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He is opposed to action by the Security Council (thru par 43).
Chilean ~~Cuban~~ delegate Schweitzer followed, beginning with the representation that his govt was a defender of sovereignty and a firm believer in non-intervention.

He said, no such note as Roa described had ever reached his government (51)

"We were very much relieved to ~~xxxx~~ hear the representative of the United States emphatically reject the Xuban charge ..." (53)

Much of the rest of the speech is addressed to the resolution of his delegation jointly with that of Ecuador which is "nothing more than a fervent appeal to the Governments of the United States and Cuba to seek a solution for their differences by all the peaceful means provided for in the Charter and in the American regional system." Altho "a number of delegations consider themselves unable to support our draft resolution".

Turkey's delegate Menemencioglu followed. He found no reasons invoked "as capable of being construed as evidence in support of the charge of imminent aggression" (68) but "noted the statement of the representative of the United States in which he has reiterated his Government's denial of any intention of aggressive action" (69) so he cannot see what the Security Council can do.

The delegate of Taiwan, Tsiang followed (listed as China). He points out that in 5 days the threatened aggression had not taken place (73) and there is "no evidence of military action ... events have already proved the charge to be groundless". He finds the charge against the US "groundless" and the Cuban "campaign" is "against the spirit of the Charter" and that of the OAS (77). Cuba, he says, has opened "an additional front for the cold war between international communism and the free world" (79)

The Pres, Mr. M. O. Loutfi, of the UAR, spoke in his capacity as his country's representative. He began with an endorsement of the principle of non-intervention. He also says, and quotes the NYTimes as his source, that the Cuban leaders do fear an armed attack "one day or other from the United States" (86). He then refers to the denial by the US of any such intentions (87). He endorses and supports the Chilean-Ecuadorian resolution (9091)

Benates Vinuesa of ~~Ecuador~~ Ecuador followed with the admission that he agreed with the Chilean delegate that their resolution had no chance.

He does not "believe there was any possibility of aggression" (107). Then Roa obtains the floor "~~xxxxxx~~ in order to exercise my right of reply". He demands that his charges "be treated with more austerity, more seriousness and more maturity" than the great powers have (114). He sees no need to reiterate or repeat the charges and finds it "significant" that practically none of the delegations which have spoken in the Security Council have dealt directly with those charges and allegations by Cuba" (115)

He points out that the US, United Kingdom, China and France addressed themselves to his letter and then "almost entirely round the confidential note which was mentioned in my letter" (116)

He charges and offers proof of a misrepresentation by the US delegate of an expedition to invade Panama and cites evidence of his own participation in informing the Panamanian Govt. (118-20)

Referring to Cuban agreement with the Soviet Union at the UN he needles the US about the U-2 flight of Francis Gary Powers and quotes Eisenhower as saying "brazenly" that "such flights were necessary for the security of his country" (121).

He charges that when Cuba passed the agrarian reform act "it received a note from the United States Government in which that Government, which was perfectly aware of the state of financial and economic bankruptcy in which the seven years' ~~of~~ tyranny of Batista had left Cuba, demanded full and immediate payment. Instead of negotiating or even displaying good will in a joint effort to reach an international arrangement for providing suitable compensation, what it did was to drive us to the wall; what it did was to demand from us full and immediate payment in cash ..." This he says "is the basic reason for the progressive deterioration in relations between Cuba and the United States" (126)

He also refers to other threats by the US: "I still remember how the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bonsal, came to the Ministry one day and threatened me because Cuba might vote in favour of the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. He would not even concede that we might abstain from voting. That was how Mr. Bonsal behaved at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and my reply was that Cuba was a sovereign country and would vote as it pleased. I was a witness of that incident; I have not heard of it at second hand." (131)

He also answers the French delegate of the previous day and disputes the statement of the UK delegate that "the dispute between ~~the~~ Cuba and the United States had been brought before the Council of the Organization of American States," stating that because "it had not been raised either by the United States or by Cuba" there "was no basis for asking the OAS for any information of any type." (138)

The Good Offices Committee of the OAS could "solve quarrels between the Latin American countries on the basis of a prior request by any States involved in a conflict or dispute", Cuba did not request such good offices (139)

Switching to the reason given by the US in breaking diplomatic relations, Roa quotes "articles approved by the Sixth Committee" and then submitted to the General Assembly granting "receiving" States the right to fix the size of diplomatic delegations by "what is reasonable and normal" (142) and he reiterates that the large US Embassy staff in Havana "engaged in activities of espionage, sabotage and terrorism" (143).

After reading the declaration of the Cuban Council of Ministers dealing with the break in relations by the US (148) he draws a comparison with US aggressiveness toward Mexico in 1930 (150) and to the Guatemala invasion of 1954 (151).

Zorin then got the floor (152). He interprets these discussions as showing "the majority of the members of the Council and particularly the representatives of the small countries ... expressed their concern and alarm at the situation ..." (153). Those countries that "have tried to minimize the danger" are "mainly allies of the United States" (154)

To him the point of "cardinal significance" is the rupture of relations by the US which "always has been and is evidence of a deterioration in relations" and when as in this case done by a great Power it alone justifies the fear of a small power (155-8). The US he says "did not in reality disprove the facts which are now known to the whole world" (159) He interprets the statements made in the Council by the US as not denying the facts but denying the intentions, and says deeds speak louder than words (160) Even the Ecuador-Chile resolution which he says is "in accordance with the basic principles of the Charter" now "cannot be adopted on account of the objections of the United States" and its allies (162)

For the US Mr. Barco spoke, saying he was answering the Soviet and Cuban statements (168). He began by alluding to the Cuban language of the US invasion coming "within a few hours" and that the Cuban delegate had made similar charges in the past which "is of very serious concern to all of those who are interested in truth, in the purposes of the United Nations and in the obligations of all members of the Security Council" (169) The Cuban statement, he says, "does not belong on a Security Council meeting" and "is an abuse of the privilege of coming here". Further, "It is an imposition on the good will of the members and it subverts the seriousness of purpose of the Security Council. It is a device which should not be allowed" (170)

He takes exception to the Soviet statement about the breaking of relations (171) and saying that the Soviet delegate cannot speak for the members of the Security Council, he thereupon does himself (172)

Alluding to the quotation from the NYTimes by the Arab delegate which said that Cuban leaders "do sincerely believe in the danger of an armed attack some day or other from the United States", he said "I can accept that there exist fantasies in the minds of the revolutionary leaders in Cuba". He further quotes the Times as saying "it could help to lessen the tensions between us if there were some way of persuading the Cuban leaders, and especially Premier Castro that we have no intention of invading Cuba or permitting an invasion from our shores" (173-4)

The Cuban complaint, he says, "is an "utterly fantastic allegation" (175). He agrees with Mr. Tsiang, in conclusion, that the Council "should not allow the type of allegation that we have heard here" (176) and thus the debate in the Security Council ended, shortly before the Bay of Pigs.

