in everything. He "turned the bureaucracy around" and "By the time that Nenni and his party eventually entered the Italian government in December 1963, the Department of State was at last in accord." (881)

p.881 .... One leading Nenni Socialist assured me earnestly in the spring of 1962, "So long as we have any influence on the Italian government, you can be sure that there will be no Paris-Bonn-Rome axis against London and Washington." In February 1963 Anthony Sampson reported to the London Observer from Rome: "Nenni, the old firebrand Socialist, cannot now con tain his praise for Kennedy. . . . There is hardly a word of anti-Americanism, except on the far right."

4. The Ruropean Trip (pp.881-8)

Comment: Schlesinger said there was rising confidence in the Kennedy administration among those he describes as the democratic left in England, West Germany, France (881). Further, "many on the left were not only Kennedyites but McNamaraites; they preferred an American nuclear monopoly and, like the Labour Party, opposed the MLF, not because it promised Europe too little control over nuclear weapons, but because it promised too much".

Schlesinger portrays himself as the active little sponsor in Washington of what he has called the deomcratic left, to George Ball for example, and then to the Pres, to whom he said, "The vital fresh source of pro-U.S. feeling in Europe today is the democratic left..." (882). In the same memo he said, "By encouraging progressive tendencies, we can help counter the Gaullist idea of Europe without seeming to challenge de Gaulle directly...." In other words, the US could interfere in Europe and seek to exercise control thru those Schlesinger called the "democratic left". So the Pres was preparing for his trip and "early in June he asked me to look at the speech drafts prepared by the State Department for the trip. 'My general impression,' I reported to him, 'is of their predominant banality and vapidity" for they could have been written as well for Eisenhower or Nixon (883).

p.884 The State Department drafts were discarded, and Ted Sorensen applied his brilliant mind and pen to the European tour. On June 23 the President left for Germany, and the triumphal journey began.

Comment: Then Schlesinger describes Kennedy's large audiences and excerpts of speeches in Germany, especially his speech at the Wall (884). Here he said "The crowd shook itself and roared like an animal." Kennedy "was first exhilarated, and then disturbed; he felt, as he remarked on his return, that if he had said, 'March to the wall - tear it down,' his listeners would have marched." (885)

Then he went to Ireland and then to England, to which Schlesinger devotes about a dozen words in a caluse of a sentence, "where Macmillan said no on the multilateral force and yes on British Guiana;"

Here in three buried and apparently entirely ignored

words, Schlesinger confirms the American pressure on and intervention in both British Guiana and the British govt to effect a change in the electoral system, a special international gerrymander by which the repeated electoral ~~xyx~~ decision of the citizens of British Guiana could be overthrown and the entire political leadership altered in benefit of the desires of the American govt. He has, to a limited degree, discussed this earlier.

Then the Pres went to Italy where Schlesinger attributes Kennedy's small crowd to the exhaustion of the Romans in the coronation of Pope Paul VI (886)

In summarizing the Pres's European trip, Schlesinger says, "He defined a democratic alternative to de Gaulle."

pp.887/8 Before the Irish parliament, he had recalled the lines from Back to Methuselah: "You see things; and you say 'Why?' But I dream things that never were; and I say 'Why not?' ... the hope of a ~~x~~reative west united in common allegiance to progressive democracy - and gave it new identity and purpose. In the summer of 1963, John F. Kennedy could have carried every country in Europe. (887/8)

p.889 The problems within the Western alliance, as Kennedy well understood, were part ofothe price the west was paying for a certain ebbing in the cold war. But, unlike some of his colleagues in the American government who looked back with nostalgia to the good old days when Khrushchev could be relied on to maintain discipline in western ranks, Kennedy was rather more impressed by the risks of war than by the risks of detente. So his first instinct after the missile crisis had been to restore communication with his adversary and resume the search for areas of common interest.

Though Kennedy did not suppose that the humiliation of the missile crisis would transform the Kremlin overnight, he did hope that his restraint in the aftermath might convince the Russians that the American menace to their security was hardly enough to jusitfy the desperate act which had brought on the crisis.

Comment: Is it not odd that Schlesinger concedes an "American menace" to Russian security while arguing it was "hardly enough to justify the desperate act" which brought on the crisis? Is it not even stranger that, in his discussion of the missile crisis, he had in no way indicated any belief, even any possibility, of an American threat to the Soviet security?

Without interruption, Schlesinger's introduction continues:

Obviously, if the United States had been waiting for an excuse to use its considerable nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union, it could hardly expect a better one than the sneak nuclearization of Cuba. Yet Washington had stayed its hand.

Comment: What utter nonsense! There was no "nuclear superiority", whether or not "considerable". Once, as Schlesinger repeatedly concedes throughout the book, each of the 2 major nuclear powers had enough nuclear strength to decimate the other, there was a stalemate and as he had earlier shown the Russians appeared to have suspended the manufacture of further intercontinental missiles once they had what they deemed to consider sufficient. But it was by no means a simple matter, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ as he here pretends, for the US nuclear weapons whether or not in superiority against the Soviet Union for no one ever doubted, and Schlesinger certainly knew, that any American first strike would still leave enough Soviet nuclear strength for it to decimate the US in return. What he sought by such subjuvenile rhetoric is not clear. It's a childish, really a stupid, argument that argues nothing. It perhaps serves in his mind to convince the reader Kennedy was a man of peace.

....Reading Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet of December 12, ~~1962~~ 1962, he expressed, as he had before, his wonder that the Soviet leader was making much the same set of charges against the west that the west was making against him: the language was almost interchangeable. Kennedy gave Khrushchev credit for sincerity in this - "I do think," he soon said publicly, "his speech shows that he realizes how dangerous a world we live in" - and the mirror effect reinforced his own refusal to regard the global competition as a holy war. If the Russians would "devote their energies to demonstrating how their system

works in the Soviet Union, it seems to me his vital interests are easily protected with the power he had, and we could have a long period of peace. . . . But instead, by these constant desires to change the balance of power in the world, that is what, it seems to me, introduces the dangerous element."

Comment: Schlesinger here has considerably edited Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech. It appeared in greater detail in Abel's book, but Schlesinger had to omit other and important parts of the speech because quoting them would have the effect of destroying the entire tissue constructed by him, his colleagues and, in fact, the entire administration and the press over what really happened and what the consequences of the Cuba missile crisis were. Khrushchev laid it on the line to the Supreme Soviet.

Note again Kennedy's preoccupation by his own special concept of "the balance of power" and ~~his~~ consider it especially in the context of his "get tough" attitude toward Khrushchev at Vienna and in Schlesinger's own acknowledgment of how the US "provoked" Soviet reaction in military affairs, construction and budgeting, etc. Note also the continued escalation of the American military budget which, of course, represented its attitude toward "the balance of power in the world". Kennedy's concept, at least as reflected by Schlesinger, is a very odd one. He, thru the US, was to dictate what other countries, including the Soviet Unnn, might or might not do; he would interpret any friendship by the newer countries toward the Soviet Union as a possible effort to alter the status quo. It really amounted to his own variation of the Dulles concept of equating neutrality and evil.

1. Intimations of Detente (890/3)

Comment: Schlesinger begnngs by acknowledging the relationship of this with what happened at Vienna:

p.890 This is precisely what they had debated the year before in Vienna, and Cuba, for a moment at least, had settled the debate in Kennedy's favor. Khrushchev's retreat means a clear victory of hhe American over the Soviet definition of the status quo. And, by accepting the status quo in the form of the existing equilibrium of power rather than of the communist revolution, Khrushchev swallowed not only the dialectic of Vienna but the rhetoric of his flamboyant speech six months earlier proclaiming the historic inevitability of a communist world. It was not, of course, that he was abandoning his beliefs; like devotees of older religions, he was perhaps beginning to reserve them for heavenly fulfillment.

