

Rusk at Hearing: ... 'Not Just a Problem of South Vietnam'

Following is a partial transcript of Secretary of State Rusk's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Secretary Rusk: I do appreciate this opportunity to appear before this distinguished Committee in support of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 and the President's budget proposals for economic and military assistance for fiscal year 1969.

The President has requested new appropriations of approximately two and a half billion dollars for economic assistance through the Agency for International Development and \$420 million for grant military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act.

For nearly two decades, assistance to less developed countries has been a major component of the foreign policy of the United States. It has been advocated as an essential effort by four successive Presidents and approved by bipartisan majorities in 10 successive Congresses.

Our paramount national interest is, of course, the safety of our Nation and its basic institutions. Another of our major national interests require a safe and progressive world environment.

We cannot find security apart from the rest of the world. And, in the long run, we can be neither prosperous nor safe if most other people live in squalor or if violence consumes the world around us. What we want for ourselves is, in the main, what other peoples want for themselves. These common goals are set forth succinctly in Article One of the United Nations Charter.

Gap Grows Wider

Even though most of the developing countries are making economic progress, the gap between most of them and the economically advanced nations is growing wider. It has been estimated that the economically advanced

countries—that is North America, Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact nations, Japan, Australia, New Zealand—have a per capita gross national product twelve times that of the rest of the world. And it has been estimated further, at present rates of growth, this differential will be 18 to one by the end of the century.

The purpose of our assistance to the developing countries is not to "buy friends." It is to help build free na-



The Washington Post

SEN. WAYNE MORSE

tions, increasingly able to meet the needs of their peoples.

Today, most of the developing countries have moderate leaders committed to peaceful progress. And in most parts of the developing world, governments committed to orderly economic and social progress have been successful in suppressing or fending off the promoters of violent revolution. But

moderate leaders who believe in peaceful progress cannot be expected to endure unless they produce results—unless their peoples make tangible economic and social progress.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is clearly in the interest of the United States to assist those who are committed to peaceful progress.

Over the past few years, we have learned—from our successes and from our failures—to do this job better. There have been striking changes in the costs, composition, methods, problems and prospects of foreign aid. We have learned how to build constructive aid relationships with the countries we help and to work together with other donor nations toward common goals. We have concentrated our assistance programs. In fiscal year 1969, for example, nearly 90 per cent of AID's country programs will be concentrated in 15 countries; more than four-fifths of development lending will be concentrated in 8 countries; and 95 per cent of supporting assistance will be concentrated in four countries.

The program being submitted is a prudent program which takes into account other present demands on our resources. This program and associated programs before the Congress represent two-thirds of one per cent of our Gross National Product.


Other wealthy nations are spending much more for foreign aid than they did formerly and are providing it on more generous terms. In 1961 the other non-Communist countries as a group provided \$2.8 billion in all forms of economic aid to the developing countries, at terms averaging 5.1 per cent interest. Currently they are providing about \$4 billion, at 3.2 per cent average interest.

Now Ranks Fifth

The United States now ranks fifth among the members of the Development Assistance Committee in official aid as a proportion of national product . . .

In addition, most of our bilateral development aid today is provided under international consultative arrangements or consortia guided by multilateral agencies.

Military aid has been reduced sharply, while long-range development aid has risen. At the beginning of this decade, nearly half of the foreign aid funds went for military equipment and training, and about half of the eco-



The Washington Post

SEN. MIKE J. MANSFIELD

conomic aid was for defense support. Today supporting assistance, despite the abnormal requirement in Vietnam, amounts to less than one-fourth of the AID budget request. Grant military assistance, excluding requirements for Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, has been cut to less than one-fourth of the 1961 and 1962 levels.

The cost of aid programs to our balance of payments has been largely eliminated. Military and Food for Freedom programs have never caused a significant balance of payments drain. But in fiscal 1961 AID's predecessors spent 54 per cent of their funds overseas, recording a \$680 million drain in the U.S. balance of payments. This year AID will spend no more than \$170 million offshore, and in fiscal 1969 it expects to hold this to \$130 million. At the same time, payments of principal and interest on previous aid loans will produce a dollar inflow to the United States more than offsetting direct offshore expenditures . . .

The President has requested appropriations for the Inter-American Development Bank. The Bank is a critical element of the Alliance for Progress and needs more funds to get on with its development work.

I urge this Committee to recommend promptly authorization for the U.S. contributions of up to \$200 million.

The New African Development Bank has made its first loan. It has requested help from the United States and other countries to establish special funds . . .

AID is giving top priority to the War

on hunger. The beginnings of a significant breakthrough in food production are already visible in several countries. It is no longer just a theory—we know—that food production can be rapidly increased through the use of new seeds, and more fertilizer and pesticides, combined with research, improved storage, marketing and distribution facilities, farm credit and producer price incentives.

The less developed nations are also beginning to come to grips with their problems of rapid population growth. Today more than half the people in the developing world live in nations which have adopted official policies of reducing birth rates . . .

See Solid Results

Today, more and more developing countries are learning that private initiatives and incentives can greatly accelerate their development.

We think our development aid programs are bringing solid results. These do not generate the headlines that crises do, but they are quietly changing the face of the developing world—and changing it for the better.