Now he tells us of a "second problem ... the withdrawal clause". Khrushchev held (Schlesinger's words) "that a nation always retained the sovereign right to withdraw from a treaty which no longer served its interest; to include an explicit withdrawal clause in this treaty would therefore imply a diminution of that right in other treaties."

Next Schlesinger tells us, "Harriman knew that the Senate, faced with the probability that China would refuse to sign and then might become a nuclear power on its own, would insist on such a clause." But China did not sign the treaty, and it did become a nuclear power, and the US did not withdraw from the treaty. But Harriman "flatly told Gromyko that, without a withdrawal clause, there could be no treaty. The result was the curious compromise phraseology in Article IV: 'Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.'" So there seems to have been really no major problem involved in the second problem.

The third one "was that of accession to the treaty", so that "states not recognized by other states" could sign "without thereby receiving implicit recognition." The US, of course, did not want to officially admit the existence of E. Germany and China. And over this there apparently were "discussions" that "proved long and difficult" in Schlesinger's words, but which, because of their character, seriously alarmed the British delegation. Schlesinger has nothing but praise for Harriman who was willing to endanger the entire treaty in pursuit of this essentially meaningless point, calling him "correct, forceful, his restraint masking a capacity for toughness and even anger. ... He would not give ground; and, as the talks dragged on, Hailsham became increasingly restive and unhappy. Soon he was complaining to London that Harriman's rigidity might lose the whole treaty. His reports disturbed Macmillan, who finally instructed Ormsby Gore to call on the President and register official British anxiety."

Now, on the water, at least for Hailsham if not for the British, is poisoned. Again Schlesinger has made intellectually dishonest use of his book, carried as it would be on the back of the dead Pres, as a vehicle for the venting of his personal spleen. What is the essence of his ridicule of Hailsham? That he was wrong? That ~~he~~ the treaty was, in fact, not in danger? No such thing. It was only that Harriman got away with it! And Harriman, in Schlesinger's delineation of his character, is something less than ~~quite~~ modest: "I am always right when I know (emphasis in original) I am right," he said on his return ..." (907)

Ormsby Gore got to the White House just as the Pres placed a call to Kaysen in Moscow to learn "the Russians had accepted a revision of the preamble eliminating the language which we had disliked", and there had been "worked out an ingenious system of multiple depositaries, leaving every signatory free to sign only in association with nations of which it approved." This is the triviality over which Harriman was willing to jeopardize the entire agreement. Schlesinger cannot totally ignore the innate silliness of the US position. So instead he deprecates it, using his own unique kind of color words and distortions: "(This idea offended the purists of interna-

tional law, since it seemed to mean that no one could definitely know who the signatories were, but ~~it~~ it did not bother practical minds.)" And just as the President agreed to Kaysen's recommendation of acceptance, "Macmillan came on the phone with a certain elaborateness", etc., - despite Kennedy's and apparently his own liking for Macmillan, ridicule has become so much a habit with Schlesinger that he cannot resist it - to "express his concern" about what was happening in Moscow. He was happy with Kennedy's assurance "Don't worry ... It's been worked out ..."

And so the treaty was signed. This eminent prize-winning historian, having given little but his prejudices and propaganda, - so little he befuddles the origin of the treaty, omitted its authorship and here ignores even its contents or provisions - meets his obligation to his craft, himself and his leader by merely saying, "immediately after the Macmillan incident, "In Moscow, after the treaty had been initialed, Harriman and Khrushchev took up the questions of France and China." And that's it, dear reader. This, perhaps one of the most important agreements between nations, is of no concern to the eminent Mr. Schlesinger. It happened and he tells us merely that it did happen.

But what about China? What about this deal, this deep understanding of the world's puppet-masters who pull strings and manipulate other countries, including the Soviet Union? What about Kennedy's "cash in West Germany" that he was willing to spend on Harriman's recommendation - his plan for a Soviet-American alliance against China? Khrushchev, even in Schlesinger's trickery, would have nothing to do with it:

p.908 The American found the Russian prickly and adamant. China was another socialist country, Khrushchev said, and he did not propose to discuss it with a capitalist. Harriman persisted: "Suppose we can get France to sign the treaty? Can you deliver China?" Khrushchev replied cryptically, "That's your problem." Harriman tried again: "Suppose their rockets are targeted against you?" Khrushchev did not answer. (908)

Comment: Here the novelist in the historian melds both skills for a worthwhile reflection of attitudes in the Soviet Union. He quotes Harriman as saying, "he saw few security men around" and Khrushchev as saying he didn't like them around. (908) And the unguarded Khrushchev told the "large crowd" that "collected behind" Khrushchev and the delegations as they walked toward their dinner, "We've just signed a test-ban treaty," and then "the people applauded and applauded". Here we have an unguarded picture of how the Soviet populace hates its rulers.

Here it becomes essential for his purposes for Schlesinger to rewrite the facts to create a history of his own preference, one of the Amer initiative and the Soviet following which resulted in the signing of this treaty, altho Schlesinger says, "American and Britain had offered the Soviet Union a limited test ban four times in four years; now it was accepted the fifth time around ..." Entirely aside from the contents of any proposals prior to this one made by the Amers and British - and this one was not, as Schlesinger implies, offered by us but accepted by us - is it not obvious that something must have happened to have caused either the Soviets or the Anglo-Amers to have agreed

the fifth time around if they couldn't on the previous four? Inadvertently, Schlesinger has already made clear what it was. It was the Cuba missile crisis. But Schlesinger dare not argue that the Cuba missile crisis caused a Soviet acceptance of this treaty because that would put in perspective the reason for an consequences of the missile crisis and, of course, he does not want people to think about it. He wants his own, the official version, granted blanket acceptance. And there is little doubt even in Schlesinger's corrupted version that the Cuba missile crisis put the Soviet Union in a position to win acceptance of a limited test-ban agreement.

In the beginning of the exercise of self-righteousness that follows, Schlesinger is correct:

p.909 ...Left to itself, the Soviet Union, to judge from Khrushchev's attitude in the spring of 1963, would not have perceived that a test ban was to its own interest and would not have understood its potentialities as a key to the future. Left to itself, the Department of State would not have persevered with the issue, nor would it have ever proposed an American University speech - that speech which, in its modesty, clarity and perception, repudiated the self-righteous cold war rhetoric of a succession of Secretaries of State. Mao Tse-tung was also entitled to credit for his indispensable assistance in making the treaty possible. (909)

Comment: But he is not correct the way he says it. It is not if the Soviet Union were "left to itself", it is that if the Soviet Union had been left without the required assurances - the assurances that Kennedy gave for the first time in his Amer Univ speech. And again Mao Tse-tung's overworked heels: his share of the credit - his "indispensable assistance". Is it not odd that a Pulitzer prize winner resorts to such innuendo, leaving his unsupported lingo to work its way thru the reader's mind and create an impression of some thing Schlesinger does not dare say? What he is trying to imply is that the threat of Mao Tse-tung suddenly clear to Khrushchev impelled Khrushchev to accept an Amer deal. But what he is actually saying is that the fear of Mao Tse-tung in the US helped create an acceptability among those whose opinions are more formed by hate than reason, which made possible the acceptance of the treaty by the Senate.

