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.... He recruited his senatorial staff, for example - Sorensen, Feldman, O'Brien, Dungan, Goodwin - as knowledgeable men on national problems; he never had a foreign policy specialist in his Senate office.

p.667 Private relationships are always a puzzle for Presidents. "The Presidency," Kennedy once remarked, "is not a very good place to make new friends" - or sometimes to keep old ones either. They watched with fascination how White Houseitis affected their acquaintances, leading some to grievance and others to sycophancy and discussed a book which might be written called "The Poison of the Presidency." ....

p.680 Kennedy was fully sensitive - perhaps oversensitive - to the limitations imposed by Congress on the presidential freedom of maneuver. But, though he was well aware of the problem within the executive domain, I do not think he had entirely appreciated its magnitude. The textbooks had talked of three coordinate branches of government; the executive, the legislative, the judiciary. But with an activist President it became apparent that there was a fourth branch: the Presidency itself. And, in pursuing his purposes, the President was likely to encounter almost as much resistance from the executive branch as from the others. By 1961 the tension between the permanent government and the presidential government was deep in our system.

This problem had assumed its contemporary dimensions after Franklin Roosevelt and the enlargement of government under the New Deal. Roosevelt had quickly seen that he could not fight the depression through the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, Commerce and the Treasury (or, later, fight the war through State, War and Navy). He had therefore bypassed the traditional structure, resorting instead to the device of the emergency agency, set up outside the civil service and staffed from top to bottom by men who believed in New Deal policies. This worked well in the thirties. But Roosevelt left his successors a much bigger government, and in due course the iron law of organization began to transform what had served as brilliant expedients for him into dead weights for them.

In the thirties conservatives had bemoaned the expansion of the federal government as a threat to freedom. Instead they should have hailed the bureaucracy as a bulwark against change. The permanent government soon developed its own stubborn vested interests in policy and procedure, its own cozy alliances with committees of Congress, its own ties to the press, its own national constituencies. It began to exude the feeling that Presidents could come and Presidents go but it went on forever. The permanent government was, as such, politically neutral; its essential commitment was to doing things as they had been done before. This frustrated the enthusiasts who came to Washington with Eisenhower in 1953 zealous to dismantle the New Deal, and it frustrated the enthusiasts who came to Washington with Kennedy in 1961 zealous to get the country moving again.

The Eisenhower administration in the end met the problem of the

permanent government by accepting the trend toward routinization and extending it to the Presidency itself. This was congenial both to President Eisenhower, accustomed all his life to the military staff system, and to the needs of a regime more concerned with consolidation than with innovation. The result was an effort to institutionalize the Presidency, making it as nearly automatic in its operations and as little dependent on particular individuals as possible. It was a perfectly serious experiment; but in the end it was defeated, both by the inextinguishably personal character of the Presidency, which broke out from time to time even in the case of one so well disciplined to the staff system as Eisenhower, and also by the fact that even the Eisenhower administration was occasionally forced to do new things in order to meet new challenges.

Kennedy, who had been critical of the Eisenhower effort to institutionalize the Presidency, was determined to restore the personal character of the office and recover presidential control over the sprawling feudalism of government. This became a central theme of his administration and, in some respects, a central frustration. The presidential government, coming to Washington aglow with new ideas and a euphoric sense that it could not go wrong, promptly collided with the feudal barons of the permanent government, entrenched in their domains and fortified by their sense of proprietorship; and the permanent government, confronted by this invasion, began almost to function (with, of course, many notable individual exceptions) as a resistance movement, scattering to the maquis in order to pick off the intruders. This was especially true in foreign affairs.

The Bay of Pigs was a crucial episode in the struggle. This disaster was a clear consequence of the surrender of the presidential government to the permanent government. The inherited executive bureaucracy rallied in support of an undertaking which the new administration would never conceivably have designed for itself. The CIA had a heavy investment in this project; other barons, having heavy investments in their own pre-Kennedy projects, doubtless wished to show that the newcomers could not lightly reject whatever was bubbling up in the pipeline, however repugnant it might be to the preconceptions of the New Frontier. But the result, except for leading the President to an invaluable overhaul of his own operating methods, was ironically not to discredit the permanent government; instead, it became in certain ways more powerful than ever. The reason for this was that, one risk having failed, all risks were regarded with suspicion; and, since the permanent government almost never wished to take risks (except for the CIA, where risks were the entrenched routine), this strengthened those who wanted to keep things as they were as against those who wanted to change things. The fiasco was also a shock to the President's hitherto supreme confidence in his own luck; and it had a sobering effect throughout the presidential government. No doubt this was in many ways to the good; but it also meant that we never quite recaptured again the youthful, adventurous spirit of the first days. "Because this bold initiative flopped," I noted in June 1961, "there is now a general predisposition against boldness in all fields." With one stroke the permanent government had dealt a savage blow to the élan of the newcomers - and it had the satisfaction of having done so by persuading the newcomers to depart from their own principles and accept the permanent government's plan.

