

CHAPTER X

NIXON AND HIS FRIENDS

FAT GRAY

from Nixon press conference of March 2, 1973:

I believe/<sup>that</sup>the Senate will find, based on his record since he was nominated, that he has been fair, he has been efficient and that he will be a good, shall we say, lawman in the tradition of J. Edgar Hoover and I am sure that the Senate will overwhelmingly approve him. .

from Ehrlichman-Dean phone conversation, March 7 or 8, 1973

(source: Senate Watergate Hearings, Book 7, p. 2951):

EHRlichMAN: Well I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slowly slowly in the wind.

DEAN: That's right. I was in with the boss ~~XXXX~~ this morning and that's exactly where he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray's smart enough to run the Bureau the way he's handling himself.

EHRlichMAN: Well, OK, you're on top of it. Good.

not Gray

March 13, 1973

P - Gray, in my opinion, should not be the head of the FBI. After going through the hell of the hearings, he will not be a good Director, as far as we are concerned.

D .... he can't do it because he is going to be under such surveillance by his own people—every move he is making—that it would be a difficult thing for Pat. Not that Pat wouldn't want to play ball, but he may not be able to.

P—I agree. That's what I meant.

B-107

March 21, 1973 - A

P—No, he is just quite stubborn and also he isn't very smart. You know—

D—He is bullheaded.

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P—He is smart in his own way but he's got that typical (expletive deleted) this is right and I am going to do it.

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and Gray (on May 1973) (see transcript of May 1973)

E, D tape

March 22, 1973

E—(first part not audible) Eastland is going to postpone any further hearings on Gray for two weeks and allow things to cool off a little bit. He thinks Gray is dead on the Floor.

P—He's probably right—poor guy.

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H—Gray, the symbol of wisdom today and future counsel for tomorrow.

D—Maybe someone will shoot him.

Laughter.

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\* \* \*

P—Well let's talk about Gray—the problem with him is I think he is a little bit stupid.

P—Frankly, I think too maybe Kleindienst doesn't help him any.

197

Felt of P. you

April 14, 1973 - H

P - I know Rogers like the back of my  
hand and Rogers does not like real,  
mean tough problems....

305

Febr. 25, 1973

P- Baker is a smoochy - impressive.

76

March 22, 1973

P to K

How about this—why don't you get him on the telephone—and get him down there. It is sort of a line with Baker saying he doesn't have any contact with the White House. Well, of course, he didn't want that—that is his fault—not our fault. We have to accept that would not be the right thing—on the other hand, it is essential for you to give him guidance.

200

\* \* \*

P-

Alright, let's leave it this way—you will handle Baker now—you will babysit him starting like in about ten minutes? Alright.

(End of telephone conversation)

201

March 13, 1973

P- How bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the FBI so terribly damaged?

D- Do you mind if I take this back and kick it around with Dick Moore? These other questions. I think it would be damaging to the FBI, but maybe it is time to shake the FBI and rebuild it. I am not so sure the FBI is everything it is cracked up to be. I am convinced the FBI isn't everything the public think it is.

P- No.

D- I know quite well it isn't.

B-105

Feb. 28, 1973

Edgar Hoover, on the other hand, I have seen socially at least a hundred times. He and I were very close friends.

D—This is curious the way the press—

P—(expletive deleted)—Hoover was my crony. He was closer to me than Johnson, actually although Johnson used him more. But as for Pat Gray, (expletive deleted) I never saw him.

D—While it might have been a lot of blue chips to the late Director, I think we would have been a lot better off during this whole Watergate thing if he had been alive. Because he knew how to handle that Bureau—knew how to keep them in bounds.

P—Well, Hoover performed. He would have fought.

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That was the point. He would have defied a few people. He would have scared them to death. He has a file on everybody.

78

April 16, 1973 - B

P—Support your own—and this was necessary to do. If we had had Hoover under more control, as Lyndon Johnson did, it would have been better.

513



Money alone

6 Feb 25, 1973

P - Somebody is after him about Vesco...

Actually they got the money after the 10th, but I don't think they pointed out that Sears got it before.

D - For all purposes, the donor - Vesco -

P - Stans would never do a thing like that! Never. Never. Never.

B 72-3

March 27, 1973

P—Magruder has got to know—I just don't—my own feeling is, Bob,—the reason I raise the question of Magruder is what stroke have you got with Magruder? I guess we've got none.

