

In addressing himself to those who he says consider the blockade "an inappropriate and extreme remedy", he asks them "to put themselves in the position of the Organization of American States". Here again of course this was at best an evasion. It was not the OAS but the US that took the action. It was not the OAS but the US that filed the resolution. And in fact the resolution was filed before the OAS took any action in any event. Stevenson was speaking at the UN at the time the OAS met. Next Stevenson says he will address himself to "those who say the quarantine is an inappropriate and extreme remedy" (and like all of the officials in Washington and those like Schlesinger, Sorensen, Hilsman and Abel who had written about it, the Madison Ave designation of "quarantine" which does not exist in internatl law is the propaganda device Stevenson uses instead of the word "blockade" which is firmly fixed in internatl law.)

Among the rhetorical questions he asks (in the context of what should be OAS and not the US) is "what were the alternatives available". Among these he ~~was~~ lists "sponsored an invasion or destroyed the bases by an air strike", a total blockade, doing nothing, etc. He falls short of asking about an invasion of Cuba and in arguing against what he calls "doing nothing" he must have brought smiles to the faces of some of the representatives when he talked about the "will and determination to live in freedom" in Latin America as well as North America.

"To have done less" than impose the blockade unilaterally, he says, "would have been to fail in our obligation to peace". In saying he is going to answer the argument that what he called a "limited quarantine" was too much he tells the Abraham Lincoln story of a man who killed a ferocious boar and answered the complaint of the boar's owner why he had not used the blunt end of the pitchfork by asking "why did the boar not attack me with his blunt end?" The story was apt ~~xx~~ to an Amer political campaign but hardly for the Security Council.

Finally in par 20 he addresses himself to the question of legality of what he calls "the defensive measures taken by the American Republics" against "Soviet long-range nuclear missiles". First it is obvious that the measures were not taken by the OAS but were rubber-stamped o by the OAS after they were taken by the US. Second, they were not long-range missiles altho Stevenson so consistently refers to them. They were, as a matter of fact, altho it makes no difference, the shortest range. He says, "I would gladly expand on our position on this" but then does not and says he will not (because of course he cannot) stating as his justification the Acting Sec-Gen's proposal presented the previous night from which he deduces "perhaps this is a matter for discussion which ... ~~xxx~~ could be more fruitfully delayed to a later time."

Completely without any evidence of embarrassment, he then says, "let me say that no twisting of logic, no distortion of words can disguise the plain, obvious and compelling commonsense conclusion ... that the OAS is entitled under par 4, art 2 of the Charter to regard the installation of missiles in Cuba as a threat "which the American Republics are entitled to meet ... by appropriate regional defensive methods."

Because Stevenson has not seen it necessary to quote the exact language of par 4, art 2, its applicability to what the US as a matter of fact had done might well be considered from its language: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Whether or not applicable to the US,

the Soviet Union, both or neither, this paragraph certainly grants no rights to the US to impose a blockade under any name or to ignore its obligations to take all disputes and threats to world peace to the UN.

Not surprisingly, he says "nothing has been said here by the representative of the communist States which alters the basic situation". There is, he says, but "one fundamental question ...: what action served to strengthen the world's hope of peace?" Not the introduction of the missiles with speed and stealth which were "an audacious effort to increase the nuclear striking power of the Soviet Union against the United States ..." (he forgot to mention the OAS behind which he had been hovering for his entire speech, and he ignored the fact that as a matter of fact, a) these weapons did not increase the nuclear striking power and b) were quite vulnerable.) Stevenson says the consequence is ~~magnified~~ to "magnify" the "frequently reiterated threats against Berlin".

This is a fiction that disturbed the days and the dreams of all the administration people that somehow or other the Soviet Union had put missiles into Cuba to weaken Berlin. Stevenson dignified it by presenting it as an argument to the Security Council.

Next he asks the question which was soon to be answered and not in the way he thought and not for the reason he and the administration thought: Did the introduction of the missiles "advance sanity and peace". There was as a consequence the limited test-ban treaty.

In Stevenson's view there was only "one action in the last few days which had strengthened peace" and this he says "is the determination to stop the ~~spread~~ further spread of weapons in this hemisphere." Satisfied with leaving a "determination" as an "action", he says he will say nothing further except to conclude by reading the Pres's letter then just delivered to the Acting Sec-Gen.

In this letter Kennedy said nothing - the intent - except that everybody was wrong except him and the only solution to the crisis was his and in fact he doesn't even agree to the specific proposals made by U Thant saying instead, "You have made certain suggestions/ and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured. Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly these ~~arr~~ arrangements with you."

As read before the UN and examined in any context whatsoever, Kennedy's willingness to have Stevenson discuss arrangements already accepted by the Soviet Union is hardly a reflection of either a recognition for or a desire for the speed which all Amer spokesmen from him down had insisted from the very beginning were an initial essential.

Following Stevenson's speech, the Cuban representative, Inchausti-gui, made a brief response in which he said, "the best proof that the serious crisis created by that Government (the US) when it ordered a unilateral act of war against the people and Revolutionary Government of Cuba was based on mere bluff ... (The US) has not produced any serious evidence ~~to~~ (of) a nuclear threat to the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The weapons in Cuba's possession (which they were not) are exclusively of a defensive nature." These were "compelled" by "the aggressive and interventionist policy" of the US.

When no one else asked to speak, the Soviet delegate who was Chairman made a lengthier response.

Zorin needled Stevenson, said that he had suddenly gone on the defensive in contrast with his earlier appearance before the Security Council, and ~~as~~ accused the US of abandoning diplomacy and deliberately lying to its people and the world.

Stevenson did not, he said, even "attempt to prove the right of the position of the United States"; instead, seeking "to convince the Council that the actions of the United States, which have brought about ~~this~~ a serious crisis in the world, are in some sort justified. He tried to prove that the United States could not have done otherwise than to declare an arbitrary blockade and to undertake what amounts to piratical action on the seas." The OAS, he says, "acted under pressure from the United States of America". In interpreting the reasons given by the US for its action, Zorin used the words "in introducing nuclear weapons, offensive installations and so forth into Cuba" these words may or not have a significance later in his speech.

Stevenson's effort, he says, was "to show that all this was universally recognized and axiomatic ... there had been nothing else to do but to declare a blockade and to violate the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized principles of international law".

"The groundlessness of this position is perfectly obvious", he said, and "there is no question here of any ~~mix~~ evidence" in either the press or the Pres's statement from which he quotes the words "unmistakable evidence" showing "the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba". US aggressive intentions, he says, "is the crux of the matter".

World opinion, he alleges, resisted American actions and he says, "the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations" are alarmed and "exercised considerable pressure on the United States of America, and on all countries supporting it, with a view to preventing further dangerous aggressive action by the United States."

Of this, if it is true, there is no reflection in the books by Schlesinger, Sorensen or Abel of such "pressure" by other countries.

The position of the US "found some support only among the direct military allies of the United States" who Zorin charges talk about an independent policy but "are obliged to follow the course dictated to them from Washington". The neutrals he said ("the representatives of countries which are independent and not associated with military blocs") declared, as Zorin paraphrases, their spokesmen, "that the blockade was illegal, was contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the universally recognized rules of international law". He says they ~~stated~~ stated Cuba was within its rights "to organize its defence as it considered necessary" and that they "openly condemned these aggressive actions by the United States". The UAR representative, he said, "spoke "on behalf of more than forty countries of Asia and Africa ... forced the United States to ponder any further steps it might take".

In Answer to Stevenson's charge that the Soviet was the prime cause "of these aggressive actions by the United States", he quotes from the Pres's Oct 22 statement saying "Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation ... purpose ... to provide a nuclear strike capability ...". He then quotes elsewhere from the speech where the Pres said he received "the first preliminary certain information" at 9 a.m. on Oct 16 following which he ~~announced~~ "directed that our surveillance be stepped up..."

Then quoting the Pres as having known what he knew on the 16th, he asks why the 18th when he "received the representative of the Soviet Union - A. A. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs", two days later, and had "unmistakable evidence" did he "not say a word about this 'unmistakable evidence' to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union?" This, he said, "the elementary rules of relations

between States would have required ~~the~~. He described these "requirements" as "normal" in the "relations between States" and especially "when the United States considers it necessary to proceed to such extraordinary measures as the declaration of a blockade."