Thus, except for some Hollywood gaudy emotionalism about Harriman, we are at the end of Schlesinger's account of the negotiating of the treaty. And as he began it, he ends it, with a massive Chinese shadow so large it is in back of everything. It has in it almost every version of China's position and the Soviet attitude toward China that is possible. On p.897 we have a Kremlin "immobilized by problems with China" but on p.905 we have the same Kremlin giving China what-for and outloud. On p.904 we have Kennedy willing to throw the W Germans to the Russians for an agreement against China, but on p.908, Khrushchev won't buy it. So we have the final cheap literary device of crediting Mao "for his indispensable assistance" of entirely unspecified, undescribed, even unhinted-at, nature. And thru it all we have a portrayal of an Amer administration and its most respected "Soviet hand" and most skillful negotiator willing to endanger the entire treaty for a poor semantic concession.

Even the State Dept deserved as it may have been then,

earlier and later of criticism is lambasted solely for the indulgence of Schlesinger's strange personality. "Left to itself, the Department of State would not have persevered with the issue ..." Nor should it have. And as a historian, as a professor, as an intimate, an associate, an adviser of the Pres, Schlesinger certainly knew it. It is not the function of the State Dept to create policy; it is its assigned duty to implement policy of the Pres. The leadership must, should come from the Pres. So what difference does it make, as long as Schlesinger enjoys himself, regardless of who pays? And it should not be forgotten there is no such thing as "the State Department" to pay; it is the country and the people who pay or, more meaningfully, who suffer.

5. The Test Ban on the Hill (909-13)

Comment: Even Khrushchev knew Kennedy would have trouble with Congress and (p.898) he told Norman Cousins that "the American Congress has ~~not~~ convinced itself that on-site inspection is necessary and the President cannot get a treaty through the Senate without it. Very well, then, let us accommodate the President." So Khrushchev, for the sake of this accommodation, agreed to 3 inspections where he believed inspections unnecessary because "the policing can be done adequately ^{from} outside our borders." When the US did not agree to fewer than whatever number of inspections they were insisting upon - Schlesinger does not tell us how many - Khrushchev had waiting the draft of a limited treaty eliminating the problem of inspections. Then he told the western powers, in Schlesinger's words, "if there were no real hope for agreement, the Soviet Union had no choice but to take measures to strengthen its own security." (898) and finally, when the Anglo-American delegation arrived, at "the first meeting" he said, again in Schlesinger's words, "there was no point in wasting time" with what could not be agreed upon.

So everybody knew Kennedy would have his troubles, that negotiaton, as Shlesinger says, "was only half the problem; ratification remained." (909) Kennedy regarded this "as the most serious congressional issue he had thus far faced." and he was "determined to win it if it cost him the 1964 election." According to Schlesinger's reporting of Kennedy's statement to his advisers.

But there was considerable opposition.

Acceptance of the treaty, Schlesinger tells us, "in the Soviet case ... meant acquiescence to American nuclear superiority." He then interprets "superiority" (910) to mean that "in 1964 the Defense Department said that we had twice as many intercontinental bombers on constant alert and at least four times as many intercontinental ballistics missiles." Even if this were true in 1963 rather than 1964, it still did not establish "nuclear superiority" because there is no element of number involved nor is there any element of any kind of "superiority" in the face of a sufficiency in the hands of any power. Nuclear strength is not measured as is the power of conventional armaments. There is either enough or there is not enough and if there is enough, no one needs any more. But if there were other elements to be

considered in "superiority" these would seem to be the power of the missiles and the megatonnage of the warhead. Were these considerations applicable, then, with or without the treaty, the Russians had clear superiority for they had more powerful missiles and more powerful warheads.

Schlesinger gives his own interpretation of "Russian willingness to accept such margins", these entirely nonexistent margins, saying they "showed not only a post-Cuba confidence in American restraint but/new understanding of the theories of stable nuclear deterrence." By this point the nonsense about "American restraint" and the whole context of a nonexistent Amer victory is hardly worthy of any comment. But how can he talk about "the theories of stable nuclear deterrence" having just alleged "American nuclear superiority"? There is either deterrent which means enough to wipe out the other country and that's more than enough, or there is a fiction of superiority but there cannot be both; one contradicts the other. This is followed by a further fiction with nothing omitted from Schlesinger's text, "And, in addition to slowing down the bilateral arms race, the treaty held out the hope of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new nations." Both halves of this sentence are utterly false. There was no such hope, especially with regard to China which refused to sign the treaty and developed its own weapon; with respect to France which had already developed its weapon, refused to sign the treaty and proceeded to perfect it and the means of delivery; or with respect to any of a number of other countries who had the capacity to develop their own weapon. Even more of a fraud is the alleged slowing-down of the arms race and Schlesinger has already proved it is a complete fraud in his discussion of what followed the Vienna conference of the Soviet "response" to Amer "provoking" and to their increases in arms expenditures following those of the US and, if anything more were needed, there is the March 2/66 then sensational press conference of Sec Defense MaNamara in which he lost his temper and in which the Def Dept very carefully edited the official version of his remarks and in which he said that for 5 years the Amer govt had been building its conventional forces for just such an eventuality as it precipitated in S Vietnam. Nor can his next sentence be regarded as any more of a verbal shellgame for in it he attributes an effect "both practical and symbolic" of "collaboration in stopping nuclear tests" for he knew the Amer govt had not and would not do this and as of the time of the appearance of his book and even afterwards was still testing underground. Nor had he any reason to believe, as he said, that it "might well lead to future agreement on more general disarmament issues" because he has already made clear that this was not about to happen and he knew the contrary was true, that the US govt was diligently building its conventional ~~armament~~ armament resources. Fortunately, there are, however, merits to the treaty with one of which he began his paragraph, the end of fallout.

