



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1196

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Dallas, Texas

June 26, 1964

JACK L. RUBY;  
LEE HARVEY OSWALD

The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy by letter dated June 18, 1964, made reference to the deposition of Captain W. B. Frazier, Dallas, Texas, Police Department, concerning his efforts to reach Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry by telephone early Sunday morning, November 24, 1963, to advise him of threats to the life of Lee Harvey Oswald, information that Captain Frazier got a busy signal and was informed by the telephone company that Curry's telephone was out of order. Interviews with Chief of Police Curry and Captain Will Fritz and check of telephone company records were requested.

Attached hereto are reports of the investigation requested.

Attachments (3)

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Chief of Police JESSE E. CURRY, Dallas Police Department, Dallas, Texas, advised to the best of his memory on the morning of November 24, 1963, between 5:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., his telephone was not in use by any members of his family. Chief CURRY related that because he had lost so much sleep during that period he does not recall receiving any telephone calls during that period although he stated it is possible he could have received a call and did not recall it. Chief CURRY stated that at 6:30 a.m. on November 24, 1963, a squad car arrived at his home on the instructions of Captain CECIL E. TALBERT of the Dallas Police Department, who advised he wanted Chief CURRY to call him immediately at the Dallas Police Department. Chief CURRY related he immediately called Captain TALBERT at which time Captain TALBERT advised him of the anonymous call relating to the threat which had been received against OSWALD's life from the Federal Bureau of Investigation earlier. Chief CURRY stated this was the first information regarding this threat he had received.

Chief CURRY advised that if the telephone was out of order during the period from 5:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m., November 24, 1963, he was not aware of it. Chief CURRY advised he is now aware that Captain W. S. FRAZIER of the Dallas Police Department had attempted to reach him early Sunday morning, November 24, 1963, and had gotten a busy signal. Chief CURRY related he had no reason to think his telephone was out of order because as soon as he was informed that Captain TALBERT wanted to talk to him he called Captain TALBERT at approximately 6:30 a.m., November 24, 1963.

Chief CURRY stated he had to make the decision as to when and how LEE HARVEY OSWALD would be transferred from the Dallas City Jail to the Dallas County Jail on November 24, 1963. At approximately 9:00 a.m. he and Assistant Chief of Police CHARLES BATCHELOR discussed the possibility of using an armored car. Chief CURRY stated Assistant Chief BATCHELOR contacted HAROLD FLEMING of the Armored Car Service in regard to obtaining the service of an armored truck. The question arose as to whether or not the armored truck would be small enough to be moved into the basement from the street by way of the ramp. Mr. FLEMING, according to Chief CURRY, advised Assistant Chief BATCHELOR

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he had a large and a small armored vehicle and would send both of them to the Dallas Police Department. Chief CURRY related that at about 10:45 a.m. Mr. FLEMING advised the Dallas Police Department he had the truck ready.

Chief CURRY stated that at about 11:00 a.m., he discussed further the use of this truck with Assistant Chief BATCHELOR and it was decided the armored truck would not be used to transport OSWALD to the Dallas County Jail. Instead, Chief CURRY advised it was his decision that a police caravan should be used and that a police escort would be furnished the armored car followed by another police car. The third car which was to be an unmarked police car would be the one used to transport OSWALD. The automobile transporting OSWALD would then be followed by another armed police car giving the appearance that OSWALD was being carried in the armored truck. Chief CURRY stated the reason the change was made was due to the earlier threats on November 24, 1963, against OSWALD's life. Chief CURRY further advised this decision was made by him with the concurrence of Assistant Chief BATCHELOR, Deputy Chief M. W. STEVENSON, and Captain WILL FRITZ of the Homicide Bureau, Dallas Police Department. According to Chief CURRY, this decision was made at 11:00 a.m., November 24, 1963, and that OSWALD was escorted to the basement from FRITZ' office approximately 18 to 20 minutes following that decision. Chief CURRY related that the decision was his to use the armored truck in the first instance and the decision was also made by him to change the plans at the last minute for the use of an unmarked police car in an effort to disguise the actual vehicle which was to be used in transporting OSWALD. He said Deputy Chief M. W. STEVENSON, Assistant Chief of Police BATCHELOR, and Captain FRITZ of the Dallas Police Department, were merely following his instructions.

Chief CURRY advised the armored truck had arrived at the Dallas Police Department to the best of his memory prior to the decision to use the unmarked police car as the vehicle for transporting OSWALD from the Dallas City Jail to the Dallas County Jail and this decision to use the unmarked police car was made prior to the transferring of OSWALD from the Homicide Bureau to the basement of the Dallas Police Department where OSWALD was to be located in the unmarked police car.

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Captain WILL FRITZ, Homicide Bureau, Dallas Police Department, Dallas, Texas, advised that on Sunday, November 24, 1963, at 11:00 a.m. a decision was made by Chief of Police JESSE E. CURRY of the Dallas Police Department, in the Homicide Bureau Office, to use an unmarked police car instead of the armored truck previously decided on to transport LEE HARVEY OSWALD from the Dallas City Jail to the Dallas County Jail. Captain FRITZ stated this was approximately 19 to 20 minutes prior to the time OSWALD was taken from his office in the Homicide Bureau down to the basement of the same building of the Dallas Police Department. Captain FRITZ stated as far as he knew the armored truck had arrived at the Dallas Police Department and was there at the time the decision was made to utilize the unmarked police car. Captain FRITZ stated as to the period of time that transpired on Sunday, November 24, 1963, between the arrival of the armored truck at the Dallas Police Department and the conversation in which it was decided not to use this truck he would not be in a position to know and such would have to be referred to Chief of Police JESSE E. CURRY, Dallas Police Department.

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Records of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Dallas, reflect DA 7-6918 is the non-published telephone in the name of J. E. CURRY, 2508 Loving, Dallas, Mr. CURRY being identified as Chief of Police, Dallas.

A representative of the telephone company advised all reports and logs for November 24, 1963, relative to "out of order" telephones were examined and no report was found as to DA 7-6918. Such records, it was explained, include complaints made by subscribers themselves, as well as "false busy" signals brought to the attention of operators by any source, all of which are required to be recorded.

Records concerning the above will be produced under subpoena duces tecum directed to R. A. BURROW, Chief Special Agent.

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by Special Agent MANNING C. CLEMENTS:ds Date dictated 6/24/64

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