



By Wally McNamee—The Washington Post
For another 4½ hours yesterday, Sen. J. William Fu



Ilbright (left) and his colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, confronted Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Associated Press

Fulbright: 'The Idea Is to Influence You Into a Wiser



By Wally McNamée—The Washington Post
(right) on Vietnam and where the war is going now.

Policy'

Following is a partial transcript of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday:

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.): The Committee will come to order. Mr. Secretary, I have a particular aspect of this that interests me and I hope to make a point.

The first thing to me, and the most important, is this question of consultation with the Congress. I wish to make this as clear as I can what I mean by this.

I believe that we in the Senate, and by that I mean all of us, but particularly this Committee and through us, that the Senate should be informed fully about the policy which this Administration intends to follow in the immediate future and before public announcement of this policy is made. In other words, not inform us after the decision is made.

In other words, if you believe, and by you I mean the Administration, that we should send a hundred or two hundred thousand or fifty thousand men, we should be notified and have a reasonable time to discuss the wisdom of such a course.

I believe there is some value in the idea of a collective judgment on a matter of this grave importance.

To be very frank about it, our experience during the past four years has not been satisfactory. We have been led gradually into a disastrous situation which I do not believe is in the interests of the country. I believe it is our duty to insist that we and the people generally through our discussions have the opportunity to register our approval or disapproval of your proposals. The Constitution contemplates that the Congress has the right to initiate or declare war. We have been negligent in our insistence upon this right, but it is still not too late to draw back before the full-scale, all-out war, possibly involving nuclear weapons, begins, and that we reassess our present situation.

The Wisest Course

In a word, I do not believe anyone is infallible, and that the wisest course is for all of us to consult together and to discuss these matters before further and significant commitments are made.

So long as we profess to be a democracy under our Constitution, I do not understand why this is not acceptable to the Administration.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Chairman, I said yesterday, and I think the distinguished Majority Leader said recently, that President Johnson has attempted to consult with the Congress more than any recent President on a great many of these matters. The President is consulting with the Chairmen of Committees, and the Secretary of Defense is meeting on Wednesday with the policy group of the House Armed Services Committee. The Secretary of Defense will be before this Committee,

I understand, on Monday in connection with military assistance. I think there is a good deal of consultation going on here, yesterday, this morning. I would think that the views of members of the Committee have been set forth rather clearly.

Sen. Fulbright: Mr. Secretary. . . . I don't feel that I learned anything yesterday about what the plans of the Administration are in the immediate future. I fully understood that you declined to discuss that.

What I am talking about now is the exact, precise plans that you have with regard to this matter of escalation. There was a very full statement in the New York Times on Sunday indicating that within the Administration there are differences of view, and so on. This was somewhat encouraging. But when we approach the matter of what is the policy in this regard, I thought you declined to answer.

Secretary Rusk: Well, I told the Committee the conversations I had with the President on Sunday, and I have not discussed the matter with him since, that is the net of the matter.

For President to Make

I think you, yourself, have pointed out last night in another place that these decisions are basically for the President to make. The Constitution is what it is. I am not in a position to dispose of the Constitution. Congress itself, with two dissenting votes, resolved that the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sen. Fulbright: Mr. Secretary, I am

sorry you bring up that resolution. I have already spent a good deal of time on it. I think you used that resolution to prevent consultation, to prevent discussion, that was the effect of it. We passed it. We had all of one hour and forty minutes of listening to you, or primarily the Secretary of Defense, on the morning of August 5th, I think it was, and I certainly don't think that is consultation. This is a method of avoiding and preventing both consultation and discussion.

Secretary Rusk: Senator, that resolution was the same type resolution that was passed with regard to the Middle East, Formosa, the Cuban situation . . . There was time, if the Congress wanted to take more time. I think the idea of the leadership was that a prompt passage of the resolution would have the maximum deterrent effect upon Hanoi.

Sen. Fulbright: That was your idea. The Administration insisted that that was its purpose and it was not to enlarge the war, and so on . . . We are in very serious difficulty. What I am proposing is that we not follow this old system of just accepting anything the Administration sends down without question, which we have literally done and did in August '64. We had entirely too much confidence, in my opinion, in the wisdom of this or any other Administration, and I am only proposing that the Congress, this Committee, and through us the Congress has a contribution to make on decisions of this importance.

Essence of Our System

I think that is the very essence of our system. If we don't do that, I would feel very derelict in my duty. After we have had a full discussion, we know what you plan, and if we have an opportunity to express ourselves, and you in spite of that take another decision, of course that is your responsibility. I don't suppose we have any power to prevent you doing it.

