

✓ 77- He says Oswald says he  
was having lunch with  
German. Oswald said only  
only that he saw German  
walk by WU 21 quoting FB, SA  
Book about James W

82 Mince incident west of Dealey Plaza  
and other side of underpass

86 Umbrella man: HS CT did not  
locate Dallas morning news story

98 Photo of Ruby shooting LHO not  
by Bob Jackson but by Jack Beers-

Page 215 he has Hosty as Hosty

When rifle focused - 32

Boys all moved before any features 33

Rifle mark alleged, wrong direction 33

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Wentz men on fund mg of rifle

~~Baker~~ 36

They even started him too far away (110)  
from his position when his motorcycle was  
farther away - in their reconstruction

is authority for the opinion that the boxes in the window seem to have been arranged as a convenient gun rest (see Commission Exhibit 301, P. 136). It also suggested that the large second box on which Oswald's palmprint was found was a place upon which he sat, implying a contradiction to the testimony of its star witness, Brennan, that the assassin was sitting. The words used are, "Someone sitting on the box facing the window would have his palm in this position if he placed his hand alongside his right hip. (See Exhibit No. 1308, '139)'"

Having seen fit not only to refer to these exhibits but to reproduce them in the Report, it is distressing that the authors of the report appeared to overlook another in this series of photographs in Volume 22, Exhibit 1312, which shows that a man Oswald's size sitting upon this box could not have fired the weapon as the report represents he did because the closed part of the window would have been in his way. The height of the window sill from the floor, as this exhibit shows, is about one foot. In this entire discussion, the authors of the Report found no interest in all the testimony about the moving of the boxes and in the fact that the boxes were placed in the pictures they reprinted in a way that did not and could not duplicate their positions at the time of the assassination.

Lieutenant Day was more helpful, but he, too, added confusion. He and the Commission were to reconstruct the shooting. At first, Day said he did not believe any boxes had been moved prior to his arrival. He was shown Exhibit 482 (21H200), a cropped version of Dillard's and said this view from the outside coincided with what he saw on the inside (4H251). But after examining this picture, he declared it "doesn't fit with my picture of the inside" (4H252). Day was correct. The Dillard photograph clearly shows another box extending much higher than the rifle rest box in the opposite or eastern side of the window. But this box and the boxes upon which it rested are missing in all the official photographs. The official interest in them ended as soon as it began, too. Perhaps this was necessary because of the probability that a barricade such as these rearmost boxes necessarily represented could have effectively prevented the ricocheting of the third empty cartridge to the point at which it was found. This point is shown in Studebaker Exhibit A and Exhibit 716 (17H500), similar but not identical photographs reprinted as taken before the empty cartridges were touched.

This mystery is not solved in the Report, which details the ricocheting of the ejected cases with the most scientific precision, but it avoids explaining how the case could have gone through a solid object. It also avoids mention of either this western barricade of boxes or how they disappeared completely. And it makes no allowance in its time reconstructions for the removal of such a barricade by Oswald.

Day understood what must have happened. He said the boxes had to have been moved after Dillard took his picture and before the identification police arrived (4H253). This left limited alternatives. Oswald had done it, there had to be other boxes with his fingerprints, and there were none, and the extra time required would have battered the Commission's time reconstruction which was tenuous at best. If another person did it, he is not accounted for and there is at least a strong suspicion he might have been the assassin. Otherwise, is there anyone left but the police?

With the "rifle-rest" boxes, Day was no help. He admitted that at the time Exhibit 722 (17H504) was taken these boxes had been moved. This photograph shows the window sill and the view south on Houston Street with no boxes at all (4H264). He identified Exhibit 724 (17H505) as a picture he took at 3:00 or 3:15 p.m. the day of the assassination from the assassination window looking west on Elm Street. This is still a different, though official, version. This photograph has the boxes stacked one on top of the other, all pointed

*144 on page 11 - bottom 1440 page*  
toward Elm Street at about a 45-degree angle to the west. None of the boxes is on the windowsill. They had been carefully stacked to allow the assassin room for his body between them and the eastern end of the window, a situation precluded by the Dillard photograph. When he acknowledged that the boxes had been moved prior to the taking of the picture, the Commission had no further interest or questions about such an obvious fake (4H264-5). Day's first attempt at an explanation was interrupted by the Commission's examiner. Day then returned to his self-justification, saying that an hour and a half after the assassination he did not know the direction in which the shots had been fired.