The permanent government included men and women of marked devotion, quality and imagination. Kennedy knew this, seized many occasions to say so publicly and gave John Macy, the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, every support in improving the morale of the career

services. Yet, though a valuable reservoir of intelligence and experience as well as a valuable guarantee against presidential government's going off the tracks, the permanent government remained in bulk a force against innovation with an inexhaustible capacity to dilute, delay and obstruct presidential purpose. Only so many fights were possible with the permanent government. The fighters - one saw this happen to Richard Goodwin when he went over to the State Department - were gradually weakened, cut off, surrounded and shot down, as if from ambush, by the bureaucracy and its anti-New Frontier allies in Congress and the press. At the start we had all felt free to 'meddle' when we thought that we had a good idea or someone else a poor one. But, as the ice began to form again over the government, free-wheeling became increasingly difficult and dangerous. At Wellfleet in the summer of 1962, I wrote that our real trouble was that we had "capitulated too much to the existing momentum of government as embodied and urged by the executive bureaucracy. Wherever we have gone wrong - from Cuba to fiscal policy - has been because we have not had sufficient confidence in the New Frontier approach to impose it on the government. Every important mistake has been the consequence of excessive deference to the permanent government. In too many areas we have behaved as the Eisenhower administration would have behaved." The problem of moving forward seemed in great part the problem of making the permanent government responsive to the policies of the presidential government.

p.690

.... Above all, he loved pungent expressions. Early one Sunday in December 1962 he woke me to read aloud two sentences from a Khrushchev speech in the morning newspapers. One began, "At the climax of events around Cuba, there began to be a smell of burning in the air." The other went: "Those militarists who boast that they have submarines with Polaris rockets on board, and other surprises, as they put it, against the Soviet Union, would do well to remember that we are not living in mud huts either." Kennedy remarked with admiration, "Khrushchev certainly has some good writers."

A 1000 DAYS

Kennedy - Policies - Truth

p.718 .... Nor were relations improved when the information officer  
~~xxxxx~~ of the Defense Department talked imprudently about news  
as "part of the arsenal of weaponry" and affirmed "the inherent right  
of the government to lie . . . to save itself when faced with nuclear  
disaster."

A 1000 DAYS

ADVISERS

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.... But, so long as the Secretaries of State and Defense endorsed the policy of unconditional support of Diem, it was hard for the President to act until some dreadful blow-up made the failure of the policy manifest - and by that time it might be too late.

p.723~~4~~ .... Kennedy feared overexciting people about public issues, as he came to believe that his call for an air-raid shelter program had done during the Berlin crisis of 1961; and he was embarrassed on the rare occasions when he succumbed to public emotion himself, as he did when the Cuban Brigade, freed from Castro's prisons, presented its flag to him at Miami in December 1962.

p.726 .... In so doing, he released the nation's critical energy. Self-criticism became not only legitimate but patriotic. The McCarthy anxieties were forgotten. Critics began to question the verities again, and defenders of the status quo no longer had the heart, or nerve, to call them communists. The President, in effect, created his own muckraking movement.



p.745 .... In foreign affairs, some regarded the cold war as the invention of the military-industrial complex and supposed that, if only Washington changed its course, Moscow and Peking would gladly collaborate in building a peaceful world. This had been somewhat the Indian view - or at least until the Chinese crossed the Himalayas and reality broke out. Others, while seeing communism as a problem and the cold war as a reality, felt that resistance involved too great a risk and were gloomily prepared to endure a communist world if that would avert a nuclear holocaust: better red than dead. Both groups condemned the policy of nuclear deterrence. Both identified themselves a bit self-righteously with 'peace' as if everyone who disagreed with them wanted to blow up the world. Both yearned for total solutions. And for both the proper United States policy was unilateral disarmament and neutralism.

Note: Schlesinger has his own strange concept of and definition of the "left", as he calls them, and he selects a few hardly typical and hardly "left" strawmen from whose writings, whether or not out of context, he selects a few samples, presented as typically, for debunking. These were what, in his definition, are the "utopian". The others he calls the pragmatic "strain". Again he wants personal spell, one can only wonder for what personal reason.

In his chapter called "The Politics of Modernity" Schlesinger attempts to portray Kennedy as a man equally detested by the left and the right. In the subsection entitled "Kennedy and the Left," by re-defining the left to include a few liberals and no Communists, with fine disregard for reality, Schlesinger pretends that there was violent opposition to everything Kennedy did and stood for by what he called the "left". In relating Kennedy's opposition from the other side, Schlesinger, by definition, restricts it. This subsection is entitled "Kennedy and the radical right." Even in his own philosophical and political terms, Schlesinger has not balanced this comparison from each side out. Dishonestly but necessarily, he had to restrict the opposition from the right to the radical right because ~~many~~ many of the right on many issues collaborated with Kennedy and approved of many of his policies.

He even pretends that the right-wing activity in opposition to Kennedy was greater than opposition to Johnson. As Schlesinger reports it, there was a "spread of extremism, right and left", about which President Kennedy felt "deep concern". The spread of extremism on the left during Kennedy's administration is a figment of Schlesinger's imagination and, with equal disregard for fact, he attributes Kennedy's concern to "his sense of the latent streak of violence under the surface of American life." Something which is anything but typical of any fraction in the American left.

Having attempted to assassinate the characters of those intellectuals not to his liking whom he personally cast in the role of the opposite of the John Birch society, Schlesinger then quotes Kennedy's speech at the University of Washington in Seattle, "it is a curious fact that each of these two extreme opposites resemble each other," invoking Kennedy also as believing such people as Norman Mailer, Professor Stuart Hughes (his former colleague in both OSS and at Harvard), Paul Goodman (who Schlesinger calls an anarchist), Michael Harrington, and Alfred Kazin are of the extreme left.