But the idea is that we might influence you into a wiser policy, and certainly it is evident that there is not much satisfaction with the present policy.

Secretary Rusk: Senator, I understand your view. I would add to the comment that when you get into detailed questions such as whether you are sending additional units of this or that or the other sort at any given time, President Eisenhower remarked to President Johnson the other day that if he were General Giap he would just love to know what we are and are

not going to do for months ahead. This is not an easy system of government under which we handle the details of military operations facing an enemy in the field. We didn't do that during the Korean War. The Secretary of State didn't come down during the Korean War for public hearings talking about the military operations going on in the face of the enemy. Secretary Hull didn't come down during World War II and hold public hearings and give the enemy all the information that could be developed in public hearings. There is nothing that would be more valuable to us than if Hanoi or Peking or Moscow were to hold public hearings portraying everything they had in mind, what their plans are for the future.

Sen. Fulbright: Mr. Secretary, I apologize, I don't seem to make clear to you at all what I have in mind. I haven't the slightest interest in the day-to-day tactics of the military, that is not what I am trying to raise. I am trying to raise the question of policy of enlarging this war, to go all-out on the war, so to speak, which I think it would be if you put 200,000 men, which is the current news that we get.

Failed to Make Point

I think I failed to make my point, but this is from the Wall Street Journal, which is certainly a very responsible and excellent institution.

"Now stubbornness up to a point is a virtue, but stubbornness could also go beyond the realm of reasonableness. We believe the Administration is duty bound to recognize that no battle and no war is worth any price, no matter how ruinous, and that in the case of Vietnam it may be failing for the simple reason that the whole place and cause is changing from within."

On the next one he says:

"These considerations may be a little subtle for the ill-tempered mood the Foreign Relations Committee currently displays, but underlying the dispute is a point worth supporting. Scrupulous consultation not only serves the interests of the Congress but those of the nation and the Administration itself."

I think that expresses it.

I am not interested in the tactics of this war. I am interested in the policy. Are we, regardless of costs, now going

to escalate the war without, apparently, that is what seems to be implied in the recommendation of Westmoreland that he be sent 200,000 more troops—can't we agree that we really ought to be told that maybe this Senate has some contribution to make?

Secretary Rusk: Senator, I can't get into speculation about numbers. I have seen some speculative stories that I think are off by a good deal. . . . The President has only the men and the money that the Congress makes available. The Congress has the decision as to what men and what money to make available, the last chance to debate it and the last chance to vote on it. This is the nature of our Constitutional system.

A Feel for the Attitudes

These are matters that are primarily for the Secretary of Defense rather than for myself. I am not the best person to get into them. I certainly am not in a position to get into them publicly in advance of any decisions that might be made or required, or disclose here all of the factors that go into judgments on these matters and be examined very carefully.

The President is in touch with the leadership and every Committee Chairman of the appropriate Committees, and I have no doubt at all that he has a good feel for the attitudes of the Congress, including members of this Committee. After all, one can derive a good deal from the expressions that were made here yesterday about attitudes on these questions, regardless of the fact that there were not specific details in front of the Committee.

Sen. Fulbright: I still don't think it is specific details, what I have in mind. But let me read you what you said on April 7, 1965.

"We do not now have a plan to ask for further resolutions on this subject unless there is some substantial development from the other side in the general scale of operations, unless the situation takes quite a different turn."

Now, it seems to me the implications from that in April were if it does take a different turn you would take some move, either a new resolution or take some kind of action that would give us an opportunity to express ourselves. Certainly you will admit, I think, that it has taken a different turn since April 7, 1965. Wouldn't —

Secretary Rusk: I would think, sir, although the scale of the effort has been increased, the basic underlying policy has remained the same. That policy, as enumerated by several Presidents in this post-war period, and as

declared again by the Congress in August, 1964, is set forth in the Southeast Asia Resolution.

Long Range Policy

It dealt with the largest long-range policy of the United States towards Southeast Asia, and it stated — and this resolution was drafted, as you remember, in cooperation with the leadership; it was not the resolution in its exact text that was put forward by the Executive. It was changed, and it contained a provision that if the Congress wished to do so it could rescind this resolution by a concurrent vote which does not involve a veto of the President.

Now, I think the policy is a policy that was there before it was in the Southeast Asia Treaty. It has been a longstanding policy of this country in the post-war period under different Administrations, Republican and Democratic; under different Congresses, Republican and Democratic. It is a succinct statement of a national policy.

