

to juxtapose with "Keepin' Coverup Away from President"

from Nixon TV and Radio address of August 15, 1973:

From the time when the break-in occurred, I pressed repeatedly to know the facts...

Impending break up away from President

Feb 21, 1973

P- ... I have stayed deliberately away from it...
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P- ... my view is to say nothing about the hearings at this point, except that I trust they will be conducted the proper way and I will not comment on the hearings while they are in process. Of course if they break through—if they get muckraking—it is best not to cultivate that thing here in the White House. If it is done at the White House again they are going to drop the (adjective deleted) thing. Now there, of course, you say but you leave it all to them. We'll see as time goes on. Maybe we will have to change our policy. But the President should not become involved in any part of this case. Do you agree with that?

D—I agree totally, sir. Absolutely. That doesn't mean that quietly we are not going to be working around the office. You can rest assured that we are not going to be sitting quietly.

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D—Well I was—we have come a long road on this thing now. I had thought it was an impossible task to hold together until after the election until things started falling out, but we have made it this far and I am convinced we are going to make it the whole road and put this thing in the funny pages of the history books rather than anything serious because actually—

P—It will be somewhat serious but the main thing, of course, is also the isolation of the President.

D—Absolutely! Totally true!

P—Because that, fortunately, is totally true.

D—I know that sir!

B-91

March 21, 1973 - A

H—We should change that a little bit. John's point is exactly right. The erosion here now is going to you, and that is the thing that we have to turn off at whatever cost. We have to turn it off at the lowest cost we can, but at whatever cost it takes.

D—That's what we have to do.

P—Well, the erosion is inevitably going to come here, apart from anything and all the people saying well the Watergate isn't a major issue. It isn't. But it will be. It's bound to. (Unintelligible) has to go out. Delaying is the great danger to the White House area. We don't, I say that the White House can't do it. Right?

D—Yes, Sir.

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Long the President

April 16, 1973 - B

P—You didn't tell me this about Ehrlichman, for example, when you came in that day.

D—I know.

P—You simple said, "Hunt needs this money." You were using it as an example of the problems ahead.

D—I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you myself didn't cause you any personal problems.

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for me with cover-up excerpts from March 13, '73 tape

from Nixon TV and Radio address of August 15, 1973:

It was not until March 21 of this year—that I received new information from the White House Counsel that led me to conclude that the reports I had been getting for over 9 months were not true.

from Nixon statement issued August 15, 1973:

Not only was I unaware of any cover-up, but at that time and until March 21st I was unaware that there was anything to cover up.

* * * * *

I was told then [on March 21] for the first time that the planning of the Watergate break-in went beyond those who had been tried and convicted, and that at least one, and possibly more, persons at the Re-election Committee were involved.

Continued

March 13, 1973

P—Who is going to be the first witness up there?

D—Sloan.

P—Unfortunate.

D—No doubt about it—

P—He's scared?

D—He's scared, he's weak. He has a compulsion to cleanse his soul by confession. We are giving him a lot of stroking.

Sloan is like a child. Kalmbach has done a lot of that. The person who will have a greater problem as a result of Sloan's testimony is Kalmbach and Stans. So they are working closely with him to make sure that he settles down.

Knowledge of 1973-74

March 13, 1973

P—Oh, yes—there would be new revelations.
 D—They would be quick (inaudible) They would want to find out who knew—
 P—Is there a higher up?
 D—Is there a higher up?
 P—Let's face it, I think they are really after Haldeman.
 D—Haldeman and Mitchell.
 P—Colson is not big enough name for them. He really isn't. He is, you know, he is on the government side, but Colson's name doesn't bother them so much. They are after Haldeman and after Mitchell. Don't you think so?
 D—Sure. They are going to take a look and try to drag them, but they're going to be able to drag them into the election—
 P—In any event, Haldeman's problem is Chapin isn't it?
 D—Bob's problem is circumstantial.
 P—Why is that? Let's look at the circumstantial. I don't know, Bob didn't know any of those people like the Hunts and all that bunch. Colson did, but Bob didn't. OK?
 D—That's right.
 P—Now where the hell, or how much Chapin knew I will be (expletive deleted) if I know.
 D—Chapin didn't know anything about the Watergate.
 P—Don't you think so?
 D—Absolutely not.
 P—Strachan?
 D—Yes.
 P—He knew?
 D—Yes.
 P—About the Watergate?
 D—Yes.
 P—Well, then, he probably told Bob. He may not have.
 D—He was judicious in what he relayed, but Strachan is as tough as nails. He can go in and stone-wall, and say, "I don't know anything about what you are talking about." He has already done it twice you know, in interviews.

