

BUILDING TO THE FINAL CONFRONTATION

JOHN F. KENNEDY VS. THE CIA

Barely two months after the humiliating defeat of the Cuban-exile brigade on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs, President John F. Kennedy attempted to put a halter on the maverick CIA.

On June 28, 1961, three top-level White House directives, National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM), were published. One of them, NSAM 55, entitled "Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations"¹ was signed by Kennedy and sent directly to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer, bypassing the secretary of defense.

This rare and most irregular routing underscored the intensity of the presi-

¹ In addition to this memorandum, there was NSAM 56, "Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements," and NSAM 57, "Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations."

These papers, and the source of these papers, were hidden for years. Although parts of them are in the so-called "Pentagon Papers," they do not appear anywhere as a unit, or with their correct titles and language.

As far as this author knows, they have never before been linked with their source document, the Cuban Study Group report contained in a letter to the president from General Maxwell Taylor to John F. Kennedy dated June 13, 1961. This is discussed in greater detail later in this article.

PART XII IN A SERIES ON THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BY L. FLETCHER PROUTY



President John F. Kennedy was intent on curbing the power of the CIA.

dent's intentions.

A copy of NSAM 55 was provided separately to the secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara. No copy was sent to either the secretary of state, Dean Rusk, or to the director of central intelligence, Allen W. Dulles. These omissions were also most unusual considering the subject and the timing.

Kennedy's no-nonsense policy directives marked the first steps in his ambitious plan to change the course of Cold War operations which, for the most part, had been made the responsibility of the CIA since that agency's creation in late 1947.

Those remarkable documents not only represented a bridge to the past — Kennedy's directives also led directly to the Reagan decision to do away with "plausibly deniable" covert operations and to come out into the open with overt Cold War operations, such as his action against Grenada and the recent F-111 air strike against Libya.

Whether or not this new military policy has been officially proclaimed as the official guideline of the United States, it is being practiced today. This policy means, in effect, that national sovereignty no longer exists and that a nation's

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 55

TO: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff


SUBJECT: Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations

I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard to my views of their relations to me in Cold War Operations:

- a. I look to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military adviser in the Department of Defense, and I expect them to advise me directly on all military matters.
- b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement. I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War programs.
- c. I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached. When only the Chairman or a single Chief is present, that officer must represent the Chiefs as a body, taking such preliminary and subsequent actions as may be necessary to assure that he does in fact represent the corporate judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- 2 -

d. While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.



cc: Secretary of Defense
General Taylor

This historical memorandum, signed by President Kennedy, was sent directly to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bypassing the secretary of defense — a most unusual routing which underscored the intensity of the president's intentions.

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borders are no longer sacred.

As this Reagan doctrine becomes more widely implemented, the traditional family of nations will dissolve into a shambles of raw power. From now on, no one will be safe. There is no sanctuary. Everyone, everywhere, is someone's potential target. There is no place to hide.

This doctrine, derived for the most part from the writings of Mao Tse-tung, first attained prominence and a measure of legitimacy under the unwitting signature of John F. Kennedy, who clearly and unhesitatingly stated his intentions in the opening sentences of NSAM 55 to the chairman:

"I wish to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows with regard to my views of their relations to me in Cold War operations:

"a) I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military adviser responsible for initiating advice to me and for responding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered.

"b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities."

As used in these directives, the term "Cold War operations" generally referred to covert operations, although it was not entirely limited to secret activities. What was new about this policy was that the president was bringing the experienced military chiefs of staff into an area of operation that traditionally had been outside of the scope of the uniformed services in peacetime. Kennedy emphasized this factor when he stated that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities."

This is an important statement, and much could be said about it today during the Reagan regime. During conventional hostilities, as defined by Clausewitz² or in the traditional sense, the military establishment takes over from the diplomats and is made responsible for total

war against the citizens, territory, and property of the enemy in every possible way.

Converting this doctrine for application during time of peace, albeit of Cold War, has the effect of raising the Cold War to a higher and more overt level and prescribes a role for the U.S. military that it has never had before. When these three directives hit the joint staff,³ the wheels within wheels of the Pentagon began to grind. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that no immediate explanation for this sudden policy change had reached the CIA or the Department of State.

Within the bureaucracy, whenever a major shift occurs, the first thing that is done is to dispatch secret investigators in all directions to discover the origin of the new policy and to determine what the change means.

A new president and a new presidential staff rarely come equipped with insiders of sufficient experience to produce such major changes on their own in one

² Karl von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, Prussian officer and military strategist.

³ The joint staff is the unit which supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the time of which the author writes, there were some 400 people in this unit.

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 56

TO: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements

The President has approved the following paragraph:

"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should set in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit."