Mr. Chairman, let me just add a word about the request for grant Military Assistance of \$420 million for fiscal year 1969.

Among the major purposes of Military Assistance are:

1. To strengthen the capability of selected allied and friendly nations against the threat of external attack.
2. To help developing countries protect their societies against internal violence, thus providing the framework of stability within which national development may thrive.

This is an austere program. It is concentrated on high priority needs in the Free World—85 per cent of the present appropriation request for grant aid is for five "forward defense" countries. We believe the enactment of this program is important . . .

Some say we should postpone or eliminate foreign aid because of the cost of our efforts to help defend freedom in Southeast Asia. But the freedom and progress of hundreds of millions of other Asians, the 250 million people in Latin America, and the 250 million people in Africa also engage our concern and are directly related to our own security and wellbeing.

I find it hard to accept assertions that we cannot afford to devote a fraction of one percent of our GNP to building a safer and more prosperous world by helping other nations to make peaceful progress.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, rather than to direct questions to you at this time, I shall do so later and will defer to my colleagues following this short statement.

Like every other public activity, foreign aid cannot be evaluated solely in terms of its own costs and components. It has to be evaluated in relation to other programs, foreign and domestic, and the costs and purposes of those

programs. It also has to be evaluated in the context of over-all national objectives, in terms, that is, of its usefulness compared to other activities toward the achievement of those objectives. For example, this program cannot in my program be evaluated apart from the question of a large increase in the troops for Vietnam.

If our national objectives were clear and generally agreed upon, it probably would not be too difficult to iron out our differences about the costs and ad-

ministration of the aid program. Unfortunately, we are not at present in agreement about our national objectives; there are, in fact, significant disagreements among us about the purposes of the aid program and the over-all aims of American foreign policy. Imprecise statements about the defense of freedom and the national interest tend to disguise but not eliminate these disagreements. As long as they persist, they are found to complicate our discussions of aid and other public programs, and we obviously cannot reach satisfactory decisions about amounts and kinds of foreign aid when we are in disagreement as to the purposes it is meant to serve. It is important, therefore, that we acknowledge our disagreements and bring them out in the open. It is sometimes said that free democratic discussion divides the Nation, but our history tells us otherwise, that only through the processes of democracy can differences be successfully resolved and the Nation truly unified.

All for America

It goes without saying—or should go without saying—that our disagreements have nothing to do with whether one is for or against America. We are all for America and for America's interests, but we disagree as to what those interests are and how they can best be advanced. We are all for America's prosperity at home and for its prestige abroad, but we disagree as to which requires precedence in these critical days: We are all for our fighting men in Vietnam, but we disagree as to whether they ought to be fighting there . . .

The focus is Vietnam, where the issue has become very much more than the fate of a poor, small and war-torn Asian nation.

The question is also the fate of America, not because it had to be so but because our leaders have made it so . . .

The crisis over the war at home is the result of certain, striking discrepancies—discrepancies between events and the description of them by the Administration, between current Administration policies and traditional American values, such discrepancies as the following:

The war is described as an exem-

plary war, a war, that is, which will prove to the Communist once and for all that so-called "wars of national liberation" cannot succeed. In fact, we are not proving that. What, indeed, are we proving in Vietnam except that, even with an army of half a million men and expenditures approaching \$30 billion a year, we cannot win a civil war for a regime which is incapable of inspiring the patriotism of its own people.

It is said that if we were not fighting in Vietnam we would have to be fighting much closer to home, in Hawaii or even California. I regard this contention as a slander on the United States Navy and Air Forces . . .

It is said that we are fighting for freedom in Vietnam and when someone objects that the Saigon government is corrupt, dictatorial and incapable of inspiring either the loyalty of its people or the fighting spirit of its soldiers, we are told that there is also corruption in Boston and Beaumont, Texas, the relevancy of which escapes me.

There are finally the discrepancies concerning the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of August 1964 . . .

Major Discrepancy

The foregoing are a few of the discrepancies about the war in Vietnam that have aroused and disturbed me and I believe many of the American people. But the greatest discrepancy of all is the discrepancy between present policies and the traditional values of America. There was a time not so long ago when Americans believed that whatever else they might have to do in the world—whatever wars they might have to fight, whatever aid they might have to provide—their principal contribution to the world would be their own example as a decent and democratic society. Now, with our country beset by crises of poverty and race, as we wait and arm ourselves for the annual summer violence in our cities, with our allies alienated and our people divided by the most unpopular war in our history, the light of the American example burns dim around the world.

More alarming still is the dimming of the light of optimism among the American people, especially among our youth, who, having believed too well what they were brought up to believe in have arisen in a kind of spiritual rebellion against what they regard as the betrayal of the traditional American values . . .

It is sometimes said that with our huge national product, we can easily afford the \$30 billion a year we are spending on the war in Vietnam. Perhaps in purely financial terms we can afford it, although I for one am far from convinced. But even if we can afford the money, can we afford the sacrifice of American lives in so dubious a cause? Can we afford the horrors which are being inflicted on the people of a poor and backward land? Can we afford the alienation of our allies, the

neglect of our own deep domestic problems, and the disillusionment of our youth? Can we afford the loss of confidence in our government and institutions, the fading of hope and optimism, and the betrayal of our traditional values?