P—I guess he should, shouldn't he? I suppose we can't call that justice, can we?

D—Well, it is a personal loyalty to him. He doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be told. He didn't have to be asked. It just is something that he found was the way he wanted to handle the situation.

P—But he knew? He knew about Watergate? Strachan did?

D—Yes.

P—I will be damned! Well that is the problem in Bob's case. Not Chapin then, but Strachan. Strachan worked for him, didn't he?

D—Yes. They would have one hell of a time proving that Strachan had knowledge of it, though.

P—Who knew better? Magruder?

D—Magruder and Liddy.

P—Oh, I see. The other weak link for Bob is Magruder. He hired him et cetera.

D—That applies to Mitchell, too.

P—Mitchell—Magruder. Where do you see Colson coming into it? Do you think he knew quite a bit and yet, he could know quite a great deal about a lot of other things and not know a lot about this. I don't know.

D—Well I have never—

P—He sure as hell knows Hunt. That we know. Was very close to him.

D—Chuck has told me that he had no knowledge, specific knowledge, of the Watergate before it occurred. There have been tidbits that I have raised with Chuck. I have not played any games with him. I said, "Chuck, I have indications—"

P—What indications? The lawyer has to know everything.

D—That's right. I said, "Chuck, people have said that you were involved in this, involved in that, involved in all of this. He said, "that is not true, etc." I think that Chuck had knowledge that something was going on over there, but he didn't have any knowledge of the details of the specifics of the whole thing.

D — People here we just did not know that was going to be done. I think there are some people who saw the fruits of it, but that is another story.

March 13, 1973

P—There must have been an indication of the fact that we had poor pickings. Because naturally anybody, either Chuck or Bob, were always reporting to me

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about what was going on. If they ever got any information they would certainly have told me that we get some information, but they never had a thing to report. What was the matter? Did they never get anything out of the damn thing?

D—I don't think they ever got anything, sir.

P—A dry hole?

D—That's right.

P—(Expletive deleted)

D—Well, they were just really getting started.

P—Yeah. Bob one time said something to me about something, this or that or something, but I think it was something about the Convention, I think it was about the convention problems they were planning something.

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from Nixon, news conference of March 15, 1973:

A Senate committee is conducting investigations....I respect the right of the Senate to conduct these investigations. We will cooperate; we will cooperate fully with the Senate just ~~like~~ as we did with the grand jury, as we did with the FBI, and as we did with the courts when they were conducting their investigations previously in what was called the Watergate matter.

100 20, 1973

P—The main thing Ervin is going to be talking about is executive privilege. Has that meeting been set yet, though?

D—No, it has not. There is ample time to have Dick go up there—

P—You have a talk with him and say we had a talk about this—now your position now I know (inaudible) which they probably never accept but it will make his position be reasonable in the public mind. That is what we have in mind.

D—Right. Correct.

B-70

P 10 D

Feb. 28, 1973

Baker, as I said, is going to keep at arm's length and you've got to be very firm with these guys or you may not end up with many things.

B - 70

Feb. 28, 1972

But I think we ought to cooperate in finding an area of cooperation. Here it is. You see, the Baker theory is that he wants to have a big slambang thing for a whole week and then he thinks interest in the whole thing will fall off. And he is right about that. But his interest in having a big slambang for a week is that we bring all the big shots up right away. The big shots you could bring up. They could bring up Stans. They have to put him on, and they've got to put Mitchell on. They would like, of course, to get Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson.

D—I understand that you and Bob have talked about running Stans out as sort of a stalking horse on it, on another post.

P—It is not my idea. I guess Moore or somebody mentioned it.

D—I think it was my idea. I think it could be one defusing factor in the hearings. Stans would like to get his story out. He is not in any serious problem ultimately. It could be rough and tumble, but Maury is ready to take it and it would be a mini-hearing there is no doubt about it. But this further detracts from the other committee.