Sen. Fulbright: Mr. Secretary, I seem unable to keep you on the main question.

Do I understand you saying in a very polite, roundabout way, that you have no intention to consult with this Committee and Congress, you are going to do as you please and we are going to take it or like it, and you think the Tonkin Resolution is full authority? I want to make your answer clear, and I don't intend to get diverted into these secondary issues.

As I have already stated, we listened to the Secretary of Defense and yourself one hour and forty minutes. That was all of the discussion, it really wasn't a discussion, we simply listened to your statement of a set of facts which I think the evidence has clearly proved to have been untrue, clearly proved to be untrue.

What Do We Do Now?

Nobody, no reasonable man can say that there wasn't provocation, in my opinion, on the action of those ships. If you will take the trouble to read the documents of your own Defense Department, it is certainly a very equivocal statement at the least that there

wasn't what any normal man would call provocation.

But I don't want to argue about that . . . What are we going to do now?

Are you saying in a very polite way, I guess, that you are not going to take this Senate, this Committee, into your confidence before you announce whatever the decision is in the future? . . . Do you think you will be able or willing, the Administration, to let us know prior to a decision what you intend to do? Because I think it is very important, and it is the equivalent, I think, of in the constitutional sense of asking us to take the initiative in the declaration of a war, even though it doesn't follow that form. Are we or are we not going to be told?

Secretary Rusk: Senator, I indicated to you that the President has not reached his conclusions.

Sen. Fulbright: I know.

Secretary Rusk: And there is therefore no knowledge, at least as far as I know at the present time as to what action may be required by the Congress, and certainly there would be consultations with the appropriate Committees, depending upon what that action is.

Sen. Fulbright: Which I conclude to mean that you have no intention of consulting with us on the specifics prior to a decision.

In other words, after you have considered the recommendation of Westmoreland and others and made up your mind what you are going to do, then you will tell us, is that a true statement?

Secretary Rusk: I think that you know that senior members of this Committee have been consulted on the general situation in Southeast Asia. None of these things are new.

Sen. Fulbright: We have been consulted, but as somebody, I think Senator Carlson made very clear . . . the consultation and information we get from the Executive is not consistent with what we get from the leading members of the press, and frankly, we tend to feel the press is better informed than the Executive.

Intention Not to Inform?

But that really isn't what I am asking. You will not say that your present intention is not to inform this Committee or the Congress as to what your plans are. If that is true then we have no business in interesting ourselves in the matter.

Secretary Rusk: I have not said that to you, sir.

Sen. Fulbright: That is the way I understand it.

Secretary Rusk: I simply haven't

gone further than what I have said, which is not a negative. It is simply—

Sen. Fulbright: It is implicit in it. You say he hasn't yet made up his mind. As if I understand it when he has made up his mind and makes decisions then you will tell us. I don't know how else to interpret it. Isn't that what you mean?

Secretary Rusk: I think, sir . . . the views of the Members of this Committee are pretty well apparent, not only on the floor of the Senate, but in our hearing yesterday, in appearances made by members of the Committee in other places, on television and otherwise. I don't think there is much mystery about the views of the Members of this Committee on such issues.

Sen. Fulbright: Then your position is you already know what the Committee thinks, therefore, there is no need for consultation?

Secretary Rusk: We know a good deal, don't we?

Sen. Fulbright: Well, I don't quite agree and particularly with the Senate. They haven't been confronted with the precise questions to decide upon . . . I agree with you this system is hard to work with. It is a very complex system compared to the orthodox totalitarian system. Nevertheless, I think many of us feel that it has certain values and in spite of its difficulty those values should be retained and the essence of that is the participation of the Congress in the making of decisions which affect the very existence of the country, particularly war, I mean the lives of our citizens and our fortunes.

If It Was Just the War

My goodness, Mr. Secretary, I need not tell you it is not only the war in Vietnam that bothers us, but it is this international monetary system, domestic monetary system, domestic violence and unrest, all of these, I believe, are affected by Vietnam, and that is why I am so insistent.

If it was just the war in Vietnam and everything else was going along pretty well . . . I don't think I or others would be quite as disturbed as we are.

Now, I think we arrived at that point where a real discussion is justified. I

think the whole feeling about this present situation is a turning point, a crucial turning point. We are either going down the road of an all-out war or we are going to pull back and seek a political decision to it. I believe—that is what I mean by policy.

It isn't so much, I am not, and I don't think the Committee wants, to advise you to send 50,000 instead of 50 or 206,000 instead of 200. That is not the point at all. It is the decision of, are we really going down that road to seek a military victory regardless of cost? . . . I think we ought to be allowed to discuss it.