These, Mr. Secretary, are some of the questions that have to be put before we can return to the normal legislative activities which, technically, are before the Committee today . . .

Secretary Rusk: You have raised some very important points before the Nation. I will not comment on all of them, by any means, but I would like to call the Committee's attention, however, to what is happening in Southeast Asia.

This is not just a problem of South Vietnam, although that is where our major responsibility lies and where our major effort is being made.

South Vietnam is one of the three principal divided countries in the world: Vietnam, Korea, Germany. If these divided countries attempt to solve their problems by force, the

consequences surely would be war. We believe that the problems of divided countries should be settled by peaceful means rather than by force.

Over in Laos, some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops are being confronted by Laotians. Now, those who think that Ho Chi Minh is just a nationalist ought to ask why he is in Laos contrary to the 1962 accords which specifically called for the removal of all foreign forces from Laos.

Thailand has many of its own forces operating in its northeastern territory against guerrillas who were trained in North Vietnam, seeking there to upset the institutions of this independent nation that has been independent for centuries.

From the Outside

Just last Thursday Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia wrote a letter to Le Mond, the newspaper in Paris, in which he repudiated the notion that the dissidents operating in his country were just locally disaffected people who didn't like the government. The Committee may wish to have this letter, but he said: "The rebellion in Battambang is basically political and launched from outside the country. Evidence of this abounds. Discovery of propaganda pamphlets in Siamese, printed in Peking, and carrying the portrait of Mao. It is material handed out by the Thai patriotic front, which is subservient to the Chinese."

Then he adds, "It is perfectly clear that Asian communism does not permit us any longer to stay neutral and out of the conflict that opposes the Sino-Vietnamese and the Americans. Not being able to make of us who do not intend to die for Hanoi or Peking any more than for Washington, not being able to make of us allies supporting it unconditionally, Asian communism strives to overthrow our re-

gime from within."

Now, the central problem, Mr. Chairman, before the human race is how to organize peace in the world, and I would hope that all of us, regardless of our specific views on one or another question, could agree that that is a central problem, and that we at least ought to debate how that is to be done.

Back in 1945 there was a long, hard discussion of that subject at the end of World War II, and the prescription for organizing the peace was written into Article I of the United Nations Charter. It makes it clear that acts of aggression and breaches of the peace have to be suppressed, that disputes ought to be settled by peaceful means; that the basic human rights ought to be sustained, and that governments must cooperate across their frontiers in the great humanitarian purpose of all mankind.

We have undertaken not the task of the world policeman, but we have undertaken certain aspects of it. We have over the years under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations concluded certain treaties. Those were approved by overwhelming bipartisan majorities in the Senate, and those treaties call upon us to take action when certain things happen . . .

No Overall Priority

Now, it is true that we have great national tasks in front of us at the present time at home and abroad. I do not believe that we can give overriding priority to any one of those. I do not believe that Vietnam is an excuse not to do our best here at home. I do not believe that our requirements here at home are an excuse to abandon our commitments in South Vietnam . . .


Our objective is and must be organized peace, but it is also true that we have a basic commitment to freedom for ourselves, and that requires an environment in the rest of the world in which freedom can survive and flourish, as Dean Acheson has put it.

So I would hope, sir, that the Committee would consider seriously the AID bill. If what is happening in Southeast Asia, this appetite on the part of these leaders in Hanoi, if that should cause us to neglect what is necessary in all the other parts of the world, in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, then the dividends, the extra dividends which these people in Hanoi would get for their effort are beyond their wildest dreams.


Sen. Fullbright: Mr. Secretary, I will comment briefly on your comment. Of course, what I had hoped was that this and other discussions, particularly on the floor of the Senate, would prevail upon the Administration to evaluate their policies generally. There is no question about our all wanting to organize the peace. There is a great difficulty about how it should be done.

Your correctly stated the United Nations was the method agreed upon

after World War—even before the end of World War II and certainly thereafter. It hasn't been as successful as we would like. But neither has our own individual unilateral intrusion. I am bound to confess that our own intrusion into Southeast Asia, it seems to me, could well be considered to have incited a number of the developments you have just made. For exam-



The Washington Post
SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT



The Washington Post
ALBERT GORE

ple, another illustration is the so-called Southeast Asia Resolution. The North Vietnamese, knowing

very well that the case that was presented to the Senate was not true, could well have concluded and still may conclude that we were determined to attack them without real provocation, because the provocation, to say the least, was extremely slight as has been admitted. There was no damage whatever to our forces, whatever else you may say, and I think they could well determine that we were determined to attack them regardless of what they did.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Chairman, may I call attention to one other matter. . . I think there is far more agreement among us in this country about what would be a reasonable settlement for Southeast Asia than appears on the surface. And I believe that one of the things that has divided us is a succession of "does" from Hanoi to so many efforts made by so many people on so many subjects to take steps toward peace in Southeast Asia.

Rejections by Hanoi

The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, wholly acceptable to us, rejected by Hanoi.