His next paragraph is devoted to the opposition. ~~His~~ The

p.911 scientific community continued in strong opposition. Some, like General Thomas D. White, a former Air Chief, considered the whole theory of stable deterrence as "next to unilateral disarmament . . . the most misleading and misguided military theme yet conceived." True security, he and others argued, lay in unlimited nuclear supremacy, and this required unlimited testing. (911)

Comment: Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that this is exactly what happened for both the US and the Soviet Union continued testing underground. And the US continued manufacturing almost limitless numbers of nuclear warheads as the earlier mentioned press conference of Sec McNamara made clear - in the version of what really happened and in not the official text of the Dept of Defense.

Much of the opposition alleged the treaty would interfere with the development of a missile defense, despite the contrary statements of McNamara and the top military leaders and scientists. Telser's response was to call for the immediate resumption of atmospheric testing. He told the Senators in ratifying the treaty "you will have given away the future safety of this country." Adm Strauss was "not sure that the reduction of tensions is necessarily a good thing." Other admirals and generals attacked the treaty (911)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed a comprehensive test ban in the spring on the ground the Russians would assuredly cheat; Air Force Chief Curtis LeMay testified he would have opposed the treaty if it would not create a situation with serious international consequences. Here Schlesinger adds parenthetically that Kennedy "kept on" Chiefs of the JCS who were out of sympathy with his policy and wrong in their own policies because he admired them as military men.

Forgetting now the arguments of the previous page in support of the treaty, that it would "slow ... down the bilateral arms race" and have the effect of "stopping nuclear tests and dispersion", Schlesinger here acknowledges Kennedy knuckled in to his chiefs of staff and agreed to exactly the opposite.

p.912

Now the Chiefs, in effect, exacted a price for their support. General Maxwell Taylor, whom Kennedy had appointed Chairman of the Chiefs in August 1962 and who had played a judicious and effective role in bringing his brethren along, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the most serious reservations" of the Chiefs had to do with "the fear of a euphoria in the West which will eventually reduce our vigilance." The Chiefs accordingly attached "safeguards" to their support: vigorous continuation of underground testing; readiness to resume atmospheric testing on short notice; strengthening of detection capabilities; and the maintenance of nuclear laboratories. The President, determined that the treaty should be ratified, gave his "unqualified and unequivocal assurances" that the conditions would be met. Secretary McNamara, while questioning whether "the vast increases in our nuclear forces" had "produced a comparable enhancement in our security," nevertheless assured the Senate that he would move in the next years further to raise "the megatonnage of our strategic alert forces." Senators, reluctant to be associated with what critics might regard as disarmament, seized with delight on the chance of interpreting the renunciation of atmospheric tests as a green light for underground tests. The effect for a moment, as Richard Rovere put it, was to turn "an agreement intended to limit nuclear testing into a limited warrant for increasing nuclear testing." (912/3)

Comment@ One wonders why Schlesinger says "the effect for a moment" because as he knew it was a permanent effect. It was a piece of diplomatic international chicanery, perhaps unexceeded in

history. McNamara was much better than his word, as he revealed on March 2/66 when he said, "during the last five years we have greatly strengthened our military establishment for precisely this kind of a contingency (Vietnam) ... and at the same time we were increasing our nonnuclear forces, we also increased our nuclear forces. ... from 836 (warheads in our strategic alert forces) in June 1961 to about 2600 in June 1966 and a total megatonnage of these weapons more than tripled. Moreover, by June 30, 1966, we will have doubled the number of tactical nuclear warheads on the soil of western Europe and large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are available for use in other areas of the world if required."

Schlesinger justifies the whole thing, saying, "The President was prepared to pay this price to commit the nation to a treaty outlawing atmospheric tests." That is all it did except to fool the people and the world who thought there was some meaningful halt to nuclear expenditures and hazards, which there was not, ~~xxx~~ from the treaty altho nuclear danger may for political reasons have subsided.

And forgetting all of those rah-rah speeches, some of which he had reviewed or drafted, he now says of the Pres in attributing another benefit to the treaty, "For two and a half years he had quietly striven to free his countrymen from the ~~xxx~~ cliches of the cold war."

But the lemming in Schlesinger cannot be completely suppressed. Having sought to justify the complete capitulation of the Pres to the military on the implied grounds of its necessity in effecting Senate passage, Schlesinger concludes this subsection by saying that "by September" 80 percent of the people, according to the polls, favored the treaty - and that it did not come before the Senate until Sept 24 - and then was passed by a vote of 80 to 19, a very considerable majority.

6. Further Steps on the Journey (913/8)

Comment: Schlesinger's capacity for ignoring Schlesinger is exceeded only by his capacity for manufacturing or ignoring fact. He begins this subsection by saying

p.913 If the treaty were to have its full effect, it would have to include all present and potential nuclear powers. This gave Khrushchev the problem of signing up China, as it gave Kennedy the problem of signing up France. (913)

Comment: It not only did no such thing, it could not possibly have done any such thing, and nobody ever believed it would or it could, or that Khrushchev or Kennedy, either one, could or ever expected to persuade China or France to sign. Only 5 pages earlier we find this exchange between Harriman and Khrushchev:

p.908 Harriman ...: "Suppose we can get France to sign the treaty? Can you deliver China?" Khrushchev replied cryptically, "That's your problem." Harriman tried again: "Suppose their rockets are targeted against you?" Khrushchev did not answer. (908)

Comment: This is not even good fiction! (913)

Schlesinger spares himself the necessity of explaining why neither China or France should halt the development of nuclear weapons when the US, whether or not the Russians, continued its redundant accumulation of them.

De Gaulle's price was not to the American liking:

p.914 ... So long as Russia and America retained their capacity to destroy the world, agreement between them would "not divert France from equipping herself with the same sources of strength." (914)

Comment: Ignoring at least the American gleeful accumulation of totally unnecessary nuclear warheads, Schlesinger tells us,

p.914 ... The French declination, on top of the Chinese, meant that the treaty would fail as a means of stopping major proliferation. "Charles de Gaulle," Kennedy told David Brinkley, "will be remembered for one thing only, his refusal to take that treaty." (914)

Comment: Whether or not de Gaulle will be so remembered exclusively, is it not a proper question to ask how Kennedy, who guaranteed the unnecessary (as McNamara had in 1961 told Dean Rusk) testing ~~the~~ an accumulation of nuclear warheads will be remembered, whether or not exclusively? De Gaulle was responsible for proliferation? De Gaulle caused the tripling of the American nuclear stockpile between 1961 and 1966, when the 1966 stockpile was greatly in excess of any legitimate needs?

In defense of Kennedy, it cannot even be fairly or responsibly alleged that had he not made this concession the Senate would not have approved the treaty. Entirely aside from the fact that it was the chiefs of his own appointment who extracted this miserable bargain from him, there remains the admittedly overwhelming support of 80% of the people well in advance of the Senate voting, and it was Kennedy who, in Schlesinger's account, offered the deal, not the Senate that extracted it (914).

