

The Executive Committee (ExCom)

p.802 Schlesinger: Sorensen: (pp.674-5)

The President	
The Vice President	Sat in on earlier and later meetings ("Other")
Rusk	Sec Dean Rusk (State)
McNamara	Sec Robert McNamara (Defense)
Robert Kennedy	Atty Gen Robert Kennedy ("Other")
General Taylor	Gen Maxwell Taylor (Defense) (newly appointed Chairman, JCS)
McCone	Dir John McCone (CIA) (upon his return to Washington, after first day)
Dillon	Treasury Sec Douglas Dillon ("Other")
Adlai Stevenson	Adlai Stevenson ("Others... such as ... sat in from time to time")
Bundy	White House aide Bundy ("Other")
Sorensen	White House aide Sorensen ("Other")
Ball	Under Sec George Ball (State)
Gilpatric	Dep Sec Roswell Gilpatric (Defense)
Llewellyn Thompson	Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson (State)
Alexis Johnson	Dep Under Sec Alexis Johnson (State)
Edwin Martin	L. A Asst Sec Edwin Martin (State)
"others brought in on occasion":	
Dean Acheson	Dean Acheson ("Others, such as ... sat in from time to time")
Robert Lovett	Robert Lovett ("Others... such as ... sat in from time to time")
	Charles "Chip" Bohlen (Participating until departing for his new post as Amb to France the following night) (State)
	Asst Sec Paul Nitze (Defense)
	Dep Dir Carter (CIA) ("On the first day")
	Kenneth O'Donnell ("Other") (sat in on earlier and later meetings)
	USIA Dep Dir Donald Wilson, ("Other") (six days later ... acting for the ailing Edward R. Murrow, was officially added.)

A 1000 Days

Note to add to Schlesinger tape on the first mention of the military importance of the missiles in Cuba:

Schlesinger knew this was not true. Not only had he straightforwardly so stated in an earlier reference to similar US missiles in Turkey, but much later (p.903) he acknowledges such missiles are of no military value.

A 1000 DAYS

British Guiana

(Add to earlier notes on)

Comment: There is a further, unindexed reference to U.S. pressure on the British govt to frustrate the repeated elections won by Cheddi Jagan. It is on p.886, where Schlesinger devotes 13 words to the English part of Kennedy's 1962 European trip: "Macmillan said no on the multilateral force and yes on British Guiana" - less even than all of the sentence in which the thoughts are contained.

FOREWORD

P.ix A personal memoir, at best, can offer only a partial view. The Presidency is such a complex institution that only the President himself can fully know his problems and his purposes. John Fitzgerald Kennedy had intended to write the history of his own administration. No one else will ever be able to achieve the central, the presidential, perspective on these years. Even the public official closest to Kennedy, then the Attorney General of the United States, looking at the White House papers after his brother's death, was astonished at the variety of presidential issues he had not known about before.

A presidential associate, moreover, inevitably tends to overrate the significance of the things he does know about. Grace Tully, who was Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal secretary, acutely observed of the books written by the men around F.D.R., "None of them could know that for each minute they spent with the President he spent a hundred minutes by himself and a thousand more with scores of other people - to reject, improvise, weigh and match this against that until a decision was reached."

.....
The presidential perspective on this administration is now tragically and irretrievably lost. But sometime in the future an historian, today perhaps a very young man, will read the volumes of reminiscence and analysis, immerse himself in the flood of papers in the Kennedy Library and attempt by the imaginative thrust of his craft to recover that perspective.

..... Then after the Bay of Pigs he said, "I hope you kept a full account of that." I said that I had understood he did not want us to keep full accounts of anything. He said, "No, go ahead. You can be damn sure that the CIA has its record and the Joint Chiefs theirs. We'd better make sure we have a record over here. So you go ahead."

A 1000 DAYS

Prologue: January 1961

p.4 "... Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never
fear to negotiate."

Footnote: "... quotation from Rousseau: "As soon as any man says
of the affairs of the state, What does it matter to me? the
state may be given up as lost."

A 1000 DAYS

p.25 When they arrived, Stevenson took Kennedy into his study for a private talk. They first discussed foreign policy. This was just after the Soviet Union had shot down the CIA's U-2 plane engaged in photographic reconnaissance over Russia, and the two men agreed in their assessment of what they regarded as a bungled administration response. Then they turned to the campaign. ...