The President requests that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and the CIA, make such an estimate of requirements and recommend ways and means to meet these requirements.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State
Director, CIA
General Maxwell D. Taylor

C-O-P-Y

C O P Y

June 28, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 57

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, CIA

The President has approved the attached recommendation:

The Special Group (5412 Committee) will perform the functions assigned in the recommendation to the Strategic Resources Group.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: General Maxwell D. Taylor

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Smith
Mr. McC. Bundy file

C O P Y

Above are the second and third policy directives issued by the president on June 28, 1961. The three no-nonsense memoranda of that date marked the first steps in JFK's plan to change the course of Cold War operations and to depower the CIA. As far as FREEDOM can determine, these three papers have never before appeared together anywhere nor has their source previously been identified.

swift stroke. It was thought that Ted Sorensen, the president's counsel, and Bobby Kennedy must have been the source of these directives.

This was not so.

The Pentagon, the CIA and the Department of State — each for its own reasons — probed the White House. They were unable, however, to find any person, or any prior work, which gave clues to the origin of these very special papers. The problem was worsened by the fact that very few copies of these NSAMs had been made available to anyone. The true source was not discovered for many years, and therein lies a story of great importance — a story that has threaded its way through the post-World War II Cold War era for more than 35 years.

During this period the whole concept of warfare, the role of the military, and the nature of the modern nation-state have been drastically altered at a cost, to United States citizens alone, of no less than \$3 trillion.

In the process of attempting to carry out the policy he had promulgated with these three directives on June 28, 1961, (continued on page 16)

AP WIDE WORLD PHOTOS



The only persons to receive copies of all three explosive memoranda were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (above) and General Maxwell Taylor.

These recommendations, attached to National Security Action Memorandum Number 57, wrested substantial powers from the CIA and gave them to the Department of Defense.

C O P Y

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

- For the purpose of this study, a paramilitary operation is considered to be one which by its tactics and its requirements in military-type personnel, equipment and training approximates a conventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of an existing government friendly to the U.S. or in support of a rebel group seeking to overthrow a government hostile to us. The U.S. may render assistance to the latter group in the form of training, equipment, or both, but should not be understood to be directly involved in the operation. The small operations will often fall completely within the normal capability of one agency; the large ones may affect State, Defense, CIA, USIA and possibly other departments and agencies.
- In order to conduct paramilitary operations with maximum effectiveness and flexibility within the context of the Cold War, it is recommended that current directives and procedures be modified to effect the following:
 - Any proposed paramilitary operation in the concept stage will be presented to the Strategic Resources Group for initial consideration and for approval as necessary by the President. Thereafter, the SRG will assign primary responsibility for planning, for interdepartment coordination and for execution to the Task Force, department or individual best qualified to carry forward the operation to success, and will indicate supporting responsibilities. Under this principle, the Department of Defense will normally receive responsibility for most paramilitary operations, where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable. It may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.

KENNEDY VS. THE CIA

(continued from page 15)

President Kennedy created an explosive force within the environs of the government and its allies such that the resulting mass went critical on the streets of Dallas on November 22, 1963.

It all began with one of the best-kept secrets of World War II.

This was the fact that while Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt had gone to Teheran in early November 1943 to meet with Josef Stalin for a discussion of grand strategy for the prosecution of the war against Nazi Germany, a special Chinese delegation had accompanied them from Cairo⁴ where Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek had been meeting. (See "Humor Behind the Scenes at Teheran," page 34.)

This select Chinese delegation had a delicate task to perform that involved Stalin and could not be made public for several reasons.

Whereas the Soviets, British and Americans were locked in battle against Germany in Europe, and the Chinese, British and Americans opposed the Japanese on the mainland of China and in the Pacific, the Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek had a more complex problem.

While Chiang was faced by an external force from Japan, his men were threatened also by the formidable Chinese Communist army under Mao Tse-tung. The British and Americans wanted Chiang to put more pressure on the Japanese on the mainland. But if he moved troops facing Mao Tse-tung to engage the Japanese, he would expose his rear. This he could not do.

The other part of the problem was that, as British and American forces were moved in increasing strength into the mainland of China to help Chiang against the Japanese, it was inevitable that somewhere along the line they would encounter Chinese Communist forces which were ideological allies of the Soviets, and which were, in turn, the military allies of the British and Americans.

Such complex affairs do not digest well in time of war when the friend vs. enemy situation is supposed to be as clear as black and white.

This is why the four powers could not

⁴ The author was the pilot of a VIP aircraft used during these conferences by the British and Americans and was the pilot of the plane that carried the Chinese delegation to and from Teheran for that meeting with Stalin.



AP WIDE WORLD PHOTOS



UPI BEUTEMANN NEWSPHOTOS

The destruction of national sovereignty by Mao Tse-tung (left) has been espoused by President Ronald Reagan (right) in such actions as the F-111 bombing of Libya.

meet at one time in one place, openly. It is why there had to be two conferences, one in Cairo and one in Teheran. And it explains why the Chinese delegates met secretly with Stalin in Teheran and how the three Pacific allies won a concession from Stalin to have him prevail upon his ally, Mao Tse-tung, to withhold his forces from further pressure on Chiang at least until the war with Japan ended. (Mao finally defeated the Nationalists in Nanking in 1949.) Such intricate diplomacy in the heat of the war demanded true statesmanship all around.

