

p.393

curious resemblances of the sort which led the President later to invoke the mirror metaphor in discussing Soviet pronouncements. Like Kennedy, Khrushchev was unyielding on his basic position. Like Kennedy, he talked about calling up reservists. Like Kennedy, he mused about the perils of nuclear war. Like Kennedy, he asked his adversaries to meet round the conference table, clear the atmosphere, "rely on reason and not on the power of thermonuclear weapons."

And so the crisis grew in the first weeks of August. Kennedy, having launched his military build-up, now tried to set his diplomatic offensive in motion. He had been pressing the State Department to prepare negotiating positions ever since the Hyannis Port meeting, but it was uphill work. This was in part because of the very genuine intellectual difficulty of devising a proposal. One day Dean Acheson, after hearing Chayes present the case for negotiation, challenged him to come up with a concrete formula: "You'll find, Abe, that it just won't write." Now Acheson himself, in response to the President's request, made his own recommendations. He suggested that the western foreign ministers be called together at the end of August to concert a stand. This could be followed by negotiations with the Soviet Union after the West German elections in September and lead to a four-power foreign ministers' meeting after the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October. As for the content of our negotiating position, Acheson offered in effect a dressed-up version of the status quo.

Acheson's ideas were more helpful with regard to procedure than to substance. Moreover, his star was beginning to wane. He had disapproved of the conciliatory passages in the President's speeches, and some of his characteristically slashing comments had got back to Kennedy, who regretted them, not because they were critical, but because he did not feel, any more than he had after the Bay of Pigs, that those involved in decisions should make their criticisms public. As for Acheson's timetable, even this seemed a little slow. Bundy, McNamara and Maxwell Taylor all thought that the meeting of western foreign ministers should take place as soon as possible; and Kennedy agreed.

p.394

Early in August, Rusk went to Paris to work out a negotiating strategy with his three western counterparts. The hope was to find enough agreement to justify inviting the Soviet Union to a four-power conference. The British wanted this, and the West Germans were more receptive than anticipated. But the Americans still had no solid position to propose, and the French remained flatly hostile to the whole idea. De Gaulle soon wrote to Kennedy that the opening of negotiations would be considered immediately as a prelude to the abandonment, at least gradually, of Berlin and as a sort of notice of our surrender. The Paris gathering consequently broke up without result. One wonders whether, if it had produced an invitation to Moscow to discuss the crisis, the Russians would have dared carry through the drastic action they were preparing for the next weekend.

4. The Wall

For the Berlin crisis was having its most spectacular effect in East Germany itself. The big refugee exodus was growing every day; over thirty thousand fled to West Berlin in July alone. Toward the end of the month the East German regime imposed new measures intended to restrict the flight, but the effect was only to increase it. Escape was fast becoming an obsession.

Remembering 1953, our embassy in Bonn began to report the possibility of a popular uprising in East Germany. In Washington a few people began to speculate about further communist countermeasures.

Under-
linin
mine

Richard Rovere wrote in The New Yorker that Khrushchev had "the means at hand for ending the largest of his problems with West Berlin; the flow of refugees could be sealed off at any time." In a television interview on July 30 Senator Fulbright remarked, "I don't understand why the East Germans don't close their border because I think they have a right to close it." Early in August the President, strolling with Walt Rostow along the colonnade by the Rose Garden, observed that Khrushchev would have to do something internally to re-establish control over the situation - and that, if he did, we would not be able to do a thing about it. Eastern Europe was a vital interest for Khrushchev, and he could not stand by and let it trickle away. But it was not a vital interest for the United States. "I can get the alliance to move if he tries to do anything about West Berlin but not if he just does something about East Berlin."

p.395

On August 13, a few minutes after midnight, East German troops and police occupied most of the crossing-points on the East Berlin side of the dividing line, tore up the streets and installed roadblocks and barbed-wire barricades. Despite the presidential and/or other anticipations, the action caught the State Department and the CIA by surprise; evidently the test-of-will thesis had diverted attention too long from the local problems of East Germany. And it was at first hard to decide what the action meant. For - contrary to the later impression that on August 13 the East Germans built overnight a great wall, which the allies, if they had had any guts, should have promptly bulldozed down - a number of crossing-points remained open, the construction of a concrete wall did not begin until August 17, and movement between the sectors continued for several days after that. For all Washington could tell on the thirteenth, the intention might have been to control rather than to end the refugee flow; and this hardly was a reason for invading the eastern sector and thereby inviting retaliation and risking war.

Yet the possibility remained that the intention might be far more sinister: that the Wall might represent the unfolding of an unalterable Soviet plan, based on a conviction of American irresolution, to drive the west out of Berlin. Kennedy, remarking that there was one chance out of five of a nuclear exchange, instantly mobilized the resources of government. These were grim days and nights. The Berlin Task Force went into continuous session. Rejecting some countermeasures, like cutting off interzonal trade, as too drastic and others, like changing the system of interzonal passes, as too trivial, it reached the somewhat impotent conclusion that accelerating the military build-up in the United States was the most effective response. The Task Force also drafted a formal protest. But it took four days - four interminable days so far as West Berlin was concerned - before the protest was delivered in Moscow.

p.396

The apparent American impassivity not unnaturally alarmed the West Berliners; and on August 16 Mayor Willy Brandt wrote Kennedy condemning the feeble western reaction and proposing a series of more stringent responses. He did not, however, suggest anything like the dispatch of troops into East Berlin to dismantle the barriers. Kennedy replied that the "brutal border closing" represented a Soviet decision which only war could reverse and that no one had supposed "that we should go to war on this point." Nonetheless, Brandt's letter, reinforced by cables from our Minister in Berlin, made it clear that some American reaction more specific than the general military build-up was necessary to sustain the morale of West Berlin. Kennedy therefore decided to send Vice-President Johnson to carry his answer to Brandt and at the same time to signify to the Russians that Berlin was an ultimate American commitment. He also ordered a battle group of 1500 men to move from West Germany to West Berlin.

.....

The Wall remained, a shabby obscenity straggling across the face of the city. In retrospect it seems to have been a defensive rather than an aggressive action. It represented a solution, at considerable political cost, of the problem which, more perhaps than anything else, had led Khrushchev to reopen the Berlin question earlier in the year. By stanching the blood-flow from East Germany, the Wall secured the most immediate Soviet interest in Berlin. Kennedy's determination to rebuild the military power of the west had shown Khrushchev that he could not obtain his maximum objectives by bluff. Now the Wall, by achieving his minimum objective, released him from the necessity of forcing the issue to a showdown.

5. The Crisis Fades Away

This was not, however, fully perceived at the time. It is hard now to recall the forebodings of the late summer of 1961, to evoke again the pessimism that shrouded the government. George Kennan came back from Belgrade for a few days early in August. "I am expendable, I have no further official career, and I am going to do everything I can to prevent a war," he said to me one afternoon with great earnestness. ". . . We both know how tenuous a relation there is between a man's intentions and the consequences of his acts. There is no presumption more terrifying than that of those who would blow up the world on the basis of their personal judgment of a transient situation. I do not propose to let the future of mankind be settled, or ended, by a group of men operating on the basis of limited perspectives and short-run calculations. I figure that the only thing I have left in life is to do everything I can to stop the war."