Of the "unmistakeable Evidence" Zorin says it was of what the Pres called "sending to Cuba" of "offensive weapons directed against the United States".

Here as in the earlier quotation Zorin seems to have seized upon the propaganda device of the US in creating a special category of weapons which are by their nature "offensive". A precise reading of his speech up to this point does not show he denied the presence of missiles but denied that they were "offensive".

Having said nothing to Gromyko on the 18th, Zorin then points out it was on the 22nd the Pres "declared the blockade and announced he was prepared to sink Soviet vessels". He asked if this is normal behavior by a great Power observing the principles of the Charter and rules of international law and replies to this rhetorical question by describing the Pres's action as "highway robbery" which, he says, "reasonable representatives of the United States Press are now saying" was a "gross mistake".

Then he invokes an article by Lippmann in that day's paper to show the Pres had abandoned ~~his~~ diplomacy: "I see danger of this mistake in the fact that when the President saw Mr. Gromyko on Thursday" - that was 18 October - "and had the evidence of the missile build-up in Cuba, he refrained from confronting Mr. Gromyko with this evidence. This was to suspend diplomacy."

Again challenging Stevenson, whom he quotes as having said the US "is against the cold war, against any actions which might disturb the peace and create a situation of tension" and asks "where is your diplomacy now? Where is it?" saying that "instead of submitting, by the diplomatic process and at the highest level, his doubts and the facts needing examination to the Government of the country against which he intended to apply armed force", the Pres then said nothing at all and "I would go even further: he assured him that the United States planned nothing against Cuba and that he believed the information published by the Soviet Government." Zorin asked "what is this, a system of double-accounting? You say one thing in official talks, and two days later you declare that the Soviet Union has been deceiving you." Here he alleges it is the US that is deceiving its own people and the whole world and he quotes from the Herald-Tribune as saying, "Today, Friday 19 October, as well as the whole of the weekend, the Department of Defense has declared that it has no information indicating the presence of any offensive armament in Cuba."

Recalling the Pres said he first "learnt of the existence of such rockets at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, 16 October", Zorin says the Herald Tribune "citing a whole series of official statements by government organs of the United States, the slanderous or, as they delicately say, protective nature of which has already been revealed by the actions of the United States Government, the newspaper reluctantly asks the following question, which I shall repeat here: 'If a lie has to be told, the public for its part is entitled to ask: When did the lie begin, and when did it end?'"

"...it is clear that the United States Government has deliberately sharpened the crisis, has deliberately engineered provocation, and has tried to obscure this by a discussion in the Security Council, at a time when there were no grounds for such a procedure." Zorin next charges and he says that Stevenson "cannot advance any grounds except, I repeat, the fake evidence supplied by your intelligence service."

He says this can "lead to catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The Soviet Government has warned the United States and the entire world of this fact."

Here a precise reading of his words earlier singled out would seem to indicate he is referring not to missiles but to "offensive" weapons.

Of Stevenson's reference to Khrushchev's answer to Bertrand Russell, Zorin says Stevenson's paraphrase "in no way corresponds with the letter's contents" so he reads the letter:

"We shall do all we can to prevent such a catastrophe. But it should be borne in mind that our efforts may prove insufficient. For our efforts and possibilities are the efforts and possibilities of one side. If the United States Government carries out its planned programme of piratical actions, then we shall of course be obliged, in order to defend our own rights and the international rights which are written into international agreements and into the United Nations Charter, to use means of defence against the aggressor. There is no other way out for us.

"It is a well-known fact that if one tries to appease a bandit by giving him first one's purse, then one's overcoat, and so forth, he does not become any more charitable as a result. He does not cease his banditry, but, on the contrary, he becomes even bolder. It is therefore necessary to restrain the bandit in order to prevent the law of the jungle from becoming the law prevalent ~~in~~ in relationships between civilized people and States.

"The Soviet Government considers that the United States Government should show restraint and refrain from carrying out its piratical threats, which are fraught with the most serious consequences.

"The question of war and peace is a question of such vital importance that we would advocate a meeting at the highest level, with a view to discussing all pending problems and doing everything to remove the threat of an outbreak of thermo-nuclear war.

"So long as nuclear rockets have not been discharged, there is still a possibility of avoiding war. But once the Americans have unleashed aggression, such a meeting will become both impossible and useless."

This is by no means a ~~blink~~ <sup>blinking</sup> position. It is tough. And in accusing the US of "banditry" says it is "necessary to restrain the bandit in order to prevent the law of the jungle from becoming the law prevalent in relationships between civilized people and States."

Next Zorin quotes from Khrushchev's reply of Oct 25 to Thant's letter:

"Esteemed U Thant,

"I have received your communication and have carefully studied the proposal contained in it. I welcome your initiative. I understand your concern at the situation which has arisen in the Caribbean area, since the Soviet Government also regards this situation as highly dangerous and as calling for the immediate intervention of the United Nations.

"I inform you that I am in agreement with your proposal, which is in accordance with the interests of peace."

The conclusion of this letter is an acceptance of Thant's proposal. This is unlike Kennedy's action which interpreted Thant's intervention to be an invitation to "preliminary talks".

Immediately Stevenson hurled investive at Zorin ("talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language and for double-talk". He then says, "if I understood what you said ... we do not have the

evidence to prove our assertion that your Government had installed long-range missiles in Cuba. Well, let me say ... We do have the evidence ... it is clear and incontrovertible ..." This of course is courtroom language because it was not what Zorin said at all. Not even the Pres had said the missiles were "long-range". They were in fact medium-range with preparations for intermediate range and of course Zorin had seized upon the play on the word "offensive" which was the basis of the entire Amer position. As of this point in the debate, he had not denied the presence of missiles. He had denied they had anything but a defensive intent.

Stevenson next denies that any pressure had been put upon the US. And with some heat he says the Soviet Union "upset the balance of power in the world". (This is an obsession running thru all of the statements attributed to all Amers from the Pres down and reflected in all of the actions and decisions going back at least to the Vienna Conference. Stevenson makes no show of evidence on this, and it is doubtful if any evidence can be produced because both the Soviet Union and the US already possessed independent means each within its own control of laying waste the other.) at

Again Stevenson resorts to a misquotation in saying that/the time of the meeting with the Pres "Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to the President that the USSR was placing such weapons on sites in the New World." Gromyko did no such thing. Abel's version beginning on p.75 of his book is that "Gromyko complained of what he called the anti-Cuba campaign of the United States ... attacks on shipping ..." He referred to Cuba as a baby that could not "hurt or threaten the giant United States" and told the Pres this was 1962, not 1812, and that "in the age of modern weaponry, the President's authority to call up 150,000 reservists had no significance". Gromyko said he "was under instructions to make it clear that the Soviet Union gave assistance to Cuba for the sole purpose of strengthening Cuba's capacity to defend herself". He insisted Soviet aid to Cuba was for a defensive purpose. And "he was appealing to President Kennedy not to allow any action with respect to Cuba that would be incompatible with peace and with the United Nations Charter." He then alluded to the Bay of Pigs etc. He did not say that the Soviet Union was not installing missiles in Cuba. Stevenson here, too, is exploiting the fiction of a distinction between defensive and offensive weapons. Bland as Rusk, he makes the assumption that in Soviet hands missiles are offensive weapons and says that any missiles in Cuba are "offensive" and therefore "perhaps it would be instructive to the world to see how far a Soviet official would go in perfidy." Apparently this is a reference to Zorin, but it could be also to Gromyko who Stevenson says "deliberately, cynically/ deceived us about the nuclear build-up in Cuba."

There then ensued the now famous exchange in which Stevenson made the most dramatic use of the television cameras focused upon him:

"Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today - again, if I heard you correctly - you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist - and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no?"

"The PRESIDENT (Translated from Russian): I am not in an American

court of law, and therefore do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner of a prosecuting counsel. You will receive the answer in due course in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

"Mr. Stevenson (United States of America): You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "Yes" or "No". You have denied that they exist - and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.

"The PRESIDENT (translated from the Russian): Please continue your statement, Mr. Stevenson. You will receive the answer in due course.

"Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): I am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over, if that is your decision. I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."

Zorin did not reply to Stevenson's last remark, calling instead upon the representative of Chile.