Comment: There are those who may disagree with his analysis that "had accepted the status quo" or had "swallowed not only the dialectic of Vienna but the rhetoric ..." or what he says in the beginning of the following paragraph, that the Cuban adventure implied a Soviet conclusion history wasn't doing the job fast enough.

p.890 .... For in January 1961 the world had seemed ripe for plucking. Asia, Africa, Latin America were all rising against their western masters and

appeared to be running in the communist direction. The existence of the nuclear stalemate reduced the credibility of the American deterrent and freed the Soviet Union for nuclear diplomacy - i.e., terrorizing other nations by the manipulation of the threat of nuclear war.

Comment: It would seem that following such strong talk Schlesinger might cite chapter and verse; might show that with the world ripe for plucking something might have been plucked. But of course this is his straw-man technique, a variant of "the self-fulfilling prophecy" he on p.873 quoted from Robert K. Merton or the stating of a false definition of a situation to make the false conception seem to come true. Having Asia, Africa and Latin America about to tumble into the Soviet basket at the time that the Pres took office in Jan 1961, Schlesinger subtly plants in the mind of the reader that it did not only because of Kennedy. RAH, Rah, rah. The facts are not as he represented them. And it is for this reason that he cites no specifications. So he fulfils his own prophecy and says "By the summer of 1962 that (Communist) offensive was in ruins." And he finds that nationalism "had proved stronger than Marxism" and that it was "communism" that "had encountered one frustration after another in Laos, in the Congo, in Latin America." Here we see why he has given us specifications for the issue in Laos, despite the distortions and obfuscations of the govt, including Schlesinger, was not one of communism but of the CIA (see The Invisible Government) and the policy of Kwnnedy's predecessor which, despite all the propaganda to the contrary, he himself perpetuated. In the Congo the question again was not Communism but the problem created by the owners of great wealth in seeking to continue the benefits they enjoyed under colonialism. In Latin America what could he be talking about except Cuba? And in the summer of 1962, the time he is talkirg of, the only major thing involving Cuba was the imminence of an American attack and the Soviet defense against this in the form of the missile crisis. But there was no "communist offensive2 (890)

Schlesinger describes "the Cuban advanture" as representing "a bold effort to turn the western flank at Berlin by altering the nuclear balance", a combination of extended geography and falsehood because he knew that "the nuclear balance" was not subject to such alteration. As a matter of fact, on just the previous page he has talked about "the nuclear stalemate". Once both the Soviet Union and the US had sufficient nuclear strength to launch a devastating response to any attack, what Schlesinger here talks about is entirely fictitious and he was aware of it. One can only question his motives in usingosuch arugument. And he makes no pretense of showing how it could have turned the flank in Berlin where the wall had already been built. He is swept along by his own momentum for he says "at the same time, it was a tacit confession of Soviet nuclear inferiority." He finds that the Soviets had engaged in nuclear blackmail and perhaps Cuba struck the weapon from their hands.

Again, this is entirely and knowingly false. It can serve only in pursuance of the Merton idea to lay a false foundation for the false structure he is about to erect on the entire subject of peace. But he persists in saying that Khrushchev had a defeat in the Caribbean and on Nov 19 1962 in a 30,000-word report

to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party "implicitly called off the world offensive and demanded concentration on the tasks of the Soviet economy." Again, this is a not accidental deception of the reader. In Nov 1962 Khrushchev had accomplished his purposes. He had had Kennedy in the position of looking into the nuclear eye, he had obtained a guarantee against an American attack on Cuba and through this a guarantee for at least of the immediate future of the elimination of the greatest single hazard to peace. He could, therefore, at least for the immediate, concentrate on domestic issues.

From all of this glossolalia, Schlesinger decides that "clearly the Soviet leaders had decided on a breathing spell" which he finds consistent with their history and he refers to entirely unrelated situations, those of Lenin in 1921 and Stalin in 1935, only to ultimately concede that "Khrushchev's situation in 1963 differed in important respects" from them (891) and he ultimately concedes that "the Soviet Union of Khrushchev obviously differed in notable ways from the Soviet Union of Stalin." Then he disagrees with "Lord Home's thesis that a fat communist would always be better for the world than a skinny communist" yet implies that "further progress toward affluence in Russia ..." would "further attenuate the old revolutionary messianism ..." and could lead to tranquillity.

He further finds that "the mystique of Marxism itself was dying". To justify this, he puts his own special meaning on "mystique" and he explains it in terms of the discrediting of Stalin and the Tito and Mao Tse-tung differences with the Soviet Union. Inherent in the justification for his wild rhetoric is his own concept that if anybody else didn't agree with the Khrushchev concept they were not Marxists by belief and he says that "if Marxism had been anything, it had been a universal ideology overriding all national and ethnic interests and dissolving all historic conflicts," a definition unique unto him. This to him is a "decay of Marxist legitimacy" but he says that all of this requires of Khrushchev a "desire for a breathing spell" because of the conflicts in the Communist camp.

As tho it were something different for Kennedy, he says of Khrushchev that"sitting on a nuclear stockpile was not the most comfortable position in the world". It might at least as well and certainly with more logic be argued that in the period immediately following the Cuba missile crisis Khrushchev felt a lot more comfortable because of the nuclear stockpile on which he was sitting. There had been no other way by which he could have prevented a world war which inevitably would have followed an American attack upon Cuba other than by the total abandonment of the Russian pledge to defend Cuba. (892)

And forgetting his repeated reiteration of the alleged American nuclear superiority, he says that of statesmen, generals and scientists contemplated nuclear weapons "especially when there was a chance that the weapons might be used against themselves" they developed a certain weariness. "Prolonged contemplation of the nuclear effect could lead even the most bellicose to the conclusion that mutual incineration was of dubious benefit." Of course, he intends this language to be applied only to Khrushchev. He does not so state and it does not so apply exclusively. But he is leading to Kennedy as the victor

of a peace battle, too. He says "But Moscow, like Washington, had had to explore the rigorous and terrible logic of holocaust." Only two men on the planet had been exposed to the absolute pressure of o nuclear decision; and even for them it was not till the missile crisis that what was perceived intellectually was experienced emotionally." Here without realizing it he has acknlwledged exactly what Khrushchev's intention was in placing his missiles in Cuba to begin with.

Further distorting the record, he says that Khrushchev "recorded his reaction in his poignant personal letter to Kennedy on the Friday night of the second Cuba week." This may be a fair statement of one of the things Khrushchev said in his letter, but actually this letter was Khrushchev's dictation of hte terms of settlement. Far be it from Schlesinger to so concede. Nonetheless he acknowledges that "as for Kennedy, his feelings underwent a qualitative change after Cuba: a world in which nations threatened each other with nuclear weapons now seemed to him not just an irrational but an intolerable and an impossible world." Again this was KhrushchevZ's intention. Sp Schlesinger concedes that Cuba "thus made vivid the sense that all humanity had a commoninterest in the prevention of nuclear war..." (893)

2. Back to the Test Ban (893/9)

Comment: It is transparent that Schlesinger is about to "prove" that the limited test ban that was finally agreed upon was Kennedy's initiative. He begins this subsection, after acknowleding the American resumption of atmospheric testing in April 1962, by saying that, "both Kennedy and Macmillan continued to keep the idea of a test ban alive between themselves". He says, "The President was particularly interested in the possibilty of lowering the required quota of o annual on-site inspections from the existing figure of twenty." He does not indicate in going further and saying that "scientists worked to refine techniques of detection and identification. The discovery that Russian earthquakes were less frequent than we had supposed and occurred mostly in areas where testing would be extremely difficult ..." that there was practically no agreement upon the American basis for determining the number of inspections that would be "required". As this chapter wears on, it will become clear that first Schlesinger will never say what the US finally decided upon and second will have no proof that any inspections were really needed. The one thing that is abundantly clear is that he also does not acknowledge is that at no time were twenty really required. The purpose of 20 was undoubtedly to make the proposal unacceptable to the Russians. (893)