Schlesinger says that Kennedy "against the left he urged the indispensability of strength; against the right the indefensibility of ~~negotiation~~ negotiation." Picture of negotiation with the John Birch Society!

p.754

He portrays Barry Goldwater as the most moderate or the most left of the right in these words, "The spectrum of the right ran all the way from the amiability of Barry Goldwater to the ~~lunacy~~ lunacy of the outer fringe."

Having found no convenient excerpt from the writings of his designated left, including not a single ~~word~~ word from an article by Kazin that Kennedy seemed to resent, Schlesinger then switches to an excerpting of the most immoderate, most stupid and vilest writings of the right to reflect the attitude of his "extremist" toward the President.

p.759/60

.... When Thomas Mann left Washington shortly before the Bay of Pigs to become ambassador to Mexico, Kennedy wanted to persuade some figure of public consequence to take his place as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The search was frustrating and lost many valuable weeks. During this time the daily conduct of Latin American affairs remained in the hands of the permanent / government - biased officials in the State Department and the aid agency who believed that they alone understood the Latinos and dismissed the Alliance for Progress as a slogan left over from the presidential campaign.

They were decent and hard-working people. But their uncritical commitment to the conceptions of the fifties - to conservative regimes in politics and to private initiative and technical assistance in economics - hardly equipped them to compete with Fidel Castro for the allegiance of a continent in revolutionary ferment. ...

Note: At the end of this section, to illustrate the attitude of the State Department personnel, Schlesinger tells of "the contrast between two memoranda" from State to the White House on the same day. The first sought to avoid a personal acknowledgment from the President for a gift of his speeches from the president of Venezuela and the second sought to enlist the President's support for the fascist regime in Paraguay by getting the signature of ~~xxx~~ "someone in the White House" on what Schlesinger described as "an effusive letter of thanks" to the Paraguayan dictator.

A 1000 DAYS

Notes - Schlesinger - Personal Integrity

On the next two pages, 761/2, are a few references to Assistant Secretary of State, presumably for Latin-America, John Leddy. His name just appears without introduction, and there is nothing to identify his background, his experience, his attitudes; he just is there, and presumably is the person "of public consequence" Kennedy was seeking for this job.

p.769 .... If anyone had doubted this proposition, it received full verification in the tribulations of the Dominican Republic. Since 1930 Rafael Trujillo had operated a cruel and efficient dictatorship on the eastern half of the lovely but tragic old Spanish island of Hispaniola. His oppression of his own people was considered beyond the reach of the Organization of the American States; but, when he sent his agents to Caracas to kill Betancourt, the OAS rallied and in August 1960 recommended that its members break ambassadorial relations with Trujillo and embargo the import of arms and petroleum. ..

.... Kennedy examined the situation realistically. "There are three possibilities," he said, "in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't ex renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third."

p.770 .... He sent Robert Murphy, one of the most experienced of American diplomats, and John Bartlow / Martin, one of the best of American reporters, on quiet trips to Santo Domingo. Martin came back with a 115-page report so enthralling that Kennedy read it all with relish one autumn afternoon as he listened to the World Series. The accumulating information suggested that Balaguer was making an honest attempt to bring about a transition to democracy. The presence of young Trujillo remained troubling, however; and his control of the army presumably limited our capacity to do anything about him. Toward the end of August the State Department proposed that we try to induce the army, Balaguer, Ramfis Trujillo and the moderate opposition to stick together in order to lay the foundations for movement toward self-government. Kennedy agreed. "Balaguer is our only tool," he said. "The anti-communist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy."

Others at the meeting in the Cabinet Room supported this policy, some in terms that suggested a certain scorn for the democratic opposition. One described the intricate factional differences within the opposition in such vivid language that the Attorney General passed me a note, "This is as bad as New York City." Finally Morales-Carrion, evidently distressed over this part of the discussion, spoke up with sober eloquence. "The democratic opposition," he said, "are the people who represent the only possibility of democratic government in the Dominican Republic. They are the counterparts of the people who made democracy effective in Puerto Rico and Venezuela. Naturally they are not too well disciplined at the moment. They have lived under tyranny for thirty years. Now the lid is off, political life has revived and it is not always under control. But we must understand them and their position and their hopes. Otherwise we will lose all chance of bringing democracy to the Dominican Republic."

p.771 The President listened with a mixture of sympathy and doubt. Finally he said, "Yes, yes, but the whole key in all those countries is the emergence of a leader - a liberal figure who can command popular support as against the military and who will carry out social and economic reform - a Nehru or a Munoz. No such figure has emerged. We don't know who he will be. The great danger / in the next six months is a take-over by the army, which could lead straight to Castro. This is the situation we have to deal with now - that is why we must get a modus vivendi among all the forces prepared to commit themselves to democracy, instead of letting them tear themselves apart and let in the

far right or the far left. The eventual problem is to find someone who will symbolize the future for the island."

p.773 The Alliance for Progress represented the affirmative side of Kennedy's policy. The other side was his absolute determination to prevent any new state from going down the Castro road and so giving the Soviet Union a second bridgehead in the hemisphere.