But note that beginning with an acknowledgment that Zorin "did not deny the existence of these weapons" he grows gradually, qualifying it "if I heard you correctly" then adding "or that we have not proven they exist" then asks if Zorin denies their presence and finally concludes by saying, "You have denied they exist." It is an effective courtroom method, it was a superbly effective television method, but it is doubtful if such a performance is consistent with the needs or requirements of diplomacy.

But perhaps it is for exactly this reason, that Stevenson had no interest in either the needs or requirements of diplomacy, that he resorted to such obviously inappropriate histrionics.

Subsequently he was said to have regretted it and subsequently Khrushchev made some acidulous comments about it.

Chilean Ambassador Schewitzer "had not expected the incident which has just occurred" and told Zorin "if you should deem it necessary" to delay until Zorin had replied to "the comments or questions addressed to you" when Stevenson interrupted to say "I had not finished my statement". He said he'd asked a question and had no reply and would like to finish his statement, to which Zorin said, "By all means, you may proceed."

Stevenson is now careful to veer away from any description of the weapons as "offensive" as he was in his emotional outburst of oratory where he referred to them merely as "these weapons". Here he says that "Mr. Gromyko denied the existence of any intention of installing such weapons in Cuba ..." and he says with Zorin's permission he will display a "portion of the evidence available". The first is a sequence of 3 U-2 photos of the same place, near San Cristobal, taken in Aug then "one day last week" and then "taken only 24 hours later". This he says showed "seven 1,000-mile missile trailers ... four launcher-erector mechanisms" and tents for 400-500 men.

The next series of the same type and in the same area, San Cristobal, "clearly show six of these missiles on trailers and three erectors".

Next a site under construction for a launching area near Guana-jay, SW of Havana, for intermediate-range missiles with a comparison with the late Aug photo and one taken about 6 weeks later. One Bldg he says "may well be intended as a storage area for the nuclear warheads". He concedes, however, "The installation is not yet complete and no warheads are yet visible."

Then he has a closer view of the same area and one of an airfield at San Julian in western Cuba with 22 crates "designed to transport the fuselages of Soviet Ilyushin-28 bombers" four of which are uncrated and one partially assembled. These are "known as Beagles, have an

about  
operating radius of 750 miles and are capable of carrying nuclear weapons". (Stevenson says nothing about these bombers but Abel refers to them twice (p.213) first as "obsolescent" and second attributing the designation to Amb Thompson as "overage". They were subsequently considered not to be "offensive", altho their removal was insisted upon.)

Then Stevenson displays another set of photographs of medium-range missiles and related equipment at an unidentified place.

Stevenson says these "are part of a much larger weapon complex..."

Quaison-Sackey of Ghana who was to have spoken said, "I would prefer to speak towards the end of the meeting," and who can blame him?

UAR Representative Mahmoud Riad found Pres Kennedy's instruction to Stevenson "to discuss promptly the arrangements proposed by Acting Secretary-General U Thant" as "a very welcome step ...". He also welcomed Khrushchev's letter "agreeing to his proposal".

Zorin here accepts the offer of Quaison-Sackey for the use of his time to reply to Stevenson. He carefully avoids directly answering Stevenson, as Stevenson himself subsequently complains, altho a rather large effort was made to show that Zorin had in fact denied the location of missiles in Cuba. Instead, he quoted from the Tass statement of Sept 11 which said that the Soviet Union did not need to transfer its powerful weapons "its existing means for the repelling of aggression and the delivering of a retaliatory blow". In addition he says, here misquoting Stevenson who had in turn misquoted Gromyko, "Mr. Stevenson himself said that Mr. Gromyko, in his conversation with Mr. Kennedy, denied the presence of such offensive weapons, in Cuba. What more do you need? That is my answer to your question."

Here again Zorin has been careful to say that the denial was of "such offensive weapons" and not a ballistics missile. The distinction is that of the US and it is the device that Zorin here employed.

Next he addresses himself to what he calls "the so-called 'evidence' and photographs which Mr. Stevenson produced here." He does not in any way impeach their authenticity but instead alludes to one of Stevenson's earlier blunders into which he was entrapped by his own govt, when on April 15 1961 he had presented ~~it~~ as a defecting plane from the Cuban air force an American fake. He challenges Stevenson to deny this and then quotes from the April 28 1961 issue of Time Mag to prove this was "in the best cloak-and-dagger tradition", a fake, "part of the 'cover story'". Zorin says "this photograph ... prepared by the United States Intelligence Agency ... was presented ... as evidence purporting to show that it was Cuban aircraft which had strafed Havana. This is an actual fact, and you cannot deny it. What is the value of all your photographs? He who lies once is not believed a second time." As a consequence, therefore, he spurns Stevenson's photograph and challenges him "if you had something in the way of serious evidence, you should have presented it in accordance with diplomatic practice ... you have not done this, but are using the Security Council as a show l.. this procedure lacks seriousness. I had a higher opinion of you personally. Unfortunately, I was mistaken. I regret it very much." He said his last point is that all this "play-acting" indicates only "a desire to distract the Security Council from the main issue: the violation by the United States of the universally accepted rules of international law, and of the United Nations Charter, and the arbitrary declaration of a blockade, which constitutes an act of war. Your main task is to distract the Security Council from all this, a.." to which Stevenson replied, "I have not had a direct answer to my question." He said he agrees with the Tass



statement that "the USSR does not need to" locate missiles in Cuba. He said the question was not whether ~~it~~ it needs to but whether it had. And despite the subsequent charges that Zorin had lied, Stevenson concludes this section by saying, "And that question remains unanswered. I knew it would remain unanswered."

After wondering "if the Soviet Union would ask their Cuban colleagues to permit a United Nations team to go to these sites" (not making the request of Cuba himself) he assured Zorin "we can direct them to the proper places very quickly." His final remark is "And now I hope ~~max~~ that we can get down to business ... we are ready to talk ... Our job here is not to score debating points: our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. If you are ready to try, we are."

Quaison-Sackey then follows, beginning with an agreement that "our job is to save the peace". His delegation "welcomes the responses" of both Kennedy and Khrushchev to U Thant and in praising the Sec. Gen's action he is careful to record the responsibility of the neutrals in saying that "as Members of the Council are aware, a 'demarche' made to him by the representatives of Cyprus and the United Arab Republic and by me as representative of Ghana, in the name of the representatives of some fifty States Members of our Organization".

At 7:25 p.m. the Council adjourned with the understanding that the President would "in the light of the results of the discussions which are to take place, decide with regard to the further proceedings of the Council in respect of this matter." i

the powers and responsibilities of the UN. Altho the members of the UN were presumably not in the position to refute him, he then falsely claimed that "even after the first hard intelligence reached Washington concerning the change in the character of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the President of the United States responded by directing an intensification of surveillance, and only after the facts and the magnitude of the build-up had been established beyond all doubt did we begin to take this limited action ..."

First, no matter what meaning Stevenson attributes to "hard intelligence", part of his statement is false for only Col Wright produced the first "hard intelligence" that was well in advance of the Pres's next step. Of course, the "change in character of Soviet military assistance" is a legal fiction created by and insisted upon by the US alone and the Pres's response of "directing an intensification of surveillance" is true only if time considerations are ignored for this was not an immediate response and when ultimately - belatedly if the Amer govt representation of the hazard it faced in Cuba is to be credited - the request for authorization of a special U-2 flight was not authorized for 6 days.

However, ignoring all this, Stevenson still fails to answer his own rhetorical question which he in the previous paragraph had described as one to which members "are entitled to serious answers" for whether or not the Pres's action was "limited" he has not addressed himself to its legality or propriety and when in the next paragraph he gets to the legality he still avoids it. He asks that the members understand "the reasons for this prompt action" which was not prompt but was only announced 8 days after the installation was photographed. What the Soviet Union did, he said, was marked by two characteristics: speed and stealth. To "quickly" complete "the whole process of nuclearization of Cuba" and "if we were to have delayed our counteraction, the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed." Of this as self-appointed spokesman for the entire northern and southern hemispheres, he says, "is not a risk which this hemisphere is prepared to take." Again he resorts to eloquence as a substitute for legality in fact, by asking "When we first detected the secret and offensive installations, could we reasonably be expected to have notified the Soviet Union in advance, through the process of calling a meeting of the Security Council, that we had discovered its perfidy, and then to have done nothing but wait awhile we debated, ~~and~~ only to have a resolution vetoed? All of this on any basis is evasive.