There are other contradictions, but are they in need of explanation? Day is perhaps best left with this explanation of what happened to the boxes: "They weren't put back in any particular order" (4H265). The reader should recall this account of what really happened to the boxes in considering the photographic reconstructions. The story of the empty rifle shells is just as bad and does not require complete tracing. They were photographed in place. Detective Sims carefully picked them up and Day sought fingerprints.

They were none. They were put into an unsealed envelope which Day signed and returned to Sims. Although Day had earlier informed the Commission he had marked all three shells at the scene, he admitted that was incorrect. At about 10 o'clock that night he had marked two of the shells. Although the third shell was missing, Day said, "I didn't examine it too close at that time." The third shell bears the identification of Captain George Dougherty, Day's superior. Why the shells did not all bear Day's mark is unexplained. How Dougherty's mark constitutes any kind of an identification at all is a mystery. There was much conflicting and contradictory testimony about these empty cases and a number of affidavits of further explanation were filed. There is this additional mystery: Day was asked by the examiner of one of these shells, "It appears to be flattened out here. Do you know or have you any independent recollection as to whether or not it was flattened out on the small end when you saw it?" Day's response was, "No, sir; I don't." What needs explaining is how a deformed shell fit into a precisely machined rifle breach (4H253-5).

By this time what happened when the identification experts were called over to where the rifle had been found should be comprehensible in a streamlined account. There is no indication the area was checked for fingerprints at all, even though the rifle was completely surrounded by boxes and carefully hidden in a space "just wide enough to accommodate that rifle and hold it in an upright position" (4H259). By "upright", Day meant horizontal. He and Studebaker clambered all over the unfingerprinted barriers behind which the rifle was hidden to take pictures, but they took only similar pictures from exactly the same spot. Studebaker's even show his own knee as he photographed downward (21H645).

After the rifle was photographed, Day held it by the stock. He assumed the stock would show no prints. Then Captain Fitts, perhaps because of the presence of newsmen, grasped the bolt and ejected a live cartridge. Day had found no fingerprints on the bolt. If there was any need for this operation, it was never indicated. There was no print on either the clip or the live bullet.

As with all the evidence, the pictures of the rifle also have other minor mysteries. Day testified that he made a negative (Exhibit 511) from one of his two negatives (Exhibit 718) of the rifle in the position in which it was found. What useful purpose this served, especially if the result sought was greater clarity, is not apparent (4H277). If these are identical, they were at the very least cropped differently. The confusion extended to the Commission's editor, who described the copied negative as "depicting location of the 02766 rifle when discovered" but of the original negative said, "Photograph of rifle hidden beneath boxes..." In any event, the rifle was almost clean of prints, as were the

shells, and well hidden. "No men appear to have found it at the same time. The Commission saw fit to call only one to Washington. He is Eugene Boone, a deputy sheriff (3H211f.). The other was Seymour Weitzman, a constable and one of the rare college graduates in the various police agencies. He had a degree in engineering. Weitzman gave a deposition to the Commission staff in Dallas on April 1, 1964 (7H105-9). Under questioning, he described "three distinct shots", with the second and third seeming almost simultaneous. He heard some one say the shots "come from the wall" west of the Depository and "I immediately scolded that wall". He and the police and "Secret Service as well" noticed "numerous kinds of footprints that did not make sense because they were going in different directions". "His testimony seems to have been ignored. He also turned a piece of the president's skull over to the Secret Service. He got it after being told by a railroad employee that "he thought he saw somebody throw something through a bush".

Then he went to the sixth floor where he worked with Boone on the search. With Weitzman on the floor looking under the flats of boxes and Boone looking over the top, they found the rifle. "I would say simultaneously ... It was covered with boxes. It was well protected ... I would say eight or nine of us stumbled over that gun a couple of times ... We made a man-fight barricade until the crime lab came up ..." (7H106-7).