These were strange, moody days. Khrushchev told Drew Pearson / of his admiration for John Foster Dulles, and this seemed to portend new Soviet experiments in brinkmanship. The Wall was followed on August 24 by an angry Soviet note accusing the west of using the air corridors to import "revanchists, extremists, saboteurs and spies" into Berlin and on August 30 by the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing (in the face of Khrushchev's statement to Kennedy at Vienna that he would not test until we did). When Rusk commented to the President on September 5 that Moscow was showing little interest in negotiation, Kennedy replied grimly, "It isn't time yet. It's too early. They are bent on scaring the world to death before they begin negotiating, and they haven't quite brought the pot to boil. Not enough people are frightened." In this atmosphere, I found myself writing friends abroad, "I feel more gloomy about international developments that I have felt since the summer of 1939."

Given this apparent Soviet desperation, the White House group regarded it as more urgent than ever to speed the military build-up and at the same time to exhaust every diplomatic recourse before Armageddon. On August 14, the day after the first crossing-points were closed, Bundy reported to the President unanimity in his immediate staff for the view that we should take a clear initiative for negotiation within the next week or ten days. The possibility of a revolt in East Germany constituted a further argument for seizing the initiative. The State Department, he added, was more cautious about American action, preferring to keep things within the four-power process. Bundy, doubting whether new ideas would come out of the four-power discussions and noting that we were making very slow headway toward a clear position, suggested that a public deadline might be the only way to galvanize the lumbering machinery into action.

A 1000 XAYS

Berlin 1961 - Advisers

p.401 That night at the Free University of Berlin he delivered the Ernst Reuter lecture in honor of the great mayor of the air-lift crisis. We had discussed this talk on the plane from Rome. Someone in Clay's headquarters had sent him an emotional draft filled with denunciations of communist perfidy and promises of American deliverance. The Attorney General had quickly put it aside. There was no point, he said, in kidding anybody, no point in exciting emotions beyond the possibility of satisfaction. This was not responsible.

pp. 404/5

The Berlin crisis of 1961 represented a further step beyond Laos in the education of the President in the controlled employment of force for the service of peace. One never knows, of course, what would have happened if Kennedy had ordered full mobilization, or if he had rushed straight to negotiation; but either extreme might well have invited Soviet miscalculation and ended in war. ...

As for the negotiations which had seemed ~~so~~ so urgent in the early autumn of 1961, they lost their priority after Khrushchev dropped his deadline and descended from the heads of state to the foreign office bureaucracies. In early 1962 each side tabled its set of proposals in a succession of Rusk-Gromyko talks. But technical formulas were not likely to bridge the gap between the allies' determination to stay in Berlin and the Soviet determination to drive them out. It seemed probable that Khrushchev did not want the gap bridged. He realized after the summer of 1961 that he could not expel the west within the existing equilibrium of military force. But he still cherished his dream of a communist Berlin, and this no doubt led him to ponder in 1962 how he might revise the military equilibrium to permit the renewal of his campaign under a balance of power more favorable to the Soviet Union.

It would take still another and more terrible crisis - the moment of supreme risk which Kennedy had predicted to James Wechsler - before Khrushchev was willing to abandon the politics of intimidation and before Kennedy, two long years after Vienna, was able to pick up the threads of his policy and try again to lead the world beyond the cold war.

Note: Self-justification; assumes as fact what isn't, ~~xxx~~ i.e., negotiations not important; Khrushchev wanted "Communist" Berlin, rather than end of problem it made for him, and is an effort to justify later missile crisis as outgrowth of Berlin crisis.

p.406 The frustrations of the summer over Berlin brought the President's discontent with his Department of State to a climax. One muddle after another - the Department's acquiescence in the Bay of Pigs, the fecklessness of its recommendations after the disaster, the ordeal of trying to change its attitude toward Laos, the maddening delay over the answer to Khrushchev's aide-memoire and the banality of the result, the apparent impossibility of developing a negotiation position for Berlin - left Kennedy with little doubt that the State Department was not yet an instrumentality fully and promptly responsive to presidential purpose.

p.411 Bureaucratization was only part of the explanation for State's malaise when Kennedy came to office. The other part was the shock of McCarthy - or rather the shock of the readiness of Dulles, as Secretary of State, to yield up Foreign Service officers to McCarthyism. The Dulles period was a time of distress and humiliation for the professionals. These years saw the expulsion of experienced and independent-minded diplomats, like John Davies, Jr., and the exile of others, like Charles Bohlen. A proud Service found itself ordered about by Scott McLeod, a coarse straw boss whom Dulles brought in as Security Administrator, and cowering before juvenile comedians like Roy Cohn and G. David Schine. Circumspection had always eased the path to advancement in the Service; now it became a requirement for survival. The McCarthy era, by demonstrating the peril of dangerous thoughts, elevated conformism into a conditioned reflex. Career men stopped telling Washington what they really thought and consecrated themselves to the cliches of the cold war. Some did this more skillfully than others, and the result, as Davies wrote later, was that "many cautious mediocrities rose to the top of the Service," along with those most uncritically committed to the cold-war view of the world.

A 1000 DAYS

Advisers - Policies

p.414 No one was more annoyed by this fidelity to the past, or more poignant in expressing his annoyance, than Galbraith. "You have no idea," he wrote me from New Delhi in 1961, "how difficult it is to control one's reaction over the smug pursuit of what experience has already shown to be disastrous policies."

pp.416-7

Caution even smothered the Department's relations with its own envoys abroad. In Western Europe after the Bay of Pigs one ambassador after another asked me in varying tones of perplexity and anguish what in hell had happened. On my return I called for the cable files and found that Washington had confined itself to sending / around bland official 'explanations' couched in language suitable for public release. For what had really happened American diplomats overseas did better to rely on Newsweek and Time. Even though the Attorney General interested himself in the problem, we were never able to persuade State to level with its own embassies on this matter. This sort of thing was all too common. Galbraith, after receiving a similarly useless 'explanation' of policy, sent a crisp cable to the Department suggesting that in the future the confidential communications of the State Department not be used for purposes of "internal bemusement." The suggestion was unavailing.

.....
~~XXXXXX~~ pp.426-8

..... The Bay of Pigs provided Kennedy the warning and confirmed his temperamental instinct to reach deep inside State, Defense and the CIA in order to catch hold of policies before these policies made his choices for him. "Domestic policy," he used to say, "can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us."

..... He wanted to end the faceless system of indecision and inaction which diffused foreign policy among the three great bureaucracies of State, Defense and the CIA. .B.

p.427

..... These instructions were aimed particularly at the CIA. Cuba and Laos had already provided the new administration with horrible examples of the readiness of CIA operatives in the field to go off on policies of their own. This was only the most spectacular expression of the steady growth of the CIA in the 1950s. The CIA's budget now exceeded State's by more than 50 per cent (though it was less than half that of the intelligence operations of the Defense Department). Its staff had doubled in a decade. In some areas the CIA had outstripped the State Department in the quality of its personnel, partly because it paid higher salaries and partly because Allen Dulles's defiance of McCarthy enabled it to attract and hold abler men. It had almost as many people under official cover overseas as State; in a number of embassies CIA officers outnumbered those from State in the political sections. Often the CIA station chief had been in the country longer than the ambassador, had more money at his disposal and exerted more influence. The CIA had its own political desks and military staffs; it had in effect its own foreign service, its own air force, even, on occasion, its own combat forces. Moreover, the CIA declined to clear its clandestine intelligence operations either with the State Department in Washington or with the ambassador in the field; and, while covert political operations were cleared with State, this was sometimes done, not at the start, but after the operation had almost reached the point beyond which it could not easily be recalled. The coincidence that one Dulles brother was head of State and another the head of the CIA had resulted in practical independence for the Agency, because Allen Dulles could clear things with Foster without clearing them with Foster's Department. The lucky success in Guatemala, moreover, stirred dangerous

p.428

longs for adventure in CIA breasts.