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from Nixon statement of April 17, 1973:

On March 21st, as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter.

from Nixon statement of April 30, 1973:

On March 21, I personally assumed ^{the} responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me, right here in this office.

from testimony of Richard Kleindienst before Senate Watergate Committee, August 7, 1973,
Book 9, p. 3596:

In the statement of April 30, 1973, by the President, the President stated:

As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me right here in this office.

Did you receive such orders from the President of the United States on March 21?

Mr. KLEINDIENST. I have no recollection of talking to the President about that. I might have, but I do not recollect it, Senator Weicker.

from testimony of Henry Peterson before Senate Watergate Committee, August 7, 1973,
Book 9, p. 3652:

Senator WEICKER. Mr. Peterson, I would like to ask you a question that I asked other witnesses before this committee. I again refer to the President's statement of April 30, 1973, in which he states:

As a result, on March 21st I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me right here in this office.

And my question to you is, on March 21, or thereabouts, did you receive any such orders from the President of the United States?

Mr. PETERSEN. No, sir. Our understanding of that is that he charged Ehrlichman with conducting that inquiry at that point.

Senator WEICKER. Mr. Ehrlichman's own testimony, just so the record stays straight, is he was charged on March 30.

from Nixon TV and Radio address of August 15, 1973:

On that day [March 21], I launched an intensive effort ~~XXXX~~ of my own to get the facts and to get the facts out....At first I entrusted the task of getting the facts to Mr. Dean. When, after spending a week at Camp David, he failed to produce ^a written report I had asked for, I turned to John Ehrlichman and the Attorney General--while also making independent inquiries of my own.

from Nixon press conference of September 5, 1973:

QUESTION: Mr. President, to follow up on that Watergate question, you have referred repeatedly to having ordered a new Watergate investigation on the 21st of March of this year. Several high officials of your Administration, Mr. Petersen, Mr. Gray and Mr. Kleindienst, have testified before the Senate committee that they didn't know anything about ~~it~~ -- this investigation that you referred to. And I wonder if you could explain how it is that they apparently didn't know anything about this new investigation?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, because I had ordered the investigation from within the White House itself. The investigation, up to that time, had been conducted by Mr. Dean, and I thought by him, working as he had been in close communication with the Justice Department.

I turned the investigation -- asked Mr. Dean to continue his investigation as I, as you remember, said last week, two weeks ago, in answer to a similar question. When he was unable to write a report, I turned to Mr. Ehrlichman.

For use with Nixon statement on picking Doan and Ehrlich to investigate for him

From a speech in the 1952 campaign:

You wouldn't trust a man who made the mess to clean it up—and that's Truman. And by the same token, you can't trust the man who was picked by the man that made the mess to clean it up—and that's Stevenson.

(Quoted in letter to editor in NEW YORK TIMES, 11/25/73)

THE DEAN REPORT

from Nixon statement released August 15, 1973:

On March 23rd, I sent Mr. Dean to Camp David, where he was instructed to write a complete report on all that he knew of the entire Watergate matter.

March 22, 1973

WHITE HOUSE

Mr. NIXON: [Should Mr. Dean be called] You simply say well that is out. Dean has made this report and here is everything Dean knows.

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Mr. NIXON: You'd simply say, "Now that's out. Dean has—he makes the report. Here's everything Dean knows. That's where, that's why the Dean report is critical."

This is from NYTimes, 6/21/74. It could appear as a footnote after the White House excerpt, which is somewhat more inclusive in my version, from p. 213.

(A)

This is from a part of the March 22, 1973 tape not included in the White House version but transcribed by the Judiciary Committee and printed in NYTimes, June 13, 1974. It begins with a paragraph by E which is included in official version, p. 215 of Bantam ed. I cut this originally for inclusion in this section, and we should now include the omitted part:

E—You have to bottom your defense, your position on the report.

P—Yeah.

E—And the report says, "Nobody was involved."

P—Yeah.

E—And you have to stay consistent with that.

* * * * *

P—Particularly if, particularly if we have the Dean statement that may have been given out.

M—Give it to the committee for the purpose [unintelligible] to limit the number of witnesses which are called up there, instead of a buckshot operation.

E—Say, "here," and also say that "this might help you in your investigation. This is everything we know, Mr. Senator."

P—That's what I was preparing to say. "This is everything we know, I know nothing more." This is the whole purpose in that sense.

