Sorensen's version is that in Khrushchev's letter "Kennedy's terms were being accepted" (716).

Abel did not so chortle for he had (A-180) seen fit to give the essence of Khrushchev's proposal of the 26th in 2 sentences:

... Khrushchev then proposed that the President of the United States give assurance that he would not attack Cuba, nor allow others to attack, while withdrawing the fleet from the approaches to Cuba. If that were to happen, the situation would be transformed overnight.

Comment: Some of this letter Abel quotes verbatim. This part he does not and the reader may draw his own conclusions as to why.

Neither Schlesinger nor Sorensen saw fit to quote what Abel (A-204) described as "a quick acceptance statement" which the Pres drafted "in a mood of unaccustomed exhilaration" immediately "released to the White House reporters and beamed to Moscow over the Voice of America". It began, "I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision", etc., and concluded with the hope that the arms race could now end, reducing world tensions and indicated a further acceptance of Khrushchev's demand to withdraw the missiles from Turkey (which Congress and the Pres had earlier decided should be done in any event) with this sentence, immediately following upon the language about "ending the arms race and reducing world tensions": "This applies to the military confrontation between the Warsaw Pacg and NATO countries as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where tensions lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons of war."

Now Schlesinger suddenly finds time to mention the "errant U-2 which had strayed over Russia" ("deep into" is Sorensen's version). He quotes the "warning" from Khrushchev "that 'an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step."' And then he quotes this significant sentence,

p.830 "We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension."

Comment: In his several pages of idolatry (substitution for the text of the crucially important letters, if historians are to find legitimate use in his book), Sorensen says (716-8) that "Bundy and Kaysen" had told Kennedy "now that he looked 'ten feet tall' ..." also that Kennedy "laid down the line we were to follow - no boasting, no gloating, not even a claim of victory." The "line" ended with his burial.

In the midst of this, tho, Sorensen does find space for Kennedy's instructions "that precautions be taken to prevent Cuban exile units from upsetting the agreement through one of their publicity-seekkng raids." (717)

Neither of the former advisers to the former Pres saw fit to quote the "more formal reply to Khrushchev's Sunday morning letter" that Abel (A-207) says the Pres drafted later that afternoon (Schlesinger doesn't refer to it at all and Sorensen, as might be expected, misrepresents and distorts it, quoting only 2 words and them out of context). Sorensen said (718) that this was "a conciliatory reply to the Chairman's

'firm undertakings'" but the Pres actually said (A-207) that he regarded the exchange had "firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out ..."

And he reflects an additional content to Khrushchev's letter that has been totally ignored in all of this in the following language: "I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas."

Naturally, Schlesinger's reqriting of the history he himself helped write contains none of this. His subsection concludes with a hair-raising account of what would have happened "if word had not come that Sunday, if work had continued on the bases", because he says, "the United States would have had no real choice but to take action". The whole thing "might have driven the hapless world to the ghastly consummation." But naturally, God had taken care of everything for "The President saw more penetratingly into the mists and terrors of the future than anyone else." B

But the last two sentences in Schlesinger's hoked-up version that, even at the time he wrote othem, had a significance Schlesinger may not have understood:

p.830 When Kennedy received Khrushchev's reply that golden October morning, he showed profound relief. Later he said, "This is the night xxxx to go to the theater, like Abraham Lincoln."

Comment: By their carefully distorted misrepresentation of history that is not even honest fiction, the late President's so-called friends earned themselves unenviable niches in the role of historians: Schlesinger, as the William Randolph Hearst of his calling and Sorensen, as the most Philadelphian of lawyers.

3. The Election (pp.830-3)

Comment: Schlesinger opens this subsection with the further exposition of self-righteousness, much of which is in the President's word, some in the form of a post-mortem, and included advice neither Schlesinger nor Sorensen took in their books, "The next morning he told me he was afraid that people would conclude from this experience that all we had to do in dealing with the Russians was to be tough and they would collapse." This is exactly the burden of both books.

In the context of the campaign, the Pres feared some Republicans would attack the settlement "... on the ground that we had a chance to get rid of Castro and, instead of doing so, ended up guaranteeing him against invasion." The Pres asked McNamara for an estimate of casualties had there been an invasion. Schlesinger places the figure at 40-50,000 in the Americans alone. But the Pres knew something that neither Schlesinger nor Sorensen has been willing to admit: "...an invasion would have been a mistake - a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky for us that we have McNamara over there." (p.831)

The Pres "was well satisfied oby the perfom ance of his

government," Schlesinger says.

p.832 The Executive Committee had proved a brilliant instrument of consideration and coordination. He was particularly proud of his brother, always balanced, never rattled, his eye fixed on the ultimate as well as on the immediate. McNamara, as usual, had been superb. Llewellyn Thompson had provided wise counsel; Edwin Martin had managed the Latin American side with tact and efficiency. If the President was disappointed in others, he was not, I think, especially surprised.

Comment: Is it perhaps modesty that suggested to Abou Ben Adhem that his name and Sorensen's be omitted? And Sorensen is even more modest. He does not so quote the former Chief Executive.
Schlesinger bestows his own benediction, wholesale: "As a whole, the government could hardly have performed better." In domestic politics, Schlesinger can talk out of his mouth from both sides just as well as he can in international affairs. "The crisis had for a moment suspended the political campaign," he says, parenthetically making a crack at "the non-political Eisenhower" who kept on speaking while the Pres and Vice Pres and ex-Pres Truman had canceled their appearances (p.832). Then he immediately concedes the crisis itself was a political asset, saying, "... foreign crisis usually strengthens the administration in office". And he documents the case:

p.833 ... And across the country the Democrats, surpassing any administration in a mid-term election since 1934, gained four seats (among them George McGovern) in the Senate and lost a net of only two in the House. The outcome left the internal composition of the Congress little changed, but, in light of the ɸlosses usually suffered by incumbent administrations in mid-term elections, the President's personal mandate was triumphantly refreshed...

4. Loose Ends (pp.833-5)

Comment: Here Schlesinger's curious prose, pointed with odd homonyms and characterized by his flippant disregard for fact and misrepresentation of events, undertakes singlehandedly to undo the agreement that settled the crisis. Referring briefly to Castro's umbrage because Khrushchev has not consulted him and slinking closer to his normal attitude towards facts not to his liking, he alludes to "the IL-28 bombers which (Castro) now claimed as Cuban property" (and saying at the same time Castro "was doing all he could to upset the Soviet-American settlement" Schlesinger concludes:

p.833 Castro's resistance, however, made it impossible to establish the UN inspection Khrushchev had proposed, and the United States therefore never completed the reciprocal pledge not to invade Cuba. ...

Comment: Rally round the roar (?) flag, boys!
Except to Schlesinger, it is an undisputed fact that the Russians did give the antiquated and short-range bombers -

Schlesinger has not seen fit to mention their limitations - to the Cubans. Of these bombers Sorensen says (p.720), "They were too limited in range to pose much of a threat to the United States." They were, in fact, so insignificant that, again quoting Sorensen, "some of Kennedy's advisers also suggested that he let the matter drop". The Pres, while "wondering at times whether his stand was right" insisted on the removal of the bombers, probably because it made more trouble for Khrushchev. Still, in Sorensen, "on November 19 he prepared letters to Macmillan, Adenauer and de Gaulle, warning them that the crisis was about to heat up again, and that air strikes and extensions of the blockade were being considered." (S-720)

Sorensen, like Schlesinger, is a true son of the cold war. Just as Kennedy was about to talk tough about this at a press conference, he says, on November 20, "a new letter from Khrushchev arrived. The IL-28's would be withdrawn ..."

Those who recall these dangerous days may remember Anastas Mikoyan spent a long time in Cuba, "for days on end" in Abel's words (A-21½) being ignored by Castro. And this was one of the toughest negotiations the famed Russian persuader ever undertook. Abel's account of the removal of the IL-28's (beginning on p.209) begins with a Nov 20 telephone call to Robt Kennedy on his 37th birthday from the Russian ambassador, who said, "I have a birthday present for you". It was Khrushchev's announcement of the removal of the Il-28's.