None of this is to suggest that the CIA constituted, in the title of a popular expose, an "invisible government" or that its influence was always, or often, reactionary and sinister. In my experience its leadership was politically enlightened and sophisticated. Not seldom CIA representatives took a more liberal line in White House meetings than their counterparts from State. A great deal of CIA energy went to the support of the anti-Communist left around the world - political parties, trade unions and other undertakings. None the less, it had acquired a power which, however beneficial its exercise often might be, blocked State Department control over the conduct of foreign affairs.

..... The Agency itself suffered from doubt and gloom after Cuba, and it was feared that drastic measures would cause total demoralization. Instead, Kennedy moved quietly to cut the CIA budget in 1962 and again in 1963, aiming at a 20 per cent reduction by 1966. ...

p.439 The Bay of Pigs experience had provided convincing evidence that the President ~~xxxx~~ required people in the State Department whose basic loyalty would be to him, not to the Foreign Service or the Council on Foreign Relations.

p.469 During the campaign he repeatedly condemned the Eisenhower administration on the ground that "in the entire U.S. Government we have had fewer than one hundred men working on the complex problems of arms control." Taking up the Democratic Advisory Council's proposal ~~to establish a new organization to work for disarmament~~ ~~of a National Peace Agency,~~ Kennedy promised to establish a new organization to work for disarmament and declared that "the fight for disarmament must command the personal attention and concern of the President of the United States."

° The idea of a National Peace Agency was first submitted to the DAC by Trevor Gardner, who had served briefly as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in the Eisenhower administration, and Dr. Harrison Brown of the California Institute of Technology. It was revised and approved by the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology and adopted by the DAC, with Kennedy's specific endorsement, on December 5, 1959.

Note: While Schlesinger reports Kennedy's condemnation of the Eisenhower administration for "having fewer than 100 men" working on arms control, it is conspicuous that, while going into the Kennedy administration's disarmament activities, he fails to give the number it had on disarmament or even to state that Kennedy increased that staff by a single man.

p.470 But still little happened. The Russians rejected the Baruch Plan; and the UN Disarmament Commission, established in 1952, degenerated into a sort of gladiatorial combat where the contestants waged unrelenting political warfare, brandishing their schemes and retreating in confusion whenever the other side showed any tendency to accept them. ... As for America, in spite of Harold Stassen's valiant efforts during his time as disarmament negotiator, our policy remained formalistic, like the Soviet's - dedicated to developing positions, not for negotiation, but for propaganda.

.....
 p.474 After all, the United States had nominally accepted "general and complete disarmament" in the 1959 UN resolution, even if our actual proposals before and after had suggested that we were interested only in partial measures and unwilling to go the distance. Any retreat from the goal of general and complete disarmament by the new administration, Stevenson warned, would be disastrous, and we had to put forward a strong and convincing plan if we were to strengthen allied unity and beat the Soviet Union in the UN.

.....
 When someone on McCloy's plane to Moscow pointed out that the plan involved the reduction of national forces in the final phase to the level required to maintain internal security and meant therefore the disappearance of all national nuclear establishments, a representative of the Navy objected that this was wrong; a nuclear arsenal would still be necessary "to maintain internal security against the Russians."

pp.478/9 Moreover, it was an issue on which we could make time against the Soviet Union: "We are ready for inspection; they aren't; and we should take all the advantage of this we can." Steven-

son of course agreed but added earnestly, "We can't do this effectively if we ourselves equivocate. Your first decision, Mr. President, must be to make sure that you yourself are genuinely for general and complete disarmament. We must go for that. Everything else in our program derives from it. Only total disarmament will save the world from the horror of nuclear war as well as from the mounting expenses of the arms race. Your basic decision must be to identify yourself with a new approach to disarmament. This must be our principal initiative in the United Nations."

/ 1. Strategy for the General Assembly

Under-
lining
mine

Kennedy listened with interest but also with a slight tinge of skepticism. With his profoundly realistic mind, he saw little present chance of significant progress and therefore looked to disarmament primarily as a measure of political warfare, feeling at the same time that, if the political warfare were to be effective, our plan, unlike its predecessors in the fifties, must offer an honest basis for negotiation. Now he said that he well understood the "propaganda" importance of the disarmament drive.

This casual remark stung Stevenson; he seemed seized for an instant as if by an anguished feeling that Kennedy did not really care about disarmament at all. While Cleveland and I, both anxious to keep our principals together, watched a little helplessly, Stevenson returned to the attack, telling the President in effect that he just had to have faith. This was not an argument likely to move Kennedy, and I never felt so keenly the way these two men, so united in their objectives, could so inadvertently arrive at cross-purposes. ...

pp.481/3

The Soviet resumption of testing four weeks later gave the September session of the General assembly even more importance than we had expected. For a moment, Cleveland argued that the resumption itself should be brought before the Security Council, but McCloy and Arthur Dean opposed this on the ground that we would gain nothing and might restrict our own freedom of action. When Cleveland mentioned the effect on world opinion, McCloy exploded: "World opinion? I don't believe in world opinion. The only thing that matters is power. What we have to do now is to show that we are a powerful nation and not spend our time trailing after the phantom of world opinion." This was by now a familiar debate in / the councils around the President; and, while the term 'world opinion' was unquestionably glib and the people who invoked it often exaggerated its significance, one could not but reflect that the capacity to move opinion was itself an element of power, a fact well understood by the American Presidents who had wielded most power in the world, Wilson and Roosevelt.

.... Finally he (Kennedy) said, "I don't see how we can do it. It would look hypocritical for us to take the question to the Security Council if we have already decided to resume testing. The two things seem to me incompatible."

This decision, of course, was based on a belief in the reality of world opinion. And, because, like Wilson and Roosevelt, he regarded opinion as a basic constituent of power, the President now, after the Russian tests, decided to go to New York and address the General Assembly later in the month. On September 5, the day he ordered the resumption of our own underground tests, he called in Rusk, Stevenson, Cleveland, Bundy, Sorensen and me to consider what he might say.

For a while we discussed Berlin, the President rattling off a series of ideas which might constitute part of a negotiating position. Stevenson then urged that he hold a special press conference to emphasize his interest in Berlin negotiations and at the same time unveil the new American disarmament plan; he feared that the Soviet Union might respond to the Kennedy-MacMillan note on an atmospheric test ban by talking once more about general and complete disarmament and thereby scooping our own disarmament initiative. In a moment he expressed his personal regret at the day's decision to resume testing.