It is not within the scope of this series of articles to venture into the areas of diplomacy and political intrigue that grew from this most important meeting. Rather we shall pursue its impact upon the development of a new U.S. military doctrine that has grown and shaped itself during the Cold War years. It was this doctrine that John F. Kennedy moved to bring under control with his directives of June 1961.

Following the Teheran and Cairo conferences, American military aid to and participation with the Chinese on the mainland increased enormously.

A group of B-29 Super Fortress bombers was flown from the United States via Africa and the Middle East to the Assam Valley wartime airport complex of eastern India, from where they were flown into China for direct operations against the Japanese home islands.

American military leaders ran up against conditions in China which were totally uncharacteristic of the military practices and doctrine of the United States.

In China, the military was deeply involved in a political role at the same time as they were fighting a conventional war against the Japanese and a civil war with Mao. This role of the military opened the eyes of the more traditional U.S. military observers.

The United States had sent a number of its finest military leaders to China. The army was under the command of General Joseph W. Stilwell. The air force units were commanded by the legendary General Claire Chennault of "Flying Tigers" fame. A number of these officers and their key subordinates came home from the war in Asia deeply impressed with what they had experienced in Asia. Two things stood out above all others: the impact of the atomic bomb and the writings and revolutionary military doctrine of Mao Tse-tung.

Looking back to World War II and even before it, U.S. military men — to the greatest extent, reservists — regarded warfare as something that took place overseas beyond our borders. They viewed military service as a totally non-political function. This, they found, was generally true in Europe also, until the end of the war. Then things began to change.

After the surrender of Italy, the U.S. Army began to help the Italians, who had been under Fascist totalitarian rule for a generation or more. They needed help not only to obtain food, shelter and clothing, but also to restructure local government. The U.S. Army began a program of "Civil Affairs and Military Government." These servicemen pitched in to get

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
(continued from page 16)

water flowing again, to get transportation rolling, and even to form a local political organization that could take over local administration. This function spread all over Europe as cities and towns were liberated, one after the other, by the advancing armies.

The U.S. Army was getting into politics. But it was someone else's politics.

This new role for an American army came at a fortuitous time. Two cities had been totally leveled by the atomic bombs in faraway Japan. If the future of warfare was going to face reality, it would have to recognize that whole countries, at least major regions of countries, would be completely devastated by nuclear weapons and their lethal fallout.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the war colleges, where military doctrine is developed, began to face up to the reality of the nuclear weapon and its immense power. If the entire span of time of the evolution of warfare had created a spectrum based upon weaponry from clubs to the B-29 bomber which went from the rich reds at one end across the rainbow to the royal purples, then it



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

The Cairo Conference featured, seated from left, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Madame Chiang. The author served as a pilot and staff assistant for the American and British delegations.

might be said that the nuclear weapon extended that spectrum almost to infinity.

The curriculum of each of these schools for senior officers contained major seg-

ments on nuclear warfare. War plans, those fundamental plans designed to implement grand strategy and that are used in the procurement process to assure

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the men and materiel essential to carry out and fulfill those plans, contained major segments dedicated to "post-strike" activity.

The new strategy recognized a type of warfare initiated by a sudden exchange of nuclear weapons, followed by a time of shock and stagnation. The urban areas of the Soviet Union would be devastated, and transportation and communications would be totally disrupted. The daily activities of the surviving population would be at a standstill with no voice of leadership from the Kremlin. The survivors would be on their own.

The war plans forecast that the first nation that could introduce, by airlift, its military forces into this shocked and devastated area and that could re-establish law and order along with a new political and economic system would seal the victory. For this purpose the Air Force was ordered to create a huge, global air transport system to be rapidly augmented at the outbreak of war by CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) aircraft from the airlines.

This huge air armada would airlift the Army and essential supplies into enemy zones that had been specifically avoided as sanctuaries in the nuclear deluge. That army would begin to create a new government that would include a new economic and political system.

As the lead element of these forces, the U.S. Army was directed to create, in peacetime, a Special Warfare section, to train Special Forces, and, once trained, to disperse them in strategic locations around the world. The Air Force created Air Re-supply and Communications (ARC) Wings — vast flying organizations trained and equipped to work with the Army Special Forces.

These ARC Wings possessed airborne printing facilities that could be operated in flight. They were able to make area-wide blanket leaflet drops to provide the psychological warfare edge and a communications substitute required to reorganize a stunned and disorganized populace. This was the grandiose plan that emerged out of the merger of the post-World War II atomic bomb and civic affairs experiences of World War II. It is amazing, on reflection, to see how these two widely divergent concepts became a grand strategy war plan, and then, by adding the superlative ingredient of elements of the Mao doctrine, were shaped expertly to become the Cold War doctrine of the Vietnam era, among others.