He indicates the probability that the American negotiators had to negotiate not only his Russian opposite number but his own govt:

p.894 But Arthur Dean, still our ambassador to the disarmament conference in Geneva and still eager to win his case, told reporters at the Geneva airport in July 1962 that it was now possible to make a substantial reduction in the requirement for on-site inspections. He did this without instructions or clearance; perhaps he intended to force the issue in

Washington. In any case, that was the entirely useful effect, and Kennedy quickly came down on Dean's side. (894)

Comment: Now the cat comes out of the bag: "The question of on-site inspections was political as well as technical. A test ban treaty required Senate ratification. To win the necessary two-thirds votes ..." as it will turn out, this necessity, real or imposed by Kennedy, resulted in a treaty that amounted to nothing but a fraud. Whether or not this was the administration's intent is a question history will have to answer. Schlesinger says that while the inspection issue "pertained to a comprehensive test ban" at the same time "the idea of a limited ban ... remained under consideration ..." He implies the world "cared primarily about explosions producing radioactive fallout." So he said that "at the end of July Kennedy consequently proposed to Macmillan the possibility of offering simulataneous treaties at Geneva: a comprehensive ban with much reduced on-site inspection - this Kennedy preferred because of iss greater effect on nuclear proliferation - with an atmospheric test ban as a reasonable second best." He says immediately that "The Russians, however, lost no time in turning both down at the end of August ~~xxxx~~ - the limited ban because it would allegedly legalize underground testing and thus 'raise the nuclear temperature', and the comprehensive ban because it called for inspection. They suggested instead o an immediate ban on atmospheric tests accompanied o by a moratorium on underground tests until a treaty could be worked out. But the west, remembering who had terminated the last moratorium, was not impressed." (894)

What an honest Schlesinger would have said was not that the Russians turned down both ideas, but that they turned down formulations. The Russians from the first had had the initiative, to the western embarrassment, in pushing for nuclear agreement.

And the business of the termination of the previous moratorium is a continuation of the unending Schlesinger effort to turn black into white. As the writings of both of the White House writers make clear, the administrtion/s first forced the Russian hand and second were prepared for the resumption of nuclear testing themselves, a very elaborate process requiring long preparation and in fact resumed their own testing within a week of the Soviet's resumption, delaying it only at the insistence of Macmillan. Neither Kennedy nor Schlesinger is holier than the Pope, as Schlesinger pretends for both.

Once again Schlesinger resorts to his new concept of "proof","no doubt". By use of the words, "no doubt" he proves that "Soviet mines were in the Caribbean at this point" from which he infers that "when the disarmament conference resumed a month after Cuba, one hoped that the mood might be changing."

Thus again he diverts attention from the real intent of the Soviet Union in precipitating the Cuba missile crisis.

p.894/5.... We were also completing our own series; and the President's sense of the meagerness of their results after the clamor about their necessity - all the tests seemed to have proved was the need for more tests - made him more determined than ever to bring the whole thing to an end. Conceivably/ Khrushchev might have similar feelings...

Note: This may overlap some of the preceding notes as the tape on which it was originally dictated was accidentally erased.

Comment: Thus the "inspection issue" was very important to a "comprehensive test ban" and here again Schlesinger begins filtering his fact and his history in recounting that Kennedy proposed to Macmillan the offering of 2 treaties at Geneva "a comprehensive ban with much reduced on-site inspection" and an "atmospheric test ban as a reasonable second best".

Having chosen not to trouble the reader with an evaluation of the previous US insistence upon a knowingly unnecessary 20 inspections within the Soviet Union, Schlesinger is at least consistent in not bothering the reader with what "much reduced on-site inspections" meant for the number the US proposed would certainly have required no more space in its stating than Schlesinger avoidance of the number. He does say of the Russians, however, that they "lost no time in turning both down at the end of August - the limited ban because it would allegedly legalize underground testing (and it should benoted that it is probably only habit that impelled Schlesinger to throw in the word "allegedly") and thus 'raise the nuclear temperature', the comprehensive ban because it called for inspection." Was it, in fact, because the comprehensive ban "calldd for inspection"? Or was it because of the number of inspections insisted upon by the US? Thus far, Schlesinger has not informed the reader of the entirely credible Russian position that the American insistence upon knowing the excessive annual inspections was a very poor "for espionage". The Russians never made any secret of their position - in fact, they rather loudly asserted it. This being the case, his representation here is nothing but deliberate falsehood.

The Russians, he said, offered "instead an immediate ban on atmospheric tests accompanied by a moratorium on underground tests until a treaty could be worked out." The rejection of this by "the west" given by Schlesinger is that they remembered "who had terminated the last moratorium".

One analyzing Schlesinger's book is in the unfortunate position of having to seem to argue every point; but unfortunately at every point Schlesinger is a mental crook. He has earlier discussed the ending of this moratorium in some detail and even though he is a dedicated propagandist to whom the other side is wrong if for no other reason only because it exists, he has nonetheless in this earlier discussion presented enough information for those minds not obsessed by his propaganda to lay a not inconsiderable basis for the other side to have considered it was being forced. But in any event, he was starkly frank in making clear the American preparations for its own testing had already been completely consummated and that within a week of the Russian testing it was also doing so, having delayed its commencement shortly at the behest of Macmillan. But here he must try and pretend the west had a reasonable basis for rejecting what would otherwise seem as reasonable Soviet proposal. And what he dare not say is that the west did not really want a ban on underground testing.

Nor does he see fit to recall how utterly astounded Sec State Rusk was upon being told by Sec MacNamara that there was no need for testing, as Schlesinger himself, hundreds of papger pages earlier, had informed the reader. Naturally, he found it

unnecessary to inform the reader that as of the time of the completion of his book the American testing had not stopped.

But all of this helps lay the foundation for what it is only too apparent he will now represent to be the meaning of what agreement was ultimately reached. (894)

Here Schlesinger introduces us to a new element of fact and logic, a new concept of proof. It is the use of the words "no doubt". The reader is like Moses on the mountain where all is in flames and a not unwilling Schlesinger is God delivering the commandments to us. God says it is true because "no doubt" and naturally we accept it. So "no doubt Soviet mines were in the Caribbean at this point" and on this basis Schlesinger develops his subsequent argument which, examined by minds less preoccupied than his with ulterior purposes, constitute the most devastating assault upon the entire American political, military and supposedly civilian attitude toward testing.

P.894/5.... We were also completing our own series; and the President's sense of the meagerness of their results after the clamor about their necessity - all the tests seemed to have proved was the need for more tests - made him more determined than ever to bring the whole thing to an end.° Conceivably Khrushchev might have similar feelings... (894)

Comment: °At this point Schlesinger has a footnote which reads, "He was also dissatisfied with the programs of underground testing, which had advanced nuclear technology little and had been by no means so fallout-proof as advertised. In the year after September 1961 there were seventeen cases of venting - that is, the discharge of radioactive debris, primarily iodine 131, into the atmosphere - at the Yucca Flats Proving Ground in Nevada."