Kennedy quickly said, "What choice did we have? They had spit in our eye three times. We couldn't possibly sit back and do nothing at all. We had to do this." Stevenson remarked, "But we were ahead in the propaganda battle." Kennedy said, "What does that / mean? I don't hear of any windows broken because of the Soviet decision. The neutrals have been terrible. The Russians made two tests after our note calling for a ban on atmospheric testing. Maybe they couldn't have stopped the first, but they could have stopped the second. . . . All this makes Khrushchev look pretty tough. He has had a succession of apparent victories - space, Cuba, the thirteenth of August (the Berlin Wall), though I don't myself regard this as a Soviet victory. He wants to give out the feeling that he has us on the run. The third test was a contemptuous response to our note. . . . Anyway, the decision has been made. I'm not saying that it was the right decision. Who the hell knows? But it is the decision which has been taken."

Note: Note that here again Schlesinger ignores Kennedy's mobilization of the National Guard. Nor is this fact referred to in the index under: Kennedy; Berlin; National Guard; mobilization; Reserves; or Army, Military. In a journalist, such omissions would be inexcusable. In a historian, they can be only a deception and a misrepresentation, deliberate and in full awareness of its significance.

p.483/4

.... Kennedy said that Stevenson could proceed along these lines. He then expressed his own sympathy with Stevenson's position: "You have the hardest thing in the world to sell. It really doesn't make any sense - the idea that Taiwan represents China. But, if we lost this fight, if Red China comes into the UN during our first year in town, your first year and mine, they'll run us both out. We have to lick them this year. We'll take our chances next year. It will be an election year; but we can delay the admission of Red China till after the election. So far as this year is concerned, you must do everything you can to keep them out. Whatever is required is OK by me." Stevenson asked, "Do you mean to keep them out permanently or for a year?" Kennedy said, "At least for a year. I am for any strategy ~~which works~~ which works. You can vote on Outer Mongolia as you think best. I am going to send a new letter to Chiang Kai-shek, based on what is good for us, not what is good for Formosa. We'll get Cabot Lodge to talk to Luce - Adlai, you talk to Roy Howard - I will talk to Walter Judd. We'll have to get / all these people to make it clear to Chiang that he can't expect to make a domestic political issue out of our strategy in the UN."

.....

p.485 A week later the President went to New York. "Let us here resolve," he began, "that Dag Hammarskjold did not live, or die, in vain." He called on the General Assembly to reject the troika. To install a triumvirate, he said, would be to "entrench the Cold War in the headquarters of peace." It would paralyze the United Nations; and in the nuclear age the world needed the United Nations more than ever before. For "a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war - or war will put an end to mankind. . . . Let us call a truce to terror."

mine

p.484

Over the next week we began work on the President's UN speech. But, as the days passed, opposition began to arise to the idea of his going to New York, or, if he did go, to his making disarmament his major theme. Lyndon Johnson argued to the President that he could not demand disarmament in New York and then return to Washington and call out more divisions; the contradiction, the Vice-President believed, would baffle our own people and confuse the world. But others ofous questioned whether this was really a contradiction, for obviously disarmament negotiations would be predicated on the resolution of the Berlin crisis. Moreover, we considered it a mistake to identify the President with menacing talk, leaving the ambassador to the UN as the champion of peace, as if the United States Mission in New York were conducting its own foreign policy.



A 1000 DAYS
pp.487-505

British - Nuclear Tests;
Advisers - Joint Chiefs of Staff - State
Missile Gap - Kennedy - Policies -
Political Morality

p.487 The JCS paper was below their usual level in logic and literacy. When we met to consider it at the State Department, Secretary McNamara, who had obviously not examined it with care before the meeting, quickly perceived its imperfections and abandoned it as a basis for argument. One defense official made an impassioned case for the resumption of atmospheric testing in order to prevent the world from believing that the Communists were gaining so commanding a lead that there was no point in resisting them further. McGeorge Bundy replied that he was against tests for the sake of psychological warfare and insisted on the principle that we never test in the atmosphere unless required by military necessity to do so. Then McNamara made clear that a serious case for resumption existed in terms of military security, and the meeting ended with a recommendation that the United States take an early occasion to reserve its freedom to test above ground.

.... The meeting had begun with a preliminary analysis of the Soviet tests. The new Russian series, according to the CIA report, followed logically from its 1958 series; this suggested that, despite the 'big hole' thesis, there had been no cheating in the interim. ...

p.488

.... Jerome Wiesner maintained in December that it remained basically a political question: "While these tests would certainly contribute to our military strength, they are not critical or even very important to our over-all military posture." Long hours of debate in the National Security Council and in the privacy of the President's office, involving scientists from Defense, AEC and various bomb laboratories, led the President to the conclusion that Wiesner was essentially right. Yet one began to notice an unconscious hardening through the government, as if a final decision had been made. Those who wanted to delay resumption in the interest of political considerations and 'world opinion' were at the usual tactical disadvantage in debating with the 'realists.'

p.489

.... When I later described the meeting to Kennedy, he said, "Personally I hate the idea of resuming atmospheric tests. But it's going to be damned hard to stave off the pressure, especially when the news gets out that the big Soviet explosion was relatively clean. This ~~will~~ will show that they have something we don't have, and we will be under intense pressure to test in the atmosphere ourselves. But I have made no final decision, and I have told everybody that I have made no decision."

.... It was evident that the current series would not by itself enable Khrushchev to reverse the balance of nuclear power. But if the Russians, on the basis of the knowledge so acquired, were to conduct a new series while the United States refrained from atmospheric testing, the next one might well put them in the lead. We could, in other words, "eat" one Soviet round but not two; and without the treaty we had no assurance that, having completed one sequence, Soviet scientists and generals would not demand another and another. However much Kennedy loathed the idea of atmospheric tests, any President who stood aside and allowed the enemy to achieve nuclear superiority would plainly have taken an unacceptable risk in the face of his constitutional obligations.

This, I believe, was the President's state of mind when, after several weeks of racking contemplation, he discussed the problem with Harold Macmillan in Bermuda on December 21. We needed British support in the decision to go ahead.

p.490

If all those talented scientists were to continue going about their business, the Prime Minister said, the only result would be more and deadlier bombs. Was this the goal to which the next generation of man should dedicate itself? If these horrible weapons were not fired off, it would be a hopeless economic waste; if they were, it would be the end of civilization. And, while the United States and / the Soviet Union were having this sophisticated competition, many other nations in a few years would begin to acquire their own simpler bombs. Berlin, Macmillan said, seemed to him small beer compared to the destruction of humanity. The world could not continue down this path. You and I, he said to Kennedy with emotion, could not sit in an ordinary little room four days before Christmas and talk about these terrible things without doing something about it. Before we went into the atmosphere ourselves, should we not make one more effort to break the cycle? The arms race was a "rogue elephant" against which we all must act.

Perhaps you and I, he told Kennedy, should meet at the summit with Khrushchev and really push for disarmament. We might fail, but we would have lost only a few months. Macmillan added that, after reading Russian novels and everything else he could find about Russia, he felt that they might come around. Moreover, the nuclear effort was costing the Soviet Union ferociously. And the Soviet position itself was changing. The Russians were halfway between Europe and Asia and watching the rise of China with foreboding. The west thought of them as enormously different, but their economic and social structure was not that alien. After all, mines and railroads were nationalized through most of Western Europe, and one saw already in Russia a spread of unequal privileges through society, the children of the ruling class were going to elite schools, as they did in Britain. Without yielding, could we not provide time to allow the forces of humanity to exert their influence?