Kennedy's Pre-occupations

p.63 It was then that he told Mailer that he had enjoyed his books, saying "I've read The Deer Park and ... the others," a remark which startled an author who had heard people in similar situations say a hundred times, "I've read The Naked and the Dead ... and the others." (It was a faithful expression of an idiosyncratic taste. When Kennedy first met James Michener, he said, "I've always liked your Fires of Spring," foregoing the inevitable Tales of the South Pacific. When he met Eugene Burdick, he mentioned The Ninth Wave, not The Ugly American.)

.....

p.64 Stevenson had pointed out that Kennedy, after his months of absorption in the campaign, would need to be brought promptly up to date on the main problems of foreign policy if elected; perhaps he should make provision now for a report to be delivered right after the election. Though Kennedy's mind was primarily on politics, he saw the point and immediately asked Stevenson to prepare the report himself.

Kennedy - Personal Character

p.59 He displayed absolute assurance about his capacity to do the job; and he had a hard and sure instinct about how to get what he wanted. In Kennedy the will to command and the will to victory were visible and unbeatable. One watched the changing of the guard with a mixture of nostalgia and hope.

p.78 Kennedy had to an exceptional degree the gift of friendship and, in consequence, a great diversity of friends; part of his gift was to give each the sense that he alone had a clue to the mystery. The friends came in layers - the Choate and Harvard friends, the friends from the Navy, the social friends from Palm Beach and Newport, the Irish friends, the senatorial friends, the intellectual friends - and each layer considered itself closest to the center. But Kennedy kept the layers apart and included and baffled them all. The ultimate reserve was a source of his fascination and his power.

p.86 And, when he entered politics, it came to mean moral courage - the courage to which he later dedicated his Pro-files, the courage of "a man who does what he must - in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and dangers and pressures," the courage which, he said, "is the basis of all human morality."

p.68 "... The sixties are going to be entirely different. ... We are a new generation which science and technology and the change in world forces are going to require to face entirely new problems which will require new solutions."

p.110 In a review of Liddell Hart's Deterrent or Defense in 1960, he praised the author's credo: "Keep strong, if possible. In any case, keep cool. Have unlimited patience. Never corner an opponent, and always assist him to save his face. Put yourself in his shoes - so as to see things through his eyes. Avoid self-righteousness like the devil - nothing is so self-blinding." Liddell Hart was addressing these remarks to statesmen; they work just as well for historians.

Kennedy rarely lost sight of other people's motives and problems. For all the presumed coolness on the surface, he had an instinctive tendency to put himself into the skins of others. Once during the 1960 campaign, Kennedy, returning to New York City on a Sunday night from a visit with Mrs. Roosevelt in Hyde Park, dropped in at Voisin's for dinner with a couple of friends. At a neighboring table, a man obviously drunk, began in a low but penetrating voice to direct a stream of unprintable comment at him. Kennedy's companions raised their own voices in the hope that he would not hear, but to no avail. Finally one made a motion to call the headwaiter. Kennedy laid a hand on his sleeve and said, "No, don't bother. Think how the fellow's wife must be feeling." His friend looked and saw her flushed with embarrassment. He later reacted with comparable dispassion to de Gaulle and Khrushchev.

He liked to quote Lincoln: "There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost everything, especially of Government policy, is an inseparable compound of the two, so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded."

p.125 On Wednesday night after the election he relaxed at dinner with several friends. The group fell into an animated discussion of what the President-elect should do first. One guest suggested that he fire J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, another that he fire Allen W. Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency. Kennedy, listening with apparent interest, egged his friends on. When they opened their papers the next morning, they were therefore a little irritated to read a Kennedy announcement that Hoover and Dulles were staying in their jobs.

This was part of the strategy of reassurance. Hoover and Dulles were still national ikons in 1960. Since the political cost of discharging them would have been considerable, reappointment enabled Kennedy to get full credit with their admirers for something he had no real choice but to do anyway. ...

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A 1000 DAYS

Kennedy's Methods - Political

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pp.163/4.....