Comment: Here we have an equally brilliant addition to the science of proof, "conceivably". Surrounding his grudging concession with his customary verbiage and cleverly concocted distractions to divert the reader's mind, Schlesinger concedes that the Pres's science advisers, Jerome Wiesner, "had suggested ... that, since

p.895

the American scientists had persuaded their government to go down on the number of inspections, perhaps the Soviet scientists could persuade their government to come up until agreement could be reached. Though Wiesner had been careful to mantion no figures, Federov evidently emerged with the impression that the Americans would accept three or four inspections. About the same time V. V. Kuzmetsov, the Soviet disarmament negotiator, acquired a similar impression from Dean in a talk in New York." (895)

Suddenly the great historian loses his tastes for the exact quotation which he has delighted in using, no only because it is a respected of method of both historical and literary presentation, but had the additional value of increasing his own importance. He gives the reader none of Jerome Wiesner's words and he carefully avoids quoting Dean's report of his talk with Kuznetsov. He has deliberately made the entire thing vague, cast doubt upon the Soviet interpretation of what happened because this he must do else he cannot do what he has set himself to the doing of. His text continues without interruption but with the consistent snide effort to undermine the reader's understanding of what actually happened:

p.895 When all this was reported to Moscow, Khrushchev, if one can believe the account he gave to Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review, told the Council of Ministers, "We can have an agreement with the United States to stop nuclear tests if we agree to three inspections. I know that three inspections are not necessary, and that the policing can be done adequately from outside our borders. But the American Congress has convinced itself that on-site inspection is necessary and the President cannot get a treaty through the Senate without it. Very well, then, let us accommodate the President." He added to Cousins: "Finally I persuaded them." (895)

Comment: One would think that at this point Schlesinger from his own position inside the White House and his function in the govt, if not indeed from the access to which he seems to have had without restriction to govt documents, would have in some manner informed the reader - especially because of his delight in portraying Khrushchev as, among other things, a liar - that a) Khrushchev was wrong in saying "three inspections are not necessary, and the policing can be done adequately from outside our borders". At the very least one might expect from Schlesinger an indication of what the US administration considered a minimum number of inspections it believed required for its own safety. Alas, Schlesinger gives neither, neither here nor in what follows, from which the reader may properly deduce that Khrushchev's statement was not in error.

Without interruption, Schlesinger follows with:

p.895/6 "It seems to me, Mr. President," Khrushchev wrote Kennedy on December 19, 1962, "that time has come now to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests, to draw a line through such ~~xxxx~~ tests." We believe, Khrushchev continued, that national means of detection are sufficient to police underground as well as atmospheric tests; but we understand ~~that~~ your need for "at least a minimum number" of inspections for the ratification of the treaty. "Well, if this is the only difficulty on the way to agreement, then for the noble and humane goal of ceasing nuclear weapons tests we are ready to meet you halfway." Citing the Kuznetsov-Dean conversations, Khrushchev proposed agreement on two to three annual inspections limited to earthquake areas. If this were accepted, "the world can be relieved of the roar of nuclear explosions."

Kennedy, who received the letter at Nassau, was ~~x~~hilarated: it looked as if the Russians were really interested in a modus vivendi. However, the inspection quota still presented difficulties.

Comment: If ever there was a beautiful opportunity for Schlesinger to present the scientific evidence that proved Khrushchev wrong, it is exactly at this point. Perhaps he might even show that the scientists or the Pres had even a reasonable ground for believing it in error. We get neither. What immediately follows reads:

p.896 Dean told the President that the only numbers he had mentioned in his talks with Kuznetsov were between eight and ten. Moreover, the Soviet figure of two or three represented not a real concession but a reversion to a position the Russians had taken in earlier stages of the negotiation and abandoned in November 1961.

Comment: Would it not be of value to the reader, less informed than the great Schlesinger, to know the nature of the "reversion"

and the alleged abandonment? Especially when it is introduced by "moreover". Could it possibly be that what the Russians were abandoning is their position already unmistakably revealed in the quotation from Krhushchev to Nroman Cousins that no inspection was necessary?

The quotation from Schlesinger's text will continue without omission, but it should be pointed out in advance that here for the first time and only by indirection does Schlesinger acknowledge the Russians believed or even just claimed the purpose of inspection was espionage:

p.896 In replying to Khrushchev, Kennedy remarked on the "misunderstanding" of Dean's statement, sought to reassure him that inspection could be hedged around to prevent espionage and pointed out the difficulties raised by the confinement of inspection to seismic areas. He concluded: ~~Kxxxxxx~~ "Notwithstanding these problems, I am encouraged by your letter." The next step, he suggested, might be technical discussions between representatives of the two governments. (896)

Comment: Of what nature were the "difficulties", Schlesinger's word if not the Pres's, for again he has seen fit to quote other language but not this directly? Were they of a political nature or of a scientific nature?

Schlesinger immediately goes into a discussion of the domestic American political situation at that point and it is proper that he do so. Why he does so may be of some interest. He cites the opposition of Gov Nelson Rockefeller, Sen Dirksen, Cong Craig Hosmer, Dr Edward Teller, Adm Lewis Strauss, "and other traditional foes of the ban". He enumerates others: Sen Thomas J. Dodd; the Joint Chiefs of Staff who "declared themselves opposed to a comprehensive ban under almost any terms and pronounced six annual inspections especially unacceptable." (896)

Schlesinger then concedes that "Wiesner and a number of scientists had arrived at the 'firm opinion . . . that the possibility of five inspections per year would have provided adequate security against clandestine nuclear testing'". Even McNamara "was ready in February to settle for six" but theproof that any were required or that even five were required is neither here nor alluded to, if in fact it ever existed.

p.897 .... As for the Russians, they not only declined to go above three but showed little curiosity about the way the inspections were to be conducted. In effect, we refused to discuss numbers until they discussed modalities, and they refused to discuss modalities until we accepted their numbers. The conclusion in the State Department and the Foreign Office was that the Kremlin, immobilized by its problems with China, could not conceivably join hands with the nation China hated most in permanently exclusing Dhina from the nuclear club.

Comment: Of course, the one thing that could not be considered was that the Soviets were sincere in their conviction that inspection was a euphemism for espionage. Schlesinger has not seen fit to so state in his by this time lengthy preparation for his allegation of another American "victory" which it may be safely assumed he is about to reveal. But is it not odd that he also fails to reveal how Khruschchev could in any way "permanently"

exclude China from the nuclesr club. This is especially true of the by this time public disagreement of a rather nasty nature between the Russians and the Chinese. Further, Schlesinger seeks to give exactly the opposite impression by the words which follow/ without omission:

p.897 The announcement of a Russo-Chinese ideological conference for Moscow in July convinced the experts that for the time being the ban was out of the questio n.

Comment; We find out that the NY negotiations failed only because Schlesinger says, "But, despite the failure of the New York negotiations and the pessimism of the professional diplomats, Kennedy and ~~Macmillan~~ Macmillan persisted in their pursuit of a treaty." He quotes the Pres's March statement of his obsession that "by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four and by 1975, fifteen or twenty. . . . I regard that as the greatest possible danger." Is it not a strange oversight by a man with such an established reputation in history and such consummate skill as a novelist to set forth the basis for, or at least the basis for his statement that, the NY negotiations "failed" especially when the Pres himself is quoted as saying he is "haunted" by the awful prospect.

During March and April, according to Schlesinger, the Pres and Prime Minister exchanged "drafts of a new approach to Khrushchev" but "the Soviet leader was not in a receptive mood."

pp.897/8 The Soviet leader was not in a receptive mood. When Norman Cousins saw him at his Black Sea retreat on April 12, Khrushchev complained that, after he had induced the Council of Ministers to accept three inspections on the guarantee that it would produce a treaty, the Americans had then insisted on eight: "So once again I was made to look foolish. But I can tell you this: it won't happen again. . . . We cannot make another offer. I cannot go back to the Council. It is now up to the United States. Frankly, we feel we were misled." (This last was a peculiar objection from the government which had denied it was sending nuclear missiles to Cuba). He went on: "When I go up to Moscow next week I expect to serve notice that we will not consider oursleves bound by three inspections. If you can go from three to eight, we can go from three to zero." (897-8)

Comment: Schlesinger cannot resist the temptation to slip his blade into Khrushchev's belly, even if he must be a liar to do so. The Soviet govt did not deny "it was sending nuclear missiles to Cuba"; it denied only that it was sending missiles to Cuba or anything else for "offensive purposes". This flippant attitude toward truth and fact, despite his exalted reputation, is characteristic of Schlesinger's regard for logic and reason. Few will be willing to believe it, but he has abandoned all the pther standards of reputable writing with the ease with which he has here deliberately and unmistakably lied for merely a snide and essentially immature purpose.