It is even more fascinating to see how



AP WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Premier Josef Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met publicly at Teheran, where a crucial meeting occurred behind the scenes with a special Chinese delegation flown in by the author.

all this has been shaped in the hands of the Reagan administration and applied as a main theme military action concept of the 1980s. Yet, with all this development, there was one thing lacking. This new doctrine needed eyes and ears and, if

possible, reliable contacts within the denied areas of Soviet territory.

CIA officials, many of them former military officers with considerable World War II experience, were brought into the (continued on page 30)



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official war plans process. They were asked to open lines to secret agents far into the heartland of Russia. These trained indigenous agents would be located in areas that would not be bombed and where the prevailing atmospheric systems were most likely not to carry lethal radioactive fallout. To perform this essential function, the CIA was made a "Fourth Force" for war plans purposes.

The relatively new CIA, concentrating for the most part on its mission of intelligence, had none of the bases, military equipment, manpower, storage sites, etc. required for such a task. Faced with this dilemma — i.e., it sorely wanted to be the Fourth Force, but it did not possess the wherewithal to pull it off — the CIA made a characteristically clever and self-serving decision.

It placed the burden of support right back on the military system. As the years passed, the CIA amassed enormous stockpiles of "war plans" equipment in warehouses, ostensibly to await either a military exercise to flex their muscles, or the real thing. This is the way the CIA got its toe in the door to flesh out its early clandestine operations.

It is an old military truism that "if you have the weapons, they will be used," and, indeed, as the years rolled by, these weapons were used by the CIA.

These two enormous strategic concepts, one from China and Mao Tse-tung and the other from Europe, began to merge with the nuclear reality. Officers with Asian experience began to soak up the European concept of Civic Action and Special Warfare.

By 1958, examples of this merger could be found in the curriculum of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. This change of direction became the central theme of the warfare in Indochina during the 1960s and 1970s and is currently the dominant theme of President Reagan's military policy, as evidenced in Central America, Africa, the Middle East and on the oceans of the world.

In earlier days, such operations were secret, and they were kept that way. Today they are called "covert," but they are as overt as the attacks on Libya, and they are, of course, easily attributable to the United States. This situation marks the end of national sovereignty among the family of nations. By 1958, senior military officers at the Army War Col-

lege were hearing lectures given by the new breed of U.S. military strategist. An excerpt from one such lecture follows:

"Mao Tse-tung explained the importance of the Communist politico-military forces in the new modern warfare. 'Their main purpose deals with the army-people relationship for winning over people to unite with the armed forces. They can be adopted by all other armies and especially guerrilla forces. There are those who cannot imagine how guerrillas could survive for long in the rear of the enemy. But, they do not understand the relationship between the people and the army. The people are like the water and the army is like the fish. How can it be difficult for the fish to survive when there is water?'"

"... the teaching of Mao, the Chinese Communist leader, had become the doctrine of the new U.S. military strategy."

In other words, all of a sudden the teaching of Mao, the Chinese Communist leader, had become the doctrine of the new U.S. military strategy. This example of the "fish in the water" was repeated thousands of times in thousands of lectures. The voice of Mao was raised again and again at the Army War College:

"There are often military elements who care for only military affairs but not politics. Such one-track-minded military officers, ignoring the interconnection between politics and military affairs, must be made to understand the correct relationship between the two. All military actions are means to achieve certain political objectives while military action itself is a manifested form of politics. There are of course differences between political and military affairs, each with its special characteristics, but the one should not be disconnected and isolated from the other.

"The world today is already in a new era of evolution and today's war is already approaching the world's last

armed conflict. This is also a fact which should be understood. The majority of mankind, including the 450 millions of China, is already engaged or preparing to engage in a great, just war against the aggressors and oppressors of the entire world. No matter how long this war is going to last, there is no doubt that it is approaching the last conflict in history. After such a prolonged, ruthless war, there will emerge a historically unprecedented new era for mankind in which there will be no more wars."

These are the statements of the greatest military leaders of modern times. They are defining the Cold War in terms of real war, and it was heady stuff for the leaders of the U.S. Army. They knew it did not have immediate application within the United States, but they saw ways to create armies of this type in other countries, particularly in the emerging Third World nations.

The next step on the road to full implementation of this new doctrine involved the joining of the teaching of Mao with the curriculum of the Civil Affairs and Military Government School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and the creation from this merger of the new Special Warfare doctrine of 1960.

From Army platforms such statements as "the kind of peace we have today is too important to entrust to the career diplomats and professional economists" became common as senior Army officials began to see "that the U.S. Army had a Cold War role." As explained by these lectures, "With U.S. guidance and help, the politico-military actions of Southeast Asian armed forces can be decisive in building strong, free nations, with governments responsive to and representative of the people."

