

before page 193:

As I wrote it this chapter got longer than I'd expected.

I think it should become three shorter chapters ~~or~~ be broken by subheads.

I do not care which.

But I'll do it as separate chapters.

The first break is at the top of ~~210~~ 201.

The Mexican Mysteries

XVI

From his Ted Bundy job in Dallas, where it was only a dry run prior to his return there, Posner turned to Oswald's week in Mexico City. He wrote nothing about it to offend the CIA. That was no mean accomplishment consider what he could have said about the CIA from what was in the public domain.

He eases into that with more of his mind-reading going back once again to that 1963 grave to do it because the mind he read has been in that grave that long. This is what he says of Oswald as he took the Trailways bus in Houston for Laredo:

"He was excited to begin the last leg of his trip, and he felt he had no reason to be secretive any longer since he would soon be in Cuba and permanently away from the U.S." Naturally, there is no source noted (Page 171)

~~Posner ended his chapter "His Mood Was Bad" with~~

Posner begins his next chapter, with more of his mind reading, saying, the first words in the chapter, "Oswald was ashamed to call Marina when he first arrived in Dallas. He had fully expected he would be calling her from Cuba, and he could not bring himself to talk to her that first day. Instead, he went directly to the YMCA...." No-Source Posner full-time again.

There could not have been any reason for Oswald staying in Dallas? Posner does not bother to tell what time he got there or what time he crossed the border. Or whether he had an unemployment claim to make. Or whether it cost him less to stay at the Y than bus fare to and from Irving if he came in the next day to look for a job.

And whaddaya know, Posner himself reports on the same page even that "later that day," time no given, Oswald file an unemployment claim. And, again on the same page, Oswald did go job-hunting the next day, too.

The point is not worth the time for me to check the available records but it is my impression that the Mexico bus reached the border early that morning and then Oswald had to get to the bus to Dallas and make that trip, which is not short. It had to be toward the end of the day by the time he got to the unemployment office to register for his check.

That he surely needed.

Posner's mind-reading is no more harmful to truth than what he presents as truth, and not infrequently it is less harmful. *than what is not true.*

It is obvious that for all his ~~decade~~ dedication to Hartogs and all the other prejudicial sources that are basic in his book, he had no way of knowing what was in Oswald's mind the day he was leaving Texas for Mexico City and the day he was back in Texas from Mexico City.

The unfortunate truth is the when Posner is supposedly writing fact from dependable sources he is as much or more the fictioneer as in his novelist's mind-reading. When the mind he reads is his own, not Oswald's, and he his own mind is telling him to build the case he does not have.

What would be surprising, were this not Posner and were not Posner exploiting a formula that worked as close to perfectly for his and Random House's purposes, is that ~~expressly~~ especially in this Mexico City writing he does not include so much that is public .

It is not surprising, too, because what he does not say as well as what he does say both favor the CIA, to which he is indebted so heavily.

Still again, when he has ^{official} real sources they are not the readily available primary sources. His other sources are those he condemns, yet he has so little on Oswald in Mexico that would not offend the CIA he has no choice but to use Tony Summers, one of his ^{best} ~~best~~ ^{as} ~~as~~ a source.

But then it can be imagined that in using Summers for a source where Summers wrote what the CIA does not like, Posner runs no risk of offending anyone in the CIA precisely because it does not recognize Summers as a dependable source and thus ~~sees~~ ^{sees} no harm in ^{quoting} what Summers wrote.

Especially when that same information could have been quoted from the newspapers, as the CIA knew.

This again comes to the provocative question ^{of} Posner's unacknowledged sources for what he cannot have known from his own work.

Other than for ~~its~~ ^{its} extraordinary generosity with Nosenko, I recall nothing in his

to account for his writing that Peter Earnest, chief of the CIA's Office of Public and Agency Information" was "always very generous in his assistance." (page 502)

Posner's treatment of Oswald in Mexico is rather brief considering ~~at~~ ^{why} that did happen there and the controversy about it and even more, considering what any writer of minimal experience and competence could have learned that is not in his book and of which he reflects no awareness.