Sen. Frank Lausche (D-Ohio): If it is the Senator's opinion that we should send no more troops to Vietnam, why doesn't he offer a resolution declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that no more troops be sent to that land?

Sen. Fulbright: I think you have got the cart before the horse. If they tell us what they have in mind then we can in whatever wisdom we have, take a position for or against it.

Sen. Lausche: Well, based upon what the Senator has said, I don't think that it would make any difference what the Administration would say, his position would remain adamant. I believe it is wrong for us to wait for the Administration to make a proposal solely for the purpose of beating it down.

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.): . . . no President, no President, has ever met with more Senators or more groups than President Johnson, and I think that when he presented the Tonkin resolution to us that he was trying to be cooperative and trying to get the Executive and the Legislative to work together. But I would hope that . . . it would be possible, and I would assume it would be, for more consultation between the Executive and the Members of the Senate.

We'd Like to Be Heard

We might be able to make proposals which would have some degree of validity. We would like to be heard, because we are representatives of sovereign states, and we do represent, at least we think, the will of our own people as well as our own conscience.

Sen. George Aiken (R-Vt.): It would be more of a point if some of those who believe that the President is right and believe in his policy and his decisions in regard to the Vietnamese War, should introduce a resolution so expressing the sense of the Senate that we have full confidence in the decision of the President and believe that he alone should make the decisions relative to the carrying on of our opera-

tions in Southeast Asia.

Now, I wouldn't vote for such a resolution, but I think that would be much fairer than it would to introduce a resolution which would later be interpreted as cutting and running on the part of the Congress, because Congress has given to the President everything he has asked for for carrying on the war. He even got the Tonkin Resolution although it was misunderstood at the time. We have given him a renewal of the draft law. We have given him every single dollar he has asked for for carrying on the war over there . . .

Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.): I respectfully suggest that a resolution approving the Vietnam policy or a resolution disapproving the Vietnam policy would be fruitless, I doubt if either would pass the Senate.

The Important Thing

The important thing is to avoid a catastrophe for the country. A stalemate between the President and the Senate would be no more satisfactory than a military stalemate in Vietnam. What is needed here is the teamwork between the President and the elected representatives of the people to the end of achieving a wise policy. Unfortunately, we haven't had in the past the teamwork which our Constitutional Forefathers envisioned. I am not sure that the Senate could have saved us from this mistake. It has been a horrible mistake, it has been a disastrous policy leading this country already to tragedy, and with further escalation under consideration, a policy which threatens to lead us to catastrophe.

Sen. Fulbright: Well, I think the Senator has expressed very well what I was trying to get at . . .

Sen. Lausche: I concur fully with the words spoken by Senator Gore about the need of teamwork.

Now, my views are that instead of achieving teamwork these meetings are creating a positive division. I suggested in our last meeting that the whole Committee ought to meet with the President, with the view of discussing what course ought to be followed . . . How wonderful it would be for our country and our military leaders

and for the morale of our people if Hanoi conducted meetings of this type, if Moscow did likewise and Peking also followed.

Finally, I want to say that the Congress can stop the President. It can refuse to appropriate the moneys which he asks for increased personnel.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.): Nearly every month in the (Senate) Preparedness Subcommittee we put out critical reports of our activities. We are short of helicopters. We have too many ships that haven't been unloaded. We haven't called up the Reserves. We haven't given the proper training to draftees. Nobody that I know of attacks the (Senate) Armed Services Committee or the Preparedness Subcommittee as doing something that is against the national interest. I presume that they are doing what perhaps we also, some of us here are doing, trying to find out if there is some way we can stop the killing in North Vietnam and negotiate ourselves out of this unfortunate war . . . I think these hearings do exactly what the military hearings do, and I am for both. I think it is important that the American people fully understand the problems.

Secretary Rusk: It is not easy to discuss all of these matters in public sessions and talk about the attitude of other governments and the details of possible negotiating positions and problems arising on the field of battle.

I Am Available

But, it seems to me that we can make an effort . . . to search for those elements on which there are agreement, because I think there are a good many . . . and then . . . to find out which the questions are and on which there seems to be some serious divergences.

I am available to the Committee to make that effort and I will do so in the greatest good spirit and candor . . . I would hope that we could proceed and finish up this public session and try to make arrangements for some private meetings from time-to-time in which we could go over such questions as a negotiated solution.