Macmillan was eloquent, and Kennedy was moved. But he had to face realities. The problem, he pointed out, was what would happen in 1964 if the Russians continued to test and the west didn't. We could not afford to be taken twice. Even though he was himself a "great anti-tester," he saw no alternative but to prepare for resumption and, if there was no progress with regard either to Berlin or disarmament, to resume.

p.491

.....
When the talks resumed, the Prime Minister began by asking that the final decision be postponed to permit one last try at disarmament. Kennedy replied that a new effort would only enable the Russians to stall things for many more months. Our case would be no better a year from now, and in the meantime the Russians could get ready for a new series of tests. He concluded later in the day by asking whether Macmillan would agree to atmospheric tests on Christmas Island if the situation did not change. Macmillan responded that this was a decision for the cabinet; but Britain and America were partners, we were in this together; he only wished that the announcement would seem less a threat than a hope.

p.492

.....
A week after New Year's, Macmillan returned to the battle. In a deeply personal letter to Kennedy, the Prime Minister argued again that resumption would probably lead the Russians to carry out their next series; we would be forced to do the same; the contest would intensify; and, as the burden of the race mounted, one side or the other, when it thought it had attained superiority, might be tempted to put the issue to the test. As the test programs of the great powers continued, he went on, there would be no hope of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. If this capacity for destruction ended up in the hands of dictators, reactionaries, revolutionaries, madmen around the world, then sooner or later, possibly by the end of this

century, either by error or folly or insanity, the great crime would be committed. It would seem to any ordinary person, MacMillan continued, that humanity was setting out on a path at once so fantastic and so retrograde, so sophisticated and so barbarous, as to be almost incredible. He himself noted the strange irony that he should have spent Christmas Day wondering how to commend to his cabinet colleagues the dedication of Christmas Island for this purpose.

p.493

It might be, he concluded, that we were condemned, like the heroes of the old Greek tragedies, to an ineluctable fate from which there was no escape; and that like those doomed figures we must endure it, with only the consolation of the admonitory commentaries of the chorus, the forefathers of the columnists of to-day. But in his view the situation demanded a supreme effort to break the deadlock. Amplifying the thoughts he had advanced in Bermuda, he proposed that the three leaders - Kennedy, Khrushchev and himself - convert the impending eighteen-power disarmament meeting, scheduled for Geneva in March, into a final try for general disarmament, a test ban treaty and an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons or information to non-nuclear powers. It was, of course, he said, easy to do nothing. But, on the whole, it was not the things one did in one's life that one regretted but rather the opportunities missed.

The Macmillan letter contained certain ambiguities. It did not make clear, for example, whether the use of Christmas Island was conditioned on our agreement to a disarmament conference at the summit, or whether the resumption of American atmospheric testing was conditioned on the conference's failure. It did make clear, however - and in moving and powerful language - both the extent of Macmillan's anxiety and the magnitude of the decision which confronted us. As Adlai Stevenson promptly wrote the President, "It would be unfortunate and could be tragic if we were to give the Prime Minister a dusty answer."

But the State Department was considerably less moved. On January 12, Bundy and I went over to Rusk's office to examine State's draft reply. The answer could hardly have been dustier. It was an evasive, bureaucratic screed, falling so far below Macmillan in style and tone as to be unresponsive. One high State Department officer said contemptuously about the Macmillan letter, "Why are we taking so much trouble over this hysterical document?" and "We can't let Macmillan practice this emotional blackmail on us."

(Note: Was this "high officer" a human? What an attitude toward the major ally!)

Rusk, however, agreed that the answer should not be perfunctory. Any reply, he said, must contain three elements: an affirmation that our concern equaled Macmillan's; a rejection of any link between the use of Christmas Island and a new disarmament initiative (Note: What an imperious and dictatorial attitude, considering Christmas Island is British!); and an initiative we might offer ourselves as a substitute for what seemed / to us the questionable notion of a grandiose disarmament conference. Bundy then prepared an excellent reply along these lines, concluding: "We are ready to examine with you the possibilities for new efforts toward disarmament on the most urgent basis."

p.494

In the meantime, a debate arising from the President's State of the Union message had redirected attention to the idea of a test ban confined to the atmosphere. At Kennedy's instruction, the early drafts promised one last try for such a ban before we resumed testing above ground ourselves. But this thought had aroused such distress in both State and Defense that the President eventually reduced it to a generality about breaking the log jam on disarmament and nuclear tests.

Still the idea persisted. In Defense John McNaughton now argued that the offer of a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere alone would

probably work to our advantage, whether accepted or refused by the Soviet Union, unless the Russians accepted the ban for two or three years and then found a pretext to break it. If they took advantage of the ban to prepare secretly for new tests, we might lose nearly a year in the technology race. To guard against this, McNaughton therefore proposed a number of political and legal devices to help make the ban stick. In the White House Carl Kaysen after a careful analysis concluded that an atmospheric ban would not pose unacceptable military risks and might well lead to new and striking gains in arms control.

This debate was not simply a disagreement between virtuous anti-testers and wicked big-bomb men. A wholly intelligent case for atmospheric resumption existed, and Robert Komer of the White House made it in comments on the Kaysen-Schlesinger position. The Russians, Komer suggested, were a few years behind us in the intellectual comprehension of the meaning of nuclear plenty; there was doubtless a cultural lag to be overcome before they would understand that arms limitation would be safer and more advantageous to both sides than continued rivalry.

Note: There were other and more desirable alternatives, one of which the Russians sponsored: Complete disarmament.

What are the Russians, some kind of white "good"?

If this were so, then they would not appreciate the value of stable deterrence until they grasped the futility of the arms race. So long as our policy encouraged Moscow to think it might possibly overtake us in nuclear power, the Russians would have less incentive to consider other ways of insuring their security. "It is ghastly to think that we may have to escalate the / arms race / further (at least technologically) before we can start the curve downward. But what realistic alternative is there?" There might be no other way to drive home to Moscow the strategic realities of the nuclear age. Moreover, incessant American concern about nuclear weapons might signal to the Russians a reluctance to use them and thereby, in a time of crisis over Berlin and southeast Asia, compromise our nuclear deterrent before we had fully developed adequate defenses of other sorts.

Note: Everybody except us is ignorant and wrong. Imagine an "adviser" who really believed any major power was unaware of "the realities of the nuclear age"! And especially that power which had both the most powerful weapons and longest-range delivery systems! And what honest answer to a Russian choice between disarmament and continued rivalry, especially after what appears on next page? Is this another U.S. expression of the concept of war equality - meaning with us far ahead?

.... In the course of February Kennedy received an analysis of the Soviet tests by a panel of leading scientists, including so prominent an advocate of the ban as Hans Bethe. Their report disclosed a highly advanced nuclear technology, with new designs and techniques, including some unknown to the west - or at least unexplainable on the basis of the information available - as well as substantial gains in weaponry. The technical basis had evidently been laid for a new series which might enable the Soviet Union to develop bombs whose yield per weight of explosive would be somewhat higher than ours. While this would not give any substantial military advantage to the Soviet Union, the knowledge that the Russians had better weapons would have given them a political and diplomatic advantage the President was disinclined to accept. With a heavy heart, he decided that we would have to resume atmospheric testing. As for the tests themselves, he made it clear he wanted low-yield detonations concentrated in short periods. In the next months, he spent a good deal of time reviewing and revising the proposals for the American atmospheric series.

