

he protested that his handwriting could be checked. I suggested he type it. Typewriters, too, could be traced, he demurred. Finally, he said he might write it all down and then get someone he could trust to transcribe it in a hand that could not be traced to him. He would think it over.

That was eighteen weeks before this writing, although it seems much longer. He has been silent.

Of the things he mentioned, "Crypto" security clearance bothered me; I had never heard of it. From time to time I asked reporters about it. In February 1967, when I was in Boston, I mentioned this strange post-midnight telephone call to Bob Scott, newsmen at WNNAC, who has connections with people who had been in military intelligence. He soon phoned to report that there had been such a security designation.

But certain parts of his story sounded provokingly familiar, so as soon as I got home I started checking against the Commission evidence. One thing I recalled closely coincided with parts of this information.

At the first opportunity I reread the May 18, 1964, testimony of Kerry Wendell Thornley, a former Marine Corps buddy of Oswald (11H832F). Thornley was questioned by Assistant Counsel Albert E. Jenner, Jr., who had played the minor part in the New Orleans interrogations, most of which had been conducted by Liebler. One thing was immediately obvious: Thornley's testimony was physically separated from 100 percent of the other testimony about Oswald's Marine Corps career. It is all alone on this subject in Volume 11, which the preface also makes clear. This confirmed my hunch that I had to reread this testimony that I had not studied for two years.

Sure enough, what I seemed to recall is there.

Thornley had an apparently incorrect recollection that, because of his court martial for the enlisted man's dream offense, pouring a drink on his sergeant's head, Oswald had temporarily lost his security clearance and

was assigned to janitorial duties. This follows. (11H-845)

Mr. Jenner: I was going to ask you what losing clearance meant. You have indicated that—or would you state it more specifically.

Mr. Thornley: Well, that meant in a practical sense, that meant that he was not permitted to enter certain areas wherein the equipment, in this case equipment, was kept; that we would not want other unauthorized persons to have knowledge of. And on occasion information, I imagine, would also come to the man who was cleared, in the process of his work, that he would be expected to keep to himself.

Mr. Jenner: I assume you had clearance?

Mr. Thornley: Yes, sir; I was, I think, cleared for confidential at the time.

Mr. Jenner: Cleared for confidential. I was about to ask you what level of clearance was involved.

Mr. Thornley: I believe it was just confidential to work there at El Toro on that particular equipment.

Mr. Jenner: That is the clearance about which you speak when you talk about Oswald having lost it?

Mr. Thornley: Oswald, I believe, had a higher clearance. This is also just based upon rumor. I believe he at one time worked in the security files, it is the S & C files, somewhere at LTA or at El Toro.

Mr. Jenner: Did you ever work in the security files?

Mr. Thornley: No, sir.

Mr. Jenner: And that was a level of clearance—

Mr. Thornley: Probably a secret clearance would be required.

Mr. Jenner: It was at least higher than the clearance about which you first spoke?

Mr. Thornley: Yes, sir.

This story of Oswald's having a high security clearance is not consistent with most material in other volumes or with the Report. Note also Thornley's unpropounded recollection of Oswald's "having worked in the security files; it is the S & C files." This is hardly a normal assignment for enlisted men who learn to speak Russian, ostensibly for themselves, openly subscribe to Communist publications and are ostentatiously pro-"Marxist."

The Thornley testimony is not inconsistent with the information that destroyed the peace of mind of my worried California informant. It is testimony that Jenner, who in late 1966 and 1967 was one of the members of the staff of the former Commission most vocal in its



defense and his own (though he always managed not to show up for those electronic confrontations with me that he had earlier accepted), as a competent and experienced lawyer, should have latched onto and probed and prodded until he had obtained from Thornley all the witness knew. It is not at all out of step with his own and the Commission's record that Jenner did not. Need we wonder longer why this testimony alone was separated from the other evidence on Oswald's Marine Corps career?

Thus, what might have been a major revelation remains instead one of the major mysteries, officially hidden by the Commission but now, I think, smoked out. It is particularly pertinent in the developing New Orleans story.

There are many other things in the record that bear on this, some negatively. For example, no member of the staff ever pursued this strange inconsistency, Oswald the Marxist in a position of high security trust in the Marine Corps. It should have been a troubling legal hangnail to each and every one, and to the members of the Commission. Instead, the Commission used the least desirable method of gathering "testimony" and that on a selective basis only. *Ex parte* and incompetent depositions were taken from Thornley, Nelson Delgado (8H228-65), another former Oswald Marine Corps chum, and his former superior officer, Lt. John E. Donovan (8H289-303). From all the few others included in the record, there are but brief and insufficient affidavits.

With one exception, all reveal a Commission interest in whether Oswald was a homosexual. That exception is the man who arranged dates between Oswald and his sister.

Lieutenant Donovan, "the officer in command" of the crew in which Oswald served (8H290), when asked about whether the murdered accused assassin had been a homosexual:

Mr. Ely: I believe you mentioned earlier that he did not seem to you particularly interested in girls. Was this just because he was interested in other things, or do you have any reason to believe that there was anything abnormal about his desires?

Mr. Donovan: I have no reason to suspect that he was homosexual, and in that squadron at that time one fellow was discharged from the service for being homosexual. He was in no way tied in with it that I know of. . . . (8H300)

Perhaps Donovan's most significant testimony tends to cast Oswald in a different role than the Report and indicates the magnitude of the breach of security and military trust he threatened at the Moscow Embassy when going through the motions if not the actuality of defection:

Mr. Donovan: I recall that he got a hardship discharge. We offered to get him a flight—that is a hop from El Toro to some place in Texas, his home. He refused. We considered that normal in that if you take a hop you sacrifice your transportation pay. We offered to take him to a bus or train station. He refused. But that is not particularly unusual, either. I recall that he was gone for some period of time, and shortly before I got out of the Marine Corps, which was mid-December 1959, we received word that he had showed up in Moscow. This necessitated a lot of change of aircraft call signs, codes, radio frequencies, radar frequencies. He had access to all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and areas, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, the authentication code of a squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentication code of a squadron, and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding units' radio and radar. . . .

Mr. Ely: You recall that various codes were changed. Now, at what level were these changed? Was this an action of your specific unit, or a fairly widespread action?

Mr. Donovan: Well, I did not witness the changing in any other squadrons, but it would have to be, because the code is obviously between two or more units. Therefore, the other units had to change it. These codes are a grid, and two lines correspond. . . . There are some things which he knew on which he received instruction that there is no way of changing, such as the MPS 16 height-finder radar gear. That had recently been integrated into the Marine Corps system. It had a height-finding range far in excess of our previous equipment, and it has certain limitations. He had been schooled on those limitations. It cannot operate above a given altitude in setting—in other words, you cannot place the thing above a given terrain height. He had also been schooled on a piece of machinery called a TPX-1, which is used to transfer radio radar and radio signals over a great distance. Radar is very susceptible