Schlesinger is not finished with his pretenses, claiming next that "if the test ban was not to stop national nuclear weapons development completely, it still denied at least its signatories - soon more than a hundred - the most convenient means of pursuing the nuclear dream." But on the previous page he had quoted de Gaulle's sneering rejection that these countries were "hardly any of them ... in a position to carry out tests. It is rather like asking people to promise not to swim the Channel."

Schlesinger's next argument is valid: "And it still offered the prospect of a detente between the two superpowers." It would perhaps be more valid to suggest that what led to the treaty was responsible for the detente.

The Soviet Union may not have found the benefits Schlesinger said were in the treaty for it, "...international breathing spell at very small cost. ... hope of keeping Soviet defense spending down ... might encourage a reduction of western military budgets ..." All of these things he knew were totally false. But grudgingly he acknowledged it was "a visible success" of "Khrushchev's coexistence policy" which to Schlesinger means that he could use it "to isolate the Chinese in the communist civil war." Almost everybody else has a different concept of "coexistence".

Now at least by inference Schlesinger reverts to his and Kennedy's implication of a Soviet-American axis, saying they now "developed comparable interests in the preservation both of their own societies and of an international order under their own control ... champions of the status quo in a world where revolution had spun beyond them." (915)

p.915

Khrushchev himself appeared ready for next steps. In statements on July 19 and July 26, he laid out a series of possibilities: the non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; the freezing or "still better" the cutting of defense budgets; measures to prevent surprise attack, including reciprocal observation teams and inspection posts in East and West Germany; and the reduction of foreign forces in both German states. (915/6)

Comment: Silly Khrushchev! He seriously underestimated the people he was dealing with. None of these things came to pass. Soon, however, Khrushchev was forced out and it would seem not inappropriate to wonder whether the unfulfilled promises of the nuclear test-ban agreement that was signed, the resulting nuclear proliferation in the guise of disarmament, were in any way or even largely responsible for his passing.

Both Harriman and Kaysen were convinced a nonaggression pact should be seriously considered. Schlesinger asks, "was this now so self-evidently against our interest?" He cites some of its merits: the reduced threat of war; the promotion of greater intercourse between the two Germanies; a possible solution of the Berlin problem; and others. But this prospect "was deeply disturbing to those accustomed to the familiar simplifications of the cold war". "...one felt an almost panicky desire in some parts of the government to return things to pre-test ban normal as speedily as possible. The critical question was whether it was to our advantage to maintain or decrease tension in Europe..." What a shocking revelation, that it was the US which controlled and could "maintain" or "decrease" the tensions in Europe! It is a macabre companion to Kennedy's W German cash! (916)

The Senate debate, Schlesinger tells us, "strengthened those who took the traditional view - that a reduction of tension was a bad thing - bad, if only because Moscow liked it and Bonn didn't." Adenauer, he says, was signalling "vast discontent" which "troubled the traditionalists". Here Schlesinger addresses himself to this "cash":

p.917 Since the days of Acheson the relationship with West Germany had been a pivot of our European policy; under Dulles it had often appeared the pivot... (917)

Comment: Adenauer "particularly did not want a non-aggression pact which might confer status on East Germany as one of the Warsaw Treaty countries." So now we wonder who was the cash and who the banker, for there was no non-aggression pact.

Altho the Pres "~~happily~~ hoped to maintain the momentum generated by the Moscow negotiations", he would do nothing "before ratification" and "he was skeptical whether there was much in the non-aggression pact for the United States." Rusk was certain there was not. The Joint Chiefs feared "euphoria".

Rusk told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Schlesinger's words, "He saw his first obligation, as one understood his view, as not to press forward with Moscow but to reassure NATO."

Khrushchev tried to persuade Rusk when the Sec of State went to Moscow in August to sign the test-ban treaty, but without any success at all (917). The Sec of State has an evasion for everything and everybody - treaties, Senators, foreign rulers, problems, too. As his quid pro quo for agreeing to sign the treaty, Adenauer "achieved what may have been his essential objective", convincing Rusk "that a non-aggression pact on top of the treaty would be just too much".

Thus is raised without any intent to do so the trenchant question of who controlled whom, who is the tail and who the dog?

"And in due course the professionals brought things back to normal. The non-aggression pact fell by the wayside." Schlesinger, not by fact but by his literary devices, has Rusk and Gromyko sharing the responsibility for this when they met in NY and "had long talks at the UN ... in the fall" for "tidying up the mess created by amateurs."

He then tells us that not a power, such as the US or the Soviet Union, but "the inspection issue blocked the extension of the ban to underground tests." By this time, even tho it subsequently persisted in the Amer position, the issue of inspection was pretty threadbare and shabby. It was not the issue but its misuse by the US as an excuse to prevent the end of testing that blocked the extension of the treaty. And when the US began pushing the MLF again in Oct, Schlesinger says, "this enabled the Russians to resume their familiar complaint that the United States was planning to give nuclear weapons to West Germany. Everyone felt more secure in the old rubrics, and foreign policy slipped back from men to institutions." (918)

Might it not be a good idea to ask what men loosened their grip? What knuckled down by whom to what institution? There remains the question why Kennedy capitulated to his own Chiefs of Staff. (918)

7. Detente: Possibilities and Limits (918/23)

Comment; Perhaps because he is faced with the reality his man did not do what he said he did, had not accomplished anything like what he said was accomplished, Schlesinger starts backtracking, finding that it was the preoccupations of Khrushchev and Kennedy with other "troubles" which denied them the means of dealing with their foreign affairs bureaucracies. But he consoles himself and us with the assurance based upon nothing stronger than his direct lineage to Herodotus that "both sides needed time to digest the test ban before they would be ready for a next large step." (918) All that was lost was "a shaping of the atmosphere, a continuation of the momentum, which might have made the next steps quicker and easier." It would indeed be nice to know these next steps were.

So he quotes Kennedy as saying "The treaty is being so chewed up in the Senate, and we've had to make so many concessions to make sure it passes, that we've got to do something to prove to the world we still mean it..." leading him to his "decision to speak for a second time before the UN General Assembly". His idea factory has ideas. Rusk's was "an Alliance for Man" to show how the US, Russia and the rest of the Un could work together "on issues beyond politics" such as health, nutrition, agriculture, productivity, etc. In short, on anything but the most important. Inquiries showed such "collaboration seemed trivial compared to the enormities of the space age." Of this the only thing that is at all surprising is that inquiry was needed. So they looked farther and next we have a proposal that is really way out: A joint moon shot. "This essentially unimportant thing when considered the crucial issues of the world of the day, it's surprising what supercilious but seemingly cogent arguments Schlesinger mustered, such as "a substantial budgetary saving for both countries", hardly in the same class as what a reduction of conventional or nuclear armaments would produce. It turns out that the State Dept, when the idea had earlier been broached, "declined to send the letter (to the Soviets) lest it in turn be held accountable for so subversive an inquiry," as Schlesinger phrases it. But Schlesinger was impressed with the idea and "I wrote the idea into an early draft of the President's UN address," having forgotten "that the President had himself suggested this to Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961" (919). It might have been more faithful to the facts and more in keeping with Schlesinger's romanticized concept of history had he said, "Kennedy had laid the egg before Khrushchev in Vienna".