The US had long suspected the character of the Soviet aid to Cuba and the Pres had made public statements amounting to threats about them. At any point during this long series of events beginning June or at the latest July the question could have been taken to the Security Council for as a matter of law there is no distinction between the kinds of weapons.

If the Pres had decided he could not do anything until he had some evidence of the installation of ballistics missiles, there is still the knowledge obtained the photographs for which Col Wright received such a high award. Even if that did not satisfy the Pres, between the time of the interpretation of the photos on the 15th Oct and the presentation of the resolution to the UN on the 23rd there was more than a week during which the same subject could have been taken to the Soviet Union. The reason this did not happen is because the one thing the US did not consider - would not consider - was allowing the UN to make the determination. It spent this time interval in deciding what it would do regardless of the UN and then, only after the Pres had acted and had announced his decision was the UN at all

involved. Even then, what could the UN have done? Could it have ordered the US to withdraw from its act of war, the imposition of a blockade? And in the extremely remote event that it would have - for the US also could have vetoed - could it have enforced it?

Or had the UN departed from internatl law and the Soviet refrained from a veto, could the UN have enforced upon the Soviet Union the blockade illegally imposed by the US?

Stevenson's argument to the UN does nothing but certify that the US would not abide by its obligations to the charter and had no intentions of allowing its own foreign policy to be considered by the UN.

Altho he then refers to how rapidly "one of these missiles can be armed with ~~xxxx~~ its nuclear warhead" adding entirely gratuitously again for propaganda reasons "in the middle of the night" for there was nothing to be gained by nocturnal arming and rather foolishly suggesting that then "its nuclear warhead ... pointed at New York and landed above this room five minutes after it was fired". So he is led to say, inferring that it is justification for the US, "no debate in this room could affect in the slightest the urgency of these terrible facts or the immediacy of the threat to peace." It is hardly probable that any representative at the Security Council was not entirely aware of the fact that such a situation had existed for many years and was not at all altered by the introduction of missiles into Cuba. Stevenson's argument is not advanced by his failure to adduce evidence of the existence of warheads in Cuba. He ignores the subject. He merely advises that they are there.

Seeking then to show that the US had in fact gone to the UN, he as tho there were some significance in it, says, "I would remind you, immediately and concurrently with the Organization of the American States. We did not even wait for the OAS to meet and to act. We came here at the same time." Again this is hardly a dignified avoidance of the fact that the US did not go to the UN first, but only after its own illegal action and only after an unnecessary delay in time. It was hardly dignified for Stevenson to pretend to the UN Security Council that it was the co-equal of OAS.

He then describes this long delay in time, going back at least the end of Sept and possibly to June, as "immediately" in saying "we immediately put into process the political machinery that we pray will achieve a solution of this grave crisis, and we did not act until the American Republics had acted to make the quarantine effective" and he pretended all this was in pursuance of "our duty<sup>es</sup>... to the United Nations." Again this is not the fact for the OAS did not even know about the situation until after the Pres's speech announcing everything the US was doing.

He then makes a further pretense that "we are now in the Security Council on the initiative of the United States", which is at best only technically true, for had there been no US resolution, there were still those of the Soviet Union and Cuba and, since it was the US that took the action, and since this action was responsible for the interest of the UN, it was thereby possible for the US to technically file its resolution in advance of the other 2 which could not be drafted until after the US action. As a matter of fact, the whole thing was carefully plotted to work out this way in Washington.

So far as the US "praying" that the UN could achieve something, when U Thant made the effort, Pres Kennedy hardly gave it the time of day. On the other hand, the Soviet Union agreed with U Thant's proposal.

Security Council Official record, S/1025, Oct. 25/62.

Stevenson opened the 4 p.m. meeting by "welcoming" assurances of Khrushchev to Earl Russell that the Soviet Union would take no reckless decisions and his agreement to U Thant's proposal he then said his govt is "most anxious to effect a peaceful resolution of this affair". Next he undertook to answer the comments of Khrushchev in his letter to Russell and to Zorin at the UN "that this threat to the peace has been caused not by the Soviet Union and Cuba but by the United States" by saying that there was "one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military build-up into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was farther from its thoughts". This distortion he follows with another (but what else could he do?) by representing the Soviet claim as "that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations." He then resorted to his now famous phrase about "the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary" and from this went on with his eloquent description of the blockade as "quarantine" of "limited measures" and the pretense that the Soviet Union claimed "that the threat is not the clandestine missiles in Cuba but their discovery".

Of course, this bears no resemblance to the position of the Soviet Union which is that an imminent Amer attack upon Cuba threatened the peace. Stevenson avoids this like the plague, instead addressing himself to "some representatives... do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles ..." He said that neither Khrushchev nor Zorin denied "these facts", again a misrepresentation because neither conceded any offensive purposes. He then offers to exhibit pictures in a description not of missiles or missile sites but of "offensive" weapons.

~~Wishingxxxx~~ Switching to "the casual remark of the Soviet representative claiming that we have thirty-five bases in foreign countries", he says the US has comparable missiles in only 3 other countries which he attempts to justify on 2 separate grounds, that they were approved by the "heads of government" and that this "was compelled ... by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe". The context in which he uses this language is that the introduction was into other countries, which is not the case. Until Cuba, no Soviet ballistics missiles were ever in any other country.

Next Stevenson addresses himself in a highly fancified rephrasing of an essentially simple question too loaded with propaganda in support of the Amer action, why hadn't the US gone to the UN? he does not answer the question, instead saying "the United States was not looking for some pretext to raise the issue of the transformation of Cuba into a military base" and makes a distinction between what he terms offensive and defensive weapons and says the US had no objection to defensive weapons, "even though such shipments (that is, of defensive weapons) offended the traditions of this hemisphere".

This is a very interesting intellectual exercise in which Stevenson first argument is that weapons that in the hands of the US and its allies are defensive become automatically offensive in the hands of anyone else; second, that there is a "tradition" in the western hemisphere of not importing arms from elsewhere, hardly the fact; and third, that this tradition, as he describes it, has the force of law, international law, and overrides all of the obligations of members to and

CUBA - SECURITY COUNCIL, 921st, 922nd, 923rd meetings, Jan. 4 and 5, 1961

(The following is from Official Records No. 921, morning meeting, Jan 4)

The US representative Wadsworth said that with "heavy hearts" the US the night before announced "the termination of diplomatic relations with Cuba". It was all Cuba's fault, he said, and the US had "worked hard in the face of great and continued provocation to prevent the leaders of Cuba from choking off these friendly relations". The charges laid before the Security Council by the Cuban Govt he says are "false and hysterical".

He charges harassment by Cuba, fraudulent complaints, and says "it is the Cuban leaders themselves who have been crying 'wo/lf' for the past six months over an alleged imminent invasion of their country and who are thereby fast making themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the world." He recalls that when the Cuban Foreign Minister "accused the United States - without proof, of course - of aggressive intentions against his country" the Council did not sustain the complaint nor had it been supported when made before the 7th meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at San Jose, Costa Rica, in Aug. He refers to a ~~long~~ 4-hour speech in the General Assembly on Sept 26 and another in Oct by Paul Roa again reporting preparations for "a large-scale invasion" and refers to similar complaints in Roa's Dec 31 letter, all of which are, according to Wadsworth, "the same midnight brew, from the same cauldron of hysteria." "Ridiculous," he calls it.

Cuba, he says, is the "most cruel imperialism of all time" in a far departure from the dictionary.

Wadsworth is interrupted by Zorin on a point of order because he is discussing the substance of the question before the adoption of the agenda and is therefore encouraged by the President to "be brief". He ridiculously answers this only interruption by saying "had it not been for the point of order of our distinguished friend of the USSR, I would have finished long ago."

Wherefore he launches into an ~~attack~~ attack on Zorin from which he denies the Cuban reporting of a State Dept document "to all the Foreign Ministries on the American continent" in which the Cubans allege the US revealed its preparatin for military intervention in Cuba. He says of Roa that he is "persistent in error" and that "as soon as we answer these points he will produce half a dozen more, again without logic or evidence... the real attacker here is the Cuban Government..." It has launched a "propaganda invasion" and fater the agenda is adopted "we are prepared to describe to the Council ... just what the threat is and where it comes from."

When no one else spoke on the adoption of the agenda, it was adopted. Roa was invited to the Council and spoke.