It is less important that in breaking up the references to the conference Khrushchev had with Norman Cousins, the earlier use of this quotation can be regarded as only an effort to make it seem as tho it had served at an earlier time than it actually did (this is on p.895). The date of the Khrushchev-

Cousins meeting was April 12, 1963. The context in which Schlesinger first used it is thoroly confused by its use at the point he used it which by implication is approximately the time of the Kuznetsov-Wiesner meeting, which is not given and the last time previously referred to is that of the Nov 1962 US elections. The time givenimmediately after the initial quotation from Cousins is Dec 19 1962. Such befuddlement is characteristic of neither historians nor Schlesinger and cannot be regarded as accidental.

Without credit to hisintegrity Shclesinger fn the quotation from the bottom of p.897 reveals the US was insisting upon a minimum of 8 inspections, whether or not as Khrushchev alleged without any contradiction that can be regarded with seriousness, was an upward revision of its offer to him of 3. 8 quite obviously is a very considerable reduction from the 20 inspections upon which the US had previously insisted and it would seem to make reasonably certain that the insistence upon 20 inspections was designed to prevent any agreement on the part of the Soviet union.

But what can be said of the new American insistence upon 8 when McNamara was ready "to settle for six" and Wiesner thought 5 sufficient? It could hardly be considered an offer in good faith and it must be considered as a further US effort to prevent agreement on a comprehensive ban which is exactly what it did.

Schlesinger has led the reader into a mental bypath with his parenthetical falsehood, but let us not be diverted and go back to the word that appears immediately before it, "misled" Khrushchev's allegation of what the US had done to him. Whether or not as he claimed the US had broken its word to him, in going upward from 3 to 8, is it at all fair to cast doubt upon the integrity of the US's position when it insisted upon 8 when 5 or at most 6 was more than adequate?

And how does the last quotation from Khrushchev's jibe with Schlesinger's portrayal of him as a thoroly cowed, defeated man because of his overwhelming humiliation as a consequence of the Cuba missile crisis? When he told Cousins, knowing full well it would be immediately reported to the US, "If you can go from three to eight, we can go from three to zero," he was being as positive, as unintimidated and as unafraid as anyone could expect of him short of invective.

Then we are immediately plunged into another cloud in the following paragraph which says that 4 days after the meeting with Cousins Khrushchev got an additional letter from the US, again not o quoted directly but paraphrased as noting "the WEst had already reduced its inspection quota from ~~[illegible]~~ twenty to seven." Not eight but seven. How much Schlesinger has found fit to omit one can only guess, but such a man as he is not as sloppy as this without some purpose and if one after 898 pages of his book is not willing to suspect any of his purposes, at least this one is highly suspect.

Again we have anything but an intimidated , cowed Khrushchev who, in Schlesinger's own words, replied/ "in early May" and "could hardly have been more declamatory and rude". From what Schlesinger says, he could have gone further and said that Khrushchev was openly ridiculing the Amer Pres in saying that "there was no point ... in going through all these arguments

again" for he had learned the US test-ban proposals as he had once learned nursery rhymes. He insisted that Soviet Union would continue to regard westem demands on inspection as designed for espionage purposes. Here Schlesinger reveals the earlier dishonesty of his own presentation of the alleged facts, his own distortion and editing of what had transpired in the various diplomatic exhhanges by quoting Khrushchev as saying (Schlesinger's words) "when he had consented to two or three inspections in December ...". The word "consented" is Schlesinger's, not Khrushchev's and certainly is not an exaggeration of what Khrushchev did for Schlesinger's entire thrust is to the contrary, and suddenly it is Deeember and not the April 12 date of the Cousins meeting. (One arguing as Schlesinger does but one seeking to evaluate the integrity of the American position in these negotiations, might at this point allude to the circumstances that impelled Harold Stassen to resign as Eisenhower's disarmament negotiator.) The rest of the quotation, paraphrased from Khrushchev in the same sentence, says Khrushchev had "consented" to but two or three inspections "not because he thought inspections necessary or sensible" but "because he wanted to help the President with his Senate" and "instead of a positive reply" Khrushchev charged"all he had had since was western haggling over the number of inspections and the conditions for conducting them."

It is not miming Schlesinger to refer back to the previous page at the top of which Schlesinger represents the Russians as refusing to discuss what he termed the "modalities", or exactly the same thing as what he here refers to as "theconditions" of the inspections and on p.898 he used the word "refused".

Schlesinger, who has seen fit to lie about what he parenthetically inserted the Russian Govt said it was sending to Cuba, here sees unfit to in any way dispute or even deprecate the Khrushchev letter which he does not quote but paraphrases. It Must therefore be accepted as a version that, at the very worst, is no more adverse to Schlesinger's argument than Schlesinger presents it .

He continues by saying Khrushchev could conclude only "that you were not serious" and that "you were ... going through
p.898 the motions for domesticpolitical reasons. If there were no real hope for agreement, the Soviet Union had no choice but to take measures to strengthen its own security. In a perfunctory final paragraph, Khrushchev, referring to the notion of sending senior representatives to Moscow, said, in effect, so be it; the Russians were even prepared to try this method of discussion." (p.898)

Comment: It might indeed have been revealing were we not restricted to Schlesinger's designation as merely "perfunctory" that "final paragraph" of Khrushchev's "referring to the notion" of a Moscow negotiation. It is hardly consistent to attribute the word "notion" to Khrushchev where he is talking of the "sending" of "senior representatives". One sends senior representatives only for themost serious diplomatic negotiations and Schlesinger's last words in this paragraph, his own paraphrasing, "the Russians were even prepared to try this method of discussion" can certainly beconsidered to be a deliberate effort to portray the Russians as entirely uninterested.

But if he portrays them in any other way, how can he sub-

sequently claim another great"victory" for Kennedy?

It is as tho beginning to tell us how Kennedy achieved this "victory" that Schlesinger represents him as feeling "that the test ban was slipping away". He attributes to the President the repeated words "I am not hopeful" on receipt of the Khrushchev letter, which was in early May. He futher quotes Kennedy as having said two weeks later,

p.899 "I have said from the beginning that (it) seemed to me that the pace of events was such in the world that unless we could get an agreement now, I would think the chance of getting it would be comparatively slight. We are therefore going to continue to push very hard in May and June and July in every forum to see if we can get an agreement." (899)

Comment: Schlesinger's representations, misrepresentations and paraphrasing of the Cuba missile crisis should lead one to question not only what he says, but the manner in which he says it. In concluding this subsection, which is so overfull of lies, distortions, omissions and an assortment of obfuscations. It reads:

p.899 Washington and London meanwhile brooded over the reply to Khrushchev's latest unpromising message. The first draft was a debater's screed, dealing seriatim with Khrushchev's points. But David Ormsby Gore, picking up Khrushchev's grudging final paragraph, suggested bypassing the debate and concentrating instead on the special emissaries. Macmillan strongly supported this view, and Kennedy readily agreed. Finally on May 30 a brief letter went to Khrushchev, touching lightly on a couple of the familiar arguments but centering on the proposal that American and British emissaries go to Moscow at the end of June or early in July. (899)

Comment: Were we able to take nothing else from this, we can be certain that Kennedy did not on his own initiative accept Khrushchev's invitation. Hence, from Schlesinger's own version, the subsequent agreement upon even a limited test-ban agreement can be credited only to either Khrushchev or the British.