Nonetheless, knowingofull well Khrushchev thought this an egg, a turkey, a dud - was totally uninterested in it - the Pres went ahead and on Sept 20 told the UN of his idea.

In any event, it provided a convenient and quite acceptable propoganda vehicle for all sorts of lofty proposals utterly without any immediate chance of acceptance. So Kennedy exploits it. And Schlesinger lumps it with what he describes as the Russian awareness of "the new sophistication in the higher strategy", a reference to Gromyko's modification of earlier Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament in which he abandoned demands for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the first stage ("in the best arms ~~control~~ control manner" Schlesinger says, with his flippancy being the US attitude in perspective) the retention of a limited number of missiles and warheads within each country until the completion of the rest of the disarmament process.

Thus Schlesinger avoids the unpleasantness of recounting the brusque Russian rejection of the insincere and faithfully improvised reiteration of a proposal already ashcanned by the Russians.

During the summer the so-called "hot line" had been installed and in early Oct Kennedy authorized the sale of surplus wheat to the Soviet Union. Again the snide remark in the description of this as "a project which, though the Vice-President considered it for a moment as 'the worst political mistake we have made in foreign policy in this administration,' did not turn out too tragically". Thus we know what Schlesinger thought of Lyndon Johnson (920).

Later that month the UN approved a resolution "with enthusiastic Russian and American support" against orbiting weapons of mass destruction. However, Schlesinger/acknowledgesix "much remained on the agenda" and he names some of them: going father with the nuclear test ban, the restraint of proliferation, arms reduction and control, etc., items having little prospect. They would have produced "a true detente" Schlesinger says had they been accomplished. They were not because of what he calls "a philosophical gap" (921). This "philosophical gap" Kennedy said at the Univ of Maine "exactly a year after the missile crisis", Schlesinger tells us, "set limits to the possibilities of agreement".

Or, "defined the boundaries of detente."

In his emotion as he winds up the chapter, Schlesinger is somewhat carried away in describing "a world slowing down the arms race and moving toward general and complete disarmament ... collaborating on an expedition to the moon and on the conquest of space (he hasn't yet acknowledged the Russian "nyet" to Kennedy's stunt(?)) would be far better than the world we had ..."

The Pres's understanding of the conflicts, Schlesinger tells us, is why he "reacted so sharply in November 1963 when Professor Frederick Barghoorn of Yale ... was arrested on accusations of espionage." He made a big deal out of it and "in view of the personal concern expressed by President Kennedy" (922) the Soviets released Barghoorn a few days later. They did not ~~of~~ withdraw the charges of ~~espionage~~ espionage. (923)

The introduction (p.924) is eloquent.

1. Into the Light (925-8)

This subsection flows with a quiet passion but not without partisanship. He finds it expedient, for example, to ignore such people as W.E.B. DuBois in the forming of the NAACP, to make no reference at all to the painful activities of the radicals in the early days of the struggle of the Negroes. Save for Martin Luther King, the Negro leaders he singles out to mention are all the more conservative ones. Among the Negro groups he finds no space for reference to Snick, the activities of which and whose members he finds unworthy of mention, even when talking about things in which they took the leadership. And it is possible to argue with his conclusion that it was the "threat to march on Washington in 1941" by A. Philip Randolph which "led Franklin Roosevelt to set up the wartime Fair Employment Practices Commission" but in crediting Randolph exclusively for this achievement, Schlesinger finds it possible to avoid crediting a left-wing Congressman with whose politics he is not in sympathy. Even in his reconstruction of changes that took place in the positions of the political parties, especially that of the Democrats, he finds no space for Hubert Humphries' courageous performance at the 1948 Convention.

But the grossest omission for a historian is the absence of any reference to enforcement of the 1954 Supreme Court decision by the Republican president Eisenhower.

Only those he likes are worthy of Schlesinger's mention. Unless, of course, he can say something real nasty about them.

~~With unintended honesty in this subsection, he does not~~

2. Kennedy and Civil Rights (928-31)

With unintended honesty in this subsection, he does not say what Kennedy's dedication to principle but his "sense of his weakness with Negroes" had led him to "ask Harris Wofford of the Notre Dame Law School ... to shift over to civil rights" on Kennedy's campaign staff. Meetings Wofford arranged between Kennedy and Negro leaders "advanced the candidate a little in his own commitment," and having found no cause for mentioning the Eisenhower administration favorably for the president's enforcement of the law in Little Rock, he now, using Democratic Senators, lashed the whip for him as he flails the administration for its "carefully avoided opportunities for executive action" on civil rights. Yet he with equal care avoids Kennedy's record, even after his personal and public commitment on such things as the elimination of discrimination in housing by Exec Order (see also pp.939 ff) where Schlesinger seeks to apologize for Kennedy's similar failings. Much of the chapter is devoted to telling specific incidents in the civil rights struggle, largely in the light of the problems the Pres faced or thought he faced over

them. It concludes with a lengthy account of the difficulty of obtaining entrance into the Univ of Miss for James Meredith and the results beneficial to the US externally that flowed from it. By inference: "Three weeks after Oxford, Sekou Toure and Ben Bella were prepared to deny refueling facilities to Soviet planes bound for Cuba during the missile crisis." (948)

U
1000 DAYS

Chapter XXXVI - THE NEGRO REVOLUTION (950-77)

Unabashedly, Schlesinger says that when the Pres finally "decided to seek legislation himself" it was only in 1963, when "recognizing the discontent and perceiving a need for new action if he were to preserve his control" (950).

Comment: "The Vietnam quandary", part of the chapter, "Autumn 1963" appears on pp.981-6 but discussion of Vietnam goes on p.998.

It begins by saying "... the abrupt collapse of the hopes of 1962 had provided the unpleasant surprise of 1963". It describes 1962 policy as "dominated by those who was Vietnam ~~xxx~~ ~~marily~~ as primarily a military problem and who believed that its solution required unconditional support of Diem." Reporting by Ambassador Frederick Nolting and Gen Paul Harkins "conveyed the picture of a regime led by an unquestionably difficult but statesmanlike and, in any case, irreplaceable figure making steady progress in winning over the peasants, pacifying the countryside and restoring the stability of government." For most of 1962 he said the policy appeared to be producing results whereas at the end of 1961 the Saigon govt had been near collapse. State and Defense both said the so-called strategic hamlet program was succeeding.