Unlike Schlesinger, Abel got from his govt sources a different interpretation of the viability of the agreement. He says that upon receiving the message from Dobrynin "a new bargain was struck: the President, Robert Kennedy assured Dobrynin, would issue his no-invasion pledge within thirty days if the bombers started moving out." (A-210).

Of the bombers, Abel says (A½212) "the stikking point for Khrushchev was the Ilyushin bombers. These had been a gift. They were now Cuban property and Castro would not hear of surrendering them." So intent were the Soviets upon persuading Castro to keep the agreement they had made without consulting him that Mikoyan stayed in Havana rather than returning to Moscow for the funeral of his wife who had died in his absence. (P.833). And in January of the next year, the US and Russia joined in "formally" removing the Cuban missile question from the Security Council. And, "

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p.834 ...For its part, the United States, without formal commitment, refrained from invasion and, indeed, took measures in the spring of 1963 to prevent hit-and-run attacks by Cuban refugees from United States territory.

Comment: Further, forgetting his earlier lawdom(?) and inspiration about Russians depending upon hurricans to hide their activities from the U-2s, when it serves his purpose in attacking Sen Keating, who was denouncing the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, Schlesinger says, "from the viewpoint of the United States aerial reconnaissance, it was plainly better to have the SAM sites manned by Russians, politely oblivious of our overflights, than by Fidelistas." (p.834)

5. The Attack on Stevenson (pp.835-8)

Comment: The Pres knew about the forthcoming Charles Bartlett-Stewart Alsop attack on Stevenson in the Sat Eve Post accusing him of ~~advocating~~ advocating a Caribbean Munich. He asked Schlesinger to apprise Stevenson in advance and to assure him the Pres had nothing to do with it. (P.835)

Yet, knowing the attack was false, Schlesinger describes Alsop and Bartlett as "intelligent and responsible reporters" and Bartlett "had been for many years a personal intimate of the President."

It turned out that the article, released in advance as part of the Post's publicity, not only misrepresented Stevenson's position, but ~~it~~ quoted from what was described as an "unadmiring official".

Schlesinger was an early supporter and admirer of Stevenson's, presumably a friend. His defense of Stevenson here is an odd one for a historian - if, indeed, a defense it is or a defense it was intended - is based upon an allegation "Stevenson had supported the Executive Committee consensus." It did not suit Schlesinger to point out that Stevenson alone of the ExCom had ~~accurately~~ accurately forecast in his proposal "the final form" of the agreement to settle the crisis and those things the United States was forced to subsequently do unilaterally. Not that he didn't know about them, because he discussed them on p.810. And of Stevenson's recommendations, the one that has not yet come to pass, (perhaps history will record whether or not the US would have been better off had it) was his suggestion of the giving up of the Guantanamo base which, as Abel describes ~~it~~ his attitude (A-95) "in any event, was of little value". (It was of little value <u>for</u> the US; it was of great value <u>against</u> Cuba.)

Sorensen, describing views similar to those of Stevenson, attributes them to no one by name. But on Stevenson's suggestion of removing the missiles from Turkey, which the US in any event did by itself later, Sorensen says that "even the synopsis prepared by the air strike 'hardliners' earlier in the week had included ... a pledge that the United States was prepared to promptly withdraw all nuclear forces based in Turkey, including aircraft as well as missiles." And he here (p.696) alludes to the Congressional Atomic Energy Joint Committee having recommended this "a year earlier". Further, he quotes "an adviser who had served in the previous administration" as saying "that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy were obsolescent and of little military value, practically forced on those countries by the previous administration." This would seem to be a reference to Douglas Dillon. Sorensen further says the Pres "admired" the way this unnamed person adhered to his position and defended it vigorously. The reference clearly is to Stevenson.

Schlesinger's "defense" of Stevenson concludes:

p.836 <u>.... On the other hand, his advocacy on Friday and Saturday of a political program, unmentioned in the Bartlett-Alsop piece, had seemed to some out of cadence with the general endorsement of the quarantine, and his persistence in contending for negotiation, even in the framework of the quarantine, had caused worry over the weekend that he might want to make premature concessions.</u>

Comment: It might seem that since, at Stevenson's request and with the Pres's approval, Schlesinger had helped - perhaps had even prepared the first draft - of Stevenson's speech at the UN and was present, his "defense" might have alluded to Stevenson's resolution, including the essence of the final settlement.

But then, friendship has many forms. (p.836)

But in the account Schlesinger then gives, little or nothing was offset ~~km~~ the impression the Pres wanted to dump Stevenson. Salinger's ; statement on behalf of the Pres, expressing the Pres's "full confidence", in the UN ambassador and "saying, in effect, that nothing which took place in the Executive Committee would be disclosed", satisfied no one and increased speculation the Pres indeed was behind the Bartlett part of the story.

Schlesinger (and presumably others) spoke to the Pres who reiterated his denial of desire to rid himself of Stevenson but did nothing about it. When Schlesinger that night told Stevenson of the Pres's belief ("I would regard his resignation as a disaster"), Stevenson replied, "That's fine, but will he say it publicly?"

The answer is the Pres would not until he was forced to, even following the next morning's headline in NY's Daily News, "Adlai on Skids Over Pacifist Stand in Cuba", the most the Pres could be persuaded to do was to write a personal letter to Stevenson. This did not reduce the clamor and regularly Harlan Cleveland reported from the UN, in Schlesinger's words, "public action by the President was essential to restore not only Stevenson's morale but his effectiveness ..." (p.837)

Kennedy thereupon redrafted the letter he had sent to Stevenson and released it to the press.

But the Pres was wrong, was he not, in saying "that nothing which took place in the Executive Committee would be disclosed"?

6. Aftermath (p.838-41)

Comment: This subsection deals with the retrieving of the Bay of Pigs captives. The first paragraph is a streamlined version of the abortive "Tractors for Freedom Committee". Their trials began in March 1962. Robt Kennedy became interested and recommended to the Cuban refugee groups that they hire James B Donovan, the NY lawyer, former OSS gen counsel. Donovan saw Castro and persuaded him to accept food and drugs in return for the prisoners released. Negotiations "dragged on into October and into the missile crisis". After the missile crisis, Robt Kennedy took "personal command" and mobilized public and private sources, including much of the drug industry. On Dec 21 an agreement was reached. The Pres went to Florida to greet them (p.839)

Actually, Schlesinger tells practically none of this story, preferring instead further rhetoric praising the Pres. For example, the reader has no idea that something other than unlimited patriotism impelled the cooperation of the drug companies - something such as tremendous tax windfalls.

The story of Pres Dick Daring switches to a meeting with

Chancellor Adenauer where,

p.840/1 ... two weeks afterward, Kennedy spoke of "an important turning point, possibly, in the history of the relations between East and West." He meant, as he later explained, that this was the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union had ever directly challenged each other with nuclear weapons as the issue; and in his sense of "a climactic period" he associated the missile crisis with the growing conflict between China and Russia and the Chinese attack on India. All this, he said, was "bound to have its effects, even though they can't be fully perceived now."

He did not exaggerate the significance of the Cuban victory in itself. He recognized that he had enjoyed advantages in this specific contest - because Cuba did not lie within the reach of Soviet conventional power or within the scope of Soviet vitalinterests, and because the Russians knew they could not sustain this particular course of deceit and irresponsibility before the world.".

Comment: And the concluding paragraph of this chapter reads:

p.841 It was this combination of toughness and restraint, of will, nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated, that dazzled the world. Before the missile crisis people might have feared that we would use our power extravagantly or not use it at all. But the thirteen days gave the world - even the Soviet Union - a sense of American determination and responsibility in the use of power which, if sustained, might indeed become a turning point in the history of the relations between east and west.

Comment: Schlesinger is so lost in his glorification that the import of his own words is lost upon him: "Cuba did not lie within the reach of Soviet conventional power" or "within the scope of Soviet vitalinterests ..." Should not one - just one - of the ExCom have wondered why the Soviet Union would undertake such a venture not "within the reach of Soviet conventional power"?