It would seem that the language referring to "Khrushchev's grudging final paragraph" might be assessed as the language Schlesinger used in misrepresenting the exchanges of the Cuba missile crisis. His failure to use even a single direct word of quotation from this entire letter which is of such obvious importance would seem to strengthen such a conclusion. (899)

3. Appeal at American Univesity (899-902)

Comment: Adrian Fisher was able to persuade Sen Dodd to alter his critical attitude:

p.899 .... On May 27 he joined with Hubert Humphrey and thirtyptwo other Senators in introducing a resolution declaring it "the sense of the Senate" that the United States should again offer the Soviet Union a limited test ban; if the Russians rejected the plan, the United States should nevertheless "pursue it with vigor, seeking the widest possible international support," at the same time pledging no more tests in the

atmosphere or under water so long as the Soviet Union also abstained... (p.899)

Comment: According to Schlesinger, Kennedy feared this approach might undercut a comprehensive ban but Schlesinger says, "the effect of the Dodd-Humphrey Resolution was to strengthen the antitesting case." (p.899)

In late May McGeorge Bundy "told several of us that the President had decided the time had come for a major address on peace ... a fresh context was required to save the dying negotiation." They were enjoined to silence except for giving their thoughts to Ted Sorensen to whom the Pres "meanwhile outlined his own views". The speech was for the Amer Univ commencement June 10. The others in the group were Kaysen, Rostow, Tom Sorensen and Schlesinger.

p.900 .... Its central substantive proposal was a moratorium on atmospheric testing; but its effect was to redefine the whole national attitude toward the cold war. It was a brilliant and faithful reproduction of the President's views, and we read it with mounting admiration and excitement. (900)

Comment: This was on June 7, 1963, when the draft was ready.

Schlesinger's handling - mishandling would be more appropriate - of dates with respect to the Amer Univ speech and the subsequent negotiations for an in conclusion of a limited test-ban agreement cannot be accidental and must be deliberate. It begins in a minor way here where he says:

p.900 Then on Sautrday morning Khrushchev unexpectedly replied to the proposal about the special emissaries. His letter, ungracious and sulky, still doubted the sincerity of the Anglo-American effort and still complained about inspection. But he said at least that he would receive the emissaries; their success, he observed sullenly, depended on what they brought in their baggage to Moscow. For all the querulousness, he had agreed to let the negotiations begin. (900)

Comment: First the undated Sat morning was June 8. It was the day after Sorensen completed the draft of Kennedy's speech. Regardless of the characterization of the tone and contents of Khrushchev's letter and whether or not Schlesinger has faithfully and honestly represented either or both, Schlesinger says "he had agreed to let the negotiations begin". The import of this language is that he did not initiate the negotiations. Even for the kind of writing Schlesinger has done in this book this is sloppy and not accidentally obfuscated, without doubt for the purpose of obfuscation. But it would appear that the initiation of the negotiation was actually Khrushchev's in his letter of Dec 19, 1962 (p.895) where, in that brief excerpt that Schlesinger quotes - and we are not told what he does not quote - Khrushchev had said, "The time has now come to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests...."

But of course Schlesinger must steal credit for this for Kennedy.

In the course of this rhetoric and what will undoubtedly follow of similar tone, Schlesinger has acknowledged, carefully disguising its significance, what in fact was the "central substantive proposal", which was not the "moratorium" which Khrushchev had earlier proposed, but the redefining of "the whole

national attitude toward the cold war." Without this, there was no chance of any test limitation agreement of any kind (p.900)

Even those limited excerpts from this speech that Schlesinger gives us are important as an answer and as an assurance to Khrushchev; for example, Kennedy's definition as peace as not "a pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war", not the "peace of the grave".

There was the normal content required of every American politician, the jibes at the Soviet Union in one of which he said the Soviet leaders must adopt a more enlightened attitude. Schlesinger here says,

p.901 ...."I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it." He added, in a sentence capable of revolutionizing the whole American view of the cold war, "But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude - as individuals and as a Nation - for our attitude is as essential as theirs." (p.901)

Comment: This of course can properly be interpreted as the effort of a leader to lead his nation along his path. Without doubt, it is just that. But it is also one of those famous "signals" of Dean Rusk's to the Soviet Union. It is, I am satisfied, exactly what Khrushchev was looking for and what he sought in precipitating the Cuba missile crisis. Kennedy made his requirement for peace comprehsnsible to the average man and appealed to those with the strongest antipathy toward the Soviet Union, saying peace

p.901 "does not require that each man love his neighbor - it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance." History taught us, moreover, that enmities between states did not last forever; "the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations." (Quote from Kennedy) (901)

Comment: At this point in a footnote Schlesinger says Kennedy repeated this thought "more explicitly eighteen days later in his speech before the Irish Parliament."

There was further exhortation:

pp.901/2 ... that should warn us "not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats. No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue." Among many traits American and Russians had in common was an abhorrence of war. "No nation in the history of battle," he reminded his listeners, "ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War." If world war should come again, all both sides had built, "all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first twentyfour hours." Yet "we are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counterweapons."

In short, both countries had "a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. . . ." (Wuotes from Ken)

Comment: Continuing:

p.902 So we must re-examine our attitude toward the wold war, "remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment." Our purpose must be to conduct our affairs so that the Russians would see it in their own interest to move toward genuine peace; "we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard." To move toward peace would "require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves . . . increased contact and communication." In particular, it would require ~~xxxxxx~~ new progress toward general and complete disarmament. And in the area of disarmament one problem "where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is . .. a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests." The President then announced that discussions would soon begin in Moscow/"looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty" and that the United States would conduct no atmospheric tests so long as other states did not do so; "we will not be the first to resume." No treaty could provide "absolute security" against deception and evasion; but if it were sufficiently effective in its enforcement and sufficiently in the interests of its signers, it could "offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race." (902) (Quotes from Kennedy)

Comment: Here without doubt was the "signal" Khrushchev required. Because it was public, because it was so eloquent, it certainly must have moved and assured him. (902)

4. Mission to Moscow (902-9)0

Comment: Pres Franklin D. Roosevelt once said he would have to appoint an Ambassador from the Amer people to the State Dept. Schlesinger tells us of the need of the Pres for an ambassador to the State Dept. "It had first been supposed that John J. McCloy ... would be the American negotiator in Moscow". He was not available, so:

p.903 ....When Kaysen discussed Khrushchev's acceptance of the emissaries with Secretary Rusk, they had chatted for a moment about possible alternatives. Somewhat tentatively Rusk mentioned Averell Harriman. Kaysen immediately reported this to Kennedy, sending along word at the same time to the entourage that the President had better settle on Harriman before the Department had a chance to change its mind. As anticipated, State developed second thoughts in the next ~~xxxx~~ twenty-four hours. But by this time Kennedy had given world to go ahead with Averell.

Comment: Schlesinger here quotes "someone from the Soviet Embassy" as telling him the selection of Harriman was accepted as a sign of seriousness by the Soviet Union. Harriman, of course, is all to Schlesinger's liking. Of the situation, Schlesinger says, "The question whether we should try for a comprehensive or a limited ban was still unresolved." If there was a conflict, if it was necessary to try for one and not the other and if there were any reasons for this, Schlesinger is unrevealing. He has nothing further to say on the subject. Given the sin-

cerity of intentions that Schlesinger attributes to Pres Kennedy, it would seem that the obvious minimum necessity would have been a sincere effort for a comprehensive ban with settlement on a limited ban if the major objective were unattainable. Instead of going into this, he lets a cat out of the bag when he switches to the subject of inspections. It was necessary for Schlesinger to pretend a choice had to be made between limited and total prohibition of nuclear testing because the US wound not, under any circumstances, agree to a total abolition. Having shifted, he is forced to admit:

p.903 .... The British were in favor of reducing the inspection quota still further, arguing that, even on the unlikely chance that the Russians were disposed to tray a few clandestine tests underground, these tests could not possibly affect the balance of military power.