In the spring of 1963 Alexis Johnson "claimed that 30,000 casualties had been inflicted on the guerrillas in 1962 - a figure twice as large as the estimated size of the Viet Cong forces ..." McNamara announced, "we have turned the corner in Vietnam" at about the same time and Gen Harkins predicted victory "within a year" (982).

But the press say Diem as he was, "contemptuous of democracy and the West" (983)

The press was indignant at the ~~xxx~~ efforts of the govt's representatives to make them instruments of and reporters of national policy. Reports to Washington "even gave the astonishing impression that there would be no trouble in Vietnam if only the newspaper fellows would follow the line," and the newsmen especially resented "Admiral Felt's reproach to Malcolm Browne: 'Why don't you get on the team?'" David Halberstam reported the embassy was "turned into the adjunct of a dictatorship" and "the Ambassador became Diem's agent. But we reporters didn't have to become the adjuncts of a tyranny." (984)

Discussing the "policy of trying to win a political war by military means" and the reversies of the Diem govt represented as victories by the embassy and Gen Harkins, Schlesinger says,

p.985

Those in Saigon and Washington who saw Vietnam as primarily a military problem thought that the answer to Ap Bac was an intensified military effort - more advisers, more helicopters, more mortars, more defoliation spray, more napalm bombs, more three-star generals in Saigon, more visitations by VIP's. After all, the American presence was still negligible - 11,000 troops in all and, in the last two years, a total of thirty-two killed in battle and eighty wounded. But the Harriman group now questioned the exclusively military strategy more insistently than ever. "Fighting a guerrilla war in an underdeveloped nation," Hilsman, the veteran of jungle warfare in Burma, had argued the previous September, "requires as much political and civic action as it does military action." There was danger, they thought, in what Hilsman called the "overmilitarization" and "over-Americanization" of the war. The Army, after all, had never cared much for counterinsurgency; at one point, of twenty-seven American generals in Saigon, not one had attended the school at Fort Bragg. The more elaborate the American military establishment, the doubters feared, the more it would be overwhelmed by brass, channels

Madame Nhu's father resigned as ambassador to Washington with a denunciation of his daughter." And the generals, pretending to be out of sympathy with Diem, "began sending clandestine messages to the new ambassador." They discreetly inquired what the Amer attitude would be if they took steps. Lodge asked for instructions. (990)

p.991

The reply was drafted on August 24. The American government, it suggested, could no longer tolerate the systematic repression of the Buddhists nor the domination of the regime by Nhu. The generals could be told that we would find it impossible to support Diem unless these problems were solved. Diem should be given every chance to solve them. If he refused, then the possibility had to be realistically faced that Diem himself could not be saved. We would take no part in any action; but, if anything happened, an interim anti-communist military regime could expect American support. (991)

Comment: Aug 24 was a Sat and everybody from the Pres down was out of town. The draft was cleared where necessary except at the top level. When the Pres saw it, he did not know it had not had the concurrence of his senior advisers.

After a meeting in Washington to which Nolting had been invited, the Pres ... "began a process of pulling away from the cable of August 24." Talks continued but "the coup itself gradually evaporated ... these generals could not carry it through" So Diem and Nhu followed with more arrests, including thousands of students of whom numbers were high school boys and girls (992) and Washington "weakly reverted to collaboration with Diem, encouraged by CIA's suggestion that Diem might have been sufficiently alarmed by the coup rumors to do some of the things we wanted." The Pres sent a "signal" to Diem by being publicly critical. His remarks included a reference to changes in personnel which Schlesinger says "no one could misinterpret".

In Sept Kennedy sent another mission to Vietnam consisting of Gen Victor Krulack of the Marines and Joseph Mendenhall of State. They returned "after a frenzied weekend of inspection and interrogation" accompanied by Mecklin who observed that "the general and the FSO not only appeared to dislike each other, but also disagreed on what should be done about Vietnam. On the whole flight they spoke to each other only when it was unavoidable." (992)

The general told the Natl Security Council, in Schlesinger's words, "the war was going beautifully, that the regime was beloved by the people and that we need have no undue concern even about Nhu." FSO reported a desperate state with the regime on the edge of collapse and that Nhu had to go. After listening to both, the Pres asked, "Were you two gentlemen in the same country?"

Because Diem ignored lodge's request, Lodge stayed away from Diem. He cabled Washington about the deterioration of the situation and recommended pressure, particularly the suspension of Amer aid. McNamara and Rusk were "at first opposed" believing it would "hurt the war effort". The Pres put McNamara and Gen Taylor on the Saigon ~~xxxxxx~~ shuttle "on one more trip" to get the facts (995).

In the struggle for military emphasis (Harkins) and political (Lodge), Lodge was more persuasive. Apparently over-

impressed by the "quantification" on his return to Washington, McNamara announced the withdrawal of 1000 Amer troops by the end of the year and that the major part of the Amer military task ~~staff~~ would be completed by 1965.

To pressure Diem early in Aug a "selective suspension" of items in the aid program that were expected to do least harm to the war when it went into effect. The US maintained secrecy about these cuts, hoping they would effect pressure on Diem but Diem "bitterly denounced the suspension" and his dragon lady sister in law, Mme Nhu, began to lobby inside the US. God alone knows what kind of cuts were made, but it must have been in the Vietnam space program for Schlesinger says, "on the last day of the month, Diem and Lodge made a trip together to dedicate an experimental reactor at Dalat."

The next day the generals struck. (996)

Schlesinger emphasizes the coup was entirely Vietnamese with no involvement of the embassy or CIA. Shortly after the coup, Schlesinger saw the Pres and says, "No doubt he realized that Vietnam was his great failure in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his full attention." He had been carried along by "the optimism of 1962". ~~xxxxx~~

p.997 "Yet, with his memory of the French in Indochina in 1951, he had always believed there was a point at which our intervention might turn Vietnamese nationalism against us and transform an Asian civil conflict into a white man's war. (997)8).

Comment: From the 2000 Amer troops in Vietnam when Kennedy took office, there were by this time 16,000, an 8-fold increase.

The Pres was sad over Diem's death, because he had fought for his country for 20 years and it should not have ended like this. (998)

6. Troubles in the Hemisphere (998-1002)

Comment: This subsection deals with troubles in the hemisphere. Some of it is in Schlesinger's frontal lobe. In his usual deriding of Castro, he says the missile crisis had "warned other Latin revolutionists that they could not count on Soviet support once the chips were down". Possibly Schlesinger was aware of a demonstration of support more impressive than sending in missiles, but he doesn't so state (998)

Saying Castro's influence was destroyed, Schlesinger concludes "the survival of a mendicant communist regime in the Caribbean was not important." His book appeared many months after a demonstration of a contrary belief by the pres and the State Dept ~~xxxxx~~ in the Dom Rep.