On January 19 Kennedy held a final meeting with Eisenhower. They talked alone and then met with their advisers in the Cabinet Room. The discussion concentrated on points of crisis, and especially on the mounting difficulties in Laos. Eisenhower said that he had hoped that the South-East Asia Treaty Organization would take charge of the "controversy" but that the British and French did not want SEATO to act. Christian A. Herter, the retiring Secretary of State, added that he did not think that "the Soviet bloc" intended a major war in Southeast Asia but that they would continue to make trouble up to the brink. The United States, Herter recommended, must convince the communists of our intention to defend Laos, at the same time trying to persuade our allies to move with us in concert. If a political settlement could not be arranged in Laos, then this country must intervene. Eisenhower added that Laos was the key to all Southeast Asia. If the communists took Laos, they would bring "unbelievable pressure" on Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Laos, he said with solemnity, was so important that, if it reached the point where we could not persuade others to act with us, then he would be willing, "as a last desperate hope, to intervene unilaterally." He wondered for a moment why communist soldiers always seemed to have better morale than the soldiers "representing the democratic forces"; evidently there was something about "the communist philosophy" which gave their supporters "a certain inspiration and a certain dedication." Then he said that it would be fatal to permit the communists any part in a new Laotian regime, citing the experience of China and the Marshall mission.

Kennedy, listening quietly, finally asked how long it would take to put an American division into Laos. Secretary Gates replied: twelve to seventeen days from the United States, less if we used troops already in the Pacific. Gates ~~was~~ went on to say that he was "exceedingly sanguine" about American capabilities for limited war; our forces were fully adequate to meet "any foreseeable test." Then he added that, while the United States was in excellent shape to meet one "limited war situation," it could not of course meet two limited war "situations" going on at the same time.

p.126-7 Early in December, Kennedy and Eisenhower had their first formal meeting. The President-elect prepared himself with great care, and the two men talked by themselves for seventy-five minutes before walking arm-in-arm into the Cabinet Room where Clifford and Persons were waiting. Persons phoned Clifford later and reported that Eisenhower, who had previously called Kennedy a "young whippersnapper," was "overwhelmed by Senator Kennedy, his understanding of the world problems, the depth of his questions, his grasp of the issues and the keenness of his mind." The subsequent rapport between the two principals assisted the transition process.

But Kennedy was concerned throughout not to assume responsibility until he assumed power. He remembered perhaps Hoover's effort in 1932 to trap Roosevelt into decisions which, as Hoover privately confessed at the time, would have forced the incoming President to abandon "90 percent of the so-called new deal" and ratify "the whole major program of the Republican Administration." In the main, the Eisenhower administration did not try to inveigle Kennedy into underwriting its policies. There were exceptions, however - most notably when Robert Anderson, the outgoing Secretary of the Treasury, wanted a Kennedy man to go with him to Bonn and discuss the gold problem with the Germans. Kennedy instead asked Paul Nitze to receive Anderson's report on his return. Similarly the State Department sought Kennedy's advance approval of a proposal for a multilateral nuclear force to be submitted to the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council; Kennedy again declined, instead asking Nitze and David Bruce to talk quietly with the NATO Director General, Paul-Henri Spaak. When the Eisenhower administration terminated diplomatic relations with the Castro regime early in January, Kennedy was informed but took no part in the decision.

p.164 The tour d'horizon reached Cuba. On November 18 Kennedy had learned for the first time from Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell of CIA that on March 17, 1960, the Eisenhower administration had decided to equip and drill Cuban exiles for possible action against the Castro regime. The outgoing President now said that it was "the policy of this government" to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces "to the utmost." At present, "We are helping train anti-Castro forces in Guatemala." Eisenhower recommended that "this effort be continued and accelerated." Twenty-four hours later, as he took the presidential oath in the freezing cold of Capitol Plaza, these became John F. Kennedy's problems.

p.163 ⁷ I was enchanted by Havana - and appalled by the way that lovely city was being debased into a giant casino and brothel for American businessmen over for a big weekend from Miami. My fellow countrymen reeled through the streets, picking up fourteen-year-old Cuban girls and tossing coins to make men scramble in the gutter. One wondered how any Cuban - on the basis of this evidence - could regard the United States with anything but hatred. ...

(Note: Date 1950)

p.174/5 ^{.....} This view found little support in the United States in the fifties. The stimulus to raw material prices provided first by the Second World War and later by the Korean War made it easy to argue that Latin America had no basic economic problems. The Eisenhower administration was thus able to relax in the comfortable doctrine that private investment by itself would bring about development in Latin America, as they supposed it had done in the United States; that government aid should be confined to military and technical assistance; and that the way to enable private investment to do its job was to back governments which would foster a 'favorable' investment climate by leaving private business alone, guaranteeing investors, especially foreign investors, full and unrestricted returns and insuring monetary stability. This meant, of course, right-wing governments; and it was this thesis, rather than an innate preference for dictatorships, which sent Vice-President Nixon to Havana to praise the "competence and stability" of the Batista regime and moved President Eisenhower himself to award the Legion of Merit to dictators like Perez Jimenez of Venezuela (for, among other reasons, his "sound foreign-investment policies") and Manuel Odría of Peru. (When the Vice-President visited these last two countries in the spring of 1958 after their dictators had been thrown out, he became the victim of Washington's identification with the detested regimes.) The insistence on monetary stability before all else received the ardent support of the International Monetary Fund, which imposed deflation on a number of Latin American states as the condition for IMF loans.^o