Comment: This lucid commensense by the British certainly was not shared in the US or was misrepresented because of the determination to continue nuclear testing under one pretext or another. (They were still going on in 1966). But this opinion of the British, who were at least as involved, more vulnerable and had at least as much to lose if not more than the US, points up the invalidity of the pretended Amer reason for the fact of and the manner in which all of the relations with the Russians about inspections were handled. Harriman likewise knew that "an inspection quota" was obtainable from the Russians and could be "acceptable to us" if as he put it he had "some goodies in his luggage". Schlesinger exact language that follows is important because of what it says so explicitly and straightforwardly and because he did not say it where it was apt, in his discussion of the Cuba missile crisis. Harriman, he said,

p.903 thus regretted the fact that we had unilaterally pulled o the Jupiters out of Turkey and Italy three months earlier; if only he had them to trade now! (not that the Russians had illusions about their military importance; but it would have given Khrushchev something to show his own people and the Chinese).

Comment: Here in parentheses is the complete admission that such missiles as wehad in Turkey and the Russians moved into Cuba had no military importance.

And we have here an indication of the origin of and the reason for the anonymous attack upon the something less than anonymous Adlai Stevenson?

The assumption that Khrushchev would agree to an unacceptable Amer demand if he had "something to show to his people and the Chinese" is not childishness for Schlesinger knows better; it is simple deception. Schlesinger certainly knew Khrushchev was not to be conned out of what to him was a basic and vital national interest by a few baubles. And as for the Chinese, this is a fiction for Khrushchev did not in any sense, as will certainly become clear, defer to the Chinese and their attitude toward the US and nuclear armament. Nor had he wanted to could he have succeeded in effecting any change in their policy which was then and continued to be quite inflexible. It did not change even when there was a clear threat of war with the US in the S Vietnam crisis several years later.

With regard to China, Kennedy's appraisal of the Soviet Union had undergone a radical transformation as had that of Schlesinger and at least by inference both regarded the Soviet Union as a potential ally against China. As Schlesinger puts it, "the problem of China was increasingly on the President's mind - indeed, on the minds of everyone except those in the Department of State who were still babbling about the 'Sino-Soviet bloc.'" (903)

("Babbling" or not, there was a major and influential part of the administration that did not undergo this change, and the phrase "Sino-Soviet bloc" still used or misused as one looks at it, became a subject of some extensive discussion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its Feb 1966 hearings on SE Asian situation. Some of the Senators, ~~xxxxxx~~ especially Sen Fulbright, the Chairman, made pointed reference to the lumping of both China and the Soviet Union together under this designation or that of "Communist" whereas history, events and circumstances would seem not to justify it.)

Next Schlesinger tells us that "by ~~1963~~ 1963 Kennedy and Macmillan were reaching the conclusion that China presented the long-term danger to the peace." Kennedy, he says, "tried to make this point to de Gaulle through Malraux" but he says, the French "were not interested" because "like the Chinese," they wanted "to prevent a Soviet-American detente". The change in Anglo-American attitude was so sharp that Schlesinger quotes Macmillan when he i and the Pres "were discussing the problem of a new ~~commander for NATO~~ commander for NATO" as saying "breezily, 'I suppose it should be a Russian'"!

This was "by 1963". What Schlesinger is impelled not to say is that in conceding by the beginning of the year 1963 there had been such a radical, such a total, about-face change in Anglo-Amer policies and attitudes toward the Soviet Union, something certainly must account for it. There is only one major event in the history of the world with which it can be related. And that event was 2 months or less only prior to this fundamental turnabout. That event was the Cuba missile crisis which did not end until well into Nov.

Here again is the real significance of the missile crisis and here again Schlesinger, like all of his colleagues then and still in govt and all of those outside or formerly inside who write about it, there is a remarkable reluctance to acknWoledge the obvious cause-effect relationship. In the end of Oct 1962 the US was ready for war with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was its and the world8s enemy. It was the worst of possible things. In Nov when the small Russian bombers had not been removed from Cuba, Kennedy was again rattling his atoms. But now "by 1963" suddenly it was China that threatened the peace of the world. And it was the Russians to whom Harriman wanted to carry "goodies in his luggage" and Schlesinger on behalf of himself and presumably of his colleagues who regretted Harriman was not able to give Khrushchev "something to show his own people and the Chinese."

The absoluteness of this reversal of opinion is further revealed in Schlesinger's following paragraph in a final meeting with Harriman and Kaysen before the mission left for Moscow:

p.904 Kennedy said that Harriman could go as far as he wished in exploring the

possibility of a Soviet-American understanding with regard to China. Averell responded that he would more than ever need something to sweeten the package. Kennedy mentioned possible concessions. The President added, "I have some cash in the bank in West Germany and am prepared to draw on it if you think I should."

Commment: Here the Cynicism, here the sinister character of American policy as portrayed by Schlesinger, is absolutely stark! It no longer a question of "something to sweeten the package" that is alone of the utmost significance, nor is it the rather unusual move ~~xxxxx~~ of the Pres in giving Harriman carte blanche in ~~xxx~~ negotiating a Soviet-Amer understanding about China, even tho it would seem impossible to exaggerate the importance of his delegation of responsibility by the Pres and the further reflection therein of his altered attitude toward the Soviets. This, however, would be much mpre interesting, even possibly of greater moment, if Schlesonger had seen fit to reveal the "possible concessions" Kennedy was prepared to make to achieve this, even tho his willingness to make concessions is, in itself, 2uite a startling thing. It is the concluding sentence of the paragraph, whether or not intended as humor (and there is no indication of anything less than the most serious meaning) "I have some cash in the bank in West Germany and am prepared to draw on it if you think I should".

What can this possibly mean - the cash, the willingness, to expend it, or both?

The "cash" that Kennedy had in W Germany was, of course, the W German govt, the W German ally, the Soviet attitude toward the W Germans which was of fear - they called the Bonn govt "revanchist" and their E German colleagues were persistently recalling the Nazi past of officials of even the greatest eminence in the W German govt. W Germany was in NATO. So the most apparent message Kennedy was giving Harriman is that he was willing to abandon W Germany and with it NATO for the sake of an aliance of some sort with the Soviet Union and against China.