And how could any analyst or historian say Cuba was not "within the scope of Soviet vital interests" when a) the Soviet Union had a solemn commitment to defend it against attack and b) there is no part of the entire surface of the world, except perhaps "behind the Iron Curtain", that the United States under Kennedy had not found "within the scope" of its own "vital interests"?

History may write a different conclusion to its chapter on this, the grreatest crisis till then, in thelong course of civilization. If the Pres ruled there would be no gloating, no claims of victory, no exultation, his closest advisers were entirely unwilling to follow his counsel and blatantly exalted his greatness and eminence, thus laying claim for themselves. The Pres was the wiser man.

A 1000 DAYS Chapter XXXII - THE NOT SO GRAND DESIGN (pp.842-65)

Comment: "... the most decisive victory of west over east" begins this chapter as it concluded and peremated its predecessors. But here Schlesinger begins with a "defeat", the "two sharp and elegant strokes" with which Gen de Gaulle "knocked out the economic and military pillars of Atlantic unity".

These were De Gaulle's press conference statements on ~~July~~ Jan 14, 1963, that British admission to the Common Market would make it "appear as a colossal Atlantic community under American domination and direction" and that what Schlesinger calls "a coordinated western nuclear policy" was not for France which "intends to have her own national defense . . . integration is something which is not imaginable". Under the "present circumstances". Anticipating American displeasure, de Gaulle said, "monopoly appears to him who enjoys it as the best possible system".

If Schlesinger saw any connection between American conduct in the Cuban missile crisis and de Gaulle's "not so grand design" he does not so indicate (P.842)

1. The Metamorphosis of Western Europe (pp.843-4)

Comment: Had it not been for the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Schlesinger says, the condition of Europe at the beginning of 1963 would have been entirely different. He traces the early history of the European economic community saying that Jean Monnet "began a step-by-step realization of his vision" of unification of Europe "with quiet American collaboration" (p.843).

Western Europe, growing twice as fast as America for a decade, by 1960 had largely lost its economic dependence on the US. There is this meaningfulsentence to which I add emphasis: "If the prospect of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe had ever been real, few Europeans believed in it any longer," which is an odd concession from Schlesinger because American policy, expecially Kennedy's policy, was based upon the certainty of an aggressive Soviet Union which, without American containment, would overrun the world. Schlesinger further concedes that "the Soviet nuclear achievement", for the first time a threat to the US itself, "had devaluated American deterrent in European eyes... meant that the conditions which had given rise to the Marshall Plan and NATO were substantially gone. The new Europe would not be content to remain an economic or military satellite of America. ..."

"Those concerned" with this "were thinking more and more in terms of" what amounts to greater American involvement in Europe. Again, it did not occur toSchlesinger that precisely this added to a demonstrated American willingness to commit its allies without consulting them so clearly demonstrated in the Cuban missile crisis may have been exactly de Gaulle's motivation. (p.844)

2. Partnership (pp.844-8)

Comment: George Ball, who for many years had been Monnet's associate, had in Washington begun "to formulate the revisions of trade policy required to prepare the American economy to live with a unified Western Europe." He soon became Undersec of State for Economic Affairs. He soon secured the ratification of a convention establishing the "Organization for Economic Coopetation and Development" or OECD, which Kennedy said would become "one of the principal institutions through which we pursue the great aim of co nsolidating the Atlantic community."

Next in April 1961 Macmillan in Washington told the Pres Britain was resolved "to apply for membership in the Common Market", an "extraordinary decision" which represented "the reversal of a thousand years of English history". Britain sought thereby economic and political aims, including "a new role of leadership in Europe", again exactly what de Gaulle didn't want. Economicaly, the Common Market was costly to the US but British leadership "was more attractive" in Schlesinger's words (p.845)

In June 1961 Kennedy raised British membership with de Gaulle and was politely rebuffed. (p.846)

The program worked out by Ball, Robert Schaetzel in State and Howard Peterson, special White House trade adviser, "became the major legislative issue of 1962." (p.847)

With the campaign organized behind it, the bill eventually passed "rather easily" with a large Senate majority. It was called the "Trade Expanxion Act" (p.848).

3, Inderdependence (pp.848-51)

Comment: There was a "discrepancy" that according to Schlesinger "was not always clearly recognized". It had to do with strategy. McNamara "laid down the strategic position" at the Athens NATO ministerial meeting in the spring of 1962 and then repeated it publicly at Ann Arbor in June where he said there must not be "competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war." His argument is that a unified deterrent was "imperative" (p.848) and he argued that what he called "relatively weak national nuclear forces" were perilous because, as Schlesinger pharased it, "they might invite preemptive first strikes". Stripped of the suger coating, this was a call for universal western dependence upon the US and criticism pf France and French policy. Inherently, of course, England, too.

The response, in Schlesinger's words, was "wails from London".

In his effort at justification, Schlesinger reveals, without so intending, that the Pres had neither hope nor design for any effective disarmament and certainly not nuclear disarmament in saying that

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p.849 and the President had privately urged on Macmillan in February 1962 that a British effort to maintain its deterrent through the sixties might both confirm de Gaulle in his own course and hasten the day when the

Germans would demand nuclear weapons for themselves.

Comment: Here the Pres anticipated a minimum of an 8-year continuation of nuclear proliferation, the expansion of nuclear resources and capacities, and no effort to forestall this. But it was an inevitable consequence of American policy, especially the policy the Pres enunciated to Khrushchev at Vienna, a policy "containment" which depended entirely upon nuclear threat.

Then Schlesinger makes clear that all the fancy words like "interdependence" were sheer propaganda ?"because what McNamara meant at bottom was precisely the ~~underlying~~ dependence of western security on a nuclear deterrent under American control". (emphasis in original).

Again precisely what de Gaulle would not accept (p.849)/

There was a "search for devices" to kid NATO ?into a "greater sense of participating in nuclear decisions".

There follows such schemes as Defense Sec Thomas Gates' 1959 idea of "selling Polaris missiles to interested allies on condition that they be assigned to NATO" and NATO's Supreme Commander Gen Lauris Norstad's proposal that "NATO itself become a fourth nuclear power, with its own nuclear force".

There is no suggestion here that such shhemes might have any effect upon Soviet thinking or the apprehensions of the Soviet Union and other countries. They are, of course, a clear reflection of the total American policy opposition to any reasonable concept of disarmament.

The West German govt, liked Norstad's idea (p.850). Thus came the "mixed-manned" seaborne force idea and in Dec 1960 the Eisenhower administration "laid before the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris the possibility of giving NATO five ballistic missile submarines with eighty Polaris missiles before 1963 if (emphasis in original) a system of multi-lateral control could be devised." This was supposed to "discourage proliferation", a position to which the US govt has since adhered and which the Soviet govt has consistently disputed. (851).

4. Flexible Response vs. Nuclear Centralization (pp.851-6)

Comment: Kennedy immediately continued the same policy. In Ottawa in May 1961 he publicly announced a willingness to commit more than 5 NATO "Polaris atomic missile submarines" and in addition, a "NATO seaborne force".

There was, however, a difference between the Eisenhower administration and Kennedy concepts:

pp.851/2 ... The Eisenhower multilateral force had been within the context of massive retaliation, empty as that doctrine had become by 1960. But the Kennedy proposal was within the context ofothe novel and unfamiliar doctrine of flexible response. This new doctrine made the strengthening of the conventional forces of the Alliance, as Kennedy said at Ottawa, the "matter of the highest priority" if, in McNamara's phrase, western strategy was going to multiply its options. The whole conception of graduated deterrence, however, emerged from a careful and exacting process of strategic analysis in the United States to which Europe,

deprived of the tutelage of the new caste of military intellectuals, had not yet been exposed. The incoming administration, assuming that the Europeans were more sophisticated in matters of nuclear strategy than they were, and in any case neglecting to consult them in a systematic way, now presented them with the new strategy as a fait accompli.