Sen. Franch Church (D-Idaho): We are involved in a war, a very precarious war, in Asia, that could easily grow to the point of a general engagement on the Asian mainland, that could involve China . . . The stakes are so high, Mr. Secretary, the stakes are so very high, that it seems to me that the general question of American policy, the general objective of the necessity to keep this war confined within manageable limits, these are matters of such mortal importance to the American people that the decisions concerning them can't be made behind

closed doors.

World Listening

Secretary Rusk: I think we ought to really also keep in mind that the debate is being listened to all over the world. Of course, we have the great constitutional prerogatives of complete, free speech and discussion. That we can never surrender . . .

Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.): I think that there is no such thing as a right of a country to exist apart from its own willingness and ability to preserve its own existence . . . The primary obligation, the existence of a nation is its ability to exist by itself. This is not a radical statement in history. It is the very basis of relations between countries, and I think it is error on our part to think that there is anything in the status quo at any particular time that we are obliged to enforce, and now this is not the same as saying that we have an interest in the maintenance of a balance which exists. But to say that there is a right of this sort seems to me to be that kind of oversimplification of a problem which leads us into great error and in part is responsible for the very difficulties we face today.

Secretary Rusk: Well, Senator, I would call attention to the fact that the right of all nations, large and small, to live as independent nations, free from aggression is fundamental to the United Nations Charter . . . and the fact it was the destruction of small states by overriding powers from without which led directly to the catastrophe of World War II. So I must say I am very much disturbed about the implications of what you say.

Sen. Case: I want to make a distinction between the question of willingness and ability . . . I think we ought to at least leave open the question whether a state is not viable . . . A fundamental basis of the state's right to exist is its will to exist as a state, and that this cannot be imposed from the outside.

Secretary Rusk: I profoundly disa-

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gree with what I take to be the implications of what you said . . .

Sen. Fulbright: I am not sure that I understand you, but certainly I would welcome executive sessions if you wished to come and tell us in executive session what you are planning . . . I would just add that I think the consequences of not discussing this kind of a decision or this particular decision with the Congress may only add to the frustration and unease that afflicts the country today. I think it is very profound and very dangerous.

Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), Secretary Rusk . . . Have you ever refused to come before the Foreign Relations Committee in executive session to talk freely, with the idea that the sensitive parts of your testimony could be deleted and the rest of it be immediately released to the public?

Secretary Rusk: "That was a suggestion that I made to the Committee in connection with the discussions, that we do that as we have done on other occasions . . .

Sen. Gore: Mr. Secretary, I hope I correctly detect a constructive turn of the hearings. You have suggested and the Chairman has responded with respect to closer consultation in executive session. I think this is an accomplishment.

I wish to explore with you the possibility of a settlement based upon a neutral status, a nonaligned status of not only Vietnam, but of the Indo-China Peninsula. That includes, as you know, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam.

I must say in all candor that I have not thought that we were in essence offering to negotiate without conditions . . . Inherent in our offer is the acceptance of a division of the country of Vietnam, a severing of the country into two. Inherent in our offer of negotiation is acceptance of a constitution prepared under our tutelage.

As long as we insist upon having in South Vietnam something made in our own image, then the war is going to last a very long time.

But this is but background to inquiry of you, if in fact you really mean the point, and if you really mean this thing that you said yesterday, that the United States would be willing to withdraw her 500,000-plus troops if North Vietnam would withdraw her 70-some thousand, coupled with the cessation of hostilities, and whether you really mean . . . that the countries of South east Asia can be nonaligned if they so choose.

Secretary Rusk: I realize that there are some problems about a public session, but I think that there is enough water under the dam for me to be able to inform the Committee that we have tried to negotiate with Hanoi a common set of points that would be a basis

for negotiation . . . as an alternative approach to the question of an agenda and what subjects would be required.

On the matter of neutralization we will have to forget North Vietnam, because North Vietnam has made it very clear that they are not interested in being a neutral, they are a member of what they call the Socialist Camp.

Now, if South Vietnam wants to be nonaligned, if it has assurance that it has that privilege, if it is going to be safe, if it is going to—if its nonalignment is going to be respected by the rest of the world, that will cause us no problems.

Protect Others?

Senator Church: Despite this massive presence of American troops in South Vietnam you testified yesterday that the North Vietnamese are spreading into Laos, even to Cambodia, into quite possibly into Thailand. . . . If this infiltration continues there does it mean that American troops will be called upon to protect these other countries as we have been called upon to protect South Vietnam

Secretary Rusk: That question has not come up in that form, Senator. It is our hope that in Thailand, for example, and in Cambodia, it will be possible for their own local forces to nip this activity in the bud.