E—I think the stroke Bob has with him is in the confrontation to say, "Jeb, you know that just plain isn't so," and just stare him down on some of this stuff and it is a golden opportunity to do that. And I think you will only have this one opportunity to do it.

P—(unintelligible) said it isn't so before.

E—That's all the better, and in his present frame of mind I am sure he will rationalize himself into a fable that hangs together. But if he knows that you are going to righteously and indignantly deny it, ah—

P—Say that he is trying to lie to save his own skin.

E—It'll bend—it'll bend him

Magruder

\*  
P—They want to convict him for Watergate.  
E—Right.  
P—Well, if he confesses perjury, he's going to be convicted for Watergate, right?  
E—Both.  
P—They'll get him for both?  
E—Yeah.  
P—Under the (unintelligible) version of the law.  
E—Well, I'm afraid that if he comes down and testifies, I would guess what he will try to do is plead some sort of a constitutional protection, Fifth Amendment, or something.  
P—Yeah. That's what I would think. He had better plead the Fifth Amendment. I don't think he's got any other choice.

282

\*-Magruder

April 14, 1973 - 6

P—Oh, Dean never denied it as it has turned out. That's John Dean's stand—but what about the aftermath? Does the aftermath held on Dean?  
H—I don't think Magruder knows about the aftermath.

344

Magruder

April 14, 1973 - F

P—One thing that occurs to me Bob is that and, as I reflect a little on Magruder's stuff—

H—Uh, huh.

P—I'll be damned if I don't think some of that could be, you know, exaggerated. But I don't know—

H—That's right.

P—I don't know. I can't tell. He is obviously flailing around like a wild man at the present time.

H—No, no, he's not really. I think he was earlier. He was frantic, but once he figured out where he was going, I think he—

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P—He thinks this is what he remembers now?

H—Yep. Uh, huh.

P—I am not sure that his interpretations on various things—they could be interpreted either way you know, like his interpretation on Dean, his interpretation on Strachan, for example.

413

April 14, 1973 - G

P - ... Magruder is a very facile liar.

422

April 15, 1973 - A

P—Yeah, Magruder—and Magruder's sort of a light-weight in a very heavy job.

K—Yeah—and also he had no experience in politics.

P—That's right.

472

Feb. 28, 1973

P—Kalmbach is a decent fellow. He will make a good witness.

D—I think he will.

P—He is smart.

D—He has been tough thus far. He can take it. His skin is thick now. Sure it bothered him when all this press was being played up. LA Times were running stories on him all the time and the like. Local stations have been making him more of a personality and his partners have been nipping at him, but Herb is tough now. He is ready and he is going to go through. He is hunkered down and he is ready to handle it, so I am not worried about Herb at all.

P—Oh well, it will be hard for him. I suppose the big thing is the financing transaction that they will go after him for.

B-89

March 13, 1973

P—Now, true, he handles our San Clemente property and all the rest, but he isn't a lawyer in the sense that most people have a lawyer.

B-112

\* \* \*

D—Let me tell you something that lurks at the bottom of this whole thing. If, in going after Segretti, they go after Kalmbach's bank records, you will recall sometime back—perhaps you did not know about this—I apologize. That right after Chappaquidick somebody was put up there to start observing and within six hours he was there for every second of Chappaquidick for a year, and for almost two years he worked for Jack Caulfield.

P—Oh, I have heard of Caulfield.

D—He worked for Caulfield when Caulfield worked for John, and then when I came over here I inherited Caulfield and this guy was still on this same thing. If they get to those bank records between the start of July of 1969 through June of 1971, they say what are these about? Who is this fellow up in New York that you paid? There comes Chappaquidick with a vengeance. This guy is a twenty year detective on the New York City Police Department.

B-121

P—How will Kalmbach explain that he hired this guy to do the job on Chappaquidick? Out of what type of funds?

D—He had money left over from the pre-convention—

P—Are they going to investigate those funds too?

(122

Kalmbach

April 17, 1973 - D

HP - One of the things that concerns me in this area and you know again an area in which I may have made a mistake earlier in the game was with respect to Kalmbach. Now I understand he is your personal lawyer—is that a fact?

P—Yes, yes—very capable guy. (inaudible)—as I understand—they called and said raise some money for the (inaudible) and so forth. I am sure he was no damn co-conspirator. (inaudible) after the campaign.