Under-
lining
mine

p.495

mine

Under-
lining
mine

The next question was when the world should be notified. Kennedy at first thought, and Macmillan concurred, that announcement should be delayed until after the eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee had met in Geneva; this would mean sometime in April.

Note: Who is honest, the USSR or our side? What lack of integrity, to go to a "disarmament" conference while hiding planned advanced armament testing!

Note also how careful Schlesinger is to avoid showing that from the USSR point of view they at least could consider they were pushed to do this, especially because, as he is also careful to not even indicate, the US had done considerably more testing, which gave it a scientific if not a military advantage.

p.496

At ~~xxxx~~ the same time, the President wanted to rescue Macmillan's suggestion for a new disarmament initiative. Opposition had arisen to the proposal that we make one more offer of an atmospheric test ban before resuming our own tests, partly because it would seem a retreat from our original Geneva position and partly because it provided no insurance against secret preparations and thus against another surprise Soviet series.° The President therefore decided to declare his readiness to trade off our atmospheric series, not for a partial, but for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Late in February I lunched in London with Hugh Gaitskell, who had just come back from a visit to Washington filled with enthusiasm for Kennedy. The President had provided him with a full technical briefing on the testing matter - something which the British government had curiously never given him and Gaitskell agreed that the United States had no choice but to go ahead. Kennedy later told me that Gaitskell's argument for relating resumption to the Geneva disarmament talks had strengthened his determination to try once more for the Geneva treaty, but that it had also convinced him, contrary to Gaitskell's recommendation, that he should not allow the Disarmament Committee to begin its work under the illusion that the United States was not yet settled in its own mind about the need for testing.

°Note: Why is Schlesinger again, as with the "high officer" above, so unwilling to name names? Whose opposition? Congress, which presumably didn't know? White House advisers? State? Pentagon?

Under-
scoring
mine

On February 17 Kennedy therefore informed Macmillan that he planned a television talk on the subject to the nation on March 1. The Prime Minister had still hoped somehow to stave off American resumption, and Kennedy's message came as a shock. His leading scientific adviser, coming to see me that day in London, said that Macmillan was "a sad and embittered man," and quoted him to the effect that the American decision would "shatter the hopes of millions of people across the earth." The Prime Minister asked the President again for postponement, but Kennedy could not see his way to delay the announcement for more than another twenty-four hours.

(Note: What a way to treat an ally! and what an eloquent exposition of Britain's real place in the "alliance"!)

.....

p.497

Under-
scoring
mine

On March 2, Kennedy made his speech. He described the precautions taken to restrict fallout, adding: "I still exceedingly regret the necessity of balancing these hazards against the hazards to hundreds of millions of lives which would be reated by a relative decline in our nuclear strength." The United States, he said, would come to Geneva with a series of concrete plans for a major "breakthrough to peace." In particular, it would once again offer a comprehensive test ban treaty.

If the Soviet Union were now ready to "accept such a treaty, to sign it before the latter part of April, and apply it immediately - if all testing can thus be actually halted - then . . . there would be no need for our tests." That action, he added, would be "a monumental step toward peace - and both Prime Minister Macmillan and I would think it fitting to meet Chairman Khrushchev at Geneva to sign the final treaty."

Note: Combination of propaganda, for it would not be a proposal as acceptable to much of the rest of the world as that of the USSR for complete disarmament, and ultimatum, which no government of a major power could accept with confidence in its survival. The result should have been predictable. (See below)

Khrushchev quickly declined the offer. On April 25, as dawn broke over Christmas Island, the United States began a new round of tests in the atmosphere.

6. Disarmament and the Defense Budget

The rogue elephant was loose again, and neither Kennedy nor Macmillan was content to let him rampage unchecked. In March Dean Rusk went to Geneva with new test ban proposals. But the Russians now insisted that the test ban could not be considered apart from comprehensive disarmament, thereby repudiating their own position of 1958-61. (Khrushchev had ~~SAI~~ said then, "Is there any surer way of sabotaging the suspension of nuclear tests than by such conditions?") and adopting the attitude for which they had so self-righteously denounced the Americans in 1956-68.

Note that the quote from Khrushchev is dated by nothing but a "then", referring to an unidentified time during the 3-4 year period. This is propaganda, not history, and ignores all developments in a 6-year period.

As for general and complete disarmament, when Arthur Dean presented the updated American plan in Geneva in April, the Russians lost no time in rejecting it because of its insistence on inspection and a dozen other real or pseudo-reasons. For their part, they put forward a plan demanding abolition in the first ~~stage~~ stage of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, as well as of all foreign bases. This would mean the immediate unbalancing of the existing equilibrium in favor of conventional force and could hardly be acceptable to the west. In addition, the Russians continued to oppose any serious verification of anything except weapons destroyed until / the end of the third stage. The talks, as they dragged on through the summer of 1962, seemed more and more a propaganda minuet, repetitive, pointless and sterile.

Yet Kennedy persisted in the struggle for disarmament. I do not think he quite saw the arms race in the image of Macmillan's rogue elephant; for the race was not in fact so insensate as that. Staggering as defense expenditures were, they remained a relatively small proportion of the total national output in both the United States and the Soviet Union; and of money spent on defense, only a fraction - in the United States, perhaps one-fifth - went to nuclear striking power. Nor was the 'overkill' idea - the notion that each side was compulsively engaged in piling up more and more nuclear bombs - justified, at least in its more nightmarish form. Actually each side (outside the air force) was coming to realize that it had more than enough; and a good deal of the new expenditure ~~was~~ went, not to increase stockpiles, but for replacement, modernization of weapons systems, research into new weapons and the maintenance of a higher state of alert. Nor was Lord Snow's sensational fantasy of 1960 - "Within, at the most, ten years, some of these bombs are going off" - necessarily acquiring more validity each passing minute; for the vast effort, in the United States at least, to improve fail-safe controls was reducing the probability of the Dr. Strangelove effect.

Under-
scoring
mine

p.498

Under-
scoring
added

In short, if there was an arms race, neither side was galloping as fast or as frantically as it could. But this provided only comparative consolation. Even if it was ~~not~~ all not so insane as Lord Russell liked to think, it was still a hell of a way to run a world. For his part, Kennedy was sure that we had enough for nearly any conceivable contingency; he regarded the balance of terror, however ingeniously safeguarded, as deeply fragile; ...

Note: Acknowledgment that USSR, before missile crisis, "had more than enough" nuclear weapons to "overkill" US.

At what point, if ever did the US Government come to realize that it had no monopoly on the theory that the other side respected only power and strength, the "get tough" syndrome?

p.499

mine

.....
The experience of the spring and summer of 1961, moreover, had convinced him that running faster in the race would only provoke his opponent to run faster too and thereby increase the strain without necessarily altering the gap. He had seen no alternative to higher defense spending in order to liberate American strategy from its predominant reliance on nuclear weapons; but the rise in Washington's defense budget had now produced a comparable rise in Moscow's.