Senator Church: Well, I think we all hope that is the case. But on the basis of the testimony so far there is reason for concern that it won't be the case. Another difficulty is that time and time again we have heard from official spokesmen of the Administration one interpretation of the war and we get quite a different interpretation from so many on the scene.

A News Problem

Secretary Rusk: There is a little problem here about the nature of the news. Let me just illustrate it in this way: If a reporter comes across an incident in which an American soldier beats up on a Vietnamese in a bar some night and he has a chance to report on any one of 2000 acts of kindness and helpfulness and friendship between American soldiers and local South Vietnamese, which story is likely to be accepted as news? There is the problem that it is controversy, it is violence, it is that kind of thing that is news, and these other things that go on all the time don't get much attention.

I am not blaming the press of this day or the press in Saigon in this respect. I am saying it is in the nature of news that it should come this way.

Senator Church: I think that the basic question is not the purity of our motive or the desirability of an objec-

tive that we have sought in Vietnam. But it is a sense or proportion.

Now, out in Asia there are vast populations that are waiting to engulf us. We maintain 132 major military bases in foreign countries. . . . We have formal commitments to the defense of 42 nations. We have already spent so lavishly abroad that by the end of this year we will have spent an incredible \$100 billion, nearly so in Vietnam alone, and we have seen a half of the gold drained out of our Treasury.

Of Chief Concern

My chief concern is . . . that we try to find a rational balance between commitment and capacity, and I am fearful that in Asia the policy of sending more and more Americans to fight more and more Asians on the widening Asian front is feeding the crocodile with American lives, and I think these questions are so basic that the time for an agonizing reappraisal of American policy is at hand. Perhaps out of the agony in Vietnam we can learn some lessons and apply them against the future, and that, I hope, will be a part of the contribution that this Committee can make.

Sen. Karl Mundt (R-S.D.): This has been a war in which we have an unusual and unprecedented amount of dissent in this country.

I think one reason is because we are waging two wars at the same time in Vietnam, an economic war and a political war. (Second) even after five years the Administration is unwilling to place a priority on whether or not we should concentrate on getting it over with successfully, or whether we should put it on the same level as the economic problems at home. Third, I think that it is unusual because it is an undeclared war. (Fourth) it is the first time I can ever think of where the Administration at high levels has said in so many words that they encouraged discussion and dissent. Perhaps this has resulted in a little bit more dissent than was anticipated.

Supplies to the U.S.S.R.

Fifth, it is the first war in American history in which we have encouraged our American fabricators and exporters and manufacturers to sell and ship supplies to the U.S.S.R. at the time that all of the sophisticated weapons, all of the petroleum being used by Hanoi, comes to it from Russia.

The sixth one is because we have failed somehow or other to bring into this picture on our side sentiment wise, economic wise, diplomacy wise, the great important free countries of the world.

Is it possible, therefore, if we pull out of Vietnam that we set in motion another chain of miscalculations by

would be aggressors and tyrants that having failed in our effort to resist Communist aggression there we would not again attempt to stop it some place else so that we might encourage, therefore our Nation and before the world, other area of the world?

Secretary Rusk: Senator, this is one of the most fundamental questions before our Nation and before the world, I don't want to appear dramatic, but let's go back to that conversation in June 1961 between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. In effect Chairman Khrushchev said to this young President of ours, "Mr. President, take your troops out of Berlin or there will be war."

The Reply in Kind

It was necessary for this young President to say, "Then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war. It is going to be a very cold winter." And with that remark the two shook hands and took their departure.

Now, suppose Chairman Khrushchev had thought or had said, "Don't kid me, Mr. President, because I know that your people will collapse or draw back when I put on the pressure." That is a very easy way to get into war. This is why in shorthand I have tried to emphasize the overwhelming importance of the fidelity of the United States, and the necessity for people to understand that at the end of the day we will meet our commitments.

Senator Mundt: We had some discussion yesterday that you got beat up a little bit by one or two of my colleagues for saying something about containing Red China, and by containing Red China I suppose you mean, at least that is what I interpret that to mean, that you are trying to maintain some kind of organization for peace which will not permit or encourage the Red Chinese when they get a delivery system early in 1970 for the bombs which they already have stockpiled, it will not really make, it seems to me it is a good bet, for them to use the bombs in a war of aggression, that is what I think about containing the Chinese. If we can't help contain them who can, Mr. Secretary? What other countries can contain them? Or do we pull out the plug and let the water pour in?

