

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

MAY 24, 1966

NO. 122

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY AT 10:00 P.M., E.D.T., TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1966.
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

EXCERPTS FROM
ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
HOTEL WALDORF ASTORIA, NEW YORK CITY
TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1966, AT 10:00 P.M., E.D.T.

It is a great pleasure for me to meet once again with the Council on Foreign Relations. By law I am a member of the Establishment of the Smithsonian Institution; from what I read from time to time I gather some would expect me to bring fraternal greetings to the company assembled here this evening. But were I to bring such greetings from the Department of State, I would disappoint the Establishment watchers. The eight highest officials in our business were born in Iowa, Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Georgia--and their colleges were Northwestern, Baylor, Occidental, Nebraska, Pomona, MIT, Pittsburgh and Davidson. The Foreign Service itself is drawn from all of our States, from families in every walk of life and from nearly 500 colleges and universities. They are a cross section of our nation's best and, in my judgment, are unsurpassed in ability, knowledge and dedication.

I am especially glad to join with you this evening in a tribute to Edward R. Murrow. I should like to compliment Mr. William S. Paley of CBS for his leadership in bringing into being such a fitting and useful memorial as the Edward R. Murrow Fellowships. To what Mr. Paley has said about Ed Murrow's high standards and achievements in journalism, I should like to add just a few comments about his service in Washington.

Ed brought to the government the qualities which had already made him famous: candor, wisdom, wit, humility and "guts". He liked that word "guts". He had seen with a clear eye the ugly face of aggression;

he was

he was deeply convinced that the word "liberal" has something to do with human freedom; and he was passionate in support of simple human rights. He imparted extraordinary qualities to the United States Information Agency and manifested them in his relations with his colleagues and the President. President Kennedy held him in the highest esteem and spoke of the "imagination, skill and maturity" which he imparted to the organization he led.

And President Johnson, in accepting Ed's resignation, wrote to him: "You have done a magnificent job in this post. Your entire life, your eloquence and idealism and sound judgment, your determined drive and sparkling personality all combined to make you superbly qualified for the task of conveying the true picture and purpose of this country to the world. You leave with the thanks of a grateful President and a grateful Nation."

Ed was a great public servant -- not just in his too brief years in the government but throughout his career in broadcasting. All of us who knew and worked with him will always be richer -- and wiser -- for that privilege.

There are other reasons I am glad to pay my respects to the Council on Foreign Relations. I am quite aware, for example, that I owe you the texts of two Elihu Root Lectures -- one on the Secretary of State and one on the Congress. A generous and kind Providence prevented their publication before I assumed my present office. But if, at some time in the future, you will ask me to deliver two lectures on "Elihu Root Revisited", I promise to keep my obligation tempered by experiences which neither you nor I anticipated when the original lectures were delivered.

We can be grateful to the Council on Foreign Relations for its continuing and serious examination of major issues of foreign policy --

an

an examination which takes into account the most divergent views, which recognizes the difference between opinion and decision, and which seeks to encompass all of the relevant considerations and the available alternatives which confront a great nation in a turbulent world situation.

The central object of our foreign policy can be simply stated -- to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity". Some may state it in other ways but without significant improvement. One must add, in the modern world, that we must prevent a major war if possible. I recall that in August 1945, when learning of the atomic bomb, a professional officer on the General Staff exclaimed "war has devoured itself and can no longer serve any political purpose". So our effort must be to organize the peace and not merely hope for it -- and to eliminate war and not merely wish that it would go away.

It is no longer possible to do that by defenses and policies confined to the North American continent, the Western Hemisphere, the North Atlantic basin, or any other geographical area. General George C. Marshall recognized this fundamental change in our security problem in his final biennial report as Chief of Staff of the Army. He pointed out that the war just concluded would be the last in which we would have space and time to arm after hostilities broke out....that "The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories into the front line of world conflict"....and that therefore "We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world." He was led to that conclusion by intercontinental planes and fission bombs. Since then have come intercontinental rockets and thermonuclear warheads. The range, speed, and power of modern weapons compel us to be concerned with the earth as a whole -- and with adjacent areas of space.

There are some who have not revised their thinking in the light of the realities of modern weapons and communications -- who cling to the
obsolete

obsolete notions of a bygone age ... who think that what happens next door is necessarily more important than what happens half way around the world. Some of them can see across the Atlantic -- but the Pacific is too broad for them even though it can be crossed in less time than could the Atlantic before the Second World War.

One of the notions that has come down to us from a simpler time is the sphere, or orbit, of influence. It has a certain superficial appeal. Lacking time here for a more thorough analysis, I would merely pose a few questions: Who is to determine how many of these orbits of influence there are to be ... which are to be the master nations and which the satellites? And what happens when the master nations intrude on each other's self-designated orbits? Quite apart from the moral problems involved, it would be hard to devise a scheme more likely to lead to major conflict -- surely history does not certify it as a structure for peace.