Note: What "experience"? A historian should specify; an honest journalist would. Kennedy's "toughness" at Vienna? Guard mobilization? 1/

Increases and decreases in the two capitals had paralleled each other before, and the administration, as time went on, began to draw a significant conclusion: that the defense budget itself might be used as an instrument of arms limitation. For it was evident that the budget was the most effective means of signaling to the Soviet Union our intentions, whether defensive or first-strike, as well as the kinds of weapons and strategies which might be mutually advantageous and the kinds of limitation that might be mutually possible. These considerations were much in the minds of Kaysen and Wiesner when the first full Kennedy defense budget came under consideration within the government in the late summer and fall of 1961.

mine

^oA number of points in this discussion have been clarified by Thomas C. Schelling; see especially "The State of the Arms Race" in J. E. Dougherty, ed., The Prospects for Arms Control (New York, 1965), 52-55.

There remained for a moment the question of the 'missile gap'. Though disowned by McNamara in February, the gap had persisted as a center of intra-service argument, with the Air Force continuing to claim that the Russians had 600 to 800 ballistic missiles, while the CIA estimated 450 and the Navy 200. But on Thanksgiving weekend, when the President convened his defense experts for a meeting at Hyannis Port, the weight of evidence was plainly against the Air Force, and the issue finally withered away.

Note: There is still a vast difference between 200 and 450 which Schlesinger just sloughs off. He actually leaves the question unanswered except for what is only a conjecture, "the weight of the evidence."

And compare the following sentence with the preceding paragraphs which makes clear the USSR would certainly do something about any US missile increase. (It can be argued the "missile crisis" was a ploy to end this fatal competition.)

1/ Note this language carefully, for it acknowledges, perhaps without intending to, that Soviet actions followed US actions, not the opposite - were "provoked" by US.

All p.500 under-scoring mine The budget nevertheless contemplated a sizable increase in missiles; and the White House staff, while favoring a larger Minuteman force than the original Eisenhower proposal, wondered whether the new budget was not providing for more missiles than national security required. But the President, though intimating a certain sympathy with this view, was not prepared to overrule McNamara's recommendation. As for the Secretary, he did not believe that doubling or even tripling our striking power would enable us to destroy the hardened missile sites or missile-launching submarines of our adversary. But he was already engaged in a bitter fight with the Air Force over his effort to disengage from the B-70, a costly, high-altitude manned bomber rendered obsolescent by the improvement in Soviet Ground-to-air missiles. After cutting down the original Air Force missile demands considerably, he perhaps felt that he could not do more without risking public conflict with the Joint Chiefs and the vociferous B-70 lobby in Congress. As a result, the President went along with the policy of multiplying Polaris and Minuteman missiles. 1/

Within the magnitudes of the budget the President, of course, retained a series of choices about weapons systems. He had a profound aversion to weapons which could be used effectively only in a first strike and which for that reason might invite a pre-emptive strike from the other side - like the Jupiters which had been sitting for some years on soft bases in Turkey and Italy. As Bundy remarked later, "he always preferred the system which could survive an attack against the system which might provoke one." The budget communicated this preference to the Soviet Union; and McNamara drove the point home in statements and speeches, especially in an address at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962. Here he argued forcefully for "a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur." By this he meant that the targets of nuclear war should be military forces and installations, not civilian populations. This 'counterforce' strategy required us to have the capacity to hold in reserve, even after a massive surprise attack, sufficient striking power to destroy the enemy society if driven to it; this would give an opponent "the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities." At the same time McNamara reorganized the control system so that, instead of investing all striking power in a single presidential push button, the command structure could retain after attack the ability to respond in a number of ways besides blowing up the world. 2/

1/ Imagine this. We don't need those missiles, we know the USSR will do something in return, tripling our striking power would not endanger theirs, and because the Secretary of Defense can't cope with his ~~own~~ subordinates and lobbyists, the entire world is to be jeopardized. Yet it was the USSR (494/5) that lacked, "intellectual comprehension of the meaning of nuclear plenty", they had a "cultural lag", and they did not understand "the strategic realities of the nuclear age".

2/ Does this not say what the US has always denied, that the President does not have either exclusive control or even last say, and that the "command structure" can act alone, as it alone desires?

p.501

The counterforce doctrine had its ambiguities. A striking force large enough to ride out a nuclear salvo and still concentrate selectively on enemy military targets would have to be larger than a force designed only to retaliate against enemy cities in a single convulsive blow. It would in consequence be quite large enough to strike first itself, possibly even large enough to suppose that it might erase the enemy's retaliatory capacity by a surprise attack; indeed, to be effective against Russian soft-based missiles, our attack would presumably have to be made while their missiles were still on launching pads. Some critics accord-

All un-der-scor-ing mine ingly interpreted the administration's desire for nuclear superiority as an 'overkill' philosophy concealing a first-strike premise. Nor could one ever know what secret thoughts lay in the minds of Air Force generals when they urged bigger defense budgets. Yet there were ambiguities on the other side too; for the anti-overkill theorists preferred a 'cities-only' strategy, which would at once emphasize the horror of nuclear war and guarantee those horrors if war should come.

These ambiguities were partly inherent in the rudimentary state of strategic doctrine.

(Note: But USSR didn't understand nuclear "strategic realities".) It should never be forgotten that the relatively recent development of the intercontinental ballistic missile had revolutionized the problem of war, that the rethinking of strategy in terms of the ICBM had been going on only for five years in the United States and hardly at all in the rest of the world, that previous military experience offered almost nothing to help this analysis (When USSR had the first one?) and that thinking about the unthinkable was painful anyway. Everything existed in the shadow world of pure theory; nor could the electronic computers of the systems analysts program the political realities weighing on the policy makers. Moreover, deterrence was in the end not a mathematical but a psychological problem. "A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously," as Henry Kissinger wrote, "is more useful for the purposes of deterrence than a 'genuine' threat interpreted as a bluff."

(But if taken seriously enough to provoke retaliation, then what?)

All this made strategic analysis far less exact than the pseudo-precision of its terminology suggested, and it permitted a variety of interpretations of diverse strategic postures. But no one who listened to the anguished musings of Kennedy and McNamara on nuclear weapons could doubt their unalterable opposition to preventive or pre-emptive nuclear war.

(This did not include Khrushchev.)

p.502 The Berlin situation prevented the President from making a public declaration against the first use / of nuclear weapons once war had begun; as he had explained to de Gaulle and Macmillan, he was prepared to go to nuclear weapons if Soviet conventional forces began a war in Europe. But Kennedy and McNamara well knew that no American first strike could wipe out the Soviet capacity to retaliate and that retaliation, even from a doomed opponent, would be dreadful beyond imagination. "Our arms," the President had said early in his administration, "will never be used to strike the first blow..... We are not creating forces for a first strike against any other nation." "My personal opinion," said McNamara, "is . . . we cannot win a nuclear war, a strategic nuclear war, in the normal meaning of the word {win'."