The theory of development as an act of immaculate private conception was founded, among other things, on a considerable ignorance of the history of economic development in the United States itself. In the

^o Undeterred by past error, the International Monetary Fund in 1964-65 persuaded a complaisant government in the Dominican Republic to accept a fiscal program which reduced per capita income, increased unemployment and led in the spring of 1965 to political convulsion and United States intervention.

p.175 first half-century of our own history government had played a relatively active role in building the turnpikes, canals, harbors, railroads and schools which made subsequent economic expansion possible. When what economists unhappily term 'social overhead capital' or 'infrastructure' is the great need, public investment becomes a necessity, since private capital will not go into these areas of low return. As for Washington's insistence on fiscal purity, this was perhaps a trifling unseemly on the part of a nation which had financed so much of its own development by inflation, wildcat paper money and bonds sold to foreign investors and subsequently repudiated. If the criteria of the International Monetary Fund had governed the United States in the nineteenth century, our own economic development would have taken a good

deal longer. In preaching fiscal orthodoxy to developing nations, we were somewhat in the position of the prostitute who, having retired on her earnings, believes that public virtue requires the closing down of the red-light district.

The policy of the fifties not only violated our own national practice; it was also manifestly inadequate to the problems of Latin America, and it reinforced the cherished Latin conviction that the essence of the United States purpose was economic imperialism. Its result had been to place our position in extreme jeopardy throughout the hemisphere. And the rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba was transforming a ~~policy~~ failure of policy into a threat to security. This was the situation which the President feared and into which he was not asking McGovern and me to look.

p.177 In recent years Brazil had so far outdistanced her in every respect that no realistic Argentine could any longer suppose that his country was competing with Washington for dominance in the hemisphere. Frondizi, relieved of this traditional antagonism, was the most pro-American president in Argentine history.

The shift to laissez faire was more puzzling, though it was in part a response to the economic orthodoxy of the Eisenhower administration and the International Monetary Fund. When we met with Alvaro Carlos Alsogaray, the Minister of Economy, he thundered at us across the conference table about the virtues of his 'free enterprise' policies. These policies had in fact brought Argentine national income down 10 per cent and real wages as much as 30 per cent (as a consequence of the termination of overtime rates and food subsidies) and had produced much stagnation and unemployment - and one wondered at Alsogaray's self-satisfaction. ...

Frondizi was skeptical about Food for Peace and, indeed, about 'social investment' in general. This was a common Latin reaction to the program launched in 1960 at Bogota providing for a Social Progress Fund and increased investment in housing, education and other forms of welfare. Frondizi argued that development required hard capital investment in heavy industry; if this were done, the new wealth produced would take care of the social problems. A continent-wide program of basic economic growth, he said, was the only way to save the hemisphere from communism.

p.178 This observation gave me the opportunity to pursue my mission for the President and raise the question of Castro. Frondizi indicated that he regarded the Cuban regime as essentially communist but added: "Castro is not the fundamental question. The elimination of Castro will not solve the underlying problem. What is required is an attack on the conditions which produced him. If he is eliminated and these conditions are left unchanged, new Castros will arise all over the continent." We agreed but tried to point out that social and economic reforms, however desirable, would not counter the existing threat which Castro posed to hemisphere unity. ...

Buenos Aires itself was depressing. It seemed characteristic that the remarkable writer, Jorge Luis Borges, whom I had been particularly eager to meet, should be receiving \$60 a month as director of the Biblioteca Nacional - less, as he bitterly remarked, than a street cleaner. In general, the government appeared weary and lacking in imagination or energy. When we went on to Brazil, the contrast was spectacular. Under Juscelino Kubitschek, the retiring president, the sheer momentum of growth had charged the nation with a certain economic dynamism. That growth could hardly have been more vagrant, disorderly and undisciplined; a Brazilian economist described Kubitschek to us as "the playboy of economic development." Yet Brazil, while defying the orthodoxies of public finance and defrauding the International Monetary Fund, could show as a result not only inordinate inflation and inordinate graft but a solid increase in its industrial base and national output. Wild as it all was, it somehow seemed better than the stagnation of Argentina; but one wondered whether a middle course might not be possible.