He charges the US with "harassment, retaliation, aggression and subversion, isolation, intervention and imminent military attack ~~and~~ ~~and~~ ... against the Government and people of Cuba ... an extremely serious threat to international peace and security ... The pretext of the US, he says, is that Cuba has become "an appendage of the Soviet Union".

Altho interrupted by disturbances from the gallery, he said, "Cuba may be invaded by the United States Marines and by the war criminals and mercenaries hired by the Central Intelligence Agency..." revealing, despite the later Amer pretenses, that the activities of the CIA were in fact well known.

There was a 5-min. interruption during which apparently peace was restored and the Pres of the Council apologized to Roa who began by saying, "Cuba is not alone, if its territory is violated, the Revolutionary Government and the people of Cuba can count on the assistance, support and backing of those who have freely undertaken to defend Cuba's independence ..." This he said the Security Council "should bear in mind" if "it intends to take the necessary steps to present the plans formulated by Allen Dulles from being carried out". As to looking forward to 1962 he stressed "the inalienable privilege" of the Charter "to each Member State to exercise its rights in the way it thinks best" and in appealing to the UN "we do not admit nor accept any jurisdiction other than the one we have chosen", the UN, an apparent reference to the US domination of the OAS. Then, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ "any attempt to transfer the examination of our complaint to the Council" to it, he says will meet with "our firm opposition".

He then warned against the "undermining" of the Security Council's authority and prestige by evasions.

His attack against the US is more an attack against Eisenhower whose administration he labels "imperialist and reactionary" and which he says "has resorted to the most blatant kinds of intrigue, entreaty, bribery, pressure and alliance in order to ~~punish~~ punish the Cuban revolution ..." and its efforts to improve conditions in that country.

"Now, in the last days of his discredited and tottering mandate, he has broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba and given his approval to a sinister plan by the Central Intelligence Agency ... for a massive military attack on ... Cuba", again revealing Cuban knowledge of what the Amer govt was in fact doing. "The pretext invoked," he says, is "the granting of Cuban bases for the launching of Soviet rockets".

~~Here~~ Here he alludes to the CIA overthrow of the Guatemalan govt in 1954.

And then says that the US breaking of relations gives the imminence of the invasion plans "an especially dramatic character" and that Cuba is "awaiting the onslaught" from "one minute to the next". Its purpose is "to restore by force the rotten regime which was overthrown".

"Since the summer of 1959," he says, there have been "hundreds of aggressive acts of a military nature, sponsored, supported and financed by the Government of the United States," in violation of international laws, undertakings and obligations. There have been "invasions of ~~pirate~~ pirate aircraft based in Florida" and he asks, in answer to Wadsworth's charge that he was inventing these things, for permission to give the Council "~~XXXXXX~~ photographs of United States high explosives" with serial numbers, etc., part of the "latest United States military equipment" dropped "to counter-revolutionary groups operating in the mountains".

He says that "officials of the United States Embassy in Havana were caught engaging in espionage activities; camps of mercenaries ~~XXXX~~ are maintained in Florida and Central America with United States dollars, and the Central Intelligence Agency bears the cost of organized broadcasts of calumnies from a number of radio stations, as part of the psychological warfare ..."

Then with remarkable accuracy he reports "the Pentagon and the State Department have been accelerating their preparations for direct action by enlarging the camps of mercenaries in Florida, at Miami, Orlando, Fort Myers, Homestead and Fort Lauderdale, and constructing air bases and bases for the military training of the invaders in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Swan Island and Puerto Rico."

He then summarizes the Eisenhower steps against Cuba beginning with the OAS meeting in San Jose in Aug followed a month later by

denial of the right of US citizens to travel to Cuba 2 weeks after which "on October 19, the Eisenhower Administration ~~xxxx~~ placed an embargo on nearly all exports to the island and on the same date the Federal Maritime Board of the Department of Commerce declared that any transfer, sale or chartering of vessels owned by United States citizens to the Government of Cuba or to Cuban citizens was illegal." This was "enlarged" to involve ships going between Cuba and the socialist countries which obstructed free trade.

He then refers to the "aggressive spirit" in which "the question of Cuba was raised in the presidential campaign" and recalls that 3½ months after the San Jose meeting Washington "completed its economic aggression in the sugar trade, by prohibiting any purchases until next March".

Again referring to US espionage by official personnel, he names 5 Americans with diplomatic status who were arrested by the Cubans, 2 of whom were "caught in the act as they were holding a meeting with Cuban conspirators".

He describes the Oct 8 capture of "some hundred counter-revolutionaries" following the landing of 27 people, 3 US citizens, who had left Fla on Oct 5. And he refers to extensive air drops by US planes and their identification of US supplies which he says "consisted of a complete set of modern weapons with an abundance of ammunition, and the latest type of communications equipment" which he describes further. (Exactly what is set forth in "The Invisible Government" account.)

When the Cuban consulate in Miami was attacked by "hoodlums" who had "the tacit approval of the authorities" Roa said "No one was caught, arrested or brought to trial ... the whole affair was covered up."

On Oct 27 LA Prensa of Mexico City "carried a report from its correspondent in Tapachula, Chiapas, ~~xxx~~ that thirteen warships without flags or registration were anchored in the bay of Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, and that in the Sierra del Peten near the Mexican frontier, hundreds of armed men were encamped." (par 79)

He makes further references to "war-mongering manoeuvres" especially involving Guantanamo and its reinforcement, the statement of Congressmen and J. Edgar Hoover, Eisenhower's press sec, Sec of Defense, the Chief of Naval Operations, "in spite of the repeated assurances by the Government of Cuba that it would not attempt to recover by force its usurped portion of its national territory..."

He refers to other acts against Cuba by the Treasury and says that the State Dept, while making announcements about ~~xxxx~~ arms purchases by Cuba, "omitted to mention that the United States had refused to sell arms to Cuba and blocked negotiations with its European allies, leaving our people defenseless against the counter-revolutionary mercenary forces armed and financed" by the United States.

In Dec an Amer rocket launched at Canaveral fell in Cuba, "endangering the lives of the local country people". He says "the fact is worth mentioning since this United States rocket, which has been partially reconstructed by Cuban technicians, is the only one we possess, Soviet rockets being conspicuous by their absence; just as the only foreign military base in Cuba is occupied by United States marines, ships and aircraft."

And the day after the rocket fell, Dec 2, Eisenhower "invoking the Mutual Security Act granted a credit of one million dollars for the so-called Cuban refugees ... mercenaries and their war-like plans sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency".

He then quotes a Guatemalan army officer in exile in Honduras in a press statement about "the mercenaries ... trained by United States

officers " and of a plan for the dropping of parachutists from its ranks in Cuba to reinforce "the counter-revolutionary movement suppressed in Escambray ...". He identified, accurately, the use of the farm "La Suiza" in Guatemala and "that the installations had been built by the Johnson powers Company of the United States." He described Guatemala as having "puppet government" which "opened its territory for the installation of camps from which it is planned to invade Cuba" and he mentions the names of ~~xxx~~ properties involved, including the Corriente camp, owned by United Fruit, the Rancho Florido plantation, the Helvetia plantation "where mobile units are being trained" the "Inca plantation" (United Fruit), the Aurora farm, etc. He declares, "the Government of Guatemala has admitted that in more than twenty private estates there are camps of mercenary troops, the principal one being the Helvetia camp - property of Roberto Alejos, the brother of the Ambassador of Guatemala in Washington - where a landing strip has been constructed."

In par 89 he gives further details of alleged similar operations of an air character and of other ground installations.

He then quotes from the Nov 19 issue of The Nation and a Dec 1 dispatch by Washington Correspondent Richard Dudman of the St Louis Post-Dispatch revealing CIA activities in Guatemala, including the acquisition of valuable and expensive land and Dudman's eyewitness account of the barracks and landing strip, etc.

of the After a Guatemalan uprising "many of those mercenaries and much war material were transferred to Nicaragua and Swan Island". He charges the activities of the mercenaries in the US is public and refers to such sources as LIFE for Oct 31, ~~EW~~ CBS Oct 25, Diario de las Americas of Nov 22 for pictures, etc., including the death of a US citizen "as the result of a shot fired accidentally by the Cuban, Rolando Martinez Campanaria, while giving military instruction in a camp situation at No Name Cay, thirty miles from Key West."