They were seeking a second-strike capacity and, both for deterrent and for political reasons, one large enough to exceed the weight of any first strike directed against the United States. We probably attained this state of beatitude by 1962, but the administration took no chances. The decisions of the Kennedy years gave the United States by 1964 1100 intercontinental bombers, of which more than 500 were on fifteen-minute alert, as against 250 Soviet bombers capable of reaching American shores; more than 800 ICBMs, aimed and fueled, nearly all in hardened and dispersed silos, as against the less than 200 Soviet ICBMs poised in far more vulnerable sites; and 250 Polaris missiles deployed in submarines, as against a much smaller Soviet underwater missile capacity with a much more limited range. (See 499, which seems to credit USSR with 200 as a minimum 3 years earlier.)

7. The Disarmament Fight Goes on.

Kennedy faced no harder problem of public education than that of convincing both Capitol Hill and the Kremlin that his demands for strength and for disarmament, far from being contradictory, were complementary. His view was that, unless we convinced the Russians we could stay in the arms race as long as they could, we would remove the incentive most likely to make them accept general disarmament;

(Note: Kennedy, Schlesinger or both here are indulging in pure fiction, blended with either propaganda, self-deception or both. Rather than "making" the USSR "accept general disarmament" the reverse is true. They initiated the proposal, which we rejected, for reasons sufficient to the US Government. Note that the language used doesn't say make them accept our proposal for this.

Just a few pages earlier Schlesinger says, and quotes the White House as knowing, that we "provoked" the USSR into increasing its arms budget when it did. And if the USSR would not abandon the "superiority" it might gain, did we abandon the superiority we said we had? The phony "second-strike capacity" is pure propaganda, for it was also first-strike capacity, and the USSR could not risk considering it anything else as, in fact, Schlesinger has just pointed out unnamed administration critics did, to which he added no one knew "what secret thoughts lay in the minds of the Air Force generals" (501). It is not, as the coming page alleges, a lack of "sophisticated analysis" that kept Moscow or, for that matter, Western Europe "from considering this as "actions for peace," but common sense and either fear or understanding of US generals, to say nothing of politicians and policy leaders.)

of obviously, if we let them win the arms race, they would see no reason to abandon their military superiority and expose their society to external inspection. Both the securing of a second-strike capacity and the diversification of the defense establishment seemed to him, moreover, vital parts of the strategy of deterrence and arms control.

But the notion that these were all actions for peace and not for war required a more sophisticated analysis of the strategic situation than existed in Moscow - or for that matter in Western Europe. In Russia, given what Robert Komar had called the cultural lag, the Soviet leaders could derive little comfort from the inevitably menacing aspect of American nuclear superiority. And even some in the United States tended to feel there was an inconsistency between building military strength, on the one hand, and working for disarmament on the other. ...

If this array of paradoxes bewildered Americans, it doubtless bewildered the Russians even more. But the budget remained a solid indicator of something; ...

.... His (McNaughton's) contribution was especially crucial in dealing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, possessed as they were by the conviction that they alone understood the requirements of American safety. Nor was the invocation of national security confined to the JCS. Once, at a meeting of the Committee of Principals, someone from ACDA objected to a proposed arms control measure on the ground that it might imperil the nation. McNamara said sharply, "If I'm not afraid of it, I don't see why you should be. You take care of disarmament. Let me worry about the national security of the United States."

William Foster, while sensitive to congressional reactions, proved a calm director of ACDA, and in Adrian Fisher he had a stalwart and ef-

All
under-
p.503

scor-
ing
mine

p.504

fective deputy. Among the civilians concerned, the Secretary of State proved the main source of indifference. This came partly, I think, from his concern about the Bonn government, which disliked disarmament since it did not want a reduction of east-west tension until the problem of German unification was solved; partly because he anticipated that disarmament would cause trouble on the Hill; and partly because of his chronically cautious cast of mind. Presiding over the Committee of Principals, he often gave the impression that he regarded disarmament as an essay in futility, if not in folly. One participant in the meetings later reported his impression that Rusk "feared living in a world in which predominant military power was not his major tool."

p.505

.... Though (Arthur) Dean was willful, long-winded, sometimes imprecise, very often tactless, and not a little vain, he was also an exceedingly able lawyer and a man of endless patience and enthusiasm. Above all, he wanted to accomplish something. ...

Under-
linging
mine

Certainly the disarmament talks forced ~~Kenn~~ the Russians to think about the intricate problems of nuclear survival, to examine their own strategic limitations and capabilities, and to ponder the riddle of the nuclear equilibrium. (Note: Right, but Schlesinger doesn't realize how and why)

In time they ~~begin~~ Evidently began to master the concept of stable nuclear deterrence and to see that arms control might be a means of approaching rather than avoiding general and complete disarmament. The talks may also have done something to convince them that the Americans honestly wanted to stabilize the weapons situation. Even though so little appeared to be accomplished at the time in the antiseptic conference rooms beside the quiet lake at Geneva, the disarmament negotiations turned out in the end to be a good deal more than exercises in political warfare or theological disputation. They became a form of communication and education, a means of overcoming the cultural lag, an encouragement to parallel voluntary action by the two great nuclear powers and even perhaps a prelude to detente.

p.506 The tendency in the years after the Second World War had been to see the planet as tidily polarized between America and Russia. In the 1950s John Foster Dulles had transmuted this from an assumption into a dogma. The Dulles world rested on unitary conceptions of the opposing blocs: on the one hand, the 'free world', capaciously defined to include such places as Spain, Paraguay, Batista's Cuba and Mississippi and destined ultimately for the private enterprise of the Secretary of Commerce and the god of the Secretary of State; and, on the other, the 'communist camp,' a monolithic conspiracy with headquarters in Moscow, enslaving captive peoples and orchestrating global crises according to a comprehensive master plan.

.... But, like a missionary, expected the primitive peoples to accept the true faith, only instead of gathering them down by the river for a mass baptism he tried to herd them into the military pacts he scattered across the face of Asia. If they declined to ally themselves to the United States or went their own way in the United Nations or indulged in tirades against the west or engaged in social revolution, it was due to inherent moral weakness compounded by the unsleeping activity of the minions of a communist Satan. Summing up his creed in ~~1957~~ 1956, Dulles described neutralism as the principle "which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others" and excommunicated / its devotees as "immoral." Though the Dulles doctrine was considerably tempered in application, he succeeded in implanting both in American policy and in opinion the idea that those who were not with us around the earth were against us.

p.507

p.509 And so the new President set out to adjust American thinking to a world where the cold war was no longer the single reality and to help the new countries find their own roads to national dignity and international harmony. But in his own government he immediately ran head-on against a set of inherited policies on colonialism, on neutralism and on foreign assistance, deeply imbedded in the minds of government officials and the structure of the executive branch.

p.510 Since the time of Franklin Roosevelt American policy had had a nominal commitment to anti-colonialism. But the State Department had been dominated by men who, regarding NATO as our top priority, flinched from anything which might bruise the sensibilities of our European allies, some of whom still had colonial possessions. ...

In the December preceding Kennedy's inauguration, forty-three Asian and African states had submitted to the General Assembly a resolution on "the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples." The resolution declared that "all peoples have the right of self-determination," that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence" and that "immediate steps shall be taken" in all non-self-governing territories "to transfer all powers to the peoples of those Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will."

While the language of the resolution was sweeping, its practical implications, as the debate made clear, were limited. It was less a plea for immediate action than for an affirmation of purpose, and it had actually been worked out by the American delegation with Afro-Asian rep-