But that, too, results in no embarrassment to the CIA where it could have been embarrassed.

With Posner and his book these things just seem to go together.

Some of the things about which he wrote he knows so little about he does not even get the name of the man about whom he ~~was~~ writes correctly. ~~But to say about this that if~~ he had asked me about that man and that incident I could and would have given him copies of FBI records and directed him to where in my files he would find what the CIA disclosed, records that involve the White House and the State Department as well as the FBI on a matter of extraordinary urgency. But any informed person reading what Posner writes about this would believe immediately that he would shun other than the ~~nothing-~~ ~~ness~~ second-hand cud he is rechewing and would know that if he tried to digest anything other than that he would not have been able to wind up with a misstatement of fact and of reality that - once again - is what the CIA prefers to the actuality, which does not reflect well on it.

In truth the actualities of what the CIA did ~~was~~ ^{when} Oswald was in ~~the~~ ^{later} Mexico and when the late David Atlee Philip was in charge ~~about~~ of its Cuban surveillances and other operations there, were well on their way ^{with} to a passion that was getting to where World War III was not an impossibility.

Posner's account of it is his end of this chapter, its last page (194) and although the relevant records are the ~~the~~ very first the CIA released in the middle 1970s there is no hint of them in what he says about the man who tried to trigger ~~it~~ ^{a war} and came close to succeeding. Posner ~~refers~~ refers to him merely as "a young Nicaraguan, Gilberto Alvarado."

His name is Gilberto ~~Al~~ Alvarado Ugarte and he as an agent of Nicaraguan intelligence. ^{Dictator Somoza,}

In much of Latin America the matronymic is part of the name.

Posner's ^{own} version of the inherently incredible story Alvarado actually got the CIA to believe is ^{el} a childish invention that anyone with any experience in intelligence matters ~~ago~~ should have recognized as a childish fake.

What those ~~innies~~ ^{and State Department} CIA ninnyies so lost in their cold war actually believed is that Alvarado was at the Cuban embassy where he "overheard" ~~only in Posner's moderated version of that silliness but he also said he saw it~~ ^{and} a Cuban he described as a black man in the Posner version (~~but~~ ^{and} Alvarado also had him red-headed) proposition Oswald to kill JFK. On Oswald's acceptance, and as Posner does not say, right out there in the open where anyone could see it, he was handed \$6,500 "in large denomination bills."

Out in the open? Their voices almost on a public-address system? Without regard to Alvarado looking right at them and listening to them? In broad daylight? Not inside the buildings there were between both Cubans? And any one spoke believed that?

And how they did!

Posner says "The CIA gave Alvarado's story full attention." The only thing he ~~then~~ ^{then} says that can represent this undescribed "full attention" is that it sent "the information" to "the FBI as well as the "White House."*

Here Posner is again the mind reader and what those who provided his dust-jacket promotions say he never does, he conjectures. Before getting into that Posner does not report that this inflammatory rubbish was also sent to Langley, CIA headquarters, and to the State Department, where Posner also does not report that ^{that} ~~annally~~ ^{Da + Lex's} Johnson was much ~~it~~ taken with it.

That footnote reads, "President Lyndon Johnson later believed that Castro was behind the assassination. ~~The~~ ^{the} Alvarado story must ~~have~~ have certainly have contributed to LBJ's early suspicion."

If Johnson did not develop that belief until "later," why did ~~it~~ ^{he} not if it was ^{his} ~~the~~ FBI's early suspicion."

I know of no record reflecting that Johnson paid any attention to it, whether or not he did. But I do know what the FBI fed him to give him that "later" belief. As Posner would

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have if he had apid any attention to a folder I keep on my desk and show all who come here to search the files.