P.774 British Guiana had a population of about 600,000, almost evenly divided between the Negroes of the towns and the East Indians of the countryside. The people enjoyed a considerable measure of self-government and, if things went according to schedule, were due for full independence ~~in~~ in another year or two. An election in September 1961 brought the Indian party, the People's Progressive Party, and its leader Dr. Cheddi Jagan into office. Jagan was unquestionably some sort of Marxist. His wife, an American girl whom he had met while studying dentistry in Chicago, had once been a member of the Young Communist League. His party lived by the cliches of an impassioned, quasi-Marxist, anti-colonialist socialism.

p.775

Jagan was plainly the most popular leader in British Guiana. The question was whether he was recoverable for democracy. Senator Dodd of Connecticut had pronounced him a communist agent, but then he had said the same thing about Sekou Toure. The British, on the other hand, were not unsympathetic toward Jagan. Though they had earlier imprisoned him more than once, they now claimed it was possible to work with him and that he was more responsible than his rival, the Negro leader Forbes Burnham. Their view, as communicated at the highest level, was that if Jagan's party were the choice of the people, London and Washington should do their best to keep him on the side of the west by cooperating fully with him and giving his regime economic support. Otherwise he would turn to the communist bloc, which would only guarantee Soviet influence in an independent British Guiana.

This was the situation when Jagan, after his election, expressed a desire to come to Washington and talk about assistance for his development program. At that point the State Department saw no real alternative to the British policy. The aid budget made tentative provision for assistance in the magnitude of \$5 million. Then in late October 1961 Jagan arrived. He made his American debut, like so many other visiting statesmen, on Meet the Press, where he resolutely declined to say anything critical of the Soviet Union and left an impression of either wooliness or fellow-traveling. This appearance instantly diminished the enthusiasm for helping his government. The President, who caught the last half of the show, called for a re-examination of all aspects of the problem, saying he wanted no commitments made until he had seen Jagan himself.

Jagan talked with the President on the morning of October 25. He turned out to be a personable and fluent East Indian but endowed, it seemed to those of us present, with an unconquerable romanticism or naivete. He began by outlining the economic circumstances of British Guiana and his own development plans. When he explained that, as a socialist, he felt that only state planning could break the bottlenecks, Kennedy said, "I want to make one thing perfectly clear. We are not engaged in a crusade to force private enterprise on parts of the world where it is not relevant. If we are engaged in a crusade for anything, it is national independence. That is the primary purpose of our aid. The secondary purpose is to encourage individual freedom and political freedom. But we can't always get that; and we have often helped coun-

\* See note on next page.

p.776

tries which have little personal freedom, like Yugoslavia, if they maintain their national independence. This is the basic thing. So long as you do that, we don't care whether you are socialist, capitalist, pragmatist or whatever. We regard ourselves as pragmatists." As for nationalization, the President said that we would, of course, expect compensation, but that we had lived with countries like Mexico and Bolivia which had carried out nationalization programs.  
66666

Note on p.775: Why should the head of a new state, or any state, be judged on his willingness to be nasty to a state with which, presumably, he would want to have normal relations and from which he might require economic aid? (Besides, I saw this program, and what Jagan refused to do was to red-bait and be red-baited.)

And compare Kennedy's "crusade ... for national independence" with what he did in British Guiana, where Jagan was twice elected.

He then began to draw out his visitor's political ideas. Recalling Jagan's words of admiration for Harold Laski on Meet the Press, Kennedy observed that he himself had studied for a term under Laski at the London School of Economics and that his older brother had visited the Soviet Union with him. Jagan replied that the first book of Laski's he had read was The American Presidency; he considered himself, he added, a Bevanite. We all responded agreeably to this, citing Bevan's faith in personal freedom and recalling his belief that the struggle of the future would be between democratic socialism and communism. Jagan, after avowing his commitment to parliamentary government, went on to say that he also admired the Monthly Review and the rather pro-communist writings of Paul Sweezy, Leo Huberman and Paul Baran. George Ball and I pressed him on this point, declaring there was a large difference between Bevan and the Sweezy group. Jagan finally said, "Well, Bevanism, Sweezyism, Hubermanism, Baranism - I really don't get those ideological subtleties." Kennedy observed later that this was the one time when his exposition rang false.

On p.776, note the tricky language and the undignified third degree to which the head of a new state was subjected.

For the rest Jagan spoke as a nationalist committed to parliamentary methods. When Kennedy asked how he conceived his relations with the communist block, Jagan inquired whether the United States would regard a trade agreement with the Soviet Union as an unfriendly act. Kennedy responded that a simple trading relationship was one thing; a relationship which brought a country into a condition of economic dependence was another. Ball described the case of Sekou Toure, who in order to recover his independence was now disengaging himself from the Soviet embrace.

The President avoided any discussion of aid figures. There were special problems here because Jagan was requesting \$40 million - a figure ~~xxxxx~~ all out of proportion to the size of his country, especially in relation to the competing needs of Latin American nations with much larger populations and closer bonds to the United States. / For this and other reasons, it was decided after the meeting that no concrete commitments would be made to Jagan and that each project would have to be examined on its merits. Jagan was considerably upset on learning this and asked to see the President again. Taking advantage of the President's usual free half-hour before luncheon, I reported these developments. Kennedy wholly agreed with the staff's recommendation

p.774

that he not receive Jagan a second time but instructed me to see him myself in view of the great British concern that Jagan not return disgruntled to British Guiana; perhaps a statement could be worked out which would give Jagan something to take home and satisfy the British without committing us to immediate action. Sitting down at his desk, he dashed off a longhand letter to Jagan, explaining that I came with his confidence, and asked Evelyn Lincoln to type it. When he looked at it again, he decided that it was a little cold, and told me to "warm it up" and signed the warmed-up letter.

