

Dear Gerald,

2/20/92

"Mengele" is quite an impressive job! That you could handle such content so matter-of-factly is in itself impressive. That must have been difficult.

When I got to page 99 so much of my own past returned. There you refer to the State Department's "Blue Book" on Argentina. It has a background that may interest you. It may also contribute a bit to understanding how Mengele could have remain<sup>ned</sup> undetected<sup>to</sup>, unwanted when he was wanted and was on so many war-criminals lists.

After I received a medical discharge from the army, when I was assigned to OSS, I was rehired as a civilian consultant by the Latin American Division. In retrospect this was at least in part because of my series of exposés of Nazi cartels. The first job I recall was the economic, commercial and financial section of what preceded the Blue Book.

In preparing this I do not recall any real intelligence reports. I used largely standard sources and the usual consular reports and other such State and Commerce Department records.

The document we prepared, and this was after the Research and Analysis Branch was transferred to State when OSS was liquidated, as I now recall, was to have been used by Nelson Rockefeller at the meeting of the American state at Chapultepec, Mexico in their preparations for the organization of the UN at San Francisco.

Only, Rockefeller had his own policy and he made US policy by failing to use this study of Nazi influence in Argentina to block its admission into the UN.

But policy remained blocking Argentina's admission. So the job had to be updated.

I was put in charge of the military end, to detail the Nazi influence on the Argentine military. We were given special quarters, as I now recall on the west side of 18th St. below Penna. Ave., NW. I had not really gotten started when, in thinking of this, I saw that it was very bad policy. I believed and said that not having taken this position at the Mexico meeting all of Latin America would resound with cries of "Yankee Imperialism."

So, I asked to be relieved, was, and my career did not survive it.

I did a few things for the scholars who were not very practical, like getting them microfilm readers sub rosa because they had not been provided.

What I predicted is what happened. All of Latin America did resound with the cry of US domination and the protests were numerous and vocal. But as I learned, being right is not always liked. And Argentina was admitted into the UN at San Francisco.

In reading a bit more this morning in the chapter on Mengele in Argentina, it is apparent that the US also was not using, was not really interested in catching and exposing escaped Nazi war criminals. Otherwise Mengele would have been included in reporting from South America. As with Rockefeller, the real interest was in imagined Communist inroads and all sorts of people who were not Communists were suspected or reported as reds.

Aside from some of the people in my division, I recall no interest in State in

identifying wanted Nazis although it was common knowledge that many were in Latin America. I do not recall any research to prepare people being assigned to Latin American embassies relating to Nazis but I do recall assignments to identify the "reds", domestic, none from the USSR.

When the CIA was created a little of its product reached me. It was incompetent and inaccurate with regard to the political right, including what was influential in that area, Franco's Falange.

US policy at that time was to use the war criminals we could get and use, and I think there was real competition with the USSR in latching onto them. One of the means was permission to import 100 people a year without regard to any law. Some, for example, worked on the atom bomb. We took over the Gehlen Nazi spying outfit to use against the USSR, and those people were excused all their crimes.

There was no real US interest in eliminating Nazi influence in Latin America and it was policy for these influences to be there to resist the imagined increasing "Communist" influence. almost always <sup>of</sup> what was regarded as Communist was mere nationalism, opposition to American corporations taking the wealth out of the countries which needed it so desperately. Where there was native ownership, as with Bolivia and tin, there was also opposition to that wealth leaving the desperately poor country. There never was any real red menace in Latin America. *same for Luis Carlos Prestes in Brazil*

However, it was this attitude, this belief and policy, that <sup>made</sup> it so much easier for the Nazis to be safe in that part of the world. I doubt we'll ever know how many were able to live their lives out there.

Were it not for this I believe that Mengele and others would have been identified and brought to trial. But there was no interest in that. It was no secret that Nazis had safety in Argentina and Paraguay in particular, where both governments were pro-Nazi dictatorships.

You refer to Stroessner's take-over in Paraguay. He was a <sup>A</sup> carbon copy of the dictator he ousted, Hector Morinigo. I sat on the Paraguay desk during a revolution by the part of the army based at <sup>concepcion</sup> Asuncion. It was not in any sense a red revolution. It was an almost successful attempt to establish a democratic government. But it got no support from the US, which did support Morinigo.

The west German government had no interest in catching the escaped Nazis. Too many in it had similar backgrounds.