March 20, 1973

D—We are and we are coming to—the more we work on it the more questions we see—

P—That you don't want to answer, huh?

D—That bring problems by answering.

P—And so you are coming up, then with the idea of just a stonewall then? Is that—

D—That's right.

P—Is that what you come down with?

D—Stonewall, with lots of noises that we are always willing to cooperate, but no one is asking us for anything.

P—And they never will, huh? There is no way that you could make even a general statement that I could put out? You understand what I—

D—I think we could.

P—See, for example, I was even thinking if you could even talk to Cabinet, the leaders, you know, just orally and say, "I have looked into this, and this is that," so that people get sort of a feeling that—your own people have got to be reassured.

D—Uh, huh.

P—Could you do that?

D—Well, I think I can but I don't think you would want to make that decision until we have about a—

P—No, I want to know. I want to know where all the bodies are first.

D—And then, once you decide after that, we can program it anyway you want to do it.

P—But you could say, "I have this and this is that." Fine. See what I am getting at is that, if apart from a statement to the Committee or anything else, if you could just make a statement to me that we can use. You know, for internal purposes and to answer questions, etc.

D—As we did when you, back in August, made the statement that—

P—That's right.

D—And all the things—

P—You've got to have something where it doesn't appear that I am doing this in, you know, just in a—saying to hell with the Congress and to hell with the people, we are not going to tell you anything because of Executive Privilege. That, they don't understand. But if you say, "No, we are willing to cooperate," and you've made a complete statement, but make it very incomplete. See, that is what I mean. I don't want a, too much in chapter and verse as you did in your letter, I just want just a general—

D—An all around statement.

P—That's right. Try just something general. Like "I

P—What I mean is we need something to answer somebody, answer things, you know they say, "What are you basing this on," I can say, "Well, my counsel has advised me that"

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have checked into this matter; I can categorically, based on my investigation, the following: Haldeman is not involved in this, that and the other thing. Mr. Colson did not do this; Mr. so and so did not do this. Mr. Blank did not do this." Right down the line, taking the most glaring things. If there are any further questions, please let me know. See?

March 21, 1973 - A

P - Still
consider my scheme of having you brief the Cabinet,
just in very general terms and the leaders in very gen-
eral terms and maybe some very general statement with
regard to my investigation. Answer questions, basically
on the basis of what they told you, not what you know.

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Haldeman is not involved. Ehrlichman is not involved.

D—If we go that route Sir, I can give a show we can
sell them just like we were selling Wheaties on our
position. There's no—

P—The problem that you have are these minefields
down the road. I think the most difficult problem are
the guys who are going to jail. I think you are right
about that.

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March 21, 1973 - B

P- You as White House Counsel, John. I asked for a written report, which I do not have, which is very general understand. I am thinking now in far more general terms, having in mind the facts, that where specifics are concerned, make it very general, your investigation of the case. Not that "this man is guilty, this man is not guilty," but "this man did do that." You are going to have to say that, John.

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* * *

P—I agree with that. And the point is,—but you see, here is the way I would see the statement that we would put out: Everything we would intend to say in a general statement that I have already indicated with regard to the facts as we send them in, we say people are to cooperate, without executive privilege, et cetera. Statement, it is true, is temporary. But it will indicate that the President has looked into the matter, has had his Counsel report to him and this is the result of the matter. We tell the Committee "we will cooperate." The Committee will say no. And so we just stand right there.

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March 22, 1973

D—And that could go on forever with you on that tack. I could draw these things like this Staff into this report and have Kleindienst come get it and give it to Ervin in confidence—I am not talking about documents you see. I am talking about something we can spread as facts. You see you could even write a novel with the facts.

P—(Inaudible)
D—(Inaudible)

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P—(Inaudible)
E—My thought is—

P—In other words, rather than fighting it, we are not fighting the Committee, of course—we are fighting the situation thing.

E—And I am looking to the future, assuming that some corner of this thing comes unstuck, you are then in a position to say, "Look, that document I published is the document I relied on, that is, the report I relied on."

P—This is all we knew.

H—That is all the stuff we could find out—

E—And now this new development is a surprise

March 22, 1973

P—(Inaudible) What is your position on Dean having to testify?

H—He might.

P—We would have to draw a line there, wouldn't we John?

M—I would agree wholeheartedly (inaudible) To have your Counsel testify would be a mistake.