He has photostatic copies of checks paid from the funds released by Eisenhower and administered by the CIA and he said the mercenaries received 275 dollars for their families plus \$25 a week.

In par 94 he declared that mercenaries "are being transferred from ~~xxx~~ <sup>those</sup> training camps" to Swan Island and Guantanamo "in transport planes ~~xxx~~ belonging to the United States Army and in civilian cargo aircraft" and he alleges that groups of 150 such men are shipping weekly into Guantanamo, beginning with the Oct 24 shipment on the US Navy ship "Burman" under Captain Joseph McDonald" and that more recently the stop at Swan Island has been eliminated.

He says that "lthough the Central Intelligence Agency has ~~re~~ frequently changed its plans and postponed them, we have reliable information that the blow is about to be struck". He describes the clothing of the mercenaries, the plans prepared for them and the further plans of the US Govt as he alleges they exist, including an invasion of Cuba by mercenaries on the Guantanamo Naval Base who are to go to the Sierra Maestra.

Further revelations of US preparations he quotes from the Dec 5 issue of U.S. News and World Report and the Wall Street Journal of Nov 28, including the involvement of Esso Standard Oil and "indications that at least one of the groups of refugees is being allowed by the authorities to carry out its illegal activities ...use landing-strips from which flights over Cuba are made."

He has further quotations from the Amer papers of training preparations, including the Nov 27 issue of the Washington Post "many cuttings of the newspaper El Diario de las Americas, published in Spanish in Miami and showing that the counter-revolutionary factions



compete fiercely for Federal cheques and cheques from the monopolies

... He identifies some of the Cubans and Americans involved, including "Rolando Masferrer, a notorious murderer".

He says these are "open preparations for war ... being made in broad daylight and in clear contempt of international law ..." and he refers to the "psychological warfare" from "powerful radio transmitters in the United States and the Swan Islands, which were taken from Honduras by the Eisenhower administration." The US Govt is paying "the traitors working on the radio programmes and servicing the transmitters".

In par 100 Roa gives further particulars of radio broadcasts to Cuba from the US or because of Amer operations. He says he is quoting from U.S. News & World Report but it is unclear whether all of the information which includes great detail is from this source or is at least in part drawn from other sources. The broadcasts to which Roa refers are from a well described ship based in Miami, from Swan Island, from NY, etc. He particularizes programs, such as "By Cuba and For Cuba", a short-wave broadcast five nights weekly from NY. The program "Radio Cuba Independiente", "broadcast from the ship which leaves Miami every day" includes orders "to sabotage cinemas, theatres and other public places."

Radio Cisne, broadcasting since Aug, he says is controlled by the Gibraltar Steamship Co of NY which sends recordings twice weekly by chartered aircraft to the Swan Islands.

Beginning in par 101 Roa details efforts of "the Washington strategists" and "the great monopolies which were swept from Cuba forever by the revolutionary laws" to overthrow the Castro regime. The US Govt and "the great monopolies" he charges "have made direct contributions to the common fund set up to pay the invasion expenses."

Next beginning with Par 103 Roa goes into anti-Cuban US committees of various sorts. One is the "Committee for the Liberation of Cuba" with headquarters in Washington and headed by John C. McClatchy, "who announced publicly that he had bought time on radio stations whose broadcasts could ready Cuban territory, and who stated with a straight face that contributions to the Committee would be tax-deductible." Congressman Pucinski and retired Air Force Major Nicholas Nonnemacher "belong to this admirable interventionist enterprise".

The International Rescue Committee, headed by Leo Cherne, 225 Park Avenue South, New York, "administers one million dollars on behalf of the so-called anti-Communist fighters of Cuba." Roa charges "Cardinal Spellman, Esso, International Business Machines, the United Fruit Company, President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles, the most prominent firms and personalities of the empire, have opened their bulging purses to bathe Cuba in blood, to restore the most hateful privileges and to bring their hirelings to power and the country once more under the colonial yoke."

Roa in par 105 refers to the newspaper report he quoted at the 909th plenary meeting of the General Assembly during the discussion of a Cuban complaint "which anticipated the modus operandi of the plans now being carried out". He attributes these three steps "to the National Review of 18 July 1960," to the intention of the Eisenhower Administration "in pursuing its policy of aggression against Cuba":

"A diplomatic and economic break" to precede "military operations by the 'liberation forces' of Cuba."

Invocation of the Monroe Doctrine by Congress with the declaration

"That an extra continental power is indirectly attacking the United States and other American nations by creating a satellite regime in Cuba". Roa says this might follow a ban on US shipments of supplies to Cuba "including spare parts for machinery and mechanical equipment, which are essential to a country where, of course, all machinery is of United States manufacture". This might also be accompanied by a US ban on arms shipments to Cuba with "the Atlantic Fleet to send patrols to prevent European vessels from delivering arms to Castro"; "c) A lightning blow could be struck by a concentration of military, naval and air units under the direction of officials of the Central Intelligence Agency. Once a strong beach-head had been established, patriots could form a provisional government and ask the United States Government for open assistance with a view to pacifying the country.

Roa then says that "Events since July and the intrigues of the last few months are unequivocal proofs of the strategic plan described in that review, which gathered its information from circles very close to the Washington administration." He says the break in relations is a fact, that "two destroyers have been placed on the alert at Key West, ninety miles from Cuba" and that "only the climax of the plan is lacking: the establishment of a beach-head, direct military aggression, and the rain of bombs on town and country. The action has already been prepared and could be carried out at any time."

This is a remarkably accurate forecast of what was to happen 3 months later. In going over Roa's charges at the UN 5 months after the fact, it seems difficult to realize that he was not reporting what did happen but is forecasting what was about to.

Because "the collective isolation of Cuba was a diplomatic failure" (107) Roa says the US "intrigued in many ways with foreign ministries and has tried to carry out several flank attacks through the organs of the inter-American system". He claims the Inter-American Defense Board ~~xxxx~~ even refused the Cuban delegate the right to speak, etc. He makes similar charges against the Council of the OAS and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (108) in which he says the State Dept has been and is manoeuvring against Cuba and "puppet governments openly further" the US "foul plans" (109 110).

He enumerates Guatemala, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Peru, and says "all these anti-national and anti-popular governments are docile servants ... the mercenaries who serve the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency ..."

Roa infers that in pursuit of "the scheme agreed upon months ago" which "has been carried out", calling for Peru "to take the initiative in convening the Seventh Meeting of Consultation in Costa Rica, ~~xxxx~~ ... alleging threats from outside the continent" led "first, to the refusal of Minister Raul Porras Barrenechea to sign the final document ... to his resignation; and subsequently to his death." (111)

He charges Peruvian Prime Minister Beltrán broke relations with Cuba as "one of the final signs of an impending aggression". This regime, he says, stooges for the Eisenhower Administration.

In par. 114 he charges this break in relations was accompanied by overflights of Cuban territory from "pirate planes." He put the "counter-revolutionaries in New York" as stating these planes operated from "foreign bases" but they in fact came from Fla. He says this also is part of the CIA preliminary to invasion of Cuba.

Apparently the US Govt, according to Roa, was forecasting the installation of Russian missiles in Cuba, even before the Bay of Pigs invasion, judging from the following quotation from par. 115:

"Similarly, it is reported from Montevideo that the Government of the United States has informed certain Latin-American Governments that it will undertake a military intervention in Cuba "to prevent seventeen sites for the launching of Russian rockets being installed in the island". The evening paper El Diario states that the Uruguayan Government was informed of this decision by Washington through a report received personally by the Uruguayan Ambassador at the White House and at the Organization of American States."

The attack on Cuba may come any moment, Roa says, and he alleges that every few hours his govt receives "definite information" which "hour by hour" indicates the attack is imminent.

The charge that Cuba "is a satellite of international communism" (117) is because "Cuba has never ceased to be a satellite of United States imperialism" because the US does not understand the far-reaching changes in the structure of contemporary society, according to Roa, it "can only conceive of two alternatives: a country is either its satellite or a satellite of the other Power".

In par 119, Roa lists those countries which have helped Cuba "economic, commercial and technical cooperation" as the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, UAR, Japan and Canada. He refers to "the unshakable determination of the revolutionary government" and "the prodigious courage of its people" and says "Cuba will fight until it conquers or dies, and it will not fight alone." Looking more than a year ahead, he concludes this paragraph: "We do not wish to bring about the suicide of mankind. But if an atomic conflagration were to break out as the result of United States military intervention in Cuba, the entire responsibility would fall on the imperialist and reactionary administration of General Eisenhower."