Secretary Rusk: I think this is something that the free nations of Asia are very much concerned about. Now, we can hope that when the Chinese fully understand, as they develop their own weapons, what these weapons are and what they can do, that the weapons themselves will carry with them some prudence.

Sen. Mundt: I would like to recommend once more that this situation of divisive necessity in this country has

reached a serious spot. You can see it manifested in this Committee and in the House, among the great newspapers of this country, and if this is important to our peace, and important to our survival, and important to our security, somebody ought to show some leadership in trying to convey the facts in a convincing manner to a public which is bewildered and confused, and I gave you six reasons why I thought they were confused. How can it be done? It could be done by a white paper setting out, as governments have done before, not only for our own people but for the countries of the free world, who should come to recognize that they ought to give some diplomatic support to our efforts to negotiate, that they ought to discontinue trading with the enemy.

If you don't want to do that, it can be done through a presidential message to a joint session of Congress in a dignified formal way where he can present the evidence. He doesn't have to ask for a new resolution, he doesn't have to ask for more manpower. He doesn't have to vacate any of his cherished administrative prerogatives, but he can at least take the people into his confidence, with these major reasons while discussing the issues with the Congress.

Carefully Noted

Secretary Rusk! Thank you, Senator, I have taken careful notes of what you said.

Sen. Symington: Last October, I proposed this Government announce as of a certain date the cessation of all offensive military action in South Vietnam, as well as over North Vietnam, and also announce that there would be no reinforcements into the theater.

The Government would also announce that these policies were being undertaken in earnest hope that their adoption would result in prompt and meaningful negotiations in the interest of a just peace.

At the same time the United States should also announce that . . . if the North Vietnamese and Vietcong nevertheless continued hostilities, then the United States would feel free to pursue this war in any manner of its own choosing.

Concurrently with the above proposed announcement of United States policy, I suggested that the Government of South Vietnam should announce its willingness to negotiate with anybody and offer amnesty to members of the Vietcong.

I made that statement in the floor talk, and not a person in the Administration ever brought this suggestion up with me, although I did bring it up with some members of the Administration. But I would like to ask you this

morning, what do you think of the suggestion?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Senator, although it might not have been discussed with you in detail, it was examined in detail. We continue to examine all possibilities and all variations and I would be glad to go into certain aspects of this in private session. But let me say some elements in your program have already been tried in one way or another.

Sen. Clark: I have reluctantly come to the conclusion from your testimony and particularly your answers to Senator Mundt that it is more likely than not . . . that if a decision will shortly be made to send substantial additional combat troops to Vietnam, we on this Committee are more apt than not to read about it in the newspapers. I say again I hope I am wrong, but I think what might be called the eyeball philosophy seems to have a considerable appeal to the Administration.

I would like to shift now and read to you, Mr. Secretary, a brief summary of my own conclusions.

"The war in Vietnam is at a stalemate which neither side can convert into a military victory without leaving the country—and perhaps the world—in ruins.

A Devouring Cancer

"Vietnam is a cancer which is devouring our youth, our morals, our national wealth, and the energies of our leadership. The casualty list from this war only begins on the battlefield. As victims we must also count the programs of the Great Society, the balance of payments, a sound budget, a stable dollar, the world's good will, détente with the Soviet Union, and hopes for a durable world peace. The toll of this war can never be measured in terms of lives lost and dollars spent—they are only the tip of a vast iceberg whose bulk can never be accurately measure.

"We are not likely to end the war by a military victory. This has been amply demonstrated by the recent VC offensive. This is primarily a political war, a war which cannot be won by bullets and bombs short of annihilation of both the enemy and the people for whom we fight.

"Nor can we get out by unilateral withdrawal" and I stress that because my position in that, as some of my colleagues, has been so grossly misrepresented in the press and elsewhere, I have never been for scuttle and run.

"Nor is the only alternative to do more of what we are doing on both the political and the military side."

satisfaction from Rusk's version of "consultations."

"No," replied Fulbright, "he never did at any time assure us that he would consult before the decision is made. I'm not certain yet—he didn't say positively that he wouldn't; he didn't say positively that he would."

When asked if he felt anyone's position was altered by Rusk's two days of testimony, Fulbright said, "if television did its work, I would hope that several million minds may have been changed." As for the effect of Rusk's testimony on his own position, said Fulbright, "It was confirmed—my worst fears."

The Committee's public questioning of Rusk on Vietnam for the first time in nearly two years ended with an exchange of courtesies on both sides. At no time in the two days did the crossfire approach the level of acrimony that often echoes in the marble-pillared Senate Caucus Room. Nor did the questioning ever get intensive or effective enough to jar Rusk off any of his previous positions.