It does not take much imagination to see the way things have been going. Somehow a strong army, presumably under a powerful leader such as General Augusto Pinochet of Chile, is supposed to build "representative" government. This new U.S. doctrine visualized a national army suspended somewhere between the people on the one hand and the seat of government on the other — truly the "fish" in the "water."

Despite the planners' optimism, they were never able to demonstrate an army that operated that way, least of all General Pinochet's. Once the army had the power, it used it. The seat of government became engulfed and the people subjugated.

Tradition in military circles is always stronger than mere words.

Mao may have said all those things about his army while he was the rebel leader. Once in power, however, the tables were completely turned. He became as dictatorial as all the rest.

To those who are not students of the evolution of warfare and the history of war, some of these developments in U.S. military doctrine since World War II may seem complex and obscure. Essentially the regular armed forces of the United States have always been regarded as a base or cadre upon which the much larger forces required for overseas warfare could be built. The role of the regular armed forces, between wars, has been to train and equip themselves for war.

The United States has never used armed forces during peacetime for political or diplomatic reasons, other than for an occasional show of force externally. And certainly there is no role for these forces within the borders of this country — with a very few exceptions: to aid police or the Secret Service, or in the event of national disasters and emergencies.

Therefore, the emergence of U.S. military doctrine tailored to the policies of Chairman Mao is quite a departure, especially when flavored with the "Civil Affairs and Military Government" concept.

The U.S. armed forces have, for the most part, been cautious about this role. But over the years they have associated themselves with the armed forces of Third World nations, in support of this concept of the army being the "fish" in the "water" of the populace. They have adopted Mao's ideas of the politico-military relationships. Where such examples have occurred, certain military elements, including U.S. Army Special Forces, have been under the direction of the CIA. This was the case in Indochina between 1954 and 1964.

In other examples, covert operations were run, as much with a blank check-book as anything else, to build up a new, popular military leader, as in the case of Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines. As described in Part III in this series, Magsaysay's CIA-supported rise placed him at the head of the military forces in the Philippines. The CIA knew that the military there could be relied upon to build a "strong government responsive and representative of the people."

And the fact is that once Magsaysay reached that level of military power, he

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also became the head of state.

Other examples of the theoretical application of these principles have involved such countries as Iran, Chile, Guatemala, the Congo, Indonesia, Tibet, Indochina (Vietnam and Laos), and many other nations in Africa and Latin America.

In every case where the intent was to create a model "Mao-defined" army, it has failed. In spite of this, however, proponents of the doctrine have continued their work. There is a purely economic reason for this. Since World War II, the Department of Defense has become the perennial biggest spender in the government. If such spending is to be continued, there must appear to be some reason for the vast procurement orders other than for actual war, and, perhaps even more importantly, there must be some way to consume military hardware in order that it will have to be replaced.

It is quite customary to find that for every defense dollar spent on new military equipment, 10 more dollars are spent for support during its military "life." These same figures, perhaps even higher on the average, apply to the military hardware that is sent to other countries and maintained and consumed overseas.

On such a scale, a modest \$50 million order may grow to \$500 million over time. With this in mind, it is essential — from the point of view that the industrial complex supports, and in turn is supported by, the military — to have as broad a base as possible throughout the world in the armed forces of as many countries as possible.

Such a situation can create many extremes.

At one time, for example, Egypt was firmly in the "communist" camp and purchased its military materiel from the Soviets. However, the Soviet manufacturers were notoriously poor managers of essential follow-up supply requirements. The CIA sent an official letter to the Defense Department suggesting that it might be wise for some armament suppliers to acquire Russian-made spare parts and to produce them for the Egyptians. It did not make any difference who was going to get military hardware or whose it was, as long as the dollars flowed through the industry.

After this "Mao doctrine" had been developed and preached at the war col-



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A principal proponent of the "Mao doctrine" was General Edward G. Lansdale. Lansdale and General Richard G. Stilwell were supported by Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence. On November 1, 1960, just before the election of John F. Kennedy, the author and Lansdale flew to Fort Gordon, Georgia, to pick up elements of the "Civil Affairs and Military Government" curriculum, which was then used as the basis for drafting the new curriculum for the Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg.

lege level during the late 1950s by U.S. military experts steeped in Asian military lore, it was introduced into the White House under the guise of a "Mutual Security Program."

By this time, May 1959, the principal proponents of the doctrine were General Richard G. Stilwell⁵ and General Edward G. Lansdale. The two generals were sponsored effectively by Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence, and by the resurgent Army Special Warfare elements at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In a May 15, 1959, White House report entitled "Training Under the Mutual Security Program," which was intended "For the President's Committee Business Only," General Stilwell and his associates set forth the doctrine "governing the employment of the military instrument, in peace and in war." During the spring

⁵ Although no relation to the previously mentioned General Joseph W. Stilwell, General Richard G. Stilwell was a friend and close associate of "Vinegar Joe's" son, General Joseph W. Stilwell Jr.

of 1959, the CIA had skillfully extricated the Dalai Lama from Tibet ahead of the invading Chinese Communist army (the same army with the same doctrine that they had adopted in the White House), and the CIA was setting up a massive over-flight program of support for the Tibetan Khamba tribesmen, who were fighting a losing battle against the Chinese.