The President went on to express doubt whether Jagan would be able to sustain his position as a parliamentary democrat. "I have a feeling," he said, "that in a couple of years he will find ways to suspend his constitutional provisions and will cut his opposition off at the knees. . . . Parliamentary democracy is going to be damn difficult in a country at this stage of ~~its~~ development. With all the political jockeying and all the racial tensions, it's going to be almost impossible for Jagan to concentrate the energies of his country on development through a parliamentary system."

With William Burdett, a careful and intelligent Foreign Service officer, I saw Jagan that afternoon at the Dupont Plaza. He was in a desperate mood at the thought of going home empty-handed but brightened at the prospect of a statement. The final text, worked out after complicated negotiation in the next twenty-four hours, committed Jagan "to uphold the political freedoms and defend the parliamentary democracy which is his country's fundamental heritage" and the United States to send a mission to determine what economic assistance we could give in support of the British Guiana development plan.

Note: Although Jagan made the commitment to democracy (as why should he not?), as Schlesinger has already said (p.774) he "was plainly the most popular leader" in the country, it is clear Schlesinger and his cronies (in opposition to the position of the State Department, which to Schlesinger is reactionary) had no intention of going through the the US end.

p.778

The problem was genuinely difficult. Assuming that Jagan would be the leader of an independent British Guiana, we estimated that, if we gave aid, there would be a 50 per cent chance of his going / communist, that, if we didn't, there would be a 90 per cent chance, and that we would all catch hell whatever we did. The State Department at first thought we should make the try; then Rusk personally reversed this policy in a stiff letter to the British early in 1962. AID was fearful from the start that assistance to British Guiana would cause congressional criticism and injure the whole aid program. The President, after meeting Jagan, had grown increasingly skeptical, but he was impressed by the British contention that there was no alternative. The British advanced this argument at every opportunity, though one always suspected that their main desire was to get out of British Guiana as quickly as possible and dump the whole problem on us (nor could one begrudge the Colonial Office its sarcasm when Americans, after bringing self-righteous pressure on London to advance the independence timetable in Africa, now kept urging delay in this case). Inside British Guiana the situation continued to disintegrate. In February 1962 frightening race riots broke out in Georgetown. Jagan, forgetting his objection to imperialism, requested British troops to help maintain order.

Note: Why should Rusk write a "stiff" letter to the British government about one of their territories they were giving freedom? Here it is clear that the US forced the British government into a change of policy and into an anti-democratic one. (Continued)



The end of the first paragraph is a brilliant display of Schlesinger at his dishonest best. The situation inside British Guiana "continued to disintegrate" because of the activities of the CIA and the AFL, which inspired and financed these riots as a means of a) preventing the granting of independence until b) they could arrange for their man Burnham to "be in charge". Although the CIA-AFL operation is public knowledge and was well publicized in Europe (recently in Washington Post as part of Jay Lovestone's work), had Schlesinger known all this, if, in fact, he did not have something to do with it, he doesn't mention it, preferring instead to blame it on the ~~frisking~~ victim. So far as the crack about Jagan's "forgetting his objection to imperialism" is concerned, this is the most vicious kind of dishonesty. British Guiana was still a British colony and it had, and in fact had been allowed, no army. What else was the prime minister to do except ask Britain for help to put down the CIA-AFL- inspired and financed race riots!

Thus far our policy had been based on the assumption that Forbes Burnham was, as the British described him, an opportunist, racist and demagogue intent only on personal power. One wondered about this, though, because the AFL-CIO people in British Guiana thought well of him; and Hugh Gaitskell told me that Burnham had impressed him more than Jagan when the two visited Labour party leaders in London. Then in May 1962 Burnham came to Washington. He appeared an intelligent, self-possessed, reasonable man, insisting quite firmly on his 'socialism' and 'neutrality' but stoutly anti-communist. He also seemed well aware that British Guiana had no future at all unless its political leaders tried to temper the racial animosities and unless he in particular gave his party, now predominately African, a bi-racial flavor. In the meantime, events had convinced us that Jagan, though perhaps not a disciplined communist, had that kind of deep pro-communist emotion which only sustained experience with communism could cure; and the United States could not afford the Sekou Toure therapy when it involved a quasi-communist regime on the mainland of Latin America. Burnham's visit left the feeling, / as I reported to the President, that "an independent British Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham will commit himself to ~~xxxx~~ a multi-racial policy) would cause us many fewer problems than an independent British Guiana under Jagan." And the way was open to bring it about, because Jagan's parliamentary strength was larger than his popular strength: he had won 57 per cent of the seats on the basis of 42.7 per cent of the vote. An obvious solution would be to establish a system of proportional representation.

This, after prolonged discussion, the British government finally did in October 1963; and elections held finally at the end of 1964 produced a coalition government under Burnham. With much unhappiness and turbulence, British Guiana seemed to have passed safely out of the communist orbit.

Note: What is the need for a newly freed colony to have elections when it has Schlesinger to decide its politics, its policies and its leadership for it? Which is exactly what he did and says he did! "The way was open to" bring in Burnham, who had lost two elections to Jagan (a second one in an effort to overcome the first) Schlesinger says. This is false. In order to "open the way" not only did the US force the British to throw out two elections that Jagan had won against Burnham, the white wealthy property owners and the ~~USxxxxxx~~ CIA and the AFL and all their money and power (and his, despite Schlesinger's implication, was the only bi-racial party), but also to change the election system

to one which had been abandoned in the US and was not in use in Britain, one by which Kennedy would not have been elected - (or Truman?)

This is US and Kennedy's dedication to democracy, to "national independence" for small countries?