The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on Laos, wholly acceptable to us, rejected by Hanoi. Or the conference on Cambodia or an all-Asian peace conference, or a special effort by the two co-chairmen or a special effort by the International Control Commission which we hoped could get somewhere in helping Prince Sihanouk meet his problems in Cambodia, or a role for the UN Security Council. Direct talks with ourselves or through intermediaries. We tried very hard to demilitarize the Demilitarized Zone without success, and that is now a one-way street for troops from the north coming south. The inter-position of international forces between the combatants is an idea that we have accepted, rejected by Hanoi. The mutual withdrawal of foreign forces. At Manila, the seven nations with troops in South Vietnam made it clear that we can withdraw our forces when the forces from the north are withdrawn and the violence subsides. We have tried on several occasions to stir up some interest in the cessation of bombing and reciprocal de-escalation. . . We have offered to stop our augmentation of our own forces if they would do the same.

In terms of negotiations, we are prepared to negotiate today without any conditions whatever. We will meet today. They have raised a major condition, the stopping of the bombing. We are prepared to negotiate about conditions to see if we can't find some way to bring about a cease fire and get serious talks started toward peace.

We have offered, as you know, President Johnson offered at Johns Hopkins on the basis of peace we would like to see North Vietnam included in a large development program for Southeast Asia, of Asia as a whole. We believe the government of South Vietnam ought to be determined by free elections in that country and the question of pacification should be determined

by free elections, and we have said as far as we are concerned South Vietnam can be neutral, if it wishes to do so.

Sen. John J. Sparkman (D-Ala): Mr. Secretary, the Chairman has just made some comment about the so-called Southeast Asia Resolution. That is the same one as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, is it not?

Secretary Rusk: This has been popularly described in some places as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Its official designation in the publications of the Congress are the Southeast Asia Resolution . . .

Sen. Sparkman: Do you believe that the Chairman (Sen. Fulbright) was right when he states that it (Gulf of Tonkin resolution) was not founded on facts?

Secretary Rusk: I do not, Senator. Quite frankly, I did not comment on that point earlier. I am convinced that there were two attacks directed against our destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. I know that the skippers of the two destroyers, the Commander of Naval Forces, Pacific, the Commander in-Chief, Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, were all convinced that these attacks occurred.

I also know that the intelligence communities, using material some of which has been provided to the committee privately, was convinced that both attacks occurred. So I have no doubt in my own mind, Sir, there were two attacks which occurred against our destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Sen. Sparkman: I sat through these hearings and I am satisfied that there was ample cause for asking for that resolution just as you have stated. I feel that there is evidence, ample evidence, to the effect that the two ships, Our two ships, were attacked.

As to Provocations

Now, with reference to the provocation, I was going to ask you about that; it is true that there is one of the wires sent between one of our naval commanders in one area to a naval

commander in another area, there was brought out the suggestion that moving in a certain direction might induce, might pull the North Vietnamese vessels away from the operation, what was the term, 34-A. . . . But, as a matter of fact, is it not true that we had a right to operate our ships in that area, and even if they had been doing nothing, they had been fishing vessels it probably would have been provocative to the North Vietnamese.

Secretary Rusk: Well, Senator, when you start with provocation, let's bear in mind that North Vietnamese vessels were trying to bring infiltrators, arms as a part of an illegal attack upon South Vietnam, that the South Vietnamese, in an effort to defend themselves against this infiltration, were carrying on operations against certain islands which were bases for these operations.

Now, surely we at that time, the United States was not taking part in any military operations against the North. Our Naval vessels were not taking part in those 34-A operations. We were not bombing the North. . . .

Now, that particular message that you refer to did not represent the mission of our destroyers as given in Washington, and that was speculation on the part of the officer who sent it. If that had been a part of its mission, I think it was carried out very poorly because these vessels were separated in time and space from the activities of the so-called 34-A operations.

Now, I think it would be a very serious matter if other nations were to assume that we have no access to high seas in normal conditions without taking aggressive or offensive action, or for us to take the view that because the vessels of the other nations are on the high seas near our shores that that is provocative and we should act to prevent it.

I believe myself this was an unwarranted action on the part of North Vietnam and that the strikes that were delivered as a consequence of that action were measured.

Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Iowa): Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about the AID program in the so-called pacification area in South Vietnam and what is happening to that?

Secretary Rusk: I might take just a moment, Senator, to comment on the TET offensive and the consequences of it. Because that has a very direct and important bearing upon your question.

Both Had Setbacks

There is no question but that both sides suffered some severe setbacks in the course of the TET offensive. On the government and allied side, the effect on the cities of bringing the battle into the cities was very destructive at some places, Hue, for example.

There was a serious disruption in the pacification effort in about a third of the provinces. There was significant disruption in about another third of the provinces and very little effect in another third.

Seventeen of the 51 battalions of the

South Vietnamese Army who were on pacification work were pulled back into the towns and cities as a part of the resistance to that TET offensive. . . .

There has been disruption in communications. There was some overrunning in some of the hamlets that were involved in the rural development program and a good deal of work has been concentrated in getting back out into the countryside.