General Maxwell Taylor had just resigned as chief of staff of the U.S. Army because of differences with President Dwight D. Eisenhower over Army policy matters. This was the climate in which the new U.S. military doctrine reached the White House.

In deference to the civilian Mutual Security Program, this long report paid lip service to "the essentiality of properly trained and motivated manpower" without the use of the word "military." General Stilwell announced that an area to be discussed was "The exploitation of MAP [Military Assistance Program] supported military establishments in furtherance of political stability, economic growth and social change."

Here the new doctrine raised its horns. The military would be used to further "political stability, economic growth and social change" in peacetime.

This was a totally revolutionary role for the U.S. military. For military forces in most Third World nations, such a function was unheard of.

The doctrine was focused on the military of those countries in what the report called "the middle third of the world."

To educate its readers and to underscore this point the report stated:

"It is not enough, however, to restrict leadership inputs to U.S. norms. Except in specifically defined circumstances, our Armed Forces have no operative responsibilities within national frontiers; conforming generally to the precepts of Western democracies, they are not an integral part of the mechanism for maintenance of law and order. The prevailing concept is expeditionary — an instrument of latent power — unentangled domestically, ready for projection abroad should the exigency arise. Not so for the great bulk of the forces of the new nations. Their role has additional dimensions and their missions are actual as opposed to contingent. They are a key element in the maintenance of internal security and are largely determinant of whether stability or instability characterizes the routine of government. The

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Officer Corps is perforce deeply involved in domestic affairs. Those who lead, or are destined to lead, must therefore acquire qualifications and attributes beyond the criteria which identify the successful commander, in combat.

"Finally, the ranks of the Officer Corps in most less developed countries are a rich source of potential leaders of the national civil service, the professional class, and other non-military sectors. Here one finds a high degree of discipline, dedication and political moderation. Moreover, one must reckon with the possibility — indeed probability — that the Officer Corps, as a unit, may accede to the reins of government as the only alternative to domestic chaos and leftist takeover. Both considerations point to a program for selection and preparation of promising officers for eventual occupation of high level managerial posts in the civil sector, public and private.

"In the field of general education, as in the development of national leadership, the military establishments can play a significant role."

This introductory material was woven into the Mutual Security Program report to create a bridge from the more normal non-military and political elements of the work to the new and revolutionary Cold War military doctrine. It served as a palliative for those in the civilian sector both at home and abroad. But, as the report moved along into the military sector, it began to sound more and more like Chairman Mao and his political-military army.

This material was enormously significant in the Eisenhower era, and it grew more controversial and dynamic during the aborted Kennedy period.

It has become even more significant during the Reagan tenure. Despite the passage of decades since this doctrine was first introduced, some of the same military officers who developed and promoted these concepts — with the strong backing of the CIA — are even today in high-level positions where they are able to promote it more than ever before.

The quotes from this report that are listed below serve as a reminder of how something novel in 1959 and 1960 has come to be taken as an accepted philosophy:

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HUMOR BEHIND THE SCENES AT TEHERAN

The legendary political skills of Franklin D. Roosevelt were never more evident than in the case of the flight of the Chinese diplomats from Cairo to Teheran in November 1943.

There were five or six men in this delegation. Many of them had never been out of China before, let alone flown in a U.S. Army Air Force plane with military crew. Roosevelt knew that and wanted to put them at their ease.

The author received a call early one morning in Cairo to prepare the Lode-star for a VIP flight to Teheran. He called the crew chief and radio man to be sure they were there early to see that the plane was ready and clean.

Shortly after sunrise, the author arrived in Operations and went out to the ramp in front. There was the plane and an irate crew chief. He said, "Captain, someone has filled the plane with big boxes and won't let me take them off for our passengers."

There, packed tightly against the rear seats, was a stack of large cartons of corn flakes. These were the wholesale cartons in which big, family-size corn flakes boxes were shipped.

At that moment, a major who had come from Washington, D.C., to help with the details of the Cairo conference came up to the author and said that those cartons had been placed on the plane "on express orders from President Roosevelt." Needless to say, they left them there and prepared the plane for departure.

Two limousines arrived later, the Chinese stepped out and were escorted to the plane. Not long after, they left Cairo and were on their way across Palestine en route to a mid-point fueling stop in Iraq. The author went back to see how the passengers were doing. There they were, all six Chinese, each one with a large box of corn flakes open

and eating them as Americans eat popcorn — right out of the box.