Coming atop the Dominican Republic, where Kennedy said he'd stick with Trujillo's people rather than run the risk of what he thought might be something like Castroism from an election (see p.769) is another example of the same. Both, it should be noted, preceded the introduction of missiles into Cuba and even the appeal to the USSR for help. They certainly were both public and known to Khrushchev when he made his decision. To Schlesinger, ~~however~~ this "however, was a marginal problem!" (p.779)

Note that he suppresses what he does not misrepresent. He doesn't even say that a single election was held, referring instead to what was the result of one of the elections, a 57% control of the parliament on a 42.7% of the vote, a rather good performance under the parliamentary system. Better than any in France, for example, for a number of decades until de Gaulle. And it is a much healthier parliamentary majority than Harold Wilson had in Britain at the time of publication of Schlesinger's book.

See also how he handles the "victory" of the Apristas, p.785 ff.

p.780 .... While Lleras Camargo sought mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba, President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina came to Palm Beach at the end of the month (12/61) in order to tell Kennedy, in effect, that the Castro problem could not be met head-on, that Washington was obsessed with Cuba at the expense of the long-run needs of the hemisphere and that a public OAS fight over Cuba would only strengthen Castro.

Within the United States government, de Lesseps Morrison, our ambassador to the OAS, urged economic and diplomatic sanctions even at the risk of splitting the OAS. He argued that, if we brought enough pressure on the Latin-American countries, they would come along anyway, no matter how unwillingly. ...

Note: The historian does not note that not so long after this outspoken (and courageous) expression of opinion by Frondizi - certainly reflected by a number of Latin-American leaders, although Schlesinger is careful not to indicate (pp.779-80) that opposition to the U.S. position could have been the reason a single Latin-American state opposed US pressure for OAS "collective action" against Cuba, Frondizi was overthrown by the army - and except Cuba's, every Latin-American army is at least heavily indebted to and influenced by the Pentagon. He does say that "Frondizi, the artful dodger," who was not in support of the US position at Punta Del Este, that his army was dissatisfied and overthrew him after the March elections "When the Peronistas made impressive gains."

Schlesinger has no harsh word to say for the overthrow of an elected President by the military when he doesn't like the president's opposition to his own politics and desires.

p.779 British Guiana, however, was a marginal problem. The central threat remained Fidel Castro, whose broadcasters were now inveighing daily and agents conspiring nightly against the democratic regimes of Latin America.

pp.781/3

p.782

The conference displayed Rusk at his best. Here all his qualities - his intelligence, command of detail, inexhaustible patience and effortless incrutability - precisely fitted the requirements of the occasion. With members of Congress and the Caribbean foreign ministers harassing him on one side and representatives of the / most important South American states harassing him on the other, he strove coolly to work out the best possible combination of condemnation and consensus. There were twelve sure votes for a hard policy; but among the dissenters were the largest countries of the hemisphere - Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile - as well as Bolivia and Ecuador. Uruguay and Haiti hung uncertainly in the middle. The foreign minister of Haiti, recognizing the value of his vote, calmly remarked to Rusk that he came from a poor country in desperate need of aid; obviously this need would affect his vote. If the United States, which had been disengaging from aid to Haiti because of the Duvalier dictatorship, would agree to finance particular projects. . . . Rusk turned away and later sent him a message saying that, while the United States as a matter of policy did not associate economic aid and political performance, now that Haiti itself had made the link, it had to understand that any future aid would be scrutinized in the light of its role at Punta del Este.

In the meantime a new idea was emerging out of the incessant buzz of talk in the lobbies and corridors of the San Rafael Hotel - that the government of Cuba be excluded from the inter-American system. This idea had been informally advanced by Argentines seeking an alternative to mandatory sanctions. It could be done at once at this meeting; it would therefore spare wobbly governments the pain of taking something home which their parliaments would have to debate and ratify.

...  
 Note: When Rusk pleases and satisfied Schlesinger's personal politics, Schlesinger can't find any praise that is excessive, condoning even Rusk's calculated threat of economic retaliation against Haiti.

His use of the phrase "spare wobby governments" to describe a device to avoid the democratic process is as interesting as his lack of note of the political orientation and beliefs of Hickenlooper, close to the far end of the Republican right, and Selden, whose devotion to the principle that the US should intervene - militarily - in Latin American countries, embodied in a House Resolution that passed in 1965, led to serious international reactions and such opposition at home that the Senate didn't pass it.

It would seem that the inclusion of these two men in the delegation appointed by Kennedy shows that he joined them, and that he wanted them because of their known positions. They are not the kind of men one would expect a "liberal" to appoint. He finds excuses for Kennedy's acceptance of Frondizi's overthrow and arrest and confinement recognition of the new regime as "constitutional", which he describes as that of a "realist".

But (786-7) when the Peruvian army overthrew a president and the election of the Apristas ("the strongest-anti-communist force and the best means of keeping the working class from communism" in the favorably quoted words of Ambassador James Loeb) shortly thereafter, Kennedy suspended relations, even though the army and the subsequently elected president both charged "fraud". Although with Jagan, who had more than 50% of the seats in parliament and more than 40% of the popular vote, the US connived and brought pressure in England to alter the election, in the case of Haya de la Torre, whose politics suited him, Schlesinger found him "freely elected", if by "only a third of the popular vote."

Anticipating what would happen, Loeb went to Washington in March and "worked out his contingency planning with (Assistant Secretary of State for ~~Latin America~~ Inter-American Affairs) Edwin Martin and then with the President."