What a reflection of the high principles, the exalted motives, of a osuccession of Amer govts and the keystone of ~~xxx~~ their successive foreign policies. What a reflection of the political and internatl morality of all of these administrations. And what a ; reflection of the integrity of all the people involved. obsessed

So/~~xxxxx~~/is Schlesinger at this point with the subject of China that he abandons all rationality in his commentary on Khrushchev's reception of the Amer U speech. Conceding politely to begin with, "one cannot know;" he immediately says what "seems probable" which is "that the address gave Khrushchev both personal reassurance and a weapon he could use against the Chinese." Of the personal reassurance there can be no doubt. It had been in diplomatic ways demanded by Khrushchev. And it had to be, as it was, offered by Kennedy. There is nothing either sinister or wrong in it. It was inevitable, it was a minimum necessity. And it lead to worthwhile things. Nothing that Schlesinger follows with in any way bears upon how the Amer U speech was something Khrushchev could "use against the Chinese". Yet Kennedy had just been quoted as leaving it entirely up to Harriman whether or not he filled in the blank check. But the subject of the Chinese is here abruptly abandoned without even a change in

paragraphing when Schlesinger switches to Harold Wilson's opinion of how he found Khrushchev after the speech: "deeply impressed and considerably more open-minded about the test ban". Then Schlesinger quotes Khrushchev's comment to Harriman about the speech: "the greatest speech by any American President since Roosevelt". Then he quotes from Khrushchev's o July 2 speech in Berlin where,

p.904 after describing it as "notable for its sober appraisal of the international situation," ge offered his answer - a limited ban, outlawing tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. "If the western powers now accept this proposal," he said, "the question of inspection no longer arises." He did not this time insist on a concurrent and unpoliced moratorium on underground tests; but he said that "on the conclusion of a test ban agreement" it would also be necessary "to take another big step toward easing international tension" - a non-aggression treaty between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact states. A test ban agreement, "combined with the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact," would create a "fresh international climate." (904)

Comment: (As we shall see, Khrushchev wanted to go much farther toward the easing of tensions and eliminating the threats to peace in the world than the Kennedy administration was prepared to go.) Two days later Khrushchev undertook to defend his position, saying, "'only madmen' could hope to destroy capitalism by nuclear war; 'a million workers would be destroyed for each capitalist.'" and "the nuclear bomb 'does not distinguish between imperialists and working people: It devastates entire areas.'" A Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow July 3 and meetings were held from the 5th to the 20th while,

p.905 on July 14 suggested how things were going. Citing Mao Tse-tung as prepared to sacrifice millions of lives in nuclear war, the Russians replied that they could not 'share the views of the Chinese leadership ...'"

comment: On July 15 the Anglo-Amer discussions began. Harriman's delegation included Carl Kaysen, Adrian Fisher, William Tyler and John McNaughton. At this point Schlesinger begins to mix the poison he will soon pour in the well:

p.905 Macmillan had originally wanted David Ormsby Gore to head the British delegation, but the Ambassador felt that, from the Prime Minister's own viewpoint, it would be better to have someone of cabinet rank who could not be considered an American stooge. The choice fell on Quintin Hogg, then Lord Hailsham, Minister of Science and an accomplished if impetuous lawyer. (Macmillan later confided to newspapermen that he had sent Hailsham because he thought he might amuse Khrushchev.) Hailsham, relying on the British amateurtradition, was ill prepared on the technicalities of the problem and was consumed by a desire to get a treaty at almost any cost. (905)

Comment: In two pages he will throw the poison in the well.
At the first meeting, speaking of the comprehensive test ban, Khrushchev

p.906 said the Russians still considered inspection to be espionage; they did not think you could let the cat in the kitchen only to hunt the

mice and not to drink the milk. Since the British and Americans disagreed, there was no point in wasting time in further argument. With the comprehensive ban thus dismissed, the limited ban was left on the table. Khrushchev now said nothing about his earlier idea of a concurrent moratorium on underground testing, but he did bring up the non-aggression pact he had mentioned in East Berlin. (906)

Comment: This was not to the American liking. Harriman had either instructions against it or knew the administration would not approve it so:

p.906 Harriman quickly replied that the test ban treaty was something the three nations could complete in a few days in Moscow. The non-aggression pact would require extensive consultation with allies, and it might hold up the test ban for a long time. Moreover, he did not see how o such a pact would be possible without assurance that interference with access to West Berlin would be considered aggression - a proposition which obviously irritated the Soviet leader. Assuming that the Americans were opposed because of Bonn's hostility to the idea, Khrushchev observed sarcastically, "You conquered the Germans, and now you are afraid of them." Harriman did assure Khrushchev, however, in accordance with his instructions from Washington, that the United States would consult with its allies in good faith about the possibility of a non-aggression pact. (906)

Comment: And of course, this never came to pass. And now Schlesinger pretends that Khruschev was opposed to "the idea of a non-proliferation treaty, forbidding the transfer of nuclear weapons from one country to another." This is some of the snide paraphrasing where first Schlesinger mind plays tricks with his hand and then his hand manipulates his pen, for the Soviets not only were anxious to have a non-proliferation agreement, but they had consistently refused to agree to any containing what they regarded as loopholes, or any even the most indirect relationship of such govts as that in Bonn with any nuclear controls, no matter how indirect.

Again, Schlesinger becomes exceedingly vague, so vague he does not even say which side composed the draft of the treaty being considered. He begins by saying, "The opening talk cleared away a certain number of issues. Then the hard negotiation began." One would think, from what Shclesinger has already quoted of Khrushchev at the opening meeting, everything but a few minor details had been settled from the start. But Schlesinger tells us Gromyko and Harriman "began a close analysis of the treaty draft", apparently a Russian draft. Naturally, of course, since it is Schlesinger's pretense that this was a Kennedy initiative and a Kennedy victory, he cannot, without openly destroying himself, acknowledge that the initiative was that of the Russians and the draft was that of the Russians - neither of Kennedy's. Can one imagine Schlesinger admitting that Kennedy sent a draft of a treaty with "foggy language in the preamble seeming to ban the use of nuclear weapons even in self-defense", which is what immediately follows in Schlesinger's text? Anyway, we hear nothing further from Schlesinger about "self-defense" even tho it is the first of "several issues" that "gave special trouble". "Special" indeed! The wording was "cleared up" and that was it.

Now he tells us of a "second problem ... the withdrawal clause". Khrushchev held (Schlesinger's words) "that a nation always retained the sovereign right to withdraw from a treaty which no longer served its interest; to include an explicit withdrawal clause in this treaty would therefore imply a diminution of that right in other treaties."

Next Schlesinger tells us, "Harriman knew that the Senate, faced with the probability that China would refuse to sign and then might become a nuclear power on its own, would insist on such a clause." But China did not sign the treaty, and it did become a nuclear power, and the US did not withdraw from the treaty. But Harriman "flatly told Gromyko that, without a withdrawal clause, there could be no treaty. The result was the curious compromise phraseology in Article IV: 'Eact Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.'" So there seems to have been really no major problem involved in the second problem.

The third one "was that of accession to the treaty", so that "states not recognized by other states" could sign "without thereby receiving implicit recognition." The US, of course, did not want to officially admit the existence of E Germany and China. And over this there apparently were "discussions" that "proved long and difficult" in Schlesinger's words, but which, because of their character, seriously alarmed the British delegation. Schlesinger has nothing but praise for Harriman who was willing to endanger the entire treaty in pursuit of this essentially meaningless point, calling him "correct, forceful, his restraint masking a capacity for toughness and even anger. ... He would not give ground; and, as the talks dragged on, Hailsham became increasingly restive and unhappy. Soon he was complaining to London that Harriman's rigidity might lose the whole treaty. His reports disturbed Macmillan, who finally instructed Ormsby Gore to call on the President and register official British anxiety."

Now o the water, at least for Hailsham if not for the British, is poisoned. Again Schlesinger has made intellectually dishonest use of his book, carried as it would be on the back of the dead Pres, as a vehicle for the venting of his personal spleen. What is the essence of his ridicule of Hailsham? That he was wrong? That the treaty was, in fact, not in danger? No such thing. It was only that Harriman got away with it! And Harriman, in Schlesinger's delineation of his character, is something less than modest: "'I am always right when I know (emphasis in original) I am right,' he said on his return ..." (907)

Ormsby Gore got to the White House just as the Pres placed a call to Kaysen in Moscow to learn "the Russians had accepted a revision of the preamble eliminating the language which we had disliked", and there had been "worked out an ingenious system of multiple depositaries, leaving every signatory free to sign only in association with nations of which it approved." This is the triviality over which Harriman was willing to jeopardize the entire agreement. Schlesinger cannot totally ignore the innate silliness of the US position. So instead he deprecates it, using his own unique kind of color words and distortions: "(This idea offended the purists of interna-