That "later" LBJ belief that there was Cuban involvement was provoked by FBI leaks to him when the electronic-surveillance "expert" hired for the CIA to do some bugging for the Chicago mafia boss, Sam ~~Trone~~ ^M "Tom" Giancana ^{was caught, Giancana had} asked for a return ~~offer~~ for the favor he was doing the CIA in that bumbling effort for the CIA to kill Castro of which he was part. The bug man, ~~many~~ ^{Man} Balletti, was caught when he did a poor job of ~~getting~~ trying to get the sound efforts. Giancana ~~was~~ suspected that his friend, Phyllis, of the Maguire sisters, was two-timing him by sleeping with Dan ^M Martin, of Rowan and Martin, while he was performing in Vegas. I have the FBI's file and of course, like all others, Posner could have seen it. Balletti let it be known that he would not go down ^{alone} at all, the word reached the FBI and the CIA, and Balletti did not go down at all. ^{He was released} ~~that~~ that staffing incompetence ^{Ad out} Cartha DeLoach wrote a memo intended for J. Edgar ^{INL} Hoover but addressed to Clyde Tolson in which he reported LBJ's reaction to ^W have this titillating stuff fed to him: "...Marvin Watson called me late last night and stated that the President had told him in an off moment, that he is now convinced that there was a plot ~~tax~~ in connection with the assassination. ^W Watson stated the President felt the ~~CIA~~ had something to do with ~~the~~ this plot. Watson requested that any further information we could furnish in this matter would be most appreciated by him and the President. I reminded Watson that the Director had sent over to the White House some weeks ago all the information in our possession in connection with the CIA's attempt to use former agent Robert ^M ~~Maheu~~ and his private detective outfit in contacts with Giancana and other hoodlums, relative to fostering a plot to assassinate Castro."

(The copy of this record I have is from the ~~FBI~~ FBI headquarters main JFK assassination file, 62-109060, in which it is Serial 5075)

At the time of that "earlier" LBJ suspicion, there is a ^e clear record left by some of those he was pressuring into agreeing to be on the Commission he as going to appoint. Earl Warren, in the words of ^{Commission} Counsel Melvin ^{Eisenberg's} ~~Eisenberg's~~ memo for the record of it, told his staff that he took ^u the job, knowing he should not, because LBJ con-

vinced him that otherwise there could be "a war which could cost 40 million lives,"

(In facsimile in Whitewash IV, page 24)

There ~~would~~ be such a war without there having been a conspiracy?

And a war with Cuba would cost 40 millions lives?

So, instead of conjectures for No-Source Posner there are documents that responsible writers wanting to be responsible can cite.

Posner's next two sentences can carry little meaning to the average reader but they will suggest that the CIA did its duty and thus this writing is good for the CIA. That its record does not justify.

Posner's first sentence is "The CIA gave the Alverado story its full attention."

What "full attention" means is not stated so the reader ~~is~~ then is justified in assuming that this "full attention" ^{what was correct and of} consisted of sending the information to the FBI and to the White House."

That is hardly what the CIA did and it was hardly necessary, with the FBI, and it was quite improper for the Mexico City CIA station to send such information to the White House. Its job is to get a information to its headquarters and the decision then is and should be a headquarters decision, not that of any station in a ^{distant} remote area. Moreover, there is generally information to be added or to be checked. And then it is headquarters, not the ^{foreign station} field office, that know^s how to handle the information ^{and} with whom in the White House.

It is not the function of any station to rush untested information, ^{IL} even rumors, to the White House, which has its own responsibilities and can be led into making the wrong decision. ^{That} ~~as~~ at one point seemed imminent in this ^{ic} case and also ^{is} seemed to be the intent of Ambassador Thomas Mann.

The FBI had a "Legal Attache" office in Mexico ~~City~~ City. Those in that Legat office knew about this Alarado amateurish concoction and did not credit it. They also did not require the CIA to communicate with their own headquarters ^{in to}. Fortunately!

As Posner does not say, thus doing the CIA another great favor, is that this silly fable with no credibility was well on its way to making the fear Johnson expressed to ~~the~~

Warren a reality when both FBI and CIA headquarters moved in, and clamped control on what ~~it~~ was a running amok. *in Mexico City, They were*

I have the CIA's records on this ^{in its first disclosure} but I do not not have access to them because I am not able, for physical and medical reason, to do that ~~search~~ searching. But I have a clear recollection of some of that rather scanty disclosure. It was also an incomplete disclosure, as newspaper accounts of those massive 1993 disclosures make clear with their reference to relevant records not disclosed until then. I was ~~to~~ impressed by some of those ^{1970s} releases, of about two hundred pages, that I recall where I was when I read them. ^{on West 81 Street,} It was ^{in New York,} in the home of a friend just off the ^{almost} west side of Central Park, opposite the Museum of Natural History. (Check).