Comment: Again the contempt for Europeans inherent in the US' assumption of European dependence upon the US - again, what De Gaulle said, and of course the lack of consideration, delicacy or subtlety on the part of the new "military intellectuals" of the administration, a deprivation Europe was perhaps fortunate to have achieved.

By the manner in which he has organized his book, at this point Schlesinger avoids several important and related considerations: One, and it's a very important one, is his own admission that the Soviet military budget followed that of the US and its military reactions were "provoked" by US actions. Second is the frank concession that during the Berlin crisis of 1961 the number of American troops dispatched had no military significance. It therefore becomes appropriate to ask, was this military build-up of a o non-nuclear nature (the nuclear build-up continued undiminished) actually intended for defense against the Soviet Union? Or, as subsequent events were to show, was it actually intended for other purposes? And was this merely a cover for making the increased in conventional military strength acceptable within the US and palatable among its allies?

Not here even addressing himself to the inability of any number of men the US could put into Germany to have any effective influence on a conventional war and while admitting that in Ehrope "no one believed in the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe ...", Schlesinger says this:

p.452 .... While everyone agreed that a Soviet blockade of West Berlin would have to be countered first by a western thrust along the Autobahn, there was disagreement between those, like General Norstad, who wanted the probe in order to create a situation where the west could use nuclear weapons and those, like Kennedy and McNamara, who wanted the probe in order to postpone that situation. And, while everyone agreed that we might eventually have to go on to nuclear war, there was disagreement between those who favored a single definitive salvo against the Soviet Union and those who favored careful and discriminate attack.

Comment: In Schlesinger's treatment, and certainly in the absence of any comment from him, this is all normal and rational.

Elsewhere he freely admits (or is it Sorensen?) Kennedy's acknowledgment that the US was doing anti-Soviet things in Western Berlin that it could readily suspend doing, yet a Russian reaction to this to the supreme NATO commander meant starting a nuclear war by an unrestrained nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

If Khrushchev wasn't worried, he was as crazy as Norstad. And if Schlesinger, with the advantage of hindsight, wasn't horrified, he was crazier than both of them (p.852)

p.853 Kennedy tried to counter this current of thought by assuring de Gaulle and others that the United States would use nuclear weapons in case of o a massive conventional attack on Western Europe. But de Gaulle, thinking always in terms of the narrow interests of the nation-state, did not see why the United States should do so unless its own territory was under assault; presumably he wouldn't if he were the American President.

Comment: What an interesting prelude to the Cuban missile crisis!!!! Certainly in the Cuba crisis of 1962 Kennedy came as close as he could to demonstrating a willingness to engage in nuclear war.

Schlesinger has his own uninhibited opinion:

p.853 The Kennedy-McNamara strategy, brilliantly designed to reduce the threat of nuclear war and to o cope with the worldwide nuances of communist aggression, thus caused confusion and concern. ...

Comment: And here for the first time there is a suggestion about the real reason underlying the marked increase in conventional military capacity: "to cope with the worldwide nuances of communist aggression" which of course was and has since been the official American position that it is the Communists who are engaged in "aggression" and here of course we go back to Kennedy's strong talk to Khrushchev at Vienna. Had Schlesinger seen fit to cite a single such case, even then his and the Kennedy arguments would have been remarkably weak in the eyes of an impartial examiner because of the presense of 42 American bases "containing" the "Communists".

But there was no possibility of Kennedy's coming out and saying, "we need these conventional forces for use elsewhere in the world." So such pipe dreams had to be smoked and every effort had to be made to blow the smoke into theeyes of all the European leaders.

One of the byproducts that is of especial interest because of the official US position later at the so-called disarmament talks at Geneva (spring 1966):

p.853 .... the multilateral force in itself implied an entry into the nuclear club, and this did have appeal, especially for Bonn, so long excluded from membership. Early in 1962 the West Germans responded with a proposal for a rather large mixed-manned fleet of surface vessels equipped with missiles; soon afterward the Belgians expressed similar interest. The Bonn proposal said nothing about meeting NATO's conventional force requirements.

Comment: How helpful the Germans were, offering not a single man to increase the "conventional force requirements". The precisely understood and altho NATO forces were in Germany ostensibly for Germany's protection, the Germans were not about to increase their own forces and afford an opportunity for the withdrawal of free-spending Americans (p.853).

The insanity of such Madison Ave approaches in the nuclear era is, in quite a different context, conceded by Schlesinger who says, "I doubt whether Kennedy, who supposed he was only mentioning a remote possibility to be considered if conventional needs were ever met, realized the energies he had released./... Though it served no strictly military function (some

military men looked much askance on ~~them~~ the idea of mixed-manning and the Joint Chiefs of Staff never liked the MLF), it appealed to the advocates of strategic interdependence as a means of preserving the unity of the deterrent and at the same time of giving NATO allies a nuclear role."

So the MLF "served no strictly military function" and it did "at the same time" give NATO allies "a nuclear role". Surprisingly enough, the Russian negotiators at Geneva in the spring of 1966 did not quote this book in the deliberations on the alleged nonproliferation aspect of American desires, allegedly for nuclear disarmament!

And toward the end of the same paragraph, "So long as the American veto remained, the MLF could never seem much more than a rather transparent public relations attempt to meet a supposed European demand for nuclear equality."

It was, in fact, "a rather transparent public relations attempt" regardless of any other circumstances - under any circumstances.

Schlesinger concludes with his own opinion: "But, if the MLF could help bring Monnet's United States of Europe into existence, it would at last bring the strategic and economic strains in our Atlantic thought into harmony."

This is worth the threat of nuclear war? This worth multiplying the number of fingers that might get at that red button?

What would Khrushchev think? So this multilateral force idea that served no military function soon was, for other reasons and in spite of its obvious defects, supported by those in the US who were for "partnership" and those who were for "interdependence". Again some of the "rather transparent" flackery. The lack of scruple here is hardly a credit to "intellectuals". Nor is it a reflection of American leadership that should inspire confidence elsewhere in the world among either friends or others. And the "MLF group" beceame a "resourceful and tireless lobby within the government" (p.854).

Again a perhaps unintended shocking - ~~suffi~~ horrifying - prelude to the Cuban missile crisis:

pp.854/5 In September 1962, however, McGeorge Bundy, striking out in another direction in a speech at Copenhagen, declared that the United States was willing to accept a European nuclear force "genuinely unified and multilateral," provided that it was integrated with the American deterrent; this, unlike MLF, meant a force without American participation. Then in October, Gerard Smith and Admiral John M. Lee headed a combined State-Defense party to brief NATO countries on the technical aspects of MLF.

Comment: And what a commentary on the American position in subsequent nuclear "disarmament" conferences with the Soviets. Here is McGeorge Bundy, the Pres's national security advisers urging "a European nuclear force" that would be "without American participation"!!!! And this at a time when the US Govt was preparing for a serious crisis with the Soviet Union which it already knew had some kind of missiles in Cuba. So, the month of this crisis, the US Govt sent a "State-Defense" mission which Schlesinger next describes as "an exercise in salesmanship".

To Kennedy, according to Schlesinger, all this was "entirely exploratory". Schlesinger neglects to suggest what it could have been to Khrushchev. Kennedy "was throwing out a variety of ideas in order to meet what he had been assured was an urgent European interest" and in the light of some of the ideas he was willing to "throw out" his willingness to consider them is as interesting as what kond of advisers were capable of making them.

To what kind of god is such theology addressed?

Yet Schlesinger says Kennedy "was determined to stop nuclear proliferation". In the light of the foregoing, is it possible to believe this? (p.855)

If the Pres was indeed opposed to stirring "Valkyrian longings in the German breast", how could there possibly have been any excuse for a suggested MLF, for Bundy's Copenhagen speech, for any of these propaganda stunts?

And how did Kennedy <u>really</u> appraise the Soviet intentions? Schlesinger says, "...he

p.856 "...he regarded muchnof the talk about European nuclear deterrents, multilateral forces, conventional force levels, American divisions and so on as militarily supererogatory since it was based on the expectation of a Soviet attack on Western Europe "than which nothing is less likely." He understood that the Pentagon's business was to plan forevery contingency, but he was not muxh impressed by its projections - the Soviet Union, for example, embarking on aggression in the Middle East and then <u>for diversionary purposes trying</u> to seize Hamburg.