p.179 On the plane Ambassador John Moors Cabot said, "I get very irritated when people blame the problems of Latin America on the United States policy. Of course, I have had my disagreements with and disappointments over some of the things we have done. But the main

trouble does not lie in the United States; it lies in Latin America. The source of the difficulty is that the masses in Latin America do not realize that their day is over. The selfishness and blindness of the oligarchies in these countries is the reason why a storm is brewing."

p.181 The process of revolution in Bolivia, which had begun haltingly with the MNR uprising of 1943, had reached its climax when the MNR returned to power in 1952 and, during the presidency of Victor Paz Estenssoro, carried through one of the few genuine social transformations in Latin America's long history of political upheaval. Despite the nationalization of the tin mines and other offenses against free enterprise, the Eisenhower administration exempted Bolivia from its Latin American canons and actually gave it more grant aid than any other country in the hemisphere - about ~~\$150~~ \$150 million. This aid, however, had produced little in the way of economic stimulus or other visible result. Much of it had gone for direct budgetary support; the rest for technical assistance. The Bolivian budget had been about \$35 million annually (less than that, say, of the University of California), and of this the United States had been paying about one-third. But, as a condition for this subsidy, Washington had insisted that everything else should be sacrificed to the stabilization of prices. In 1960 the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs actually told the House Foreign Affairs Committee with regard to a projected development program, "We had to tell the Bolivian Government that they couldn't put their money into it and we weren't going to put ours into it." This decision to pursue stabilization at the expense of development, along with the decline in tin prices, condemned the country to economic stagnation. As President Hernan Siles, who had faithfully carried out the stabilization program in 1956-60, put it, "The United States has given me just enough rope to hang myself." Paz Estenssoro, whose second term as president had recently begun, was now struggling to get his poor and isolated nation moving again.

p.182

The visitor to the Presidential Palace in La Paz must pass by the lamppost, across the street, from which the corpse of President Villaroel dangled in 1946 - a chastening reminder to his successors of the uncertainty of political life (and one on which Paz Estenssoro may now muse today from his exile in Peru). Paz, an intelligent and harassed man, began by setting forth the general case for revolution with fluency and candor. The great need in Latin America, he said, was to incorporate the poor people into both the money economy and the political society. But too much of Latin America lingered in a quasi-feudal state, with the very poor, and especially the Indians, living under the domination of a landed oligarchy which thought it was ruling by divine right. The longer the oligarchs resisted change, Paz said, the more violent revolution would be when it came. Peru and Ecuador, he added, were particularly near the point of social explosion.

I responded that many North Americans agreed with this analysis, that even a Republican administration in Washington had provided the margin of financial support which had saved the Bolivian Revolution from disaster. Where revolution meant healthy social change, the Kennedy administration could be depended on to look on it with sympathy, but not so when revolution meant dictatorship, depression and the entry of alien forces into the hemisphere. The leaders of the Bolivian government surely bore a particular responsibility to maintain the integrity of their revolution.

p.183

"There is much poverty in my country," Paz replied. "The communists have made themselves the advocates of the just demands of the workers and peasants. That makes it hard for us to oppose them without

seeming to oppose what we regard as a just social program." But he gloomily admitted that they might try to take over Bolivia as they had taken over Cuba; ever since the Castro revolution, he added, the communists had proved especially successful in winning adherents and forcing issues.

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p.189 Though Dillon knew little about Latin America, he soon received his baptism of fire at a conference of hemisphere finance ministers in Buenos Aires in the fall of 1957. Examining the Treasury position papers before the conference, he was struck by their complacent negativism: Inter-American Bank, NO; commodity agreements, NO; development assistance, NO. The State Department was not much better. Its Latin American experts, supposing the Korean War's boost to raw material prices to be permanent, said that Latin America was too prosperous to require external assistance. Three hard weeks at Buenos Aires convinced Dillon that Washington's diagnosis of the hemisphere was badly wrong. On his return to Washington he began to agitate for new policies.
p.190 Plenty of ideas lay at hand. Since 1948 the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) had conducted studies of Latin American development and, under the inspiration of Raul Prebisch of Argentina, had worked out a number of far-reaching plans - to all of which, however, the State Department had been systematically hostile....

pp.180/1

..... We drove with him through the humid area along the coast, devoted largely to sugar cultivation. Then we headed toward the semi-arid land in the interior. I had never seen such an area of despair - one bleak, stagnant village after another, dark mud huts, children with spindle legs and swollen bellies, practically no old people (Furtado noted that life expectancy, for those who survived their first year, was twenty-nine years). In one hut a baby, lying helplessly in his mother's arms, was dying of measles. The rest of the family of seven was sitting on the dirt floor eating a hopeless meal of beans and farina. When McGovern and I entered, they looked up apathetically, except for a naked baby, perhaps eighteen months old, who rushed cheerily toward us, holding out his arms to be taken up. He was covered with scabs and pockmarks, and we were reluctant to touch him. A cameraman, who had come along in order to record evidence of need sufficient to convince Congressmen, kept flashing pictures of this terrible scene.