I see no rational or realistic alternative to a world order which recognizes the right of every nation, large or small, under institutions of its own choosing... to live in peace, free of coercion or threats from others, including its next door neighbors.

That is the kind of world order envisaged in the Preamble and Articles One and Two of the United Nations Charter -- a document drafted while the greatest and most destructive war in history was still raging, when we and others were thinking deeply about the tragic lessons of the past and how to prevent another, and still more frightful conflagration.

Such a world order is the abiding goal of American policy. And, we believe, it is in harmony with the aspirations and interests of a great majority of mankind. Is this just a visionary dream? ... It had better not be, because mankind cannot afford a war fought with thermonuclear weapons. It will not have a chance to apply lessons learned from World War Three. If civilization is to survive, those lessons must be seen and applied in advance.

The

The achievement of a peaceful world order that is safe for freedom is not only our abiding goal... but our daily concern. Most of the vast activity of the Department of State and related agencies is directed to that end. We work toward it not only through the United Nations and its specialized agencies but through a growing array of regional and functional organizations, and other cooperative arrangements, through treaties and other international agreements, through negotiation and consultations, by promoting exchanges of knowledge and people. Beneath the crises, these constructive efforts proceed, day and night. Most of them are seldom mentioned in the daily press. But, in Raymond Fosdick's phrase, they are spinning "the infinity of threads which bind peace together."

One obstacle to organizing a reliable peace is, of course, excessive nationalism. In some cases, this has appeared among those who only lately have achieved national independence and have not discovered that what nations, especially small ones, can achieve in isolation is severely limited. It has appeared also among a few who would try to recapture the glories of a vanished -- and in part imagined -- past rather than face squarely the realities of the present and the requirements of the future.

Another, and more formidable obstacle, to the sort of world order we envisage is presented by those who are committed to a different scheme for organizing the affairs of mankind. The underlying crisis of our time arises from this fundamental conflict: between those who would impose their blueprint on mankind and those who believe in self-determination, between coercion and freedom of choice.

Significant changes have occurred within the Communist world. It has long ceased to be monolithic, and evolutionary influences are visible in most of the Communist states. But the leaders of both the principal Communist nations are committed to promotion of the Communist world revolution -- even while they disagree bitterly on tactics.

If mankind

If mankind is to achieve a peaceful world order safe for free institutions, it is of course essential that aggression be eliminated -- if possible by deterring it, or, if it occurs, by repelling it. The clearest lesson of the Nineteen Thirties and Forties is that aggression feeds on aggression. I am aware that Mao and Ho Chi Minh are not Hitler and Mussolini. But we should not forget what we have learned about the anatomy and physiology of aggression. We ought to know better than to ignore the aggressor's openly proclaimed intentions or to fall victim to the notion that he will stop if you let him have just one more bite or speak to him a little more gently.

I believe it is widely understood that a thermonuclear aggression would not be a rational act. And I believe it is generally realized that aggression by moving masses of conventional forces would entail very grave risks. But what the Communists, in their familiar upside down language, call "wars of liberation" are advocated and supported by Moscow as well as by Peiping. The assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam is a critical test of that technique of aggression.

It is as important to defeat this type of aggression in Southeast Asia now as it was to defeat it in Greece 19 years ago. The aggression against Greece produced the Truman Doctrine, a declaration of a general policy of assisting other free peoples who are defending themselves against external attacks or threats. A clear understanding that aggression must not be allowed to succeed produced our support of Iran, our aid to Turkey as well as to Greece, our aid to Western Europe, the Berlin airlift, the North Atlantic Treaty and the other defensive alliances and military establishments of the Free World, the decision to repel the aggression against Korea, and the decision to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia to preserve their independence.

In the discussion of our commitment in Southeast Asia three different aspects are sometimes confused: why we made it, how we made it, and the means of fulfilling it.

The why

The why was a determination that the peace and security of that area are extremely important to the security of the United States. That determination was made first, before the Korean War, by President Truman, on the basis of protracted analysis in the highest councils of the government. The problem was reexamined at least twice during his Administration and at intervals thereafter. And the main conclusion was always the same. It was based upon the natural resources and the strategic importance of the area, on the number of nations and peoples involved -- more than 200 million -- as well as on the relationship of Southeast Asia to the world situation as a whole and to the prospects for a durable peace. Those of both parties -- and of no party -- who have had to bear the responsibilities of protecting the security of the United States during the last twenty years have never regarded Southeast Asia and Viet-Nam as "obscure" or "remote" or unimportant.

The how of the commitment consists of various acts and utterances by successive Presidents and Congresses -- of which the most solemn is the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed in 1954 and approved by the Senate in early 1955 with only one dissenting vote.