The South Vietnamese forces have rapidly been replenished with replacements for the casualties. They started drafting the 19-year-olds on March 1st, and will be drafting the 18-year-olds on May 1st.

Both the South Vietnamese and the allied forces are returning to the initiative in most parts of the country. And we would like to see, of course, as is evident, the countryside restored. But there was some serious setback in some areas to the pacification effort that you asked about, Sir. . . . Secretary, to me, consideration of the foreign aid bill today is secondary, very secondary to a consideration of our position in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

My questions will be brief and I would hope the answers would be brief.

For the record, why are we in Vietnam?

Secretary Rusk: We are in Vietnam to take steps to meet the common danger in the face of an attack by North Vietnam against South Vietnam.

Sen. Mansfield: You do not consider the struggle in Vietnam between the Vietcong and Saigon a civil war?

Secretary Rusk: Senator, there is a component here that can properly be called a civil war. There are authentic southerners who are in armed rebellion against their government. But that is not why the United States has its forces in there. We have our forces in there because North Vietnam has sent large forces of its own persistently and over-time in this very difficult and mean type of war called guerrilla war, against South Vietnam from the North.

We can't accept the view that because both Vietnams — Vietnamese that this is just a civil war. If West Germany were to go after East Germany or East Germany after West Germany this would not be looked upon as just a family affair between Germans. And the same thing in Korea. So there is a part of this thing called the civil war.

Now, we believe that if the North Vietnamese, their forces, their people, were to get on back to their own part of the country, that the southerners could work out their own arrangements through amnesty, through reconciliation, through political action, and bring this war to a conclusion.

Sen. Mansfield: Mr. Secretary, how many — what is the size of the forces of our opponents in South Vietnam today?

Secretary Rusk: I would have to get

an exact figure for the record, but there are up to 40 regiments of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and that is in the order of 65,000 or 70,000, in the regular North Vietnamese units. There are tens of thousands of North Vietnamese in addition who have been sent in to provide cadre for and to reinforce the so-called

See TEXT, A11, Col. 1

Vietcong units: I would think the numbers would be something on the order of 200,000-240,000 in the military units of the other side.

Sen. Mansfield: And how many of those are Vietcong?

Secretary Rusk: I would think perhaps 125,000 or 150,000. But may I correct that figure for the record if I can, Sir, because — you see one of my problems is that in identifying Vietcong units, we find increasingly that the proportion of North Vietnamese in those units is increasing, and so we would think that in terms of — well, I see here a figure that is not too far away from what I talked about. In terms of the VC about 60,000, guerrilla forces 72,000, about 132,000, plus some 73,000 North Vietnamese, and another 12,000 or so North Vietnamese guerrillas in VC units.

But these figures vary in terms of, from time-to-time, as we get more information on the situation.

Sen. Mansfield: Now, Mr. Secretary, for some years we have been bombing the North. As I understand it this bombing of the North had three purposes: One, to hurt North Vietnam. That has been done. Secondly, to stop the infiltration of men down across the parallel and the Ho Chi Minh trails. Has that been done?

Secretary Rusk: It has not been stopped completely, Senator, and we never suppose that it could stop it completely. But we do know that it has had some major impact upon the capacity of the other side to carry out this infiltration and has cost them very heavily.

For example, if 6000 vehicles are destroyed on their way south they no longer get on down to the border area with the men and the arms on board. If 9000 barges are destroyed coming south they are not there to carry this target on.

The large, large number of secondary explosions inflicted on the supply routes and in depots and installations reflect ammunition that is being destroyed that otherwise would be moved to the south in the attacks on the South Vietnamese, and our own forces.

Significant Attrition

We know from prisoners there is a

significant attrition on the move to the South as units try to move, as a combination of bombing and disease and desertion. So that we have never claimed that it could stop it completely. I think any infantry man would know that that would not be possible. But it has made a very important difference to the ease with which they can carry on this infiltration and support themselves in the South.

Sen. Mansfield: Well, Mr. Secretary, as I understand it the rate of infiltration in 1965 was about 1500 a month. In 1966 about 4500 a month, in 1967 between 5500 and 6000 a month, and in 1968 it is my understanding that in January 20,000 men came down from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Is that a correct figure or a correct estimate?

Secretary Rusk: I would accept those as approximately correct, Sir.

Sen. Mansfield: Then, the third factor in addition to hurt, reducing infiltrators, the third factor was to bring Hanoi to the conference table. Are they any closer to the conference table now than they were when the bombing began?


Secretary Rusk: We have seen no evidence that they are prepared to undertake serious discussions toward a peaceful settlement of this situation. I do think though, Senator, that one must bear in mind another factor here: If North Vietnam were to sit there safe and secure and untouched while they sent their armies into South Vietnam and Laos at whatever pace and whatever numbers they wanted to, I don't quite see what incentive they would have ever for making peace. Unless this situation is costing them something, unless their own effort is being hampered and handicapped by the bombing, I don't know how they, on what basis they would say "Let's make peace in this situation."

Now, we would like to see them do it, but they talk about a fightable negotiating strategy in which their side of the war is maintained full blast while North Vietnam itself is to be safe and secure from any attack whatever. That isn't a good indication of a desire to achieve the kind of peace that the nations of Southeast Asia and their allies could accept.