When shown three unidentified photographs that seem to be those the police took, Weitzman said of the one with the hidden rifle, "It was more hidden than there" (7H108). If it had not been so securely hidden, he said, "we couldn't help but see it" from the stairway (ibid.). In addition to his only too graphic testimony about the finding and hiding of the rifle, Weitzman provided information about seemingly meaningful footprints at a place not in conformity with the official theories of the crime and about a strange effort to hide a piece of the President's skull. All this should have been valuable information for the members of the Commission. Why he was not called to appear before the full Commission is a mystery. Boone, who was called, did not have such testimony to offer.

Weitzman's testimony about the care and success with which the rifle was hidden and about the searcher's stumbling over it without finding it is important in any time reconstruction. With the almost total absence of fingerprints on a rifle that took and held prints and the absence of prints on the clip and shells that would take prints, this shows the care and time taken by the alleged user of the weapon. That this version is not in the Report can be understood best by comparison with the version that is.

Merrion L. Baker is a Dallas motorcycle policeman who heard the shots and dashed to the building, pushing people out of the way as he ran. He is the policeman who put his pistol in Oswald's stomach in the dramatic lunchroom meeting. The Commission also used him in a time reconstruction intended to show that Oswald could have left the sixth floor and been in the lunchroom in time to qualify as the assassin (3H211-70). The interrogator was Assistant Counsel David W. Belin. As so often happened, despite his understanding of his role as a prosecution witness, Baker interjected information the Commission found inconsistent with its theory. It is ignored in the Report.

The time it would have taken Oswald to get from the sixth-floor window to the lunchroom was clocked twice (3H253-4). Secret Service Agent John Joe Howlett disposed of the rifle during the reconstructions. What he did is described as "putting" it away or, in Belin's words, he "went over to these books and leaned over as if he were putting a rifle there?" Baker agreed to this description. But this is hardly a representation of the manner in which the rifle had been so carefully hidden. With a stopwatch and with the Howlett streaming, they made two trips. The first one "with normal walking took us a minute and 18 seconds ... And the second time we did it at a fast

walk which took us a minute and 14 seconds". During this time Oswald had to clean and hide the rifle and go down to the lunchroom and 20 feet inside of it, and a door with an automatic closure had to shut. This was an additional time-consuming factor ignored in the reconstruction and the Report.

On the other hand, the first reconstruction of the time the Commission staff alleged it took Baker was actually done at a walk! In Baker's words, "From the time I got off the motorcycle we walked the first time and we kind of run the second time from the motorcycle on into the building". Once they got into the building, "we did it at kind of a trot, I would say, it wasn't a real fast run, an open run. It was more of a trot, kind of" (3H253).

Walking through a reconstruction was pure fakery and the "kind of run or kind of trot" was not much better. Both Baker and Roy "truly" who accompanied him once inside the building, described what would have been expected under the circumstances, a mad dash. They were running so fast that when they came to a swinging office door on the first floor it jammed for a second. In actuality, Baker had sent people fleeing as he rushed into the building. He had been certain this building was connected with the shooting that he had immediately identified as rifle fire (3H247). The totally invalid walking reconstruction took a minute and 30 seconds. The "kind of trot" one took a minute and 15 seconds.

The reconstruction of Baker's time began at the wrong place, to help the Commission just a little more. To compare with the rifle-man's timing, this reconstruction had to begin after the last shot was fired. Witnesses the Report quotes at length describe the leluwiness with which the assassin withdrew his rifle from the window and looked for a moment as though to assure himself of his success. Not allowing for his leluwiness, the assassin still had to fire all three shots before he could leave the window. Commander Dulles mistakenly assumed the Commission's reconstruction was faithful to this necessity. He asked Baker, "Will you say what time to what time, from the last shot?"