Furtado was realistic in his assessment of possibilities. Seeing no present hope of doing anything in the semi-arid zone, he was concentrating on the sugar lands. An emergency food program, he said, would do no good; it might even disturb the existing dietary balance which kept the people marginally alive. "Real development," he said, "means giving man the possibility of being happy in his work. These people hate their work. They are too weak anyway to work very long. If you give them food and do nothing to change their way of life, they will only work less." As we drove through the desperate countryside, Furtado discussed women as the index of the state of development. "In the poor areas they are no longer have the grace or form of a woman; they become beasts of burden." After nine hours in the hinterland, we returned, tired and depressed, to Recife. As we got out of the car, an enameled Brazilian girl came out of the hotel in high heels and a chic Paris dress. Furtado said drily, "We are obviously back in a developed country."

p.181

Furtado himself came from a ranch in the interior. During the fifties the American Embassy regarded him with mistrust as a Marxist, even possibly a communist. But in 1961 Furtado seemed to see the problem of the northeast as a personal race between himself and the agitator Francisco Juliao, who was organizing the peasants in Ligas Camponeses and urging them to seize the land. McGovern and I were both appalled by the magnitude of the problem and impressed by the initiatives which Brazil had already taken. We carried the cause of northeast Brazil with us back to Washington.

pp.186/7

In a famous quotation of 1952 German Arciniegas spoke of two Latin Americas: the visible and the invisible. The visible Latin America was the Yanqui's Latin America of presidents, chancelleries, generals, embassies, business houses, law offices, estancias and haciendas. The other, the "mute, repressed" Latin America, was a "vast reservoir of revolution . . . Nobody knows exactly what these 150 million silent men and women think, feel, dream or await in the depths of their being."

By 1961 there were a good deal more than 150 million people; they were no longer silent; and the whole hemisphere was seeming to move in response to their inchoate stirrings. When I came back to Washington in early March, it was with the conviction, more urgent now than ever, that the struggle of the invisible Latin America to join the twentieth century was confronting the United States with a crisis - one which, if ignored, might end by transforming the southern half of the hemisphere into a boiling and angry China, but which, if approached in a strong and comprehensive way, might still not be beyond our power to affect.

1. Evolution of a Policy

Here was a continent of 200 million souls, at least two-fifths of whom were under fifteen years of age, nearly 50 per cent of whom were illiterate, 30 per cent of whom would die before their fortieth year - a population multiplying faster than any other in the world - where 2 per cent of the people owned 50 per cent of the wealth and 70 per cent lived in abject poverty; yet here also was a part of the west, permeated and tantalized by democratic ideals of freedom and progress, where the existence of a common ethical and political inheritance might create possibilities of ~~partnership and action which did not exist in Asia or Africa.~~ partnership and action which did not exist in Asia or Africa.

Here was a world at once fascinating and appalling in its internal contrasts, where a highly polished nineteenth century civilization co-existed with unimaginable primitivism and squalor, and where a surging passion for modernization now threatened to sweep both aside. Here were free republics with meager traditions of stability or continuity - where, indeed, ninety-three illegal changes of regime had taken place in the last thirty years - but with deep pride in their more than a century of independence. Here was half of the western hemisphere, which, if it turned against the United States, would mock our leadership before the world and create a hard and lasting threat to our national security, but which, if we could work effectively with its people, might provide the world a model in the processes of democratic development.