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April 17, 1973 - G

P - Incidental-ly, it is terribly important that poor Kalmbach get through this thing.

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Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1974

# Kalmbach Pleads Guilty

**Nixon Lawyer  
Admits Election  
Fund Offenses**

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon's personal lawyer, Herbert W. Kalmbach, pleaded guilty yesterday to secretly raising millions of dollars and peddling an ambassadorship in an illicit 1970 fund-raising operation organized by the White House.

He admitted his complicity in federal court here and

from March 21, 1973 - A meeting:

White House Transcript / House Judiciary Committee Transcript

MR. NIXON: Your major guy to keep control is Hunt?

MR. DEAN: That is right.

MR. NIXON: I think. Does he know a lot?

MR. DEAN: He knows so much. He could sink Chuck Colson.

MR. NIXON: Well, you, your major, your major guy to keep under control is Hunt.

MR. DEAN: That's right.

MR. NIXON: I think. Because he knows—

MR. DEAN: He knows so much—

MR. NIXON: About a lot of other things—

MR. NIXON: He knows so much. Right. Uh, he could sink Chuck Colson.

(This appeared in NYTimes, 6/21/74. A more extended excerpt from the White House version, p. 148, is included under the general category of Hush Money)



March 21, 1973 -A

D - Hunt has now made a direct threat against Ehrlichman. As a result of this, this is his blackmail. He says, "I will bring John Ehrlichman down to his knees and put him in jail. I have done enough seamy things for he and Krogh, they'll never survive it."

P—Was he talking about Ellsberg?

D—Ellsberg, and apparently some other things. I don't know the full extent of it.

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P—I don't know about anything else.

D—I don't know either, and I hate to learn some of these things.

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\* \* \*

P—All I know about is the time of ITT, he was trying to get something going there because ITT was giving us a bad time.

D—I know he used Hunt.

P—I knew about that. I didn't know about it, but I knew there was something going on. But I didn't know it was a Hunt.

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\* \* \*

P—I think Hunt knows a hell of a lot more.

D—I do too. Now what McCord does—

H—You think he does. I am afraid you are right, but we don't know that.

P—I think we better assume it. I think Colson—

D—He is playing hard ball. He wouldn't play hard ball unless he were pretty confident that he could cause an awful lot of grief.

H—Right.

P—He is playing hard ball with regard to Ehrlichman for example, and that sort of thing. He knows what he's got.

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April 14, 1973 - A

P—Question, for example, is Hunt prepared to talk on other activities that he engaged in?

E—Well, I think, I couldn't derive that.

P—You mean is he going to blow the White House on the—

E—I couldn't get that at all.

P—The U.S. Attorney, I would assume, would not be pressing on that.

Hank Greenspun

April 17, 1935 - A

E—Ordinarily not. McCord volunteered this Hank Greenspun thing, gratuitously apparently, not—

P—Can you tell me is that a serious thing? Did they really try to get into Hank Greenspun?

E—I guess they actually got in.

P—What in the name of (expletive deleted) though,

has Hank Greenspun got with anything to do with Mitchell or anybody else?

E—Nothing. Well, now, Mitchell. Here's—Hughes. And these two fellows, Colson and Shapiro, Colson threw that out.

P—Hughes on whom?

E—Well, you know the Hughes thing is cut into two factions—

E—I don't even know—but they're fighting.

P—Yeah.

E—Bennett, Senator Bennett's son, for whom Hunt worked.

P—Oh?

E—Represents one of those factions.

P—So he ordered the bugging?

E—I don't know. I know the (unintelligible) say it's a bag job.

H—They busted his safe to get something out of it. Wasn't that it?

E—No. They flew out, broke his safe, got something out (unintelligible). Now as they sat there in my office—

P—Other delicate things, too. You've got apart from my poor brother, which unfortunately or fortunately was a long time ago but, more recently, you've got Hubert Humphrey's son works for him and, of course, they're tied in with O'Brien I suppose. But maybe they were trying to get it for that reason.

Sept. 19

from 1968 campaign speech: Good and competent men...

...are not attracted to an administration in which all the credit is gathered to the White House and blame parceled out to scapegoats, or in which high officials are asked to dance like puppets on a presidential string. I believe in a system in which the appropriate Cabinet officer gets credit for what goes right and the President takes the blame for what goes wrong.