The nonplused Baker simply repeated, "From the last shot" Belin corrected them both, interjecting, "the first shot" (3H252). Dulles asked, "the first shot?" and was then reassured by Baker, "the first shot". The minimum time of the span of the shots was established by the Commission as 4.8 seconds. Hence, that much as a minimum must be added to the Baker timing. During this time, according to Baker, he had "revved up" his motorcycle and was certainly driving it at something faster than a walk or "kind of a trot".

Added to this impossibility are a number of improbables. Roy "truly" was running up the stairs ahead of Baker and saw nothing. He retreated from a position between the second and third floors when he realized Baker was not following him. Whether he nor Baker saw the door closing, as it did, automatically. The door itself had only a tiny window, made smaller by the 45-degree angle at which it was mounted from the lunchroom. Baker saw 20 feet through this, according to his testimony.

Dulles was troubled by this testimony. He asked Baker, "Could I ask you one question ... think carefully." He wanted to know if Oswald's alleged course down from the sixth floor into the lunchroom apparently could have led to nowhere but the lunchroom. Baker's affirmative reply was based upon his opinion that a hallway from which Oswald could also have entered the lunchroom without using the door through which Baker said he saw him was a place where Oswald had no business" (3H256). This hallway, in fact, leads to the first floor, as Commission Exhibit 197 (17H212) shows. It is the only way Oswald could have gotten into the lunchroom without Roy and Baker seeing the mechanically closed door in motion. It also put Oswald in the only position in which he could have been visible to Baker through the small glass in the door. And Oswald told the police he

had, in fact, come up from the first floor.

There are ten references in the Report to this reconstruction. Two are specific. All conclude the reconstruction proves that Oswald could have been in the lunchroom before Baker got there and infer that he could have come from no other place than the sixth floor. The first one (RH52-3) says, "the time actually required for Baker and Truly to reach the second floor on November 22 was probably longer than in the test runs." The second says, "tests of all of Oswald's movements establish that these movements could have been accomplished in the time available to him" (RH49).

Exactly the opposite is the truth. Ignoring the flummery in these reconstructions and the obvious errors, the Commission itself proved that the unhurried assassin would have required a minute and 11 seconds. And the policeman at a minute and 15 seconds less than that time-span of the shots, or at least four seconds less time. If things happened as the Report alleges, Baker would have been at the lunchroom before Oswald. And with Baker's gun in his belly, Oswald, having just killed the President, was "calm and collected" (RH25). In following into the lunchroom Oswald was seeking escape. "There is a door out here," he alleged, "that you can get out and to the other parts of the building." This door leads to the conference room. The next witness in the Commission's reconstruction proved it was normally locked and, specifically, was locked that day.

Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr was given an opportunity to ask Baker a question. Speaking of the day of the assassination, Carr asked, "Did you have occasion during the rest of the day either in passing visits or idle conversation or anything of that type with any of the people who were there at the time who might have seen something or told you some theory they had about what might have happened?" "Not until last Friday morning," Baker responded. "Chief Lunday had worked traffic outside several times but I never did go inside or talk to any of the employees. Carr told Baker he was asking about only the time of the shooting. Baker was never asked what he had learned the Friday morning prior to his testimony at the Book Depository (3H26h).

Unsollicitedly, Baker also offered the Commission unwelcome evidence of the invalidity of its conclusion that a single bullet hit both the President and the Governor. He quoted Officer Jim Chaney, one of the four flanking the Presidential car, Chaney said he saw a separate shot hit the Governor and that he had so informed the Chief of Police. Chaney also said, as had Truly and "several officers" that at the time it made the turn into Elm Street the Presidential car "stopped" (3H26c).

Chaney was never called as a witness. Getting Oswald to wherever he had to be to make the Commission's reconstruction possible was a never-ending problem. In not a single case did the time reconstruction prove the Commission right. Following the fatal Baker reconstruction was one intended to get Oswald out of the building in time. This was attempted with Mrs. Robert A. Reid. Mrs. Reid's reconstructed time from her view of the motorcade outside to her desk was fixed at two minutes. When she began to protest that it was longer, she was interrupted and diverted. Her desk was near the lunchroom and she recalled seeing Oswald walk past it, something not confirmed by other employees present. The Report thus theorizes that, whereas it took Mrs. Reid two minutes to run to her desk from the outside, Oswald could have calmly walked it in one minute. But Mrs. Reid shattered the reconstruction by undeviatingly insisting that at the time she saw Oswald he was wearing no shirt over his T-shirt. All who saw Oswald thereafter without exception say he was wearing a shirt. The Report allows no time in its departure reconstruction for Oswald to have gotten his shirt from elsewhere in

the building.