H—Even if Dean would have to, it would be a mistake (inaudible)

P—Well on the Dean thing—you simply say well that is out. Dean has made this report and here is everything Dean knows.

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* * *

E—You have to bottom your defense, your position on the report. And the report says nobody was involved, and you have to stay consistent with that.

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Dean

April 16, 1973 - G

D—I am not doing any investigative work or—

P—Well, that's right. (unintelligible)

D—Well, I turned that off three weeks ago.

P—Good. You haven't done any since three weeks ago?

D—That's right.

P—You haven't done any since March 21st?

D—Let me check back and see.

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from Nixon TV and Radio Address of April 29, 1974:

And so on March 27 I assigned John Ehrlichman to try to find out what had happened, who was at fault, and in what ways and to what degree.

EHRlichMAN INVESTIGATION

from Ehrlichman testimony before Senate Watergate Committee, July 27, 1973:

GURNEY: Let me then complete, if we can, the assignment you had from the President to now, be the sort of chief Watergate investigator in the White House.

Would you tell the committee about that, what you found and what you reported to the President?

EHRlichMAN: I have tried to disclaim the designation "investigator," Senator because I don't consider what I did to be an investigation, to a conclusive result.

(Book 7, p. 2750).

April 14, 1973 - A

P—Then you're thought is to get out beforehand.

E—No, no.

P—Your thought is just to make a record of the decision?

E—When somebody comes to (unintelligible) what the hell was the White House doing all this time? Then you're in a position to say well, we began to investigate personally the external circumstances and we came to some conclusions—we acted on those conclusions.

P—John Ehrlichman conducted an investigation for the President.

E—And we made an effort. Now, it may be that what should happen here is that if they both stonewall, I ought to sit down with Silbert and just say now I don't have a lot of evidence.

P—I agree with that.

E—But I have an accumulation of hearsay—

P—And the President wants you to go forward on this.

E—And I'll turn over to you the report that I made for the President for whatever it's worth. And I want to tell you that I have had contact with two of your targets to make clear to them that nobody in the White House wanted them in any way to be reticent. Beyond that, I don't have anything to say to you.

P—Well, then, let's see what happens.

E—Well, let's see what these guys go. But I think maybe like, tomorrow, I ought to see Silbert.

P—I agree. I think the record should be made we have talked to him so that he knows that the President has moved on this.

E—And that's, that puts—

P—And we saw the U.S. Attorney and turned over our information to him. All the information we had.

April 19, 1973 - C

E - He says the better out would be to go to Kleindienst who will probably step aside and refer you to Dean. Dean would in turn say to Henry Petersen they have done this little investigation over at the White House. They have collected a bunch of hearsay. There doesn't seem to be much new but they've got it there if anybody wants it. Petersen would in turn inform Silbert who would say, "I've got more than I can handle here now. We'll wait and interview that guy later."

He - Dean

P—The purpose in doing this is what?

E—The purpose of doing it is—

P—The White House has conducted an investigation and has turned it over to the Grand Jury.

E—Turned it over to the Justice Department.

P—Before the indictments.

E—Right.

P—How much are you going to put out?

E—I think I would let them drag it out of me in a way. I don't know I just really haven't thought that part through.

P—Because if they say why did the White House wait for Justice Department to do all this—

E—Did the White House know is probably the way this would in turn come.

P—Yes, as a matter of fact.

E—We had been at work on this for sometime. President first ordered it.

P—Independent investigation.

E—Needed it known.

P—I had ordered an independent investigation at the time McCord had something to say. Right.

E—Alright.

P—At that time you conducted an investigation.

April 14, 1973 - C

P—What—what I, basically, is having an Ehrlichman report. We've got some of the Dean report. That would be simply we have an Ehrlichman report that he makes and here is the situation with regard to the White House involvement. I haven't gone into the Committee thing.

E—Now the current (unintelligible) the current (unintelligible) on White House involvement primarily are Haldeman's (unintelligible).

P—That's right.

E—Well, I didn't go into White House involvement. I assumed that—

P—No. I (unintelligible).

E—That what you needed to know from me, and this would be what I would say. "What the President needed to know was the truth or falsity of charges that were leaking out with regard to—Committee for the Re-election personnel and any connections to the White House that might exist. That was the area of inquiry rather than whether anybody in the White House was involved."