(Quoted in Wash. POST, 8/15/71)

April 14, 1973 - A

P—With regard to your, regard to your views, and so forth, John, now I was told the other day, last night, John, you and Bob or somebody—I guess you and I were talking about somebody going to see Mitchell. You suggested Rogers. Got any other better names?

E—Well, I've been up and down the list.

P—Why did you suggest Rogers?

E—Well, I suggested Rogers because—

P—First let me tell you—the purpose of the mission and tell me what it is.

E—The purpose of the mission is to go up and bring him to a focus on this: The jig is up. And the President strongly feels that the only way that this thing can end up being even a little net plus for the Administration and for the Presidency and preserve some thread is for you to go in and voluntarily make a statement.

P—A statement (unintelligible)

E—A statement that basically says—

H—He's got to go beyond that.

E—"I am both morally and legally responsible."

P—Yeah.

April 14, 1973 - D

H—If the situation's going to get worse, then you maybe have to do something. If this is as bad as it's going to get, then, if this is going to change in a different direction, maybe you're better off not doing anything. Of course, the alternatives are, it's going to get worse. In other words, if you think you're going to swing, there is an actual danger, then the Republican House will meet and pass a resolution calling on the President, and probably a unanimous resolution.

P—I think it's very close to that right now. I think this would trigger it, without question. They would be so horrified about that—

H—Could be. He says it's not going to satisfy them. He says this pretty much establishes the Watergate thing and then you say to people like Goldwater, the people that want this done with are going to—You've got to look at the other possible boxes to say, "Well, thank God, it's all been cleared up now. Let's forget all this other—" And some will say, "It's now clear the

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White House wasn't involved, and thank God they weren't. And it's clear the President wasn't involved and thank God he wasn't. It's a tragedy that that great man, John Mitchell, was."

P—And that so many people at the Committee were.

H—And then, everybody will dwell on that.

P—Except that you've got a fair chance that Dean will go. A fair chance that someone will break.

E—I would spotlight it as the umbilical cord at the White House and the Committee, and the question will be, "What is the other end of those umbilical cords?"

P—Then, you don't think—You don't think there's much—Dean, no, Dean's high enough.

H—The believable mess of it is being answered by this. "There is—somebody higher than Gordon Liddy had to have agreed to spend a quarter of a million dollars to bug the Democratic National Committee."

E—Now you've got that somebody.

P—That's Mitchell.

H—Now that you've got somebody who was, you've got a believable case where you can now say, "Well, so there was some other stuff going on but this was where the problem was."

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April 19, 1973

P—Well, they're touched by this because anybody who was in the campaign is touched by everything about it. And frankly, Mitchell's an honest man. He just wasn't tending the shop—he had problems with his wife—these jackass kids and other fools around did this thing and John should have stepped up to it—that's what happened in my opinion.

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John Mitchell

Feb. 28, 1973

P- But let's remember this was not done by the White House. This was done by the Committee to Re-Elect, and Mitchell was the Chairman, correct?

D—That's correct!

P—And Kleindienst owes Mitchell everything. Mitchell wanted him for Attorney General. Wanted him for Deputy, and here he is. Now, (expletive deleted). Baker's got to realize this, and that if he allows this thing to get out of hand he is going to potentially ruin John Mitchell. He won't. Mitchell won't allow himself to be ruined. He will put on his big stone face. But I hope he does and he will.

B-92

March 26, 1973 - A

D- I was suggesting a meeting with Mitchell.

P—Mitchell, Ehrlichman, yourself and Bob, that is all. Now, Mitchell has to be there because he is seriously involved and we are trying to keep him with us. We have to see how we handle it from here on. We are in the process of having to determine which way to go, and John has thought it through as well as he can.

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March 22, 1973

P—Well, John how are you? It is good to see you.

M—Mr. President, I am just great—how are you?

P—You're a big Wall Street lawyer—you do have to admit you're rich—

M—Not in front of all these people who help collect taxes. But I can report that the firm is doing quite well.

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Mitchell must hard-line

April 8, 1973

P—Magruder could be the loose (unintelligible) of the whole plan.

E—He's entirely vulnerable and nobody knows.

P—Uh, huh.

E—But Dean's very strong feeling is that this is a time when you just have to let it flow. And that's his . . . .

P—I tend to agree with him, you know. Do you?

E—Yes, I do. I do.