The Report has no witnesses to Oswald's presumed trip from the sixth to the second floor. But the Commission had witnesses who gave evidence proving it impossible. Jack Dougherty was working on the fifth floor at the stairway where both elevators were then located. He saw no one going down the stairs. Three employees were at the windows on the fifth floor underneath the one from which the Report says the shots were fired. They testified they heard the empty cartridge cases hit the floor and the slight clicking of the operation of the rifle bolt. But all agreed that even after the shooting, when they were alerted and in some fear, they heard no one moving around on the sixth floor (3H18). Nothing but silence (3H179). Ten minutes before the shooting, Bonnie Roy Williams, one of the trio, had eaten his lunch next to this sixth-floor window (3H173). Asked "... did you hear anything that made you feel that there was anybody else on the sixth floor with you?" he explained, "that is one of the reasons I left - because it was so quiet" (3H178).

Placing Oswald at that sixth-floor window was one of the most unsuccessful tasks of the Report. They had the testimony of but a single man, Howard Leslie Brennan. Congressman Gerald R. Ford, Commission Member, was to describe Brennan as the most important of the witnesses in an article in LIFE dated October 2, 1964. Brennan had already described himself as a liar when lying served his purposes, as his own words will show. The Report has a section mislabeled "Eyewitness Identification of Assassin" (RH3-9).

This section begins with a prime example of the use of words to convey meaning that is the opposite of the truth. It says, "Brennan also testified that Lee Harvey Oswald, whom he viewed in a police lineup the night of the assassination, was the man he saw fire the shots from the sixth-floor window of the Depository Building." It is true that Brennan "viewed" the lineup, although he appears to be the one person whose presence the police have no written record. But he did not identify Oswald. Two pages later the Report, in its own way, acknowledges this by admitting "he declined to make a positive identification of Oswald when he first saw him in the police lineup." The fact is that Brennan at no time at the lineup made any identification (3H14-8). The next sentence reads, "The Commission, therefore, does not base its conclusions concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan's subsequent certain identification..." How certain Brennan could be of anything he saw or alleged he saw his own testimony will reflect better than any description. But the fact is that the Commission had and quoted no other so-called eyewitness. In the balance of this section it refers to the testimony of a number of people, none of whom identified Oswald. Congressman Ford's article stated without semantics or equivocation that Brennan "is the only known person who actually saw Lee Harvey Oswald fire his rifle at President Kennedy." Nobody did, as Brennan admitted.

The Report imparts a new meaning to words in saying "the record indicates that Brennan was an accurate observer..." (RH5). It says his description "most probably" led to the description broadcast by the police (RH14), having forgotten his earlier and contradictory version that this broadcast was "based primarily on Brennan's observations" (RH5). The earlier version also concedes Brennan was the "one eyewitness". Between the 12:45 police broadcast and Brennan's statement to the police the same day, there were changes in Brennan's description, but the Report calls the two descriptions "similar". The Report quotes the police broadcast of the suspect as "white, slender, weighing about 165 pounds, about 5'10" tall, and in his early thirties". Of his account to the police, the Report says "he gave the weight as between 165 and 175 pounds and the height was omitted". This information is footnoted. The source referred to in the footnote contains no description of any kind. I

Bledsoe on shirt  
Reid on shirt  
and "escape"  
route

~~1/14/69 2002 05 2~~

When Mrs. Bledsoe saw the Oswald shirt, Exhibit 150, before Ball was able to describe his evidence and ask his questions, she interrupted him to exclaim, "That is it." While the counsel persisted in formulating his question, she interrupted him three times to exclaim again, "That is it." While Ball was trying to lay a foundation for his questioning with further questions, she twice again interjected, "That is it." Finally, she said the shirt had been brought to her "by some Secret Service man."