Next Roa quotes from a speech by Castro two days earlier saying that for "the danger looming over our country" the President-elect and the new administration in the US will also have responsibility for "we assert that no aggression could be carried out without the complicity of the new rulers elected by the United States". Castro also expected "certain changes from the new Administration" saying it would "follow a more sensible and balanced policy if it does not want to lead the world into a great massacre, an apocalyptic holocaust." (121)

Referring again to the rupture of relations by the Eisenhower administration the previous day, Roa says "we are aware that this rupture will lead to aggression ..." He describes the Amer Embassy in Cuba as a "nest of vipers" with "the greater part" of its staff "involved in espionage, subversion and terrorism." and says this was the reason for the demand the US reduce the size of its embassy staff to that of the Cuban embassy in Washington. "The empire's angry reply was to break off relations." (122)

Roa says Cuba had no grievance or complaint against the Amer people, only the administration in Washington (123)

In advance Roa "rejects in advance any draft resolution which would involve any kind of understanding with the imperialist, reactionary Government of President Eisenhower" saying "there can be no compromise" and that "the reactionary and imperialist government of President Eisenhower has ordered military intervention in Cuba, and Cuba is preparing to repulse it" (124)

Roa continues his remarks in par 125 at 1:05 p.m. by asking the Security Council to declare the US an aggressor. This is the end of that particular session.

922nd session, Security Council; Official records, Jan. 4, 1961

Security Council Official Records 922 <sup>Wadsworth</sup> apparently is the afternoon meeting, but in my copy the first and last pages of print are blank. Apparently ~~Stevenson's~~ reply comes first, but the first 4 of the paragraphs of it are missing. The conclusion of the 4th paragraph US rep. is his charge that "the leaders of Cuba have put that unhappy country ~~re-~~ more and more into the hands of international communism." He implies ~~SENT.~~ this is the meaning of the visit of Mikoyan to Cuba in Feb 1960 (5) ~~Active:~~ and of the Soviet "discredited charge of United States aerial aggression" at the Oxt General Assembly (6)

He says that in view of "certain events in Laos or in the Congo" the Soviet Union "must find it very convenient that the Security Council should be hearing this spurious ~~xxxx~~ Cuban charge of an imaginary United States aggression" (7)

He says Cuba is itself isolated (8), that the US breaking of diplomatic relations shows it is "severely provoked" and that "we shall ... maintain" the security of the Western Hemisphere "against aggression from whatever source" (9) He believes the proper form is the OAS. But the Cubans do not agree and "would rather ~~come~~ here and fling wild charges about. As long as they are in that frame of mind, we see no chance for improvement" presumably in relations (10).

Roa's speech, like his letter, is "completely without any foundation ... hysterical ... doubt that Mr. Roa himself believes them." He says that "to try to refute them all ... like making a point by point rebuttal of Aline in Wonderland" (12)

He says the US delegation "will not make very much comment on Mr. Roa's speech until we have had an opportunity to see it in the verbatim record, but I will say a few words about the main charges contained in his letter ..." (14)

He refers to the charge "the United States Government has informed the Foreign Ministers in the Western Hemisphere of our intention to carry out a military intervention ... if 'the construction is resumed on seventeen sites for the launching of Soviet rockets' ...<sup>2</sup> In the letter he says Roa stated the existence of this note "that flatly as a fact" but in the speech attributes it to the dispatches from Montevideo (15)

He denies the charge categorically (17).

Forecasting Adlai Stevenson's later and unhappy experience, he begins par 19 "So much for our latest invasion plot ..." He goes further, seeks to ridicule Cuban leaders who "ascribe to the United States the intention to carry out a military invasion of Cuba ..." (19)

Here and in what follows there is a shocking debasement of Amer honor for the soon-to-be implemented US plans were well along prior to this time. Continuing in the same vein, he refers to Havana newspapers of ~~the~~ Dec 31 which "all carried a lurid scare story under one identical banner headline, one headline in all the newspapers, 'Yankee invasion imminent'. That night, Prime Minister Castro addressed a banquet in Havana and devoted one hour of his speech to the new invasion charge", emphasizing "the supposed United States document alleging the construction of Soviet rocket bases in Cuba" ... an example of the daily mental diet for the Cuban people ... " (20)

Next he refutes Roa's description "of Cuban war criminals" as "mercenaries, adventurers, spies, saboteurs and terrorists of every kind", implying, but not saying, that they are various kinds of intellectuals and "they are not war criminals" (21)

But it "is absolutely false" to say "that we have supported military incursions by Cuban refugees into Cuba" altho "it is natural and readily understandable that some Cubans on our shores did want to engage in activities against the government which has done them so much harm" the US Govt "has been in no way associated with such activities. On the contrary, we have made unusual and special efforts to prevent violation of our laws." (22)

Roa's third charge, of the attempted diplomatic isolation of Cuba "is entirely false" (24)

Reverting to the break in relations, he says it was made necessary because of Cuban actions (29)

Most of the speech consists of propoganda and political charges against Cuba alleging it is in effect a Communist invasion of the western hemisphere in support of which he cites such things as a) quotes from "the communique" of "the leaders of the Communist Party of the world" just a month previously in Moscow: "The victory of the popular revolution in Cuba is a splendid example for the peoples of Latin America" (36)

From time to time (as in par 37) he says the US Govt and its people "rejoice" when Castro took power but were since "sickened" by what followed (37)

Having failed oentirely to even refer to the detailed charges by Roa of specific acts of aggression planned and of othe wealth of detail of anti-Cuban activity by the Amer govt and its various agencies, the "reply" concludes (40) with the assertion that these charges "are empty, groundless, false, fraudulent ... without basis in fact"

This speech is in fact anything but a reply to the specifications by Roa. In the light of the history soon to be made, there was little else could be done.

Apparently from the transcript there were again demonstrations in the gallery following which Mr. Benites Vineuza of Ecuador spoke.

He says his delegation assumes the role "of a friendly adviser in a family quarrel" (42) and begins talking about "our regional community" (43) following). This includes reference to "the principle of non-intervention" (47) and continues through par 49. He beings par 50 by saying US-Cuban differences should be settled by the regional system.

He denies that Ecuador has been pressured or received any document "implying the use of pressure or threats against the government of Cuba" (52) but he also says "my delegation believes that the Security Council is fully competent to deal with this matter ... " (55)

Zorin for the USSR follows beginning with par 56. He says there is "an extremely grave situation resulting from the latest aggressive acts by the United States" (56). He finds Roa's statement convincing (57) and Wadsworth's "completely groundless" and reflecting merely an attempt "to evade any detailed discussion of the facts and arguments that have been put forward. .. a very simple but highly unconvincing line. It is also a significant fact that, despite the gravity of the circumstances in which we are examining this question, the United States representative did not consider it necessary to make a clear and unequivocal statement" that the acts against Cuba "would be brought to an end" or that the "xxxx preparations for direct aggression will be discontinued". This failure he says "gives us food for serious thought" (58)

Of the break in relations, he says it means the US desires no settlement but rather wishes "to bring about a further deterioration in an already tense situation and to prepare for open acts of aggression" (59). Again charging evasion by the US representative, he says

the attempt is "futile", "doomed to disappointment" and "extremely dangerous for the Republic of Cuba and for peace throughout the world" but "not unexpected". He refers to efforts "a few months ago" by his govt and that of Cuba to draw attention to the US govt's "steadily intensified preparations for direct military attacks ...". The denial of the US Govt he says were "the usual utterly cynical cover statements ... used to conceal its many discreditable activities" (60)

Here Zorin goes into several paragraphs (beginning with 61) to trace the acts of hostility by US Govt and companies from the beginning of the Castro regime and to describe as hypocritical Wadsworth's statement of the rejoicing of the US at the success of the revolution. Because "the fall of the United States hireling, Batista, had been too sudden" measures to be taken against the new regime had not been prepared in advance but had since been planned and implemented (63)

Referring to Wadsworth's charge of a "reign of terror" in Cuba, and of the "espousal of "the principle of non-intervention" by the Ecuadorian delegate (64), Zorin says the charge by the US is in itself "direct intervention in the domestic affairs of a small but independent state" and a disregard "of all the rules of international intercourse" including those referred to by the representative of Ecuador (65).