Comment: So all of this is intended for defense against the Soviet Union ? And if the Soviet Union was not going to attack Western Europe, <u>who</u> were they going to attack? And what of the tremendous stockpiling of nuclear armaments by the US and the equally aggressive (from the Soviet point of view) increases in its conventional forces and their armaments? And "nothing is less likely" than a Soviet attack on Western Europe or "embarking on aggression in the Middle East" what did the Pres really intend by maintaining NATO? What did his predecessors intend by creating it? And again, what of the increase in US conventional forces? And the continuation of the largest contingent of American troops in Europe? Clearly, the supererogation to the contrary, all of these things must have been calculated to serve other intentions than those publicly declared. And underlying it all, how could the Soviets regard it?

On March 2, 1966, Sec McNamara held a lengthy and unsual and in some respects quite spectacular press conference in which he openly feuded with members of the press, including Clark Mollenhoff (not revealed in a lengthy treatment in the Wash Post). The Sec had a prepared statement and subsequently answered questions. The following two excerpts are from his prepared statement:

But to put it all in context, the Sec during the course of his heated give-and-take with newsmen said that he was giving them more classified information than he had ever done before. This of course raises the question of the <u>reason</u> for the original classification and the <u>reason</u> for its spontaneous declassification. When examined in context it is clear the classification was not originally for military but for political reasons and its declassification was for exactly the same purposes - the achieving of a political rather than a military end. In describing the extent of the classified information he was making available, the Sec

gave what Sec Rusk calls a "signal" to the other side. He said he wanted American attention not to be "miscalculated". In effect, it was an abject begging for China to understand that the US is tough.

The Sec was dealing with American problems in Vietnam and despite the great power and wealth of the country these are great problems. He said the question was not whether or not there was difficulty but "rather how was it possible to carry through such a major military operation without invoking the usual emergency measures.

"The answer is that during the last five years we have greatly strengthened our military establishment for precisely this kind of xxxxxxxxxxxxx contingency. ..."

The Sec had been talking about the great build-up of American involvement in SE Asia, an involvement of approximately 300,000 men at the time he was speaking, and a virtually incredible expenditure of equipment. But this is hardly the explanation given at the time the "greatly strengthened ... military establishment" was begun, as detailed above by Schlesinger. It is not the reason given at the time it was begun. It is, however, a muchmore credible - the only credible - reason for the marked expansion in Americsn conventional forces at a time when there was no possibility of the alleged reason, a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

The second excerpt from the Sec's statement reads, "And at the same time we were increasing our non-nuclear force, we also increased our nuclear forces. For example, the number of nuclear warheads in our strategic alert forces will have been increased from 836 in June 1961 to about 2600 in June 1966 and the total megatonnage of these weapons more than tripled. Moreover, by June 30, 1966, we will have doubled the number of tactical nuclear warheads on the soil of Western Europe, and large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are available for use in other areas of the world, if required."

All of this, of course, is in direct contradiction to the discussions of the alleged "missile gap" by both Schlesinger and Sorensen. It is in direct opposition to the belief of the Pres 4 and 5 years earlier that there was no possibility of a Soviet attack on Western Europe (for that matter, anywhere else) nor can it be considered in any sense an effort to meet a similar Soviet build-up of nuclear strength for, as Schlesinger has explained, the Soviets, to the best of US's knowledge, had ceased their own installation of intercontinental ballistics missiles much earlier. When only a few dozen nuclear warheads are required to devastate the entire Soviet Union, the significance of the 2600 figure assumes even greater proportions. This is 100 times what is required to lay waste the entire Soviet Union. When the figure of 836 nuclear warheads existing in the American arsenal in June 1961 was in itself some 35 timesmore than those required to virtually incapacitate the potential opponent, there indeed must be some questions asked about this frightfully expensive and incalculably hazardous escalation in the nuclear arsenal. It certainly seems to be not susceptible to any explanation of defense.

But it has a great significance in the context of Schlesinger's delineation of Soviet policy as in response to American policy, which "provoked" Soviet response and of the Soviet military budget, which followed the American military budget.

5. Skybolt (pp.856-62)

Comment: In beginning his discussion of this crisis in Anglo-American relations, Schlesinger reports that prior to the Cuba missile crisis, Gen de Gaulle, while believing British entry into the Common Market would change the character both politically and economically, gave the British Prime Minister the impression de Gaulle in Schlesinger's words "would offer no strong resistance to the British application". Then "in the weeks after the missile crisis the concepts of partnership and interdependence entered into unexpected conflict." Five pages intervene in Schlesinger's discussion but on p.862 he concedes that between the 9 June meeting between de Gaulle and the British Prime Minister where de Gaulle seemed to relent about British admission into the Common Market and December, with the Cuba missile crisis intervening, "de Gaulle's mood had changed" and "he no longer saw how Britian could possibly join the Common Market..." Schlesinger deems it unworthy of comment, but here is a clear reading of the meaning of American action in the Cuba missile crisis to a major European country and ally.

Skybolt was an intricate and complicated Air Force "answer to Polaris in our permanent inter-service competition over the strategic deterrent." In short, if we already had at least as many Polaris missiles scattered around the Soviet Union as we needed, the Air Force had to keep up with the Navy Joneses and add to the surplus. From this it was only natural that the US desire to supply the British with the capacity for delivering further excesses of nuclear warheads and in a conference with Pres Eisenhower at Camp David the British Prime Minister left "with the conviction that their loan of Holy Loch obligated the Americans to assist the British deterrent by providing one form of missile or another". Holy Loch is a British naval base made available to Polaris submarines. There were provisions in the agreement for the cancellation of Skybolt, but apparently not of Holy Loch (p.857).

Despite the "extraordinarily intricate" character of Skybolt, both the British and American Air Force and the American Douglas manufacturer "kept up a steady flow of optimism" about the progress. The early problems were glossed over until

p.858 .... One day in January 1962 Kennedy wondered aloud at luncheon with Julian Amery, the British Minister of Aviation, whether Skybolt would ever work. Amery, much upset, responded that it was the basis of British nuclear defense; if anything happened, it could have far-reaching effects on Anglo-American relations. ...

Comment: Then the Air Force convinced Amery who then "returned to London well satisfied that Skybolt had a future." But further studies convinced McNamara by August 1962 "that further investment would be a mistake" in Schlesinger's words. As usual, the Air Force generals gave them trouble as they then recently had over his decision against the RS 72-man bomber. Altho McNamara had already decided to discontinue Skybolt, he had "decided to postpone the decision until Congress adjourned" and the coming budget was under review in November.

p.858 /... When Peter Thorneycroft, the British Minister of Defense, visited

Washingtin in mid-September overflowing with soulful reminders about the moral commitment to Skybolt, he elicited only guarded responses from McNamara.

Comment: The administration got further warnings about the effect on Anglo-American relations of the cancellation of the Skybolt agreement, this time thru Schlesinger himself. But the following day, McNamara "formally recommended cancellation". The Pres and Sec Rusk both agreed. McNamara undertook to inform the British and Rusk decided this wasa military and not a diplomatic matter. The British ambassador Ormsby-Gore, upon being informed, said, "that it would be 'political dynamite' in London." There then ensued what Schlesinger said perplexed Kennedy because "the political life" of the Tory govt was at stake. In a footnote Schlesinger explains this perplexity caused the Pres to have Richard Neustadt "undertake a study designed to find out how two close allies could have miscalculated each other and fallen into a surely avoidable crisis." This is particularly interesting in the context of the Cuba missile crisis where so clearly the American govt "miscalculated" the Soviet intentions, and yet insisted publicly and privately that it was the Soviets who miscalculated the American intentions. It also was the position of the US govt at the time of the great escalation of the war in Vietnam that it feared the other side would "miscalculate". In this case also the evidence is to the contrary.