I do not find it easy to understand how anyone could have voted for that treaty -- or ever read it -- without realizing that it was a genuine collective defense treaty. It says, in Article IV, that each party recognized that "aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area" -- which by protocol included the nations which came out of French Indo-China -- "would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dulles said specifically that this clause covered an armed attack "by the regime of Ho Chi Minh."

Article IV

Article IV binds each party individually; it does not require a collective finding. That was made plain when the Treaty was under consideration and has been reiterated on various occasions since then.

The assertion that the Department of State only recently rediscovered the SEATO Treaty is untrue. I have referred to it frequently, beginning with a public statement in Bangkok on March 7, 1961, that the United States would live up to its obligations under that treaty and would "continue to assist free nations of this area who are struggling for their survival against armed minorities directed, supplied, and supported from without" just as we would "assist those under attack by naked aggression." President Kennedy referred to our obligations under SEATO on a number of occasions, including his last public utterance. President Johnson has done so frequently.

In April 1964, the SEATO Council of Ministers declared that the attack on the Republic of Viet-Nam was an "aggression" "directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962." They declared also that the defeat of that "Communist campaign is essential" and that the members of SEATO should remain prepared to take further steps in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty. Only France did not join in these declarations.

A few days later, in this city, President Johnson said: "The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is 'essential' is a reality. To fail to respond ... would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine world-wide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive.

"... So let no one doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom."

The

The resolution of August 1964, which the House of Representatives adopted unanimously and the Senate with only two negative votes, said: "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." It also said: "The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

The third aspect is the means of fulfilling our commitment. These have changed with the nature of the problem and as the dimensions of the aggression have grown. The decision to commit American forces to combat was made by the President with great reluctance -- and only because it became necessary to cope with the escalation of the aggression by the other side.

A large majority of the governments of the Free World are sympathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia and would be alarmed were they to fail. Gallant troops from the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are fighting at the side of our forces and those of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Thailand and Laos are fully engaged in the larger issue of Southeast Asia.

You are familiar with our far-reaching, persistent efforts to bring the other side to the peace table. We shall continue those efforts. I remain prepared to go to Geneva immediately whenever there is anybody there with whom to negotiate peace. But I am confident that the United States will also continue to do what may be necessary to assure that aggression in Southeast Asia does not succeed. When the other side becomes convinced that it cannot achieve its purpose by force, peace will come.

In our policy toward our adversaries, the prevention or defeat of aggression is only the first step. We welcome every opportunity for agreements or understandings which settle or blunt disputes, without
sacrificing

sacrificing the interests of our allies and other free peoples. We continue most earnestly to seek reliable agreements and arrangements to control and reduce armaments.

We welcome the evident desires of most of the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe for more normal relationships with the nations of the West. The President hopes very much that Congress will grant the broader authority he has requested in negotiating trade agreements with those nations.

We are glad that the terror has been lifted in so many of the Communist states. We have welcomed trends toward more personal freedom.

We welcome and do what we can to promote friendly natural relationships between the peoples of the Communist world and ourselves.

In my experience as Secretary of State, I have found that the objectives of American policy are widely understood, respected, and supported. I believe that a great majority of governments and peoples realize that we seek nothing for ourselves except the right to live in freedom. I believe a great majority of them want the sort of world order we and they are trying to build, in which all men can live in peace and freedom and fraternal association.

We took the lead in organizing the United Nations and many of its related institutions, and have been their largest financial contributor.

At the end of the Second World War we demobilized the most powerful armed forces the world had ever known -- so rapidly that in 1946 we had not one division or one air group ready for combat.

We offered to share our atomic monopoly with the entire world -- for purposes of peace.

We supported Iran when its integrity and independence were threatened.

When Greece and Turkey were threatened, we assisted them.

✓ We assisted

We assisted Western Europe to recover from the war -- and to move on to unprecedented levels of well-being.

We joined in organizing NATO and other alliances for the defense of the Free World.

When Free Berlin was threatened, we organized an Air Lift which enabled it to live -- without war.

We negotiated a peace of reconciliation with Japan and Germany.

We played a major role in repelling the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea.

We took the lead in organizing a great cooperative undertaking in the Western Hemisphere, the Alliance for Progress.

We have encouraged and assisted many other cooperative undertakings for human welfare.

We have extended economic and technical assistance to most of the developing countries.

Altogether we have furnished approximately one hundred and twenty billion dollars of assistance to others.

This has included many billions of dollars in food -- without which millions of our fellowmen would have starved.

Since the end of the Second World War our armed forces have suffered more than 165,000 casualties in the defense of freedom.

Those are some of the things the American people have done in the last two decades. Why? To build a peace, to sustain the freedom of man, to lift the burdens of misery, ignorance and disease, to bring turbulence under law.

* * *