Next he refers to the campaign against Cuba in Amer communications media and economic pressures which he also charges run "directly counter to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States" (66)

And there is a "political campaign against Cuba (67) as well as military (68), including "preparations have been made to carry out a direct military attack on Cuba". These include a "try-out" of landings on the Cuban coast which he describes as a "dress rehearsal" which he says "was represented as week-end shore leave for 1,500 Marines, who were landed at Guantanamo on 29 October". He refers to other manoeuvres at Guantanamo on Nov 4 as of the same character and he charges where Naval operations "between 17 November and 7 December 1960" (68).

Next he quotes David Lawrence (Nov 18 1960, Herald Tribune) as saying US might soon "be compelled to land troops" to protect US property in Cuba.

He quotes NY Times (Nov 20) on "what ~~it~~ it describes merely as symbolical patrolling" as asking "why was it necessary to assign a carrier with seventy planes and five destroyers to the patrol? A year ago the Navy had merely put two small vessels on patrol off the Panamanian coast" (70)

This was of course not a patrol, Zorin says, and was accompanied by US fleet manoeuvres also involving cruisers and submarines off the Cuban coast - only 6 miles from the Cuban capital (71)

Wadsworth's charge of a military threat from Cuba with its small population, Zorin says, is "utterly ludicrous" (72)

These manoeuvres, Zorin says, were for "the working out of the technical details of intervention against Cuba ... final steps in the military and political build-up for invasion." He says that on Dec 2, 1960 ~~the US Govt~~ "the United States Government directly espoused the cause of the counter-revolutionary elements ... and formally provided for their financial support, openly appropriating one million dollars for these bandits and political upstarts" (73)

He says the Dec 9 warning of the US State Dept against travel in Cuba at Christmas and New Year's means "the time for the attack upon Cuba" was near. He also quotes the Christmas 1960 edition of the Miami

Herald describing "final preparations for an invasion of Cuba. These forces are not, of course, the main invasion forces; their intention is to ride into Cuba on the bayonets of the United States Marines" (74)

Charges that because of Cuban exposure of the "secret designs of the United States to carry out an armed attack" the Eisenhower administration "is exerting pressure on the Latin American countries with a view to forcing them to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba ..." (75)

The "commotion" by the US over Cuban arms purchases Zorin calls "a smokescreen" in which the US alleges these arms are for use in revolutions in other Latin American countries, but really intended "to disarm Cuba and leave it without the means of defence" (77)

The US does not fear "armed intervention by Cuba in its own affairs or in those of the Latin American countries. Such a danger neither does nor can exist." Zorin alleges. He says what the US does fear "is the great emancipating force of the ideas underlying the victorious revolution in Cuba." (78)

Zorin then ridicules Wadsworth, asking if the communique issued by Mikoyan which was to have been quoted agreeing "to joint activity in the United Nations" is a crime. May not any states act jointly, he asks? (79)

Of the Havana Declaration of Sept 2 1960 Zorin says it "repudiated the Monroe Doctrine and the principles of Pan Americanism as interpreted by Washington ..." and looks toward "the liberation of the Latin American countries from the political and economic oppression of the United States ... broad road of free and independent national development..." (80)

"In preparing for intervention against Cuba" Zorin says the US aimed at regaining what it lost in Cuba and intending it "as a object lesson for the benefit of the other Latin American countries in case these countries should ~~not~~ take it into their heads to repeat the Cuban experiment" (81), and "has shown the whole world that it openly advocates the maintenance of other countries in dependence upon itself .." (82)

US anti-Cuba activities he says were once "aptly described as 'the invisible empire of the United States'" by Nehru. "The purpose of this aggression, from which preparations are under way, is to overthrow the revolutionary ~~Government~~ Government of Cuba ... re-establish the control of the North American monopolies and to eliminate the example of a successful struggle by a small country for its freedom and independence ..." (84)

But he says, "There is still time to avert a course of events which may be fraught with the gravest consequences not only for the Caribbean, but for the whole world" (85)

Next Zorin addresses himself to Pres Eisenhower's statement on the breaking of relations and the justification he gave of the Cuban demands for the limit to the Amer personnel in the Havana embassy to 11 people. This, Zorin says, is precisely the ~~way the staff in~~ size of the Cuban staff in Washington and rather than rendering impossible normal relations, as Eisenhower had charged, it is a demand for equality as Zorin sees it. He asks if the US has "grown used to the idea that it must have an embassy staff of 120, 130 or 300 in every Latin American country while those countries may have an embassy staff of 10, 12 or 15." He reiterates the Cuban demand amounted to one for "equality" (87 & 86).

And in par 88 he interprets Eisenhower's statement that "the people of Cuba" are "now suffering under the yoke of a dictator" to mean that Eisenhower did not regard ~~the~~ Batista as a dictator.

The decision facing the Security Council, he says, "is not merely a question of its duty to come to the defense of a small country ... also a question of its duty to avert a course of events which would imperil peace throughout the world" (90)

But "if the Security Council does not come to Cuba's defence, if it does not take steps to preclude aggression by the United States against that country and if this aggression should nevertheless take place, Cuba/will, of course, not stand alone ...", a clear inference if not an open statement that the Soviet Union will defend Cuba (91)

Zorin follows this with a reference to Khrushchev's message to Castro in which he promised "the Cuban people can always rely on the solidarity and support of the Soviet people in the struggle for its independence ..." (92)

What follows the expression of hope by Zorin "that all members of the Security will give due consideration" is unknown to me at this point because p.20 and possibly 21 are missing from this copy.



The first speaker is Liberian delegate Padmore who is "not convinced that the evidence produced by Cuba gives substantive proof of an actual imminent invasion..." To him it is "inconceivable that the great United States in these days of our Lord would attack the territory of the Cuban people, when the United Nations affords so many facilities for a peaceful solution of international problems" (4)

His delegation, he concludes, "heartily welcomes the categorical denial of the United States in connexion with such a plot" (8)

The contribution of France to the debate was made by Mr. Berard. He begins by saying that for the Security Council would be in an undignified position if it were placed "on guard without serious cause" and that "four days have elapsed" since Cuba sounded the alarm "and the dramatic events which, we were told, were to take place in the next few hours have not occurred. There is no indication, even, that they could have occurred." (10,11) Addressing himself to the language of Roa's letter he finds it intemperate and inspiring "doubt as to the reality of the grievances put forward" (12) He denies that the US is following a policy of "diplomatic isolation" and says "we know the Governments of Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay too well to think that, if they have decided or are about to decide to break off diplomatic relations with Havana, they lack serious reasons for doing so." (13)

Next, referring to the Cuban claim "that the United States Government is prepared to order a military intervention in Cuba in order to prevent the installation in the island of seventeen sites for the launching of Soviet rockets" on which work has been suspended "but indicates that intervention will be ~~xxx~~ ordered whenever such construction is resumed" he asks "are we to understand by this that the Cuban government has decided to resume construction and fears the possible consequences? (14)

He doubts the document actually exists (15). He also doubts "that Mr. Roa has brought us any proof of the United States Government's connivance" with the Cuban refugees (16). Roa had made earlier complaints (17), as had Castro in the General Assembly (18) so he wonders "whether there was really any reason for the Cuban Government to refer the question to the Council" which he regards as a propaganda move (19) and while his government "regrets the tension at present characterizing the Cuban Government's relations with the United States" it will in the vote give Cuba no comfort (23).

Ceylon's delegate Wijegoonawardena begins with an expression of regret at the breaking of diplomatic relations and the hope that they will soon be restored (24). He feels that "the poisoned atmosphere of suspicion that prevails" between the US and Cuba "merits the most ~~xxx~~ serious consideration by the Council" (26)

The statement of the United Kingdom was made by Mr. Beeley. He also begins by referring to previous charges by Cuba at the Security Council against the US (27). That complaint was referred to the OAS with which Cuba declined to cooperate (28-33). Next he refers to the complaint to the General Assembly on Oct 18 of "plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States" which also alleged a forthcoming invasion (35). Roa reiterated his charge on Nov. 1 (36) and on July 1 and 3, Roa ~~xxx~~ addressed additional similar letters to the Pres of the Security Council (37-38) These charges, he finds, are "nightmares" and he finds not "a single particle of evidence which convincingly supports the accusation" (39)