This was a small but most thoughtful and understanding act on the part of a busy president. He happened to know that the Chinese liked corn flakes, and he knew that this small gesture would welcome them to an American plane, an American crew and put them at their ease.

The remainder of the flight was marked by one more incident of note.

The Russians were the hosts in Teheran and had totally taken over the city. As the author approached with the Chinese delegation in a line of cars from the airport, he noted that an enormous, royal purple velvet curtain had been hung like a wall all around the central blocks of the city. No one was to get inside that curtain without proper credentials.

As the cars with the Chinese approached the entry checkpoint, another small group of cars came into view ahead. In the lead car, with a small British Union Jack flying from the front fender, was Winston Churchill. He had traveled in his famous "bomb shelter" one-piece jumper suit. It had no pockets, and Churchill, save for his ever-present cigar, had no credentials with him. The young Russian soldiers at the gates, with automatic weapons held firmly, were not about to let anyone inside that curtain without proper credentials.

Ten or 15 minutes passed before a British officer prevailed upon some proper Russian authority to let that unidentified man in the lead car, that man with the famous cigar, through the curtain and into the Russian-held city of Teheran.

The Chinese visitors seemed to enjoy that scene as much as they had the flight and President Roosevelt's corn flakes.

— L. Fletcher Prouty

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"New Roles for the Military"

"In the past year, a number of informed and thoughtful observers have pointed out that MAP-supported military establishments throughout the less developed areas have a political and socio-economic potential which, if properly exploited, may far outweigh their contribution to the deterrence of military aggression. . . ."

"This is due, in part to", . . . the growing realization that armies are often the only cohesive and reliable non-communist instrument available to the fledgling nations. . . ."

"... armies . . . are the principal Cold War weapon from the shores of the East Mediterranean to the 38th Parallel (Korea)."

Then the report drives home its point that the armed forces operate in a never-never land somewhere "between government and populace."

"It is not enough to charge armed forces with responsibility for the military aspects of deterrence; they represent too great an investment in manpower and money to be restricted to such a limited

“. . . in the process of stamping out ‘communist-inspired subversive insurgency’ . . . millions of defenseless little people are murdered as though some monstrous Malthusian bulldozer had been mindlessly set in motion to depopulate Earth.”

mission. The real measure of their worthiness is found in the effectiveness of their contribution to the furtherance of national objectives, short of conflict. And the opportunities therefore are greatest in the less-developed societies where the military occupy a pivotal position between government and populace. As one writer has phrased it, “. . . properly employed, the army can become an internal motor for economic growth and socio-political transformation.”

Later in the report, that same thesis is sounded again: "The maintenance of internal security constitutes a major responsibility of these armed forces. . . ."

The report states: ". . . even, requirement may be direct military action against armed dissidents; consequently, appropriate elements of the army should be equipped and trained for unorthodox warfare."

It reaches a climax with the following statements of U.S. military policy, concealed in 1959 behind a Third World policy. This affirmative presentation at White House level shows how thoroughly the new U.S. military doctrine — albeit for other nations, they say — followed


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the teachings of Chairman Mao.⁶

"Here is the ultimate test of the armed forces. Their role, in the countries under discussion, is unique. They are at once the guardians of the government and the guarantors that the government keeps faith with the aspirations of the nation. It is in their power to insure that the conduct of government is responsive to the people and that the people are responsive to the obligations of citizenship. In the discharge of these responsibilities, they must be prepared to assume the reins of government themselves."

"... we have embraced the struggle for the minds of men. ..."

The report continues and endorses the "Formulation of a Military Creed."

It cites "the unique responsibilities of the military forces — one might almost say armies — in the development of political stability and national unity" and it talks about "the relationship of the military instrument to the state and to civil power. ..."

This report takes on full color when we recall that Chairman Mao had launched, in 1957 — only two years before this was written — the Great Leap Forward, which was an attempt to decentralize the Chinese economy, such as it was, by establishing a nationwide system of people's communes.

At the same time, the CIA, augmented by the U.S. Army and the Department of State and assisted by experts from the Department of Agriculture, was working with the Diem government of South Vietnam to establish hundreds of similar communes, then called "Agrovilles" and later "Strategic Hamlets," in South Vietnam.

And in May 1959, this White House presidential committee had suggested in the same report, "Military equipment and labor can expedite completion of village communal projects. ... Only thus can an enduring relationship be estab-



General Maxwell Taylor authored the three policy directives which rocked the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department.

lished among the government, the military and the people themselves."

Mao's doctrine, even in the Great Leap Forward, found itself flowing from the pens of U.S. military officers in the form of revolutionary ideas. The nations they describe are to be sliced up into three distinct entities: the people, the government, and the military. What kind of country is that? They do not say. But their new U.S. military doctrine was thrust upon the emerging government of Vietnam, and their concept of Cold War (peacetime) operations permeated the highest levels of government at the time Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961.