But with Skybolt, London and Washington was each waiting for the other to come up with a proposal (p.859). Nobody bothered to formally inform the American ambassador in London whose knowledge had come thru military and not diplomatic channels and who felt "immobilized". When on his own initiative"he finally sent warnings to the Department" of State, "he received no instructions". And Skybolt was not even on the agenda of the Dec18 meeting in Nassau between Prime Minister Macmillan and Kennedy. Yet those Schlesinger describes as "the Europeanists in State" feared the cancellation of the Skybolt contract "would overthrow o the government in London", but, like everybne else, they also did nothing. The cynicism of this element in the State Dept is something Schlesinger makes not even a rudimentary effort to disguise for he immediately says of them, "But, if Skybolt had to go, at least let it carry the special relationship down with it; this would place the British and the Germans on a level of equality in the missile age ...". In further discussion, Schlesinger does not in any way disguise a feeling of the various elements in the State Dept that the British in any event were little more than American pawns (p/860).

But it is the other side that "miscalculates"? And altho there was considerable apprehension the cancellation of the Skybolt contract could cause the British governmnent to fall, simply because London, under the impression it had an obligation from Washington, was silent, "Washington concluded that the British were not too unhappy ..." and official minds ignored the Skybolt problem. Those who subsequently became most prominent in pleas for the other side not to "miscalculate" American intentions ghere, according to Schlesinger, displayed an unseemly frivolous attitude toward the crisis they were creating, oblivious of it:

p.861 .... When a so-called defense policy conference was convened at the end

of November, Skybolt received only cursory attention. Rusk ~~mentioned~~ said he wished that Hound Dog, one of the alternative missiles under consideration, had been named Skybolt B. McNamara replied that the Secretary of State would have been great in the automobile business.

Comment: Equally the Mad Hatter himself, Schlesinger concludes this paragraph with this sentence: "The talk then turned to the problem of persuading NATO to increase its conventional forces." There was no chance of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, yet NATO had to increase its conventional forces. Why? For defensive purposes?

And it was always those who allegedly were under this Soviet threat who were always reluctant to increase their conventional forces and ~~many~~ always the US, not under this gun, always anxious to have it done.

McNamara, who was always concerned about the miscalculation of American intentions, landed in London to inform the British press of 5 consecutive failures in Skybolt tests. Even Schlesinger called it "imprudent". His talkes with Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft "were a ~~p~~ Pinero drama of o misunderstanding: Thorneycroft expecting McNamara to propose Polaris, McNamara expecting Thorneycroft to request it." Thorneycroft "concentrated on the political consequences of cancellation: for the Tory government, for Anglo-American understanding." He pointedly told McNamara this would confirm those "who had always been saying that it was impossible to rely on the United States," and that "those who had argued for that reliance would be betrayed".

Who are the miscalculators? (p.861)

When Thorneycroft asked if the US would "be prepared to stste publicly that it would do everything possible to help Britain preserve its independent nuclear role", McNamara did nothing but express sympathy; and when Thorneycroft invoked the "moral obligation" of the ~~Nass~~ Holy Loch-Camp David agreement, McNamara sought to drive a further bargain: would Britain, on receiving Polaris, "make it part of a multilateral force"? Thorneycroft declined the condition, insisting that Britain "would decide this as an independent power". The London papers, "presumably stimulated by the Defense Ministry", were rather sensational that night.

Later in Washington when the question was discussed before the Pres, Kennedy, even tho aware of "the British sense of our moral obligations/ and Macmillan's shaky political position", nonetheless "finally suggested the possibility of relating an offer of Polaris to eventual commitment by the British of their Polaris force to NATO." Is it any wonder that as he stood "in the December drozzle at Rambouillet" to greet the British Prime Minister, "de Gaulle's mood had changed"? And even here Schlesinger pretends de Gaulle's changed attitude was not because of the Americans treatment of Britain but because of his own altered conditions: "The Algerian war was now behind him, the assembly elections at the end of Npv had refreshed his mandate, and he spoke with towering and placid self-confidence."

But in the handling of Skybolt all levels of the American govt from the Pres down had displayed an insensitivity toward the British and a total disregard for the minimal needs of the British goft. And all had thought to strip the few vestiges of indepen-

dence by which the British had sought to disguise their naked dependence upon the US. (p.862)

6. Nassau and After (pp.862-6)

Comment: In Nov the Pres was still preoccupied with the remnants of the Cuba missile crisis and not one of his own people had "told him that Skybolt might cause an Anglo-American crisis". Only the British ambassador, his friend David Ormsby Gore, had so told him. Later the Pres was to complain of Macmillan, "He should have warned me of the dangers to him ... he should have had Gore come in" but Gore had. The Pres's was no explanation. Schlesinger does not find it necessary to comment on the responsibilities of the American Sec of State to counsel the American Pres.

In fact, the American Sec of State didn't even go to the Nassau conference with the Pres, as Schlesinger says, "to the President's surprise". Rusk claimed "he thought it better to stay in Washington" to attend an "annual ceremonial engagement with the diplomatic corps". Instead, he sent Ball, who has been described by Schlesinger as a leading Europeanist in the State Dept, those desiring the termination of the British-American "special relationship" and wanting to "force Britain into Europe" (the quote is on p.861).

On the way to the conference, the Pres and his friend, the British Ambassador, "worked out a proposal" calculated to make it seem as tho giving up the Skybolt would have been the British decision. The idea was for the US and Britain to "agree to split future development charges" which Schlesinger calls a "wise and generous offer" but says "now it was too late" for the Pres had already publicly destroyed "any lingering interest Macmillan might have had in Skybolt" (p.863).

From the beginning there was an only too visible British "resentment and suspicion of American intentions".

The first night "Macmillan told Kennedy that he wanted Polaris, and it was clear that he felt he had to have it under conditions which would preserve the British claim to a national deterrent." (p.864)

In reporting Macmillan's declining of the sharing offer on Skybolt, Schlesinger says he "made it clear that he had no further interest in Skybolt; the lady had already been violated in public." Schlesinger's figure is particularly appropriate but his masculine attitude toward it inappropriate. While it is true that the lady, Britain, had been humiliated and shamed in public, did any less shame inure to the violator than the violated?

Schlesinger makes light of it, describing what Macmillan then did as "a bravura performance" and as more of a "lamentation" than a "threat" but the British Prime Minister said, "If the United States would not help, Britain would continue on its own at whatever cost, including the inevitable rift with the United States."

And of this Schlesinger opined, "Instead of pleading that his government would fall, he seemed to be saying that his party would accept anti-Americanism to keep itself in power." So the Pres decided Britain must have Polaris but thereby was confronted with the conflict between "multilateralization and European partnership."

Those who drafted the agreement between Macmillan and Kennedy, in Schlesinger's candid comment, "outdid themselves in masterly ambiguity". In Article 6 they "contemplated a NATO multinational (p.864) force" but in Art 7 committed their "best endeavors" toward MLF "from which national withdrawals would be impossible". Then in Art 8 the US agreed to make Polaris missiles without warheads available to the British so that the British forces "might be included in either the multinational or the multilateral system".

Who was fooled by this? Khrushchev? De Gaulle?

Schlesinger says this "was a great victory" for Macmillan, "a reasonable adjustment to a thorny problem" for Kennedy, and

p.865 .... For our own Europeanists, it was a missed opportunity and bitter defeat: instead of forcing the British to an MLF commitment, we had saved their deterrent, thrust an issue into the hands of de Gaulle and set back the cause of European integration.

...