The Chilean Foreign Minister had warned the US, Schlesinger acknowledges, "against being more royalist than the king." (787)

p.783

.... Assistant Secretary Woodward solved these juridical scruples by arguing ingeniously that the declaration of incompatibility would exclude Cuba automatically. As for Haiti, we finally yielded to blackmail and agreed to resume our aid to the airport at Port Au Prince.<sup>o</sup> There remained the Caribbean states which still wanted mandatory sanctions; ...

<sup>o</sup> In the end, after new problems, we never built the airport.

Comment: The introduction to this chapter contains a report of a chance meeting between Che Guevara and Richard Goodwin at the first Punta del Este conference in which Guevara "with surprising freedom" described the economic problems of Cuba and, in Schlesinger's words, said that, while any real understanding with the US was impossible, "what about some sort of modus vivendi? He indicated that Cuba might be prepared to pay compensation in trade for expropriated properties and to forswear formal alliance, though not ideological loyalty, to the east." Schlesinger agrees with Goodwin's appraisal that this was an effort to get Washington "to call off the policy of containment before the Latin American governments generalized" (p.795)

4  
p.795

THE GAMBLE - first subsection, (pp.795-7)

p.795 On July 2, 1962, Raul Castro, the Minister of the Armed Forces, arrived in Moscow. Either before his arrival or very soon thereafter the Soviet and Cuban governments arrived at a startling decision: that Soviet ~~and Cuban governments~~ nuclear missiles were to be secretly installed in Cuba in the fall.

Comment: This is good writing because it excites the interest of the reader and begins with a very dramatic treatment. However, it is remarkably poor and wholly inaccurate reporting, for it leaves out entirely the background and entirely the context in which the decision was made and in no way indicates what immediately led to it or how.

Explaining that "the Soviet Union had never before placed nuclear missiles in any other country", Schlesinger in a burst of yellow journalism asks a question he does not answer, "Why?"

p.795 ... Why should it now send nuclear missiles to a country thousands of miles away, lying within the zone of vital interest of their main adversary, a land, moreover, headed by a willful leader of, from the Russian viewpoint, somewhat less than total reliability?

Comment: After quoting what he presents as different versions of who made the decision as reported by Castro to newspapermen, without in any way establishing that he is talking only of missiles and not of the defense of Cuba, Schlesinger then quotes what Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet in December 1962:

pp.795/6 "We carried weapons there at the request of the Cuban government . . . including the stationing of a couple of score of Soviet IREMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) in Cuba. These weapons were to be in the hands of Soviet military men. . . . Our aim was only to defend Cuba." The presence of the missiles, Khrushchev continued, was designed to make the imperialists understand that, if they tried to invade Cuba, "the war which they threatened to start stood at their own borders, so that they would realize more realistically the dangers of thermonuclear war." This was all very noble, and the defense of Cuba was certainly a side effect of the Soviet action. But the defense of

Cuba did not really require the introduction of long-range nuclear missiles. One may be sure that Khrushchev, like any other national leader, took that decision not for Cuban reasons but for Soviet reasons. pending Khrushchev's reminiscences, one can only speculate as to what these Soviet reasons were.

Comment: One might have thought Schlesinger, in the course of such a lengthy and definitive ~~history~~ history, might have found it informative for his reader to know that the Soviet Union had been pledged to come to the defense of Cuba if Cuba was threatened from an attack by the US. Instead, he argues with a mixture of irony, half-fact, distortion and falsity. The missiles were not long range but were short ~~range~~ and intermediate. The defense of Cuba was not a side effect but the only possible effect (see Khrushchev's secret letter to Kennedy in Abel) for the transferring of the entire Russian military establishment to the island of Cuba could not successfully defend Cuba from destruction if the US determined upon this course. Whether or not "noble", in the same space Schlesinger could have informed the reader that it was in pursuance of an agreement, a commitment by the Soviet Union to defend Cuba. The oddest thing of all is that Schlesinger, in common with the rest of the President's top advisers, already had "Khrushchev's reminiscences" quoted earlier in this very paragraph, so he need not "speculate as to what these Soviet reasons were" and, in common with all the other President's advisers, he had already reached a decision as to what the Soviet reasons were and the entire American conduct was based upon this decision - three years before this book was written! It is passing strange that here, Schlesinger should see fit to at least cast doubt at the whole mythology on which the American action was based.

Now Schlesinger launches in to his own mythology of hard-nosed, hard-line "total victory" element in the Soviet Union desiring "the Supreme Soviet probe of American intentions". His evidence of this consists of two words: "no doubt".

Contrary to his own footnote and the evidence of others, he says there were to be "about sixty-four" medium and intermediate range missiles which would "thereby come near to doubling Soviet striking capacity against American targets". (Here it is worth recalling his own earlier description of identical missiles in Turkey where the US had them for what could only be first-strike capability; but he is careful to avoid saying that the Soviet Union could use them in Cuba, if they were intended for use at all, only as a first-strike weapon). T

The footnote says that under construction were 24 pads for medium and 16 for intermediate range missiles and that while "Forty-two medium-range missiles were brought to Cuba" (he finds its "seems reasonable to presume that at least six more were on the way", altho there is no evidence of any) "Apparently no intermediate-range missiles ever arrived." This would appear to be contradiction to everybody else, including the President. He explains it by saying that it took longer to construct bases for them "and there may have seemed no point in sending the missiles until the bases were nearer completion."