P—Basically, Mitchell must say—go in and hard-line it, John, etc. We cannot, we can't claim privilege for Dean on this kind of a matter, can we?

E—I don't believe on acts prior to the investigation, no.



April 14, 1973 - C

E—Well, let me tell you what Mitchell said. It was another gigging of the White House. He said, "You know in Bob's office, Magruder said that Haldeman had cooked this whole thing up over here at the White House and—"

P—Had he said that?

E—Well that is what he said, and that he had been sort of—

P—Now wait a minute. Your conversation with Mitchell is the one where—

H—I've got my notes on it.

P—where Mitchell (unintelligible) is one where— Mitchell does—it's good you have the notes, too, but—

E—Mitchell's theory—

P—Whatever his theory is, let me say, one footnote—is that throwing off on the White House won't help him one damn bit.

from the Washington Post, December 17, 1973

# Colson, 'Mr. Tough Guy,' Finds Christ

12/17/73

By William Greider

Washington Post Staff Writer



In some ways, the story is as startling as any of the other startling revelations which have come out of Watergate.

Charles W. Colson, who was "Mr. Tough Guy" in the Nixon White House, has found Christ.

"I have found in my own life the relationship with Christ," Colson explained.

"I think I realize now," he said, "that your abilities as an individual are much more limited than I believed them to be before and, if you have a relationship with God, that enables you to call upon him for the strength that you otherwise try to summon out of one miserable body . . ."

From an intense religious experience, he now feels "a great inner serenity, a great relief in a sense, really a new life that, in a way, changes your whole attitude about why you're here and what you're doing while you're here. And it's

remember his famous campaign promise to his White House staff: "I would walk over my grandmother if necessary."

This is the same guy, they recall, who was dreaming up nasty political tactics for his President, the same who was scared a few months ago by the possibility of indictment by the Watergate grand jury, who is still under that cloud.

Cynics ask: Who is he trying to kid? Chuck Colson, evenly and without any malice in his voice, promises to pray for them.

"Someone asked me last week," he said, "whether people wouldn't say I was hiding behind God to escape from the Watergate. My answer to them was, if someone wants to say that, I'll pray for them. That's all I can say."

One Christian who does not doubt the sincerity of Colson's new religious commitment is Sen. Harold Hughes, the liberal Democrat from Iowa, who intends to leave public office next year for full.

Feb. 28, 1973

D - Chuck is going to be of aid when he is out there not connected with the White House, coming through with bits of tidbits. Chuck will still have his channels to flip things out.

P—Sure! Sure! In my view—of course it is hard to believe since he loves the action and the rest—but apart from the financial—for the country's aid, etc.—I don't care what you think: Colson can be more valuable out than in, because, basically in, he has reached the point that he was too visible.

D—A lightning rod.

P—And outside he can start this and say that I am a private citizen and I can say what I (expletive omitted) please.

D—Right. I think Chuck can be of great aid in this thing, and I think he will do it.

B-79

P- ... Colson would do anything.

B-91

March 21, 1973 - A

P- Incidentally, I do not feel that Colson should sit in this meeting. Do you agree?

D—No. I would agree.

P—OK. How then—who does sit on Colson? Because somebody has to, don't they?

D—Chuck—

P—Talks too much.

B-161

H—That's the problem. Chuck loves (unintelligible). Chuck loves what he does and he loves to talk about it.

P—He also is a name dropper. Chuck may have gone around and talked to Hunt and said, well I was talking to the President, and the President feels we ought to get information about this, or that or the other thing, etc.

April 15, 1973 - A

P—Colson denies this doesn't he?

K—Yes. He also did the unusual thing of hiring himself a lie detector test.

P—Oh (expletive removed)

K—Isn't that a terrifying thing I've ever heard?

P—Of course, I'm a great supporter of Colson's. He's been a brick as have all these people. But (expletive removed) that was a stupid thing.

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April 17, 1973 - B

H—We should not give Colson reason to get squeamish.

P—No.

E—I'm cultivating him.

P—No, sir.

E—I'm keeping him on the team. He feels that there is a coincidence of interest between you and me and him.

P—Right. Fine.

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Halderman / Ehrlichman loyalty

April 17, 1973 - B

-Let me say this. I know your (unintelligible) It's a hell of a lot different that John Dean. I know that as far as you're concerned, you'll go out and throw yourselves on a damned sword. I'm aware of that. I'm trying to think the thing through with that in mind because, damn it, you're the two most valuable members on the staff. I know that. The problem is, you're the two most loyal and the two most honest. We don't have to go into that. You know how I feel about that. It's not bull—it's the truth.