Then Schlesinger has some provocative comments and quotations beginning with a significant sentence:

pp.999/1000 I have the impression that in the ~~xxxx~~ autumn of 1965 the President was reappraising the Castro problem. When Tito came to the White House in October, Kennedy remarked that he did not know what was going to happen, but, if Cuba rid herself of Soviet influence, perhaps we could deal with a domestic revolutionary regime; on the other hand, if

~~xxxxxx~~

Castro's refusal to sign the test ban treaty meant that China was now playing a role in Cuba, that could hardly be considered a desirable development. Jean Daniel, who saw Kennedy a few days later, reported him as saying, "The continuation of the (economic) blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities." Daniel was on his way to Cuba to interview Castro, and Kennedy invited him to stop by on his return.

In the meantime, unofficial soundings encountered difficulties on the two points of submission to extra-continental influence and subversion directed at the rest of the hemisphere. On November 18 in a speech at Miami Kennedy sent a message across the water to Cuba. A band of conspirators, he said, had made Cuba the instrument of an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. "This, and this alone, divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which in a few short years stirred their hopes and the sympathy of . . . the hemisphere." (999-1000)

Comment: Two days later, when Jean Daniel interviewed Castro, while Castro maintained what Schlesinger describes as the predictable position/on most things, he also said Kennedy "could" be an even greater President than Lincoln. . . . he had come to understand many things over the past few months; . . ." (1000)

Sept 25, 1963, the Dominican military overthrew Juan Bosch. The following week, another military coup overthrew the Ramon Villeda Morales regime in Honduras. Kennedy promptly recalled the ambassadors and economic and military aid chiefs, saying, "We are opposed to coups".

Schlesinger is troubled by the non-recognition of these two military dictatorships and has a rather lengthy footnote attributing "some" apprehension "on the apparent contradiction" between US policy in Latin America and in Vietnam where it recognized a military coup. He explains it away by saying, "the United States has special obligations within the western hemisphere" because it was committed to work "within the framework of democratic institutions" to which he adds the business of individual liberties, social justice, etc., all the nice phrases that do not exist to most of Latin America. Schlesinger falls just short of saying that because there was no freedom or democracy in Vietnam, it would not be consistent with American policy to recognize the coup in which a military dictatorship overthrew a personal one (1001).

Late in Oct the Pres, after conferring with Goodwin and Schlesinger, sent a memo to Rusk saying he wanted to create a new undersecretaryship for Latin America despite the abstract arguments against it because of "the practicalities of the situation".

Schlesinger says Rusk turned the letter over to the bureaucracy "and it took Ralph Dungan's intervention to convince the Secretary that this was a serious matter requiring senior attention. Receiving no response, the President after a fortnight renewed the request." (1002)

7. Revolution in Fiscal Policy (1002-~~9~~)

p.1002 In the autumn of 1962 the administration had quietly committed itself to a radical principle: the deliberate creation of budgetary deficits at a time when there was no economic emergency ... (1002)

p.1003 Because the principle was so revolutionary, it exacted a price, or rather a series of prices. The first had been the decision to create the deficit through tax reduction rather than through social spending. (1003)

Comment: Schlesinger quotes Kenneth Galbraith against some of the program as "a commendable program to get greater equity among the rich, but it affects only a small fraction of the population - a comparative handful of affluent Republicans." (1003) Galbraith also put himself on record as predicting the tax reform would get nowhere and challenged "anyone who disagrees with this prediction" to "put it in writing".

Schlesinger cites some of the tax abuses. The Pres, he says, "

p.1004 was outraged to discover that an oil man reputed to be among the richest living Americans had in certain years paid income taxes of less than \$1000; that, of the nineteen Americans with incomes of more than \$5 million a year, more than 25 per cent had paid no income tax at all in 1959 and that of the rest not one had paid in the 80 to 85 per cent bracket to which their income nominally consigned them; that in a recent year one American received an income of nearly \$20 million and paid no taxes at all. The President and the Attorney General, brooding over these figures, decided to make a major issue of the tax-avoidance spectaculars after the 1964 election. (1104)

Comment: Nonetheless, what Schlesinger calls "mythology" dies hard because of a vast unwillingness to accept planned deficits. He quotes some of the more extreme comments. (1004)

But despite the acceptance of "Keynesian revolution" Schlesinger concedes, "a problem remained". The steady increase in national output had not been accompanied by any equivalent lessening of unemployment. He quotes from Kennedy's campaign speeches, detailing the suffering throughout the country (1005)

The Pres's belief was that ~~the economy~~ if the economy were "sufficiently stimulated" it "could reduce unemployment to the figure of about 4 per cent" (1006) There then appears a selection of data on the number of people in various kinds of bad shape compared with the condition of the economy (19% of the adults in the Cumberland of Ky unable to read on p.1007; with the "remarkable increase in the gross national product, the absolute number of poor appeared to be slightly higher" in 1963 than in 1957 on p.1011; and "by reasonable definitions" about a fifth of the nation "lived in an underworld of poverty beyond the reach of most government programs" on p.1011; all of which "troubled Kennedy" because "the poor were not angrier and more politically demanding". Thus, the Pres determined on a war on poverty and in Oct and Nov it figures in a number of his conferences.

"the longest American peacetime expansion of the economy in the century of recorded business cycle history" Schlesinger attributes to "the policies of the Kennedy years". There was, he

says, an "average increase of the gross national product in real terms" of 5.6%, yet an accounting for this and attributing to the increased expenditures, Schlesinger makes no reference to the vastly increased military expenditures and the tremendous proportion of all of the natl govt's expenditures that they were (1012)

Schlesinger quotes from the speech that Kennedy made at ~~Amherst~~ Amherst in Oct 1963:

p.1015 "The men who create power," Kennedy told his Amherst audience, "make an indispensable contribution to the nation's greatness, but the men who question power make a contribution just as indispensable . . . for they determine whether we use power or power uses us." (1015)

Schlesinger's cracks about Sec Rusk have appeared throughout the book and his critical comment was well quoted before the book appeared:

p.1017 With reluctance, because he still liked Rusk and thought he had useful qualities, he made up his mind to accept his resignation after the 1964 election and seek a new Secretary. He always had the dream that a McNamara might someday take command and make the Department a genuine partner in the enterprise of foreign affairs (though he also said that he had to have a McNamara at Defense in order to have a foreign policy at all). (1017)

In discussing several of the policies on which the Vice Pres was not in accord with Kennedy's policies, Schlesinger says one of them was "on Vietnam". There is no amplification nor is there any indication of the basis or nature of the disagreement. (1029)