Both Rusk and his questioners however, reflected a mood of frustration with the military and diplomatic dilemmas of Vietnam that varied from

grim determination on Rusk's part to dismay by Fulbright.

Three-fourths of the Committee's membership, however, registered more of Fulbright's gloom than Rusk's hope. This position, all informed observers knew, was the important added factor behind Rusk's invocation of the Executive Branch's constitutional prerogatives in refusing commitment on consultation. With the Fulbright Committee loaded with "doves" on Vietnam, the Johnson Administration is little interested in consulting with it. Rusk verbally fenced for hours with Fulbright and his fellow "doves" over consultations.

"The Constitution contemplates that the Congress has the right to initiate or declare war," said Fulbright. "We have been negligent in our insistence upon this right," he said, "but it is still not too late to draw back before the full-scale, all-out war, possibly including nuclear weapons, begins, and that we reassess our present situation."

Rusk countered that "President Johnson has attempted to consult with the Congress more than any recent President. . ."

"I think there is a good deal of consultation going on here, yesterday, this morning," said

Rusk; "I would think that the views of members of the Committee have been set forth rather clearly." At another point, Fulbright said, "Then your position is you already know what the Committee thinks, therefore there is no need for consultation?"

Rusk replied wryly, "We know a good deal, don't we?"

The Secretary said that during World War II and the Korean war, the Secretaries of State "didn't come down . . . and hold public hearings and give the enemy all the information that could be developed in public hearings. There is nothing that would be more valuable to us, than if Hanoi or Peking or Moscow were to hold public hearings portraying everything they had in mind . . ."

Fulbright protested that Rusk was "confusing" the "day-to-day tactics of the military" with the Chairman's interest in "the policy."

"Are we or are we not going to be told?" asked Fulbright. Rusk countered, "Senator, I indicated to you that the President has not reached his conclusions."

Sen. Frank J. Lausche (D-Ohio), an Administration supporter, challenged Fulbright to put the issue to a test with a Senate resolution barring more troops for Vietnam. Fulbright replied, "I think you have got the cart before the horse. If they tell us what they have in mind then we can in whatever wisdom we have, take a position for or against it."

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) agreed that "a sense of the Senate resolution" has "no power" to it. What Fulbright seeks, he said, is to put the Committee on "a consultative basis with the President before the take-off" point of decisions.

Views Balance Off

Mansfield said the need for more consultation "is a matter which should be given the most serious consideration . . ." He said, "We realize the final responsibility lies with the President, but we would like to be in on some of this

discussion."

The calls for consultation by those who seek to moderate the military expansion of the war are being balanced off, but considerably less noticeably in public, by those who favor intensifying the use of military force.



Associated Press

Sen. Cooper shields eyes from TV lights at hearing.

IMPACT—From Page A1

Doubts Unmoved By Rusk Hearings

tions Committee may learn a little more about this rethinking process when it hears the new Defense Secretary, Clark M. Clifford, who is due to testify in public next Monday. The indications are that Clifford is taking a fuller look himself rather than just approving Gen. William C. Westmoreland's request for more troops to regain the initiative.

In short, the Administration, or at least important parts of the bureaucracy, clearly is involved in the agonizing reappraisal some of the Senate critics were demanding. But there have been no clues as to how President Johnson feels about it or where his White House adviser, Walt W. Rostow, stands.

It was against this background of reappraisal that Rusk was on the stand. He himself said the review would be "from A to Z." Essentially, however, Rusk was trying to hold the present policy line, pending some new Presidential decision. The senators were trying to influence that decision.

Rusk was a model of solidity, intelligence, patience, dedication. He outpointed his questioners because he knew the facts in detail and most of them had not done much of their homework. As

a result Rusk got away with a good many doubtful points without any real challenge.

Since there is a decreasing number of people, including senators, who think the United States can "win" in Vietnam, much of the talk had to do with negotiations. In reply Rusk was at times almost wistful in saying that only the "appetite" of the men in Hanoi stands in the way.

Rusk tried to buttress his argument against discussing the future American course by saying that Gen. Eisenhower had recently told the President that if he, Ike, were Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the Hanoi commander, he would love to know what the United States is going to do in the coming months.

But that line of argument didn't sell yesterday. Nor did Rusk's recollection that his predecessors as Secretary of State had never been asked such questions in public during World War II or the Korean War.

Too many Americans in and out of Government, now agree with Sen. Church that sending more and more American troops to Vietnam may simply be "feeding the crocodile."

But the question remains: what does President Johnson think?