To its discredit the Mexico City CIA made no effort to confirm Alvarado's fabrication.

The cold-war dominated minds went for it big. Whether or not this was David Atlee Phillips' decision or responsibility is a question that will present itself as we continue. That we survive that mindset and the acts and decisions of those recruited with that mindset and set is the world's good fortune. But that tale, which had no credibility at all, made no sense at all, appealed to those cold-war demons in Mexico City.

No-Source
/Posner's last sentence in this passage and this chapter begin with a factual misstatement that also cover the CIA. It reads, "Although Ambassador ^{Thomas} Mann, ~~was not convinced~~ ~~the U.S. representative in Mexico at the time,~~ was not convinced of the Alvarado story....." The exact opposite is true. Mann was convinced and pummelled Washington with demands for "action". What action was possible other than an attack on Cuba?

And would not that have meant World War III?

The cables released at that time reflect that in the State Department, to which most of Mann's cables went, U. Alexis Johnson, was much impressed by Mann's pressures and if I recall correctly, shared Mann's irrational opinion that something should be done.

What ~~was~~ was done that I am certain of is that FBI headquarters was properly frightened and properly demanded that there be a vigorous effort to break ~~Alvarado~~ Alvarado down. I believe ~~but~~ am not certain that it recommended polygraphing him. I am certain that this was decided by CIA headquarters. I now do not recall whether that was on its own or

as the result of FBI pressure.

There also was a step FBI headquarters could take and it did, promptly.

Alvarado ~~said all that he made by a~~ ^{dated his invention as having happened} but but said he saw and heard at the Cuban ~~embassy~~ was on September 18. FBIHQ immediately asked its Dallas and New Orleans filed offices if they could account for where Oswald was on the eighteenth of September.

~~Said he~~ was in New Orleans, not Mexico City.

Checking ^{was} ~~was~~ an obvious necessity before any credence ^{was} ~~is~~ given any such story. But the CIA Mexico City Station and Ambassador Mann ~~did not~~ ^{my} begin ^{with that demand} and they did ~~begin~~ ^y ~~crediting~~ what a reasonably ^{intelligent} ~~intelligent~~ college ~~freshman~~ ^{freshman} ought ~~not~~ credit.

With the most catastrophic consequences a possibility ^{result} ~~of it~~.

The records reflect that even after Alvarado failed the polygraph test Mann continue with some faith in his poppycock and at least in the records of that disclosure never fully abandoned giving the Alvarado fiction some credence.

Aside from Alvarado's story being inherently without credibility, as any experienced spooks, as ^{those} ~~though~~ in the Mexico City station were, because ^{if} anything like that were to ~~done~~ the one certainty is that it would not be in public, what kind of political idiots could believe that Castro would invite the United States to wipe him and his country out?

Would anyone but a political dumdum believe that Castro preferred the hawk Johnson to the dove Kennedy? Johnson ~~was~~ the certain successor with Kennedy ~~killed~~.

And then, as CIA officials and agents are supposed to be, how could anyone with any political maturity not know that the solution to the 1962 Cuba (fol lit) Missile Crisis was that Kennedy was and would be Cuba's protector, the only one in the world who could be its protector? Khrushchev and the USSR could come to Cuba's aid in a war but could not in any real sense at all protect ~~it~~ from any war or any invasion.

The whole business that No Sourec Superscholar and Supersleuth Posner covers up is a classic case of total failure, total breakdown by the CIA and the Ambassador. Both passed the immature ^{conclusion} ~~conclusion~~ along with what amounted to endorsement of it and ~~was~~ with a demand by the ambassador that something be done without sensible analysis of it or any effort to confirm it or break its ^{n/} ~~source~~ down. That, once made, ^{was} ~~was~~ child's play.

And that should ^v ~~have~~ been the beginning, not the end. ^{Too} much was possible in between.