Comment: But "for France it might ~~not~~ have devastating effect" so "it was decided at Nassau to offer de Gaulle Polaris on the same terms as to Macmillan ...". This had "the escape clause of emergency withdrawal" and, according to Schlesinger, "was an entirely genuine proposal, though made publicly,..." But the French Minister of Information "promptly pointed out that France had 'neither the submarines required for the Polaris missiles nor the warheads'". Kennedy and Macmillan did not exclude the thought of a British offer of Polaris warheads to Paris in exchange for French nuclear cooperation. Of course, this does not take care of the submarines. (p.865)

In Paris on Jan 5 Charles E Bohlen discussed the situation with de Gaulle who, in Schlesinger's words, "showed no passion for Nassau", nonetheless, "during December and the first two weeks of the new year those in Washington who based themselves on Nassau's Article 6 remained quite optimistic about the chance of the French joining a NATO multinational force. The MLF, they hoped, was dead." (p.866)

Those who Schlesinger described as "the Europeanists" he says "were meanwhile rallying from their post-Nassau gloom to mount a new campaign, based on Nassau's Article 7, to retrieve the MLF and defend the Grand Design against both de Gaulle and Macmillan." They also convinced Kennedy "Nassau had given Bonn a dangerous sense of exclusion" so he "agreed that a modest refloating of the MLF might pull West Germany back toward the alliance". Accordingly, in Jan 1963 "George Ball was sent to Europe to reassure the Germans."

p.866 Four days later in Washington Kennedy in his State of the Union address hailed the alliance: "Free Europe is entering into a new phase of its long and brilliant history . . . moving toward a unity of purpose and power and policy in every sphere of activity." In paris the same day de Gaulle held his press conference and declared war against the Grand Design.

A 1000 DAYS Chapter XXXIII - TWO EUROPES: DE GAULLE AND KENNEDY
(pp.867-88)

Comment: The introduction describes the "brutality" of de Gaulle's attack and agonizes over the possible immediate inspiration, such as Ball's "stress" on the integrationist side of Nassau on whether "the Polaris offer" should have been "pressed harder," or perhaps not even made to Britain, etc., even back to "the treatment of de Gaulle by Roosevelt and Churchill during the Second World War"! On his own, Schlesinger compares the French General with Andrew Jackson.

Of himself, Schlesinger says:

p.867 .... Its roots, as I endeavored to persuade the President, lay deep in the view of Europe and the world de Gaulle had stated and restated throughout his career. Kennedy asked for a memorandum on this point. My report to him concluded: "There is very little we could have done to divert him from what has plainly been the cherished objective of his life."

Comment: Apparently all alternatives were considered except the most obvious one - de Gaulle's fundamental policy differences.

1. De Gaulle's Europe (pp.867-71)

Comment: Schlesinger quotes from de Gaulle's writings (1959) his belief that Britain and the US wanted "to relegate us to a secondary place ..."; "prevent the rise of a new Reich that might again threaten the safety" of France; "co-operate with East and West"; "assure French primacy in Western Europe"; and attempt to organize Western Europe to a "political, economic and strategic bloc... as one of the three world powers..." From the states of his bloc de Gaulle omitted England.

Churchill had told him in 1954 that, faced with a choice between the US and France, Britain would elect the US (p.868)

Schlesinger paraphrases de Gaulle's attitude as "if the United States and Britain try to use (NATO) as an instrument for the Anglo-Saxon domination of Europe, they must be resisted."

Asking why so many people were "astonished" by the "brutal" de Gaulle speech of Jan 14, Schlesinger says he "discovered to my dismay ... few people in the State Department appear to have read de Gaulle." De Gaulle, he says, "was one of the consummate political tacticians of the twentieth century", who "audaciously pressed Churchill and Roosevelt during the war ... always stopping short of the unforgivable provocation ..." Asking himself "why had he chosen this moment to come into the open", that is, make his speech of Jan 14 to which Schlesinger alludes but yet from which he quotes not a single word, Schlesinger answers, "Probably the Cuban missile crisis was a precipitating factor." Why? Because "it showed that the United States in emergencies would act on its own, without NATO consultation of 'integration', on matters affecting not only American security but world peace. This undoubtedly reinforced the General's old belief that America did not regard Europe as a primary interest ..." (p.869)

Next Schlesinger switches to a quotation from de Gaulle saying "No one ... can say xxx whether, where, when, how, or to what extent American nuclear arms would be used to defend Europe."

This is an interesting technique of Schlesinger's and he uses it insistently and effectively. Having raised the question of the Cuban missile crisis, Schlesinger implies he has given the essence of it as it related to de Gaulle's interest, but the fact is he has ignored this. The two most important elements in it are, first, the character of the American action in the entire crisis - not just its failure to consult its allies, but whether or not the US precipitated it, overreacted to it, was irresponsible during it, etc., and second, the meaning of it, the significance of the solution which certainly de Gaulle understood as something other than the official American explanation which is naught but self-serving propaganda. In addition, Schlesinger attributes to de Gaulle the desire "to be in on the peace-making" were the crisis to be followed by a detente. This is pure speculation and is not supported by anything in the book. On the contrary, the initiation of a detente in a meaningful form had already been made by Khrushchev (see later discussion of nuclear test-ban negotiations) which automatically froze France out.

Schlesinger again quotes from his memorandum:

p.870 My memorandum probably pushed the inexorability thesis too far, and I believe the President could never rid his mind of the thought that, if this or that had been done differently, it might have been possible to avoid the impasse of 1963.

Comment: Kennedy seemed obsessed by "why so obviously great a man took such incomprehensible and petty positions" and the Pres spoke to his ambassadors, Cy Sulzberger and others in an effort to learn the answer for de Gaulle "was one of his heroes" (870)

Schlesinger says "kennedy also contempt for the spitefulness of official French pronouncements, especially those ... from ... the Ministry of Information, and he was angry at the clandestine French campaign against the United States in Africa and Asia." Unfortunately, Schlesinger neglects to point out over what in Africa and over what in Asia. But two of the obvious are the Congo where the history of American activity has yet to be written and Southest Asia where it is already a public disgrace. This was especially true in Laos (see The Invisible Government, etc.) and by the time Schlesinger's book appeared the position of the US Govt had altered to where it would have welcomed the policy recommended by the French but ignored in his text by Schlesinger, that of neutrality. How this could be called "spitefulness", especially in reference to "official French pronouncements", Schlesinger ignores. The fact is he doesn't give even a single example. Nor does he even make any further reference to them.

2. MLF (pp.871-5)

Comment: US policy "on the political side" had as "our chief object ... to tie Germany more firmly into the structure of Western Europe." Of this the Pres said, "De Gaulle is doing that in his own way". The Pres also felt economically French membership in the Common Market was against the American interest (p.871)

Germany and France signed a treaty of cooperation on Jan 22. Schlesinger apparently saw no connection between the treaty and the preparation for it which certainly extended much farther back and were undoubtedly to a large degree public than the Jan 14 date of de Gaulle's speech.

Those Schlesinger calls "the Europeanists" apparently led by George Ball "discoursed publicly about unspecified European leaders dominated 'by a nostalgic longing for a world that never was' and seeking to revive the 'vanquished symbols of beglamored centuries'". Apparently it was Washington's purpose to indicate to Adenauer that if "West Germany chose between France and the United States, the MLF in Washington's view was the way to make it clear that Bonn would find greater security in the Atlantic relationship". To strengthen this point, Kennedy in mid-Jan decided to visit Germany on a spring trip to Europe. Ambassador Livingston Merchant was sent to work with Finletter (NATO Amb) "in preparing and negotiating American proposals on the MLF".

p.872 Kennedy accepted tge need to reassure the Germans and show NATO that there were alternatives to Gaullism. But he retained a certain skepticism about the MLF. He felt first of all that the MLF campaign diverted interest from more serious problems of the planet. "The whole debate about an atomic force in Europe," he told Spaak of Belgium in May, "is really useless, because Berlin is secure, and Europe as a whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is the rest of the world." As for the MLF per se, he really considered that, so long as the United States retained its veto (and he never mentioned renunciation as a possibility, though other members of his government did), the MLF was something of a fake. Though he was willing to try it, he could not see why Europeans would be interested in making enormous financial contributions toward a force over which they had no real control. (872)

Comment: Schlesinger says "Bonn wanted the MLF because it was a status symbol, marking a form of accession to the nuclear club; because it gave West Germany an indissoluble nuclear association with the United States and a sense of nuclear equality with Britain ...". This language bears a remarkable resemblance to that subsequently employed by the Russian negotiators at Geneva and denied by the US. Those sponsoring MLF argued that without it "West Germany would start pressing for nationaly manned and owned missiles ..."

p.873 All this rested on the premise that the Germans were hell-bent on having nuclear weapons and, if they could not get them multilaterally, would seek them bilaterally, even at the expense of the American relationship. Though this proposition had been hackneyed around the American government, it did not seem to some, especially the British, all that self-evident.