The old order in Latin America was obviously breaking up. There was no longer any question of preserving the status quo. The only question now was the shape of the future. Here was Fidel Castro, the passionate leader of the Cuban Revolution, behind him the inarticulate woes of generations, and behind him too the thrust of communism from beyond the hemisphere; and here was the new young President of the United States, whose accession to power had already awakened fresh hope in the Americas, and behind him the uneven and uncoordinated energies of reasonable men and of indigenous Latin democracy. Which road into the future? My talks with Betancourt, Haya de la Torre, Paz Estenssoro and others had given me the strong impression that the democratic left in Latin America had turned decisively against Castro and that he would increasingly appear as the symbol not of social revolution but of Soviet penetration. None-

theless, if the United States were not ready to offer an affirmative program for democratic modernization, new Castros would undoubtedly rise across the continent. This was the nature of the crisis.

p.189 John Moors Cabot, as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, fought in 1953 for a hemisphere program of economic assistance and social reform. But George Humphrey and his Treasury Department denounced the whole idea, and Cabot, discouraged, resigned to return to the field. His successor, Henry Holland, better fitted the Dulles-Humphrey mood. A doctrinaire apostle of 'free enterprise,' he passionately opposed, for example, United States loans to public undertakings in Latin America, and he feared that, if the progressive democrats came to power, they would curtail the power and disturb the confidence of businessmen, as they had in the United States under the New Deal. It was Holland who tried to keep Romulo Betancourt from finding refuge in Puerto Rico. After Holland left the government to take advantage as an international lawyer or contacts he made as Assistant Secretary, he was followed by R. R. Rubottom, Jr., a Foreign Service officer of temperate but cautious views.

p.191 In a speech in Puerto Rico at the end of 1958, a few days before Fidel Castro entered Havana, Kennedy urged that Latin America be given a new priority in United States foreign policy. He warned against the illusion prevalent in North American discussions "that all Latin American agitation is Communist-inspired - that every anti-American voice is the voice of Moscow - and that most citizens of Latin America share our dedication to an anti-Communist crusade to save what we call free enterprise." ...

p.192 Perhaps the most influential was Adolf Berle, who, after playing a role in the creation of the Good Neighbor policy, had served Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of State and as ambassador to Brazil. More than anyone else, Berle provided the link between the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for Progress. His experience in Brazil, where he helped in 1945 to set off the train of events leading to the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship, convinced him that the Good Neighbor policy ~~was~~ could not survive as a diplomatic and juridical policy alone. The principle of absolute nonintervention, he felt, did not exhaust the policy; it could only be the first phase in its unfolding. If Good Neighborism did not mean a set of democratic ideas, it would be no more than a policy of sanctifying economic stagnation and political tyranny - a result that would injure the moral position of the United States without ~~of~~ furnishing strategic security.

.....
This evolution of the Good Neighbor policy, Berle well understood, required the emergence in Latin America of political leaders and parties committed to democratic objectives. During the forties and fifties, when the State Department was ignoring or harassing Latin American democrats, Berle made it his business to keep in close touch with men like Betancourt and Figueres. In this effort, he worked closely with Luis Munoz Marin, the remarkable governor of Puerto Rico. Together they developed a network of unofficial relationships with the partidos populares of Latin America. Kennedy, whose friendship with Munoz began with the Puerto Rican trip of 1958, fell heir to these ideas and relationships.

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Kennedy's man on Latin America was Richard Goodwin. After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1958, Goodwin came to Washington as law clerk to Justice Frankfurter. He was certainly driving and often impatient; those whom he overrode called him arrogant. But he was a man of uncommon intelligence, perception and charm. Above all, he had immense facility, both literary and intellectual. He soon proved himself more skilled in writing for Kennedy than anyone but Sorenson; and he also showed himself able to take on any subject, however new and complicated, master its essentials with rapidity and precision and arrive at ideas for action. Kennedy liked his speed, wit, imagination and passion.

Goodwin's friendship with Karl Meyer, who wrote editorials on Latin America for the Washington Post, had given him an acquaintance with hemisphere problems and personalities even before he met Kennedy. During the campaign the candidate repeatedly cited Latin America as a signal Republican failure in foreign affairs. ...

A 1000 DAYS

ECONOMIC - General
Political - General
Military - General

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p.195 The task force submitted its report early in 1961. The problem, it said, was "to divorce the inevitable and necessary Latin American social transformation from connection with and prevent its capture by overseas Communist power politics."

p.196 Democracy was weak in Latin America in part because the United States "has stated no clear ~~philosophy~~ philosophy of its own, and has no effective machinery to disseminate such a philosophy." It was useless to try to "stabilize the dying reactionary situations." ...

p.197 The report also offered specific suggestions about emergency situations. Its significance, however, lay in the new elements it brought into official thinking. It saw the communist threat as requiring not just a military response as the Pentagon believed, or just an economic response, as some Latin Americans believed, but a combination of both. Besides military containment, it urged the systematic and semiofficial promotion of democratic political parties and a new stress on economic development through country development plans. These elements carried the task force program beyond Kennedy's Tampa speech or Dillon's Social Progress Trust Fund. If the recommendations were accepted, the goal of the United States would be not just the limited program of social development envisaged at Bogota but a long-term program of ~~national~~ national and continental development, shielded against communist disruption and aimed at leading the whole hemisphere to self-sustaining economic growth and democratic political institutions.