Mr. Ball. It was brought out by the Secret Service man and shown to you?

Mrs. Bledsoe. Yes.

Mr. Ball. Had you ever seen the shirt before that?

Mrs. Bledsoe. Well -

Mr. Ball. Have you?

Mrs. Bledsoe. No; he had it on, though. (6HJ12)

When Mrs. Bledsoe, who had said she had seen Oswald on the bus and given such a graphic description of the expression she alone saw on his face, also said that she had never seen the shirt he was wearing until it was shown her by the Secret Service, while insisting that Oswald had it on, Ball faced a problem. He finally solved it, at least in part, by leading her through the same sort of questions and getting her to say, "Oh, huh, when he asked, 'first time you ever saw the shirt was when you saw him on the bus' (6HJ13). With three buttons missing from his shirt, she did not see the color of his undershirt. Of his pants, "they were grey, and they were all ragged in here... at the waist, uh, huh" (6HJ10). Shown both pairs of pants, Exhibits 156 and 157, she said "it could not have been 157 because 'it was ragged up at the top'. With only one pair left from which to make her identification, Mrs. Bledsoe said of 156, "That must have been it, but it seemed that it was ragged up at the top" (6HJ11).

Despite Mrs. Bledsoe's vivid description of Oswald's appearance and her dislike of him and her displeasure at having seen him on the bus, she did not at first connect him with the assassination, even when hearing his name on television.

"... I wanted to hear about the President and there was a little boy came in that room in the back and he turned it on, and we listened and hear about Mr. Rippen (sic) being shot, and it didn't dawn on me, and I said - told his name as Oswald. I don't - didn't mean anything to me, so I wanted to hear about the President, only one I was interested in, so, he went on back to work and they kept talking about this boy Oswald and had on a brown shirt, and all of a sudden, well, I declare, I believe that this was the boy, and his name was Oswald - that is 'I give me his right name, you know, and so, about an hour my son came home, and I told him, and he immediately called the police and told them, because we wanted to do all we could, and so, I went down the next night. He took me down, and I made a statement to them, what kind of - Secret Service man or something down there" (6HJ12).

Mrs. Bledsoe was not the only witness who, as reflected in the Report, recalled only what the Commission needed. Another was Mrs. Robert A. Reid, clerical supervisor at the Texas School Book Depository (3H270-81). She was used to place Oswald on a path that led to one of the exits from the building on the floor below. This was another shaky time reconstruction of which even she was leary. When Commission Assistant Counsel David Belin went over this reconstruction with her, recalling his time check on her path back to the office at "about 2 minutes", he forgot that, even on the 17-minute-

plus reconstruction of the walk from Oswald's roominghouse to the scene of the Tippit killing, the time was given in seconds. Mrs. Reid answered, saying, "Well, it wasn't any less than that, I am sure, because two minutes time..."

Belin interrupted her with more questions. Mrs. Reid had seen the assassination. She had conversed with a superior, O. V. Campbell, about the source of the shots; Mrs. Reid thought they came from above, Mr. Campbell from the grassy area to the west of the building. She had looked up and seen the Negro employees in the windows. And she had remained outside long enough to see the reaction of the crowd. She then ran into the building, noting no one where, at most, seconds before Officer Warrion L. Baker had had to push his way through people standing around. With all of this, Belin's time reconstruction got her into her office on a two-minute run two minutes after the first shot of the assassination rather than the last.

The Commission's problem was to get Oswald out of the building by 12:33, the time the Report says he left the building (RH55). Only by nudging Mrs. Reid could this have been possible, for all the employees in the doorway downstairs, none saw Oswald leave. The time reconstruction using Officer Baker, the policeman who encountered Oswald in the lunchroom, placed him in the lunchroom not earlier than 12:31:30, and this was accomplished by having the policeman retrace his steps from too far away and starting too early (3H252). By doing the same with Mrs. Reid, it was made to seem that in the half-minute between her reconstructed time and Baker's, Oswald could have gotten his coke and been in her office on his way "presumably, out. And he had to be out by 12:33 because the Commission next located him seven minutes after 12:33, seven blocks away, getting on the bus.