Sen. Mansfield: Now, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the fact that in response to numerous requests and moves by this Government, and it is a fair statement, that what you have received from Hanoi is "a battery of noise."

I don't believe you mentioned U Thant's peace proposal when you were reeling off the attempts you had made over the years.

I do not believe any suggestion was made relative to the proposal of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, to confine our bombing to the 17th parallel and the infiltration routes in that area giving full protection to our



The Washington Post

SEN. KARL MUNDT

troops in South Vietnam . . . Has consideration been given to the (John Sherman) Cooper (R-Ky.) proposal which would concentrate and consolidate our activities to South Vietnam?

Secretary Rusk: Yes, Senator.

That proposal has been looked at very closely. Indeed we do examine all proposals that we can find from any source. Most of the proposals that we get are variations of one sort or another of efforts that have already been made at one time or another. It is quite clear from our recent contacts with Hanoi that they would not accept a partial cessation of the bombing as a step toward peace in any way, shape or form. That does not mean that as we move into the future that we don't consider examining that and all other proposals that we can get our hands on, that we can think up ourselves.

We have looked at these in the greatest variety over a long period of time.

As far as U Thant's proposal is concerned, let me go back to his proposal of March of last year. At that time he made a three-point proposal, that there be a military stand-down, that there be preliminary political talks, and that there be a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

We said that we would enter immediately into discussion of the arrangements for a stand-down. That we would enter preliminary talks and that we would go to a Geneva Conference. Hanoi apparently rejected that proposal.

Now, at the present time the question in front of us is whether discussions or negotiations or bombing pauses or the stoppage of bombing can, in fact, be a step toward peace.

So far as we can tell by the complete rejection by Hanoi of the San Antonio formula Hanoi is in no such mood . . .

No One Able to Tell

No one in the world, Senator, has been able to tell us that there would be the slightest reduction in anything that they are doing militarily if we stopped the bombing, no one, and we have probed and probed and probed on that point because no one in the world wants peace more than the President of the United States.

Senator Mansfield: I agree with that statement, but I would call to your attention that various Chiefs of State and outstanding public officials in countries throughout the world, in addition to U Thant have indicated that if there was a stop to the bombing of the North, the North only, that negotiations could begin. I believe in U Thant's word within a few days. I think that is being a little too optimistic but what you are faced with is either a continuation of the bombing with very few targets of any real significance left to bomb for the first time, or an escalation in manpower and resources to carry on a war in Southeast Asia . . .

Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.): I agree with Senator Mansfield that foreign aid is very secondary to the problem before this Committee this morning, because we have to resolve our difficulties in South Vietnam before, I think, we can go ahead to what I hope will be enlarged foreign aid program eventually.

Very quickly. I want to say for this fiscal, next fiscal, I think foreign aid should be cut at least 50 per cent, probably more, and that we should call on our alleged friends in Europe, Canada and Japan and elsewhere in the world to move in because they are not helping us with the fighting in Vietnam, to move in and assume a larger share of the responsibility of helping the underdeveloped countries. That is my position, will be my position throughout the hearings on foreign aid.

But I do want to comment very quickly on what has been brought into the record this morning by you and some of my colleagues on the Committee in regard to Tonkin Bay.

As you know, I have no vote for the

Tonkin Bay Resolution that I have to alibi or rationalize, and the facts speak for themselves in support of my vote...

Norse Asks Why

Why did not the Administration tell this Committee on August 6, 1964, that the Maddox had been taken to Taiwan, was completely equipped with spy equipment, including the big black box? Why did not this Administration make clear on August 6, 1964, that the Navy, that the Navy provided the four torpedo and bombing boats, equipped them, trained the personnel that bombed the two posts on the mainland of North Vietnam at the time? Why did not the Administration tell this committee on August 6, 1964, that they put two officers on the Maddox, one officer to be over the commanders of both the Maddox and the Turner Joy, and one officer with full knowledge of the South Vietnamese bombardments of North Vietnam to keep the two ships and the naval officials in contact with what was going on? . . . Why did not the Administration point out that there was the wire or the cablegram from the Commander of the Maddox at the time as the result of the electronics stimulation that that big black box on the Maddox made possible, to stimulate the electronic instruments of North Vietnam to frighten them, to create the jitters that the intercepts that our Navy got from North Vietnam at the time showed that they considered the Maddox at that time a hostile ship connected with the operations on North Vietnam and considered them a hostile ship to be treated as hostile ships, and so the Commander of the Maddox sent out a cablegram to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet suggesting they ought to go out to sea because the risks were great . . .

I want to say there is not the slightest question, and history will so show, we were a provocateur and that is why on August 5, 1964, and again August 6, 1964, I made the two speeches on the history of this Maddox, tried to warn the Senate we were a provocateur because I had had a call from a high official in the Pentagon Building the night before asking me to call for the logs, asking me to ask what the Maddox was doing . . .

Mr. Secretary, you and I do agree to a major premise. We have to find a way out. But do not forget, if I am correctly informed in a press interview not so long ago, not so many weeks ago, you said one of the reasons we were in Vietnam was to contain China. That is the first time you stated it publicly and I think you ought to tell the Committee this morning what you mean by containing China.

