Church's subcommittee on multinational corporations, which would have laid bare the cooperation of the CIA and ITT in opposing Allende in Chile.

I locate Church addressing an Israeli bond rally, show him the memo and film his indignant reaction to his colleague's backstabbing. Jackson comes to the studio to tape an interview, explaining he was just giving the CIA procedural advice. The story leads the brand-new *CBS Sunday News*, and we show the memo, leaving no doubt that we have the report. There are other stories, but I'd like to try to space them out through the week before the report is published.

January 26th: I guess I wasn't alone in getting access to the report. The *New York Times* is out with a three-column lead summarizing the whole report, a separate Jackson story and various sidebars. The *Morning News* staff calls me at 5 a.m. and asks me to come in and do a live report for the 7 a.m. show, cramming in as much of the report as I can, and showing the title page on television.

There isn't time on television to do it justice, but radio is insatiable. I record seven spots of two minutes each or more on various episodes in the report.

In the afternoon, Colby calls his third—and last—news conference (Bush is due to be confirmed tomorrow) at CIA headquarters for a bitter protest against the substance and the leaking of the report. Because it's crowding deadline, I don't go out to Langley but listen on a line to our stu- [Cont. on 97]

[Cont. from 95] dio. I have never heard Colby sound so aroused. He denounces the "bursting of the dam protecting many of our secret operations and activities." Though its contents are substantially out, Colby says, "This report should not be issued."

There must be some move afoot to still try to block, or Colby wouldn't be going through

all this.

January 27th: Helms, testifying on future CIA oversight, says he might be in less trouble than he is if there had been better oversight in the past. "I have had a feeling a bit that not only were these senators very busy men, but that on occasion they really did not want to know that much about it because it could be an embarrassment to them politically." Helms says, "There were times when I felt quite lonely." He has a point there.

After the Helms session, I take the subway from the Senate Office Building to the Capitol, and walk from the Senate to the House side. Pike is making some routine move on the floor, and I want to keep up. At noon, the floor almost deserted, Pike asks unanimous consent to publish his report on Friday, June 30th, the consent needed because the House will not be in session that day. Robert Bauman, a chronic Republican objector, objects. That means Pike must go to the Rules Committee and get a resolution to be adopted by majority vote.

January 28th: From the office of Dale Milford of Texas, a Democrat who usually votes with the Republicans on the Pike committee and is trying to block the report, comes a tip: watch the Rules Committee today! And, indeed, it turns out to be worth watching. Milford's Texas friend, John Young, proposes an amendment that would hold up release of the report until President Ford can decide about the secrets in it. And, to the consternation of Pike and others on his committee, that amendment is carried, nine to seven. It is after 6 p.m. and there is barely time to get the story on the Cronkite show.

I say on the air, again showing the report, "If the House backs up its committee, it means that this report, already obtained by CBS News and others, will be filed with the clerk of the House as a confidential document. . . . It's the first good news the administration has had in a long time on the subject of leaks and secrecy."

For tomorrow morning I record an analysis saying, "This may be the first sign of a backlash against the disclosure of intelligence secrets."

January 29th: I sit all afternoon in the House gallery until it becomes clear that a vote

on the Pike report won't come in time for the *Evening News*. I have promised to take my wife to the Israeli reception for President Ford on the occasion of Prime Minister Rabin's visit. Toward the end of the reception, I run into "Tip" O'Neill, the House majority leader, who tells me that the House has just voted, two to one, to block the report.

I ask him, "Why, do you think?"

O'Neill says, "I wondered about the same thing, and I asked some of my friends. And they said that this is an election year, and they're getting a lot of flak about leaks, and they're going to vote with their American Legion posts."

February 3rd: The Pike committee, working now on legislative recommendations, acts as though it is shell-shocked. Pike, disgusted, had to be talked into even going ahead with these sessions. He seems utterly flabbergasted by the bottling up of his report, and even the triumphant minority seems dismayed. Milford, who did it with his little maneuver, seems embarrassed. He moves that the report be sent to the White House so that it can be sanitized and released. Pike rules the motion out of order.

February 5th: Kissinger, testifying on future oversight, says that foreign policy won't work unless congressional leaks are plugged. Of the Pike committee: "I think they have used classified information in a reckless way, and the version of covert operations they have leaked to the press has the cumulative effect of being totally untrue and damaging to the nation."

On the secrecy business, Kissinger, long on the defensive, seems clearly now on the offensive.

February 10th: The Pike committee adopts its recommendations and goes out of existence, its report still bottled up. It may be that I have the only copy of the report out of government control. There are no headlines left in it—CBS and the *New York Times* have told its main stories. But, it begins to grow on me that I cannot accept the responsibility for withholding the whole document from anyone who may still be interested in reading the text.

I don't think that, as a report,

it's all that great. It has about it a sense of advocacy, a way of taking the goriest details out of context to make a case against the CIA. But good report or bad report, it is the result of a long congressional investigation, and I feel that it will die—if I let it die. So, I reach the decision that I must try to arrange to have it published as a book and, if that is not possible, by anyone who will promise to publish the full [Cont. on 98]

[Cont. from 97] unexpurgated text.

But then a story drops into my lap! Sig Mickelson, former president of CBS News (now head of Radio Free Europe), identifies two newsmen as having been CIA agents while serving as stringers for CBS News. Mickelson says he learned about Frank Kearns, who worked for CBS in Cairo, from CIA Director Allen Dulles. And Mickelson says that he learned about Austin Goodrich, who had been a CBS stringer in Stockholm, from two CIA officials who told him about it in the presence of William S. Paley, CBS board chairman, in Paley's office in October 1954. Paley denies it.