In this case, as in all others, the Commission's time reconstruction proved the opposite of what had been intended. But Mrs. Reid gave the reconstruction an additional fatal blow by insisting Oswald was, at the time she said she saw him, wearing only a T-shirt. She was specific and positive in declaring he was not wearing the brown shirt. Shown the shirt, in an effort to get her to "remember", she stated flatly, "I have never, so far as I know, even seen that shirt" (3H276). So Mrs. Reid's testimony, even placing Oswald in her office at 12:32, proved he could not have left the building "early" (3H279), whereas she had been running and a very slow pace, taken her two minutes running. The Report says it took him one minute, walking. But in this one minute Oswald had had to go to an unspecified place elsewhere in the building, get his shirt and either drink his coke or put an untouched bottle down somewhere, put on his shirt and leave, all without being seen. Nor was a full bottle of coke found anywhere.

Those things Mrs. Reid remembered with clarity were what the Commission required of her. She remembered Oswald when none of the other women in the office did. She remembered not only that he had a coke, but that it was full and in his right hand. They passed at her desk and she did not see him again (3H279).

Prior to her appearance, the Commission had a pretty good idea of what Mrs. Reid could and could not say, especially about the shirt, of which she informed it she had been asked before. Except for the T-shirt, she remembered nothing about Oswald's clothing and could not identify his trousers when shown them (3H279).

What Mrs. Reid did not remember gives an interesting appraisal of the value that can be put on what she did:

On what floor she saw the Negroes looking out the windows after the assassination, she could not even guess, and this was the building in which she had worked for seven years (3H273). When pressed to identify the floor, she said "a couple of floors up". It was the fifth floor.

With whom she ate lunch, and her estimate of the time she finished was impossible (3H271).

Whether or not she was the last to leave the lunchroom. Whether there were any men in the lunchroom. With this history she was not asked about seeing other employees, whether others were in the office area when she returned, or who they were. The only person she saw was Oswald, whom she knew only as an employee and did not even know his name until after the assassination (3H276). And he was the only one to whom she spoke. None of the others saw him. But Geneva Hime, who had not left the building, saw Mrs. Reid return and was sitting where Oswald would have to pass and did not see him. Miss Hime did name employees she recalled seeing (6H393ff.).

Mrs. Reid's testimony is also in conflict with that of other employees. She ate in the lunchroom regularly and saw Oswald only a few times" (3H276). Others said he was there regularly. In his entire employment at the Depository, she saw him only about five times. And what characterization of this monster did she give? He was a quiet man who minded his own business. The only conversations he had with the other office employees of which she knew were about his family, including the new baby (3H276). He "always went about his business" (3H280). And if the recollections of Roy Truly and Officer Baker were correct, after the policeman poked a pistol in his belly, the killer still took the time to buy, but not drink, a coke, walk through the office at "a leisurely pace", calmly, instead of taking a hallway which led to the same stairs and was as convenient and more private, all with no show of emotion, not even fear.

Notably, the Report reflects only that slight and most questionable part of Mrs. Reid's testimony that suited the Commission's purposes. She saw him walking in the general direction of a stairway that could have taken him to the entrance of the building. And if Oswald had entered the lunchroom for any purpose other than to buy a coke, as he had told the police, what could this purpose have been? Could it have been part of an elaborate escape route? Mrs. Reid disproved that possibility. The only other exit is through a conference room, normally locked, and on that day she personally unlocked it for the police (3H277).