The worry was not about the military balance for "this would still leave the United States with a two-to-one superiority in nuclear power targeted against the Soviet Union", figuring

on 64 missiles in Cuba. The problem was "political balance" because "every country in the world, watching so audacious an action ninety miles from the United States, would wonder whether it could ever thereafter trust Washington's ~~again~~ resolution and protection" (p.796)

It would also, in Schlesinger's tortured reasoning, "permit Khrushchev, who had been dragging out the Berlin negotiations all year, to reopen that question". Again, this is a unique type of reasoning. When did Khrushchev ever need any excuse? And how do you "reopen" a question on which you are already in "negotiation all year"?

But with some accuracy, Schlesinger describes this:

p.797

.... It was a staggering project - staggering in its recklessness, staggering in its misconception of the ~~the~~ American response, staggering in its rejection of the groundrules for coexistence among the superpowers which Kennedy had offered in Vienna.

Comment: Kennedy's "offer" of ground rules in Vienna, of course, had no standing and certainly not the ~~the~~ sanction that Schlesinger here tries to give them. Nor did Khrushchev wait until this time to "reject" what Kennedy had "offered" as Schlesinger own lengthy discussion of the Vienna meeting makes clear. Khrushchev at the ~~meeting~~ meeting told Kennedy he would not accept the new strictures Kennedy was trying to impose upon him and everything in his subsequent actions made clear that he had not and would not. By this agonizing anti-reasoning Schlesinger tries to say that what Kennedy offered was a proper thing, that Khrushchev until this moment had accepted, and that it was in fact Khrushchev that was challenging the normal relationship between powers. The opposite is true. It was Kennedy who sought without success to impose upon Khrushchev his, Kennedy's, ambitions for the relationship between the two powers.

Here he launches into a speculative delineation of the kind of planning that went into the establishment in Cuba of 2 different types of missiles and aircraft, the SAM anti-aircraft missiles "to protect bases and deter photographic reconnaissance" and the "offensive weapons, both ballistic missiles and Ilyushin-28 jet aircraft able to deliver nuclear bombs". Of course, this was done by superstealth, etc. All the propaganda devices they used here, including the slight omission of a more precise description of Ilyushin 28, an outdated, short-range plane which could carry nuclear bombs as could any number, for example, of commercial airliners. Sorensen (?) quotes the concession that this was really not an offensive aircraft, but again there remains the unique American definition of "offensive".

Of the installation of the SAMs, Schlesinger says this "required no special concealment". He implies that installation of the other missiles did, but he does not in fact say that any effort was ever made to conceal them. He accomplishes this by such devious writing as "one can only imagine the provisions made in Moscow and Havana ... all with a stealth and speed designed to confront the United States ..." or as by saying that ~~xxxx~~ it "called for the most careful and complex program of deception". - This is typical of what might be called Schlesinger's stuck pig writing; when he has no fact, he invents it by a screaming-bloody-murder kind of yellow journalism.



Also conspicuous by its absence is any reference to the existence of a single nuclear warhead in all of Cuba (p.797).

THE SURVEILLANCE - second subsection (pp.797-801)

p.797

Here again there is an entirely unhistorian-like lack of precision. Schlesinger says "By late July the Soviet shipments began to arrive. Three weeks later CIA sent an urgent report to the President that 'something new and different' was taking place in Soviet aid operations to Cuba. There were perhaps 5000 'specialists' now in Cuba ..." and that other specialists "more electronic and construction equipment" were en route with military construction going on, etc.. The data "suggested" the refurbishing of air defense, "presumably by putting up a network of SAM sites."

In the light of the characteristics of Schlesinger's concept of history as revealed in this book, it is not niggling to point out that he didn't say the President received the urgent report 3 weeks later but that it was sent and we are left to presume that he did receive it. Also, there is no evidence in the writing that the rest of the information was contained in this report. The one thing that is hard is that at some time, presumably near "late July", there was reason to believe missiles were being installed in Cuba. Structurally, the presumption to which Schlesinger refers relates as much to the nature of the missiles as to the fact, and to the fact as to the nature.

Eliminating self-serving interpolations and propaganda, Schlesinger next says Moscow "decided to insure the regime against external attack". The propaganda has to do with the intention of establishing a "Soviet bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere", increasing Castro's prestige and showing the world "Washington's inability to prevent such things at its very doorstep", clearly an attribution to "Moscow" of what it suited Schlesinger and the administration to attribute to them, for which Schlesinger has ~~no~~ laid no foundation in normal logic or fact. What little attempt at reasoning consists in saying ~~that~~ "obviously, Moscow had calculated that the United States" after the Bay of Pigs, couldn't object. For only a flashing instant, a single member of the intelligence community, John McCone, ever doubted "the Soviet Union would conceivably go beyond defensive weapons." Here the bland assumption that only the US could define for the Soviet Union and for Cuba what was defensive and offensive. Now we here from Schlesinger not the "historian" but the international lawyer: "The introduction of nuclear missiles, for example, would obviously legitimize an American response, ~~we~~ even possibly an invasion of Cuba." We must assume his competence as an international lawyer is beyond question, for he ~~makes~~ no authority, even one less than "obvious", that granted such legitimization.

cites

In fact, what is "obvious" to him is so obscure to the Soviet Union that he at no time indicates the Soviet Union would so construe American reaction. His whole argument, like that of the administration, is that the Soviet Union never assumed such a thing would happen - that they, in fact, planned the opposite would happen. Only American experts made this assumption, and