April 17, 1973-B

H to P -... but my interest is served  
and I will also argue that the better off I come out of  
this, the better off you come out of it—vis-a-vis me.  
In other words, anything I do to my interest is to your  
interest.

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April 17, 1973 - B

P—You better damned well remember being—The main thing is this, John, and when you meet with the lawyers—and you Bob, and I hope Strachan has been told—believe me—don't try to hedge anything before the damned Grand Jury. I'm not talking about morality, but I'm talking about the vulnerabilities.

E—Sure, good advice.

P—Huh?

E—Good advice.

P—You guys—damnit—I know you haven't done a damned thing.

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April 13, 1973 - G

P—I know I don't have any (unintelligible). Don't you agree with me that that was—you know I am concerned about my people. I know that Haldeman and Ehrlichman are not guilty of a damn thing. You know what I mean. It's only tangential on that, Bill—tangential. Sure they knew we were raising money for these damn defendants, but they were (unintelligible) in the campaign. I mean, I mean (unintelligible) Dean at the meeting, wasn't he?

R—Yeah.

P—Ehrlichman was handling the whole domestic thing and Haldeman was working with me at the time. They didn't work in the campaign. It was all over with Mitchell. Mitchell was—in this whole thing—and frankly, Dean was handling it for the White House. (unintelligible). Our people were aware that he was. We were aware about that.



April 19, 1973

S—But they are wonderful fellows.

P—They are. They're great, fine Americans. And they tell the truth, too.

W—Yes—

P—I can tell you one thing about your clients. They'll tell you the truth. They don't lie.

The Questionable virtues of Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson--and their President

from Nixon press conference of March 6, 1974:

I should also point out that in the case of Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Colson--all of whom have been indicted--it's significant to note that none of them have used the shield of the Fifth Amendment, as they could have, and pled self-incrimination....

from the Washington POST, September 20, 1973:

# Colson Won't Reply To Watergate Quiz

9/20/73 By Lawrence Meyer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former special presidential counsel Charles W. Colson invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer questions yesterday at an emotional closed session of the Senate select Watergate committee.

Investigating the September, 1971, break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and other matters, has reportedly informed Colson that he is a target of its investigation. Shapiro reportedly told the

continued from March 6 news conference:

Each of them has testified freely before the committee; each of them has testified before the grand jury; each, apparently, believes in his innocence.

From the Grand Jury indictment handed down on March 2, 1974:

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)
	)
v.	)
	)
JOHN N. MITCHELL, HARRY R.	)
HALDEMAN, JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN,	)
CHARLES W. COLSON, ROBERT C.	)
MARDIAN, KENNETH W. PARKINSON,	)
and GORDON STRACHAN,	)
	)
Defendants.	)

Criminal No.  
Violation of 18 U.S.C.  
§§ 371, 1001, 1503, 1621,  
and 1623 (conspiracy,  
false statements to a  
government agency, ob-  
struction of justice,  
perjury and false  
declarations.)

### INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

From Nixon TV and Radio address of April 29, 1974:

We agreed that Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson, the head of the Criminal Division, and a Democrat and career prosecutor, should be placed in complete charge of the investigation.

\* \* \* \* \*

From the time Mr. Peterson took charge, the case was solidly within the criminal justice system, pursued personally by the Nation's top professional prosecutor with the active, personal assistance of the President of the United States.

Transcript of April 16, 1973 - F

P-- I've got Peterson on a short leash.

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Note from Haldeman to Nixon, dated April 15, 1973:

Message to the P  
8:15

Sun April 15th

To Higby from H--to P  
also inform E

- (1) I hope you understand that my actions are motivated by total loyalty to you & the Presidency. If that is not clear now, I believe it will become clear.
- (2) E has requested to meet with me tonight, but I believe it is inappropriate for me to meet with him at this time.
- (3) I am ready & willing to meet with you at any time to discuss the matter.
- (4) You should take your counsel from Henry Peterson who I assure you doesn't want the Presidency hurt.

Note.—This is printed from handwritten notes which were not legible enough for photographing. The original copy is retained in committee files.

(1313)

(from Senate Watergate Hearings, Book 3, p. 1313)