These are not exaggerated samplings of the many Commission witnesses. The worst is yet to come. At the scene of the Tippit killings the same was true. For example, Sam Guinyard (7H395) saw the running man "knocking empty shells out of his pistol and reloading it in a one-hand operation," rolling them (the bullets) with his hand - with his thumb". Guinyard saw this from a half-block away (7H397). Guinyard is in contradiction of the other witnesses on the route the man took and on the closest he ever was to this man, his estimate of ten feet having been measured at 55 feet (7H398). Guinyard also testified that after a short interval during which Red Galloway started in pursuit of the fleeing gunman, they went to the next street and about a hundred feet down it to the scene of the Tippit killing. He was there, Guinyard swore, when the truck driven by Domingo Benavides "came up". "He came from the east side - going west" (7H398). By the testimony of all other witnesses, including Benavides, Benavides had parked his truck across the street from the police car prior to the shooting.

Not only in listening to incredible witnesses and ignoring their implausible, inaccurate and frequently impossible testimony without anything that could be considered searching questions did the Commission display a remarkable attitude toward those from whom it gathered evidence. Bias was clear in the examination of the only person to come forward with an offer to help the Commission. The Commission did not want any help, as it made clear, and especially did it not want anything that might disturb the neat little package already prepared for it before it began its deliberations.

Mark Lane is a New York lawyer and former assemblyman (2H32-61; 5H46-61). Disturbed as were many lawyers at what was reported from Dallas beginning with the apprehension of Oswald, he conducted his own inquiry. He was retained by Mrs. Marguerite Oswald to look out for her dead son's interest. Soon he presented a brief on Oswald's behalf, challenging much of the police case. His request to be allowed to represent Oswald was rejected by the Commission, as described earlier.

The Commission was untroubled by this situation: The one lawyer who had interested himself in the dead Oswald and had been engaged by the mother to represent him was rejected by the Commission on the ground that the widow, Marina, not the mother, was Oswald's legal representative. The Commission was "cooperating" with her and had obtained big-name counsel. Then Harlin, knowing of the rights of married people under the Fifth Amendment, waived or never exercised any rights and became the major witness against her husband.

Lane discomfited the Commission. He put into the record things the Commission had sought to, and continued to seek to, keep out. Among these were quotations from doctors at Parkland Hospital who initially tended the President's wounds, describing the anterior neck wound as one of entry. He also gave the names of some of the doctors who had so stated. The Commission was later to go into an elaborate ritual with some of these doctors, most especially with Doctor Malcolm Perry, in which the identification of the doctors of this wound as one of entry was as carefully avoided as possible. The circumlocutions were unbelievable (6H7-18; 3H366-90).

So Lane was unwelcome to begin with because the Commission wanted no information in contradiction to its story. He was additionally unwelcome because he trod on a sensitive toe. And he kept treading on that toe, pointing out that Mary Hootman still had the FBI receipt for her picture showing the front of the building, but the picture had been unused (2H44). On the finding of the rifle, he declared the affidavit was executed the day after the assassination and at that late time still identified the rifle as a 7.65 Mauser (2H46). The dealer who supplied the rifle to Oswald, according to Lane, was warned by the FBI to keep his mouth closed. His

The really sensitive nerve was touched when Lane recounted his interview with Helen Markham, converted by the Commission, again without need, into the most important witness in the Tippit killing. Lane listed the contradictions between Mrs. Markham's testimony and what she had told him, of her distance from the scene of money and what she had told him, of her description of the killer, of her means of identifying Oswald in the lineup - by his clothing.

In his second appearance before the Commission on July 2, 1964, Lane and Rankin battled over the propriety of the questions Lane accused the Commission's general counsel, without contradiction, of making demands that invaded the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship. This had to do not with the contents of the tape recording of the Markham-Lane phone conversation but with the circumstances under which it was made. According to Lane, "the Supreme Court has been quite plain, I think, on the sanctity of work-ing documents of attorneys." And I think, therefore, that the questions are no longer in a proper area (5H47). With Rankin's persistence in asking questions about the recording but not its contents, Lane declared, "I decline to answer any questions, because the questions you are asking clearly are not for the purpose for which this Commission has been established. And I tell you I am amazed, quite frankly, Mr. Rankin, that the kind of harassment which I have been subjected to since I became involved in this case continues here in this room - I am amazed by that" (5H50).

Lane also complained about treatment he had received from FBI Agents. When the questioning returned to the tape recording, Lane de-