Comment: British leaders reported "no significant German demand for

Comment: British leaders reported "no significant German demand for nuclear weapons" and Henry Kissinger reported "that he saw 'no sign of any domestic pressure in Germany for a national nuclear weapons program'" but "other British political leaders" feared "that the Merchant mission was having the effect of generating such a demand where none existed before. They added ominously, that, if such a demand ever came into being, it was not likely to be satisfied by the secondary symbolism of mixed-manning." (873). It would seem at this point that Schlesinger is buttressing the Russian argument that it is the German leadership that had the ambition for a nuclear potential and that the American sponsorship of the MLF "has awakened the German demand it had premised" and that "the Germans would never accept second-class nuclear status as a permanent condition" (p.873)

He quotes Kennedy as agreeing that "MLF was the best available tool to reconcile interdependence - the indivisibility of the deterrent - with partnership - the building of a united Western Europe; moreover, it would fill a vacuum into which, otherwise, Gaullism might seep." In Feb after a discussion with Adm Hyman Rickover, Kennedy agreed an MLF submarine force would raise security problems so the concept grew in 1963 to a contemplated 25 surface vessels, each with 8 Polaris missiles. It would cost $5 billion over ten years, with the US paying about a third.

Schlesinger says "the Europeanists" pushed the idea "with greater zeal than the President intended."

p.874 ....The Merchant mission of March and April evolved mysteriously from a modest and quiet exploratory inquiry into an oversized thirty-two-man group, charging around Europe in a Convair, giving the impression of a major American campaign and stirring opposition wherever it went. A USIA survey of the West European press reported early in April overwhelming rejection of the MLF. Wits dubbed it the multilateral farce. Moreover, as the campaign roared along, it began to exude the pent-up anti-de Gaulle feeling in State - Gavin remembers a State Department officer calling de Gaulle "a bastard who is out to get us." Apart from Germany, the response was meager; and, as the MLF appeared likely to dwindle into a Washington-Bonn operation, which the President would never have accepted, its supporters had to redouble their efforts elsewhere. (874/5)

Comment: In Oct 1960 Lord Home, soon to become Prime Minister, told Washington the British "were bothered by the insistence with which the American Government was pushing it", the MLF (875)

3. Italy (p.875-81)

Comment: Schlesinger found "One was indeed sometimes oppressed by the long abstract discussions of partnership and interdependence" in Washington by 1963, when "the MLF ZEALOts had become known in the government as the 'theologians'". The questions this raised, according to Schlesinger's account of them, all boiled down to what kind of American intervention or control there should be in Europe. He concludes his first paragraph by saying,

p.875 If a line were to be drawn against de Gaulle, might it not be drawn most persuasively, not against his concept of Europe or of Atlantica, but against his concept of freedom?

Comment: Switching to politics, Schlesinger talks about the "two great groups historiaally inhabiting the center-left", the Christian democrats and the social democrats, who had long been at odds over some issues but whom he believed should be drawn together. At that particular momemt "such a rapprochement seemed most likely in Italy".

Here there had been "a united front between Communists and Socialists" since the war, with one wing of the Socialists having splintered and established the Social Democratic party (876)

Among the Christian Democrats a rapprochement became known as an "apertura a sinistra" or an opening to the left. Before Kennedy, US policy had opposed this because the Eisenhower administration did not trust Nenni and, as Schlesinger puts it, because "it did not want social and economic reform in Italy".

p.877 .... The issue had become so tense in our embassy in Rome that one younger officer, as noted earlier, was disciplined in 1960 for carrying the case for the apertura past the deputy chief of mission to the ambassador.

Comment: Schlesinger says Nenni perfomred an "ingeniuus reinterpretation" of his party's neutralism to mean "the preservation of the existing European equilibrium" or that phrase so dear to Kennedy, the status quo. Hence, neutralism to him meant opposition to Italian withdrawal from NATO "as an unneutral act".

p.877/8 For all these reasons it seemed to me and my White House colleague Robert Komer that the time had come to end the American opposition to the apertura and make it clear that the United States welcomed a government in Italy which addressed itself to the social and economic needs of the people. Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani's visit to Washington in June 1961 provided an obvious opportunity to signalize the new departure. President Kennedy, who had some acquaintance with the Italian situation, readily agreed that the United States from now on should indicate discreet sympathy for the opening to the left.

p.878 "Kennedy told Fanfani privately that, if the Italian Prime Minister thought it a good idea (as he did), we would watch developments with sympathy."

The presidential decision was, of course, at once communicated to the State Department, and this should have ended the matter. In fact, it only marked the beginning of a long and exasperating fight. In the end it took nearly two years to induce the Department of State to follow the President's policy.

Comment: Schlesinger says that the problems within State were partly "the chronic difficulty of changing established policies; partly the patriotic conviction on the part of certain Fpreign Service officers that they owned American foreign policy and, in any case, knew better than the White House..."

Note Schlesinger doesn't say better than the Pres but better than the White House, which, of course, included Schlesinger. And he has already cleaimed credit for the idea. (Yet

elsewhere in the section on the test-ban negotiations, he refers deprecatingly to "amateurs" in diplomacy) (878)

Schlesinger also says that "the pervading attitude" was that "Nenni and his party must meet a series of purity tests before they could qualify for American approval ..."

He was in Rome in Feb 1962 and conferred with a number of the party people and prominentpersonalities. Here Nenni stressed "his dislike of the Communists, the neutralist traditions of his party, his support of the Common Market and his acceptance of NATO on a de facto basis." He hoped "for a formula which would continue the present arrangement" in Berlin and "in any case, the apertura was on the way".

pp.879/80 The fight continued. In May 1962, the State Department Italianists, apparently unmoved by anything that had happened since the days of John Foster Dulles, declared that the Nenni Socialists were "not anti-Communist" and that their success would strengthen anti-NATO sentiment in Italy. Soon Komer and I enlisted Robert Kennedy, Arthur Goldberg and Walter Reuther in the effort to cajole the Department into abandoning the legacy of the past. It was an odd situation. We had, of course, the presidential decision and the patient backing of McGeorge Bundy. We had the sporadic sympathy of George Ball and William Tyler, when they were not out reorganizing Europe. As for the Secretary of State, he did not have, so far as I could find out, any views on Italian policy beyond a nervous response when President Segni, an old-time opponent of the apertura, told him that American interest in the Socialists would be interpreted as a rejection of our only "true" friends, the Italian conservatives... (879/80)

Comment: The struggle went on and on. There were meetings and meetings and meetings.

pp880 .... A memorandum of mine to Bundy in October 1962, sixteen months after the President had tried to change the policy, began: "As you will recall, the White House has been engaged for about fifty years in an effort to persuade the Department of State that an air ofsympathy toward the Nenni Socialists would advance the interests of the United States and of western democracy. . . . During this period, practically all the evidence has supported our view that the Nenni Socialists have split irrevocably from the Communists and are determined to bring their party into the democratic orbit. . . . During this period, however, State at every step along the way has resisted proposals to hasten the integration of the Socialists into the democratic camp."

Comment: So 6 weeks later, or 18 months after the Fanfani visit, State came up with a new argument against the center-left, "this time on the incredible ground that,if the Socialists entered an Italian government, it might encourage the Russians in a miscalculation of the west's determination!" (p.880) Schlesinger said if the people in State fighting the apertura had their way, "they might well bring into power a right-wing government with fascist support". So he and Komer in Jan 1963 sent a melancholy memo to the Pres "describing the present situation and concluding: 'Lest you think you run the United States Government, the matter is still under debate.'" (880)

Averell Harriman became Under Sec for Political Affairs in spring 1963. He was, as Schlesinger describes him, an expert