P—(Unintelligible) trying to get you out there in a way that you didn't have to go into all that stuff, you see.

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* * *

E—I didn't. I didn't try and duplicate the work of the U.S. Attorney. What I tried to do was simply determine for the President's use—and for the President's use only—whether or not there was substance to charges that we were hearing, and whether or not there was White House involvement with relation to those charges. And to determine whether or not the White House ought to be doing anything about its own personnel

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or about others that it was not doing. We were not trying to determine what the U.S. Attorney should do or the Grand Jury should do or the Justice Department should do. At the same time it would be (unintelligible) for us to withhold anything from the Justice Department in the thought that some of this information might not have been previously available to them. So I am not going to go into it. I am not going to tell you what I found.

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April 14, 1973 - F

P—And I want them heard in public, and I want them to tell their story in public. I am almost convinced that that is what we ought to do with the whole damn bunch and not try to stand on the Dean thing and the rest. Get a settlement that way. Well, that's my present view, Bob, and we can go on it. Another point. You do, one person you do tell and I—and he can still say that he just told him to tell the truth. You ought to tell Strachan, but tell him—

H—John is telling him.

P—John is, but not in a way that Strachan indicates that he knows what the other fellow said.

H—That's right

P—Is Strachan smart enough to do that?

H—Yes.

P—He has to be prepared that he is going to be asked this and is going to be asked that. John should put him through a little wringer there.

H—Yep.

P—John is the one who should do it. He is conducting an investigation for the President.

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April 14, 1973 - G

P— Is there anyway at all—you are going to talk to Ziegler—that you can get out the fact that you have conducted a thorough investigation?

E—We will work on that. I think there is.

P—I think we have to get that out. Don't you?

E—I think so.

P—The President is calling the signals.

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P—Well you could say that the President, because of the charges that have been made, wanted an independent investigation made and he directed you to make it. You have made an independent investigation of the situation because the President wants it. If there is anybody who is guilty in this thing, he must through the judicial processes be brought to the bar. Is that what you would say?

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April 16, 1973 - C

E—I had this report and I tried all day long to get the Attorney General who was at the golf course and got him as soon as he got home for—

P—Do we want to put this report out sometime?

E—I am not sure you do, as such.

P—I would say it was just a written report.

E—The thing that I have—

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P—The thing they will ask is what have you got here?

H—It was not a formal report. It was a set of notes.

P—Handwritten notes?

E—Yeah. There are seven pages, or eight pages. Plus all my notes of my interviews.

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COVER UP -- PURPOSES OF THE MARCH 22 MEETING

From Nixon statement issued August 15, 1973: (juxtapose with excerpts from pp. 164-65 on 'cov

On March 21st, I arranged to meet ~~XXX~~ the following day with Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Mitchell to discuss the appropriate method to get the facts out

from Nixon Press conference of March 6, 1974:

That is why I directed that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell, who was then in New York, meet in Washington that evening, if possible, but it turned out that they could not meet till the next day--so that we could find what would be the best way to get the whole story out.

COVER UP -- WHAT NIXON WAS DOING (also for use with purpose of March 22 meeting)

from Nixon statement issued August 15, 1973:

Even if others, from their own standpoint, may have been thinking about how to cover up an illegal act, from my standpoint I was concerned with how to uncover illegal acts. It is my responsibility under the Constitution to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and in pursuing the facts about Watergate I was doing precisely that.

from transcript of March 22, 1973 tape (omitted from White House version, but quoted by House Judiciary Committee and reported in the LOS ANGELES TIMES, 6/13/74, the NEW YORK TIMES, 6/21/74, and TIME, 6/24/74):

NIXON: [to Mitchell]— And, uh, for that reason, I [unintelligible] I don't give a shit what happens. I want you to [unintelligible] stonewall it, plead the Fifth Amendment [unintelligible] else, if it'll [unintelligible]. That's the big point....

But that's the way [unintelligible]. Even up to this point. The whole theory has been containment, as you know, John....

That's the thing I was concerned with—we're going to protect our people, if we can.

from Nixon press conference of August 22, 1973:

I met at great length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell of the 22nd. I discussed the whole matter with them. I kept pressing for the view that I had throughout, that we must get this story out, get the truth out, whatever and whoever it was going to hurt...