How to Contain China?

Do you mean militarily containing China, and if so, for how long, and do you think you can contain China militarily and not eventually go to war with China when China is ready to go

to war because of that kind of unilateral action on our part?

These are some of the broad brush-strokes, Mr. Secretary, that shows the great differences between you and some of us on this Committee, but the common objective we ought to join on, and that is to find a way to honorably get a peace over there. And so I ask you again, as I have so many times, have you ever sent to the Security Council a resolution asking the Security Council to take over jurisdiction with our pledge that we will abide by the jurisdiction if it, in turn, will carry out its corollary obligation to enforce the peace over there . . .

This talk about sending over 1000,000 or 200,000 more troops, you are going to create a very serious difficulty in



The Washington Post
SEN. FRANK CHURCH

this country if you people in the Administration go through with that . . .

Secretary Rusk: I would like to comment briefly on certain points made by the distinguished Senator from Oregon.

On the Tonkin Gulf, this great Committee has recently had a full day's set of hearings on that matter and those hearings with very few deletions because of security matters, are now available to the public . . .

My own conclusion is that two attacks were delivered on our vessels which were operating where they had a right to be. They were not engaged in offensive operations against North Vietnam. That obviously any vessel on patrol is going to look and listen, but looking and listening on the high seas

cannot be interpreted as warranting an attack from the nearest coastal power . . .

On the matter of containing China, I do not think that I myself put it that way. What I, in a press conference, and I will be glad to put the text of that portion of the press conference in the record if the Committee wishes it, I said basically four things about China. One was that in the next ten to 20 years there are going to be a billion Chinese, and I know of no one who disagrees with that.

Secondly, I said they are going to be armed with nuclear weapons. And I do not know anybody who disagrees with that.

Third, I said we do not know what their attitude is going to be during this period toward their own neighbors in Asia, and I do not know anyone who does know what their attitude is going to be, and, fourthly, I said that the free nations of Asia are concerned about this problem, and this prospect, and I have no doubt whatever that they are concerned, they express it frequently and regularly . . .

Entered Alliances

As far as containment is concerned, the Truman Administration and Eisenhower Administration entered into certain alliances.

In the first instance under President Truman, with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand; under President Eisenhower, with Korea, the Republic of China and the SEATO Treaty involving Thailand, and the protocol states, including South Vietnam.

If those treaties add up to containing China, then I cannot object to the word. But the purpose of these treaties is to defend the countries with which they are made, to insure the safety and the independence of those countries that became our allies. We made these treaties presumably because we considered that that was vital to our own interests; that as a Nation that lives both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, the peace of the Pacific Ocean area is vital and important to our own stand why pr national security.

If that were not true, I do not understand why previous administrations and Senates went into such treaties, because they are serious undertakings.

So I would not debate, Senator, the particular expression "containing China." These treaties will be of no importance if these countries are not attacked. The best way to deal with a treaty of alliance is to live at peace, and such alliances would never become active.


On the U.N. Security Council aspect of the matter, Senator, you and I would go a long way, I think, on an agreement on many aspects of that. We do believe that the Security Council has a responsibility in Southwest Asia, that it has an over-all responsibility under the charter for the mainte-

nance of international peace and security.

We would like very much to see the Security Council assume jurisdiction and work diligently at bringing about peace in Southeast Asia. Following the passage of the resolution to which you referred, which Ambassador Goldberg supported when he was before the Committee, we did consult further with the members of the Security Council, including the new members who became members January 1. We ran into the same problem that we had encountered before, and that is because Hanoi and Peking insist that this is not a matter for the Security Council, there is a strong consensus in the Council, not necessarily a clear majority, a strong feeling in the Council that it will be a mistake for the Security Council to try to assume jurisdiction.

Now, that is not a very satisfactory result. We discussed with the members of the Council the Senate's resolution, and urged them to take that fully into consideration.

Now, the present prospect is that if this matter were put into the Security Council, the only result would be an eye-gouging debate without result, that is, we know that the Soviet Union would veto any resolution which was not approved by Hanoi. We know that Hanoi does not accept the jurisdiction of the Security Council in any way, shape or form. So the question has



The Washington Post

SEN. FRANK J. LAUSCHE

been, do we precipitate a debate merely to register the fact that the Security Council does not believe that it is in position to do anything about Southeast Asia.

Now, part of that belief is the feeling that if the Security Council injects itself into the situation, it might make it more difficult for other machinery,

such as the machinery of the Geneva Accords, to find some way out of the situation in Southeast Asia.

Sen. Frank Carlson (R-Kan.): I had not intended, Mr. Secretary, to bring up the TET offensive but you raise it in answer to a previous question. But reports have been coming out of, say, the top officials in our Government that it was a great victory. Surly that wasn't a victory for us in view of the setbacks we have now and you have already mentioned in the pacification program. Militarily and otherwise it is going to take some regrouping in my opinion to get us started.

