

CELESTY RAMPARTS 1112  
then grew monumental on Cold War business. Its current economic base consists of the "independent" oilers of the Southwest (non-Rockefeller, non-Arabian), cattle, grains, the agribusiness generally, and the military-industrial complex.

7. The Yankee sees Vietnam across the Atlantic in Europe, whose industrial democracies—plus Japan—constitute his central galaxy. Integration of the world economy, particularly of the industrial countries, particularly as the Yankee can contrive to dominate the new relationship, is the main current motive. The Yankee has long dominated Latin America without native, domestic or foreign rival (although today things may be changing); but the primary arena of Yankee operations is the North Atlantic community. Expansion on through the Pacific to the Orient is desirable on principle, and the Yankee is traditionally at the center of U.S. attempts to open China and Japan. In Vietnam, the Yankee would surely have been happy to win. But still the Atlantic system always comes first over the problematical Pacific system, if ever there is a conflict. Hence, the source of apprehension over the Vietnam war.

8. The Cowboy sees Vietnam across the Pacific in Asia, whose mysteries and teeming millions are important to his notions of the world, often as the basis of a keen sense of present menace. The Cowboy bourgeoisie is much smaller than the Yankee, is without a comparable foreign empire of commerce, is fiercely hostile to Yankee and European values, (there is an old-rich/new-rich component), and draws its social ego from its self-mystifying Wild West mythology, producing its own images of man apart from the European culture stream. John Wayne again, who refused to participate in the Freudianizing of the Cowboy during the fifties, and thus saved that whole kingdom of meanings from the methods of Yankee skepticism.

9. Like the Rockefellers who epitomize them, Yankees are as diverse politically as the Cowboys. Some main Yankee names: the Ford Foundation, the Bilderberg Group, Lindsay, Javits, Kennedy, Lodge, the Securities Exchange Commission, John Gardner and Common Cause, the International Monetary Fund. Some main Cowboy

names; Nixon, Connally, Reagan, Eastland, Westmoreland, Murchison, Picoso Ranch, CINCPAC, Honolulu, Lyndon Johnson, Scoop Jackson, and Poseidon.

10. The left Yankee apostrophizes rationality and progress; the right Cowboy, lawfulness and social order. Cowboy power manifests its spirit in the movement of authoritarian consciousness which parallels the career of Consciousness IV in the sixties and today.

11. We can interpret JFK as a victim of Cowboy militarism, of a force

which he intuitively opposed but understood too late, maybe never. The irony of his career is pure, clear and classical: More adventurer than zealot, he seeks the presidency because, as he said, it's where the action is; yet what does he find if not, finally, that the office is powerless? By his last summer he was at war with the right wing, the Cowboy wing, of the governing group. Johnson, Rusk, Bundy were reduced. McNamara was hammer and tongs with the Joint Chiefs to make them accept civilian discipline. Bobby was frantically trying to create a

parallel FBI, a parallel CIA, a parallel State Department—all in hopes of finding out what was happening and acquire control over events.

12. Around the first of November 1963, Diem was assassinated. Events took a marked turn towards a political settlement of the war. Three weeks later, Dallas brought an end to the turnabout and restored direct Cowboy authority over the executive branch. The Pentagon shortly began implementing its preferred war plan under the cover of "peacenik" Johnson's "liberalism." And just as the left was prophesying at each step, the war grew and grew. Then came the crisis of 1968.

13. For present purposes, we need only note the Tet offensive of February, which blew out Johnson's military illusions, and the gold-outflow crisis of March, which blew out his financial illusions. When the meanings of these two blowouts merged, which was quickly, some unknown-to-me, forever-mysterious mechanism of Yankee decision-making appears to have been activated. The next thing you knew, the superheavy mainline Yankee gun-slingers, Clark Clifford, Averill Harriman, and Cyrus Vance, were conferring with Johnson. Who knows what they told him? By April the bombing of the DRV was stopped (never to happen again, some dared to hope), negotiations were at last commencing, McNamara was on his way to manage the monetary crisis, Johnson had abdicated, Clifford was about to assume de facto command of the government from the Defense Department, reasserting the principles of the Yankee line, and Cowboy forces seemed scattered. Bobby's exquisitely orchestrated presidential campaign soon became unbeatable except by the means fate discovered. Upon his June assassination in Los Angeles, the elements of his New Deal-style coalition parted and control over war policy soon reverted to the Cowboy right.

[THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE NIXON CRISIS]

In brief: An American multinational Yankee bourgeoisie has lost control of the state policy apparatus to a domestic or national Cowboy bourgeoisie;

and the latter has pursued stubbornly a war, which is necessary mainly in its own eyes, to the point at which a North-South conflict again threatens to spill over the banks of the electoral system. The conflict is deep because the differences are deep. The Yankee can review today nearly a decade of straight Cowboy administration. He sees in part:

—The rise of China in spite of all the costs of the Pacific Cold War campaigns.

—The inability of the U.S. military to produce a stable base in Southeast Asia.

—The decay of the alliance with Japan.

—The emergence in more than embryo of a fateful Japan-China alliance.

—The slackening of spirit of European-American relations; the deepening of the movement of European nationalism—America still strong but the prestige and role of the USSR over-all on the rise.

—Domestically, the exhaustion of known remedies. Whatever is happening to the cities is out of control. There are no believable plans afoot. Spirit is on the defensive. The people are unhappy.

McGovern is of course a plains democrat, not a Yankee (his relationship to Yankee power somewhat resembles Lincoln's); but the new-style populism that made his candidacy real cannot influence policy directly except through a coalition. Hence, the logic of "Yankee populism," full of contradictions and dangers but a logic nonetheless: the logic of *realignment*.

Realignment: the lib-to-lib, con-to-con polarization of a party system which normally pits a lib-con coalition against a con-lib one. The Republican Party "realigned" in 1964, the Democratic Party this year; the Republican liberals like Rocky, Javits, and Brooke, are as out of pocket with Nixon as the conservative Democrats with McGovern. The campaign role in which Nixon has cast arch-Cowboy Connally further makes clear what is happening.

After all this, however, I'm still much more certain that realignment is the major and long-term force acting at this moment. If McGovern wins, the military could bolt; they seem to have threatened this before—to have done it before—for less. If he does not, and

militarism decides to see Nixon's re-election as a mandate, new energies will surely form in more urgent opposition. It may help in thinking the situation through, however, to know that in some very real sense the McGovern campaign is much less the pre-emption or co-optation than the continuation of the movement launched ten years ago with the publication of a few thousand mimeographed copies of *The Port Huron Statement*, SDS's founding manifesto. Consider the following as a strategy, then think of the pattern of development in the ten years since it was written:

*"A crucial feature of the political apparatus in America is that greater differences are harbored within each party than . . . between them. Instead of two parties presenting distinctive and significant differences of approach, what dominates the system is a natural interlocking of Democrats from Southern states with the more conservative elements of the Republican Party . . . What emerges from the party contradiction and insulation of privately-held power is organized political stalemate . . . Congress becomes less and less central to national decision-making especially in the area of foreign policy . . . No one is demanding structural changes such as the shunting of Southern Democrats out of the Democratic Party . . ."*

*"[Meanwhile], discontented super-patriotic groups . . . emerge through political channels and explain their ultra-conservatism as the best means of Victory over Communism. They have become a political influential force within the Republican Party, at a national level through Sen. Goldwater . . . But ironically, it is somewhat to the interests of the United States that such a movement should be a public constituency pointed toward realignment of the political parties, demanding a conservative Republican Party in the South and an exclusion of the 'leftist' elements of the national GOP."*

This seems to be the pass things have come to. Currently, forward action is preeminantly dependent on McGovern's power to move the energies of realignment with the Kennedy House of the Yankee, Atlanticist bourgeoisie.

G.M.S.  
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