I am known to our studio technicians as "one-take Schorr" because I can usually record my stories smoothly on the first try. This time it takes four takes as I stammer each time I reach the name of Paley. But we complete the taping moments before the Cronkite show starts.

February 11th: The CIA announces it won't hire news people anymore, but will never disclose the names of those who worked for it in the past.

February 13th: The *Village Voice* has appeared with the Pike committee report. I release a statement saying that, rather than "cooperate in what might be the total suppression" of the report, I decided to arrange for its textual publication. I enlisted the cooperation of the Reporters' Committee for the Freedom of the Press in providing an intermediary who could arrange publication. Also, considering it unthinkable that I would profit personally, I authorized the intermediary to arrange a contribution from whoever would publish it to go directly to the Reporters' Com-

mittee. The intermediary, I say, reported little prospect for book publication, then relayed an offer from Clay Felker, publisher of the *Village Voice*, which I agreed to.

CBS announces that "another correspondent will be assigned to coverage of the House Intelligence committee and the controversy surrounding the report," under existing policy that "no correspondent may report on a story in which he is personally involved."

February 15th: There have been a couple of times in my career—especially when I was covering Watergate—when I had to cope with the unexpected problem of finding myself part of my own story. This is the first time, though, that I have been ordered off part of my story. I am anxious to show, and as soon as possible, that I can still go on working. So, on this Sunday, I spend a lot of time on the phone—glad to find

my White House sources still willing to talk to me as though nothing has happened. And I go into the office to do a preview of the new Ford program on intelligence organization for the *Sunday News* and the *Morning News* of Monday.

February 17th: Senators Hudleston and Mathias, of the Church committee, go out to the CIA to talk to Bush about how they can finish their investigation of the CIA and the media without having names of journalists. I wait at the CIA gate to interview them. They explain they'll get descriptions of activities, without names.

This evening I attend President Ford's news conference. Coming in, I meet Bob Mead, of the White House press office, who says, jokingly, "Sorry, you aren't allowed." I listen from a back row while Ford denounces the leak of the report and its publication in the *Village Voice*.

February 18th: Wait outside the Senate Foreign Relations hearing room to chat a moment with Bush, arriving for a get-acquainted briefing in closed session. The difficulty now is to keep the spotlight off me. A picture of Bush and me runs on the front page of the *Washington Star*, billed as a "confrontation," which later prompts Bush to call me and say he hopes he didn't cause me any embarrassment.

At 11 a.m. there's a detailed

White House briefing on the administration's new program. There I ask what are the institutional protections in the new plan against a president who will have his CIA chief eavesdrop on the opposition party or undertake a covert operation to please a friendly foreign head of state. I get long answers from Bush and other officials present.

No sooner back at the office, I am assigned to rush out to Dulles Airport and meet Senator Church, returning from Europe, to get his reaction to the new Ford program.

When I return, about 4 p.m., rushing to get all this assembled for the Cronkite show, I am told that I am off the intelligence assignment altogether—effective immediately. Which means I won't handle today's story. . . . I go home.

EPILOGUE

The journal stops at 4 p.m. on February 18th, when I was taken off the assignment. On the Cronkite show that evening I saw a shot of me interviewing Senator Church. My name was not mentioned. I have not been on the air as a reporter since then.

On February 19th, the House of Representatives voted, 269 to 115, to have its Committee on Official Conduct, known as

the ethics committee, make an investigation and say whether I should be held in contempt of the House.

President Ford offered all "services and resources of the executive branch" to track down the leak. Speaker Carl Albert declined the offer. But the ethics committee said it was considering asking that FBI agents be detailed to assist in the inquiry.

Attorney General Edward Levi said the Justice Department, with FBI assistance, was making a preliminary inquiry of its own to determine if it had any cause to act.

On February 23rd, CBS announced that, "in view of the adversary situation" in which I had been placed, I was being "relieved of all reporting duties for an indefinite period."

There are things I shall want to say about all this. But my lawyer, Joseph A. Califano Jr., who is being paid by CBS, ad-

vises me that I shouldn't say them as long as any investigation may be pending.

I should like to be able to say my commitment to ROLLING STONE to cover the investigation ended on February 18th when I stopped covering the investigation. But that would be a sophistry, because the story continues. Not only because, at this writing, the other shoe—the Senate's report—hasn't dropped yet. More specifically, because what happened to me isn't irrelevant to the story.

The underlying issue has always been secrecy, the secrecy that made Watergate possible, the secrecy that made the CIA think that, having found a lot of wrongdoing that looked awful in the post-Watergate climate of 1973, it could conduct a secret reform and cover the whole thing up.

When Colby boasted to me that the CIA had cleaned its own house, I asked him if he had thought it could be done without public accounting and public retribution. That, he said, had been the intention.

When waves of disclosure rolled over the CIA, it acted meek and laid low. But, when it found the time ripe, the intelligence community, which I like to call the secrecy establishment, started rolling back. It had the enthusiastic help of a president who saw a security-minded executive versus a leaky Congress as a campaign issue.

Standing there doing my thing—the same thing I had been doing for a long time—I guess I got in the way of the rollback, and was knocked over.

But, what is different from the old days of clandestine operations, a lot of people noticed and seemed to care. Not for me, but for what this all seemed to mean.