4. Birth throes of the Alliance

This view did not prevail in all parts of the executive branch. A preference for right-wing governments had been implicit in the policy of the early Eisenhower years; and the evolution of the Castro regime in Cuba had persuaded some, especially in the armed services, that the right-wing alternative should now become the explicit object of United States policy. The Cuban experience, it was argued, proved that the United States could never retain control of a Latin American revolution, no matter how plausible it might seem in its first stages. As for attempts to avert revolution through pressure for reform, this would only alienate those who held the real power - the oligarchy (more favorably known as the 'producing classes' or 'those commanding capital resources') and the military - and open the door to incompetent liberals who would bring about inflation, disinvestment, capital flight and social indiscipline and would finally be shoved aside by the communists. The conclusion was that we should oppose revolution and reform in Latin America and concentrate on helping our 'tested friends' - those who gave us economic privileges, military facilities and votes in the United Nations and who could be relied on to suppress local communists, tax and land reformers, and other malcontents and demagogues. If we did not support our true friends, we would only convince Latin America that our friendship was not worth having. It was idle to say that a policy of permanent counterrevolution would not work; military support, anti-guerrilla training and unswerving United States backing would keep any friendly regime in power, and the resulting social stability ~~would~~ would attract

investment and produce growth. Eventually the Latin Americans might become capable of self-government.

There was a sophisticated case for this policy, and it was made during his visits to Washington by a brilliant former diplomat, John Davies, Jr., who had been drummed out of the Foreign Service by John Foster Dulles and was now running a furniture factory in Peru. Davies argued with cogency in conversation (and later in his book Foreign and Other Affairs) that the process of development was so inherently disruptive that the first requirement had to be the maintenance of order: "The basic issue is not whether the government is dictatorial or is representative and constitutional. The issue is whether the government, whatever its character, can hold the society together sufficiently to make the transition." Progressive civilian governments tended to be unstable and soft; military governments were comparatively stable and could provide the security necessary for economic growth. This argument, impressive in the abstract, was perhaps less satisfactory when it got down to cases, because the military who really produced development were rare in Latin America. Elsewhere they were revolutionaries of a sort themselves, like Nasser, and hardly more agreeable to the capital-commanding class than a Castro. In finding examples of military leadership which asserted control without manhandling the oligarchs, Davies had to force his comparisons: "Consider what Ayub Khan achieved in Pakistan against what Nehru did for India, or the slow but orderly development under General ~~Stroessner~~ Stroessner in Paraguay as against the disheveled, aid-dependent performance of Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia."

In Washington the case for the right-wing alternative seemed to proceed less from thoughtful analysis of the conditions of growth than from unthinking satisfaction with the existing social order. During the Second World War the United States armed services began to become acquainted with Latin America. Our officers naturally associated with members of the oligarchy, who spoke English and invited them to parties, and they naturally developed a fellow feeling for their brother officers south of the border. After the war, the War Department argued that military relations with Latin American governments should be enlarged in the interests of the security of the United States. In 1946 Truman proposed - under Pentagon pressure and over the State Department's objections - "to standardize military organization, training methods, and equipment" throughout the hemisphere with the evident hope of ultimately producing an inter-American army under United States generalship. In the wake of this policy came a program of arms exports to Latin American countries. This program was reinforced by the Pentagon's chronic need to dispose of obsolescent weapons and thereby acquire credits against which new ones could be purchased.

In these years the United States military fell into the habit of conducting their own direct relations with their Latin American counterparts, training them in United States staff schools, sending them on tours of United States military installations, welcoming their arms missions in Washington, showing them the latest available (i.e., most recently obsolescent) 'hardware' and engaging in elaborate return visits of their own - all with minimal notice to the Department of State and minimal coordination with the country's foreign policy objectives. The original rationale for all this was the supposed need to protect the long coastlines of the Americas from foreign attack. In time the notion of a flotilla crossing the ocean to invade Latin America began to lose what thin semblance of probability it might ever have had, and the Pentagon began to cast about for new missions to justify its incestuous relations with the military of Latin America. By 1961 anti-submarine warfare and counterinsurgency were the favorite candidates. The Latin American