There is a strangely contrived side to all this. As Mao Tse-tung had said, "The world today is already in a new era of evolution and today's war is already approaching the world's last armed conflict. ... No matter how long this war is going to last, there is no doubt that it is approaching the last conflict in history."

By the mid-1950s, significant elements of the U.S. military establishment had begun to accept the fact that a nuclear war was impossible and that the Cold War was now and for the future the best

from the White House, without comment but with the weight of apparent approval. As a top-level document of great importance, it then became fundamental to the development of the new Special Warfare curriculum as it was re-written and merged with the material from Fort Gordon.

Because the Fort Bragg curriculum had the blessing of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, contained elements of a White House report, and was supported by the CIA, this whole layer of apparent authority became the Special Warfare and Special Air Warfare doctrine for dealing with Third World nations — particularly with Vietnam.

There were no specific approvals of all of the

scenario for those who saw warfare as essential to the existence of the nation-state.

Earlier in this series, *The Report From Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace*, was cited as a work of crucial importance. It stated that a nation-state could not survive without warfare, and this top-level study, commissioned in August 1963, described an attitude which had begun to surface right after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. So secret was this work that even today the identities of the men responsible for the report have never been publicly disclosed.

The members of Kennedy's inner circle were concerned that no serious work had been done to plan for peace in the world. The commissioning of the study which resulted in *The Report from Iron Mountain* illustrates this concern. It did not, however, lead to a future of peace.

The report notes, "The organization of a society for the possibility of war is its principal political stabilizer."

It states, "The possibility of war provides the sense of external necessity without which no government can long remain in power.

"... War is virtually synonymous with nationhood. The elimination of war implies the inevitable elimination of national sovereignty and the traditional nation-state."

Chairman Mao knew all this. Many good strategists in the U.S. military knew this too, so they designed the parameters of the new type of military doctrine and a new type of constant warfare that would, for the most part, take place in the territory of relatively powerless Third World nations.

Thus, in the process of stamping out "communist-inspired subversive insurgency" or other bogeymen foes, millions of defenseless little people are murdered as though some monstrous Malthusian bulldozer had been mindlessly set in motion to depopulate Earth. A classic example of this was the massive

above. The author has no evidence or recollection that any of this was ever discussed with the Congress or with the Department of State. Yet, on the basis of these policy statements, evolved from the writings of Mao, among others, the U.S. Army had more or less defined a new Cold War role for military forces.

With this presentation the reader is getting a rare and unusual view of the inner workings of our government as it pertains to the development and utilization of the military in Cold War operations. This is exactly what is being done today in Central America and Africa.

⁶ It may be difficult, or at least unusual, for the inexperienced reader to see in such a report its real and far-reaching significance. The author has provided an important example:

Just before the election of John F. Kennedy, on November 1, 1960, the author and General Edward G. Lansdale flew to Fort Gordon to pick up elements of the "Civil Affairs and Military Government" curriculum, which was then used as the basis for drafting the new curriculum for the Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg.

At that time, they were both assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. By late 1960, this Mutual Security Program report had filtered down

slaughter in Cambodia.

It just happened that Kennedy put a man he had never met, General Maxwell Taylor, on the Cuban Study Group after the Bay of Pigs disaster. Taylor had been the chief of staff of the U.S. Army when the Mutual Security Program report was written. No man was better prepared to further the philosophy. He believed and endorsed this new doctrine developed by members of his Army staff.

After the report of the Cuban Study Group had been given to the president on June 13, 1961, Kennedy issued the three National Security Action Memoranda on June 28. They hit the Pentagon like a thunderclap and caused a muffled roar from the State Department and the CIA.

This, in turn, set in motion a determined search to discover their author. It has taken decades to discover who that author was. It was Maxwell Taylor — not anyone of the Kennedy clan.

Shortly thereafter, General Taylor moved into the White House as military adviser to the president. The posting created a rather anomalous situation. President Kennedy had just sent NSAM 55 to General Lemnitzer, saying that he wanted his advice on Cold War matters, then he placed General Taylor in the

White House for practically the same thing.

That October, the president sent General Taylor to Vietnam for a military report on the situation there.

One year later, in 1962, Taylor was made chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and remained there until 1964, when he left to become ambassador to South Vietnam.

The Kennedy years in Washington and in Vietnam were, to put it mildly, turbulent. Because of John F. Kennedy's sponsorship of the Maxwell Taylor-authored U.S. military doctrine, it was felt by many that the young president was bent on destroying the existing structure of the system. His actual intentions will be explored in detail in the next article. ▲

L. Fletcher Prouty is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel. A pilot during World War II, Colonel Prouty rose through the Defense Department chain of command to a point where all CIA military activities were channeled through him.

Between 1955 and 1963, Colonel Prouty served as chief of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in a similar capacity with the Office of Special Operations in the Office of the Secre-

tary of Defense, and headed the Special Operations Office for the U.S. Air Force. All of these positions were charged with the military support of the clandestine operations of the CIA.

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