Talked About Victory

Here again, I think it is unfortunate, I don't think the State Department did, but there is no question that many in top echelons in the Government talked about the great victory where thousands of people who were supposed to be associated with us were killed and great areas of the country were turned over to the Vietcong because there are many pacification areas that you mentioned this morning that we lost and we have to start over. So here again, I just mention I sincerely hope that from now on out the folks would give the people the facts, give them the information, just give us the facts and we will take it.

Secretary Rusk: Senator, you brought me back to a point I did not complete in an earlier comment.

I had talked about some of the serious damage done to the allied side, to the government and its activities by the TET offensive. It is quite true that both sides received some serious setbacks but in different respects.

As far as the North Vietnamese-Vietcong forces are concerned they did receive very heavy casualties. They attacked 60 district towns out of the 240. They attacked most of the province capitals, some 40 province capitals and autonomous cities. They did not seize and establish a position in any of those, although there was some very heavy fighting at Hue and one or two other places.

They did not stir up a popular uprising that they seemed to be counting upon. They did not get defections from the South Vietnamese Army in terms of defections in units and the collapse of the forces there that some of them apparently had hoped for.

So the question now is which side resumes the initiative and repairs the damage and gets on with the job. I think the South Vietnamese and allied job are the ones who are in the process of doing that.

Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.): Mr. Secretary, with the statement you just made a few moments ago that the American people are entitled to know as much as possible about our policies, I wish to express agreement.

I had received information that a reassessment was under way within the Administration. It had been my hope that our policy in Vietnam would

be carefully re-examined, and that the representatives of the people would have a part in that reassessment.

Do we, in fact—is there in fact a reassessment under way? What are the hard choices? You referred to what may happen to the countries in Southeast Asia. I ask you what will happen to the other countries in Southeast Asia if they received the same assistance we have given to South Vietnam? What are the consequences to the United States of continuation of this policy?

But my first question is: Has General Westmoreland requested an esca-

lation of the war with an additional 200,000 men? Is a reassessment under way?

No Fresh Conclusions

Secretary Rusk: Senator, when I saw some newspaper stories yesterday about sweeping reassessment I went by and called on the President yesterday afternoon after he got back from church, talked to him about it. He said that he had come to no fresh conclusions. He had sent General Wheeler out to visit with General Westmoreland, Ambassador Bunker, President Thieu, to look over the situation and come back and inform us of what he found.

Obviously, the so-called TET offensive calls for an examination of many subjects, including the tactics and strategy of the enemy, the impact on the pacification program, and on the military side.

As you know, as you may know, at the end of this month and early next month, certain units that had previously been scheduled under existing plans, will be going out in the general level of that 525,000 that the President talked about. But he has not made any fresh decisions or come to any new conclusions and I think it would not be right for me to speculate about numbers or possibilities until the President has had a chance to look at all the information and consult with his advisers and determine how and on what basis he would wish to consult with the members of the Congress and the appropriate Committees of the Congress if any congressional action should be indicated.

Senator Gore: Well, Mr. Secretary, I had hoped that the Congress, the Senate, would have some information before the President would have some conclusions, reaches fresh conclusions that you have described. You have related that General Wheeler has been to Vietnam. Did General Wheeler bring a request back, has General Westmoreland made a recommendation? Has the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a recommendation for major es-

calation of the war?

Secretary Rusk: My understanding is there is no specific recommendation in front of the President at the present time.

Senator Gore: What to you mean specific?

From A to Z

Secretary Rusk: The entire situation is under consideration from A to Z. The President, as you know, does keep in touch with the leaders of the Congress and the leaders of Committees. I just don't think there is anything more I can say on that. I would add, that call your attention to the fact that, the distinguished Majority Leader said the other day that President Johnson has tried to consult with the Congress more than any President he knows of, and these are matters that are being examined. I think the facts and problems and opportunities are to be looked at, but I can't speculate about decisions that have not been made or conclusions that have not been reached.

Senator Gore: You said a moment ago that the whole matter was being examined from A to Z, I believe. I think that is good. It thoroughly needs it. In this examination is the Administration exploring the consequences of escalation of the war and is the goal of military victory a part of this examination?

Secretary Rusk: All aspects of this, Senator, are examined regularly and in depth at all times. It is no different in this particular situation.

On the matter of a military victory, I think it is important to understand that the military purpose out there is to prevent these people who have come in from the outside from scoring a military victory on their side.

Now, in another sense, the answer cannot be achieved through military means alone. We have to have assistance to the political, economics, social processes of the South Vietnamese people, and the other war is just as important as the military war.

But there is a military element which cannot be avoided. Here comes a regiment down the road from North Vietnam. Somebody has to decide whether you shoot at it or get out of its way. There isn't much in between, and we know our allies have felt that that kind of military effort has to be resisted if we are to meet our commitments and if the South Vietnamese people are to have a chance to get on with the other part of their effort, which is to build a nation for themselves, with their own consent and of the sort that they themselves want rather than one that is to be imposed upon them from the outside.

So the military and the civilian components go hand in hand. It is hard to separate the one from the other because of the military action that is being directed against South Vietnam from North Vietnam.



Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee question Secretary Rusk on Vietnam. From left are Mundt,

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 12, 1968 A 11



Williams, Carlson, Aiken, Hickenlooper, Chairman Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore and Church.

By Wally McNamee—The Washington Post