

NOSENKO: THE GAMES HOOVER, THE FBI, CIA AND COMMISSION PLAYED

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Little appreciated as it was then and in the ensuing years,
essential to acceptance of the Report, particularly because of the
absence of real proof and the presence only of disproof in the mean-
ingful evidence, was prejudice against and hatred of Oswald. This
need was met by building a false case of Oswald as pro-USSR and pro-
Communist. All the credible evidence is to the contrary. Oswald
hated the Russians and American Communists. (WHITEWASH pp.1,10,19,
72,119-23,137,149,192.) This propaganda line dominates the Report
and the extensive conditioning campaign of "leaks" prior to its is-
suanee. Its table of contents alone provides evidence. The entire
last regular chapter dealing with the assassination (pp.375-424) is
devoted to Oswald's "Background and Possible Motives." The preced-
ing chapter allegedly on the alleged "Investigation of Possible Con-
spiracy" (none not involving him) has a separate 74-page section
(R254ff) on "Background of Lee Harvey Oswald." Appendix XIII (R669ff)
is 71 more pages on his "Biography." - All of this and so much more
just to make the anti-Communist Oswald appear to be a "Red" who could
be accepted as a lone "nut" assassin.

Suppressing fact and truth was an early, major and endless
problem. On the reality of Oswald, its confrontation with unwanted
proof began 2/4/64 when a former KGB deputy section chief, Yuri No-
senko, defected to the CIA. Nosenko had had custody of the KGB's
entire Oswald file.

With his life at stake if he lied, Nosenko talked. His story
checked out. There is no mention of him or what he disclosed in the
Report. Total suppression. I have obtained hundreds of relevant
pages, seek more and will be writing about this separately. Nosenko
told the CIA (not one report from which can be found in the Commis-
sion's files) and the FBI that the Russians actually believed Oswald
was a "sleeper" or "dormant" American agent and had him and his mail
under surveillance all the time he was in the USSR. Despite this,
Oswald did not hide his dislike of the USSR. Marina's uncle, a colo-
nel, begged Oswald "not to be too critical of the Soviet Union when
he returned to the United States."

The Commission and its witting staff had to hide all of this.
They and the Commission's successors have perpetuated secrecy to the
degree possible.

The CIA could not deny the FBI access to Nosenko. FBI agents
known to have interviewed him are Maurice A. Taylor, Donald E. Walter
and Alekso Popanovich, beginning 2/26. The wily Hoover, knowing it
would embarrass and compromise both the CIA and the Commission, ar-
ranged without being asked for Nosenko to offer to testify, the last
thing the Commission wanted, and then put it in a letter.

The CIA people involved were under James Angleton, who, with
others of them, was forced out as a result of the Watergate scandals.
Typical of the continuing suppression is the withholding of the para-
graph from David Slawson's 3/12/64 "TOP SECRET" memo on a CIA confer-
ence: "The first topic of conversation was Yuri Nosenko, the recent
Soviet defector. A general discussion was held on this problem [sic]
with the CIA's recommendation being that the Commission await further
developments."

"Await" is the right word. The CIA stonewalled successfully.
As of October 1975 I "await" response under the law to months-old re-
quests for declassification of what never qualified for any classifica-
tion, what Nosenko told the CIA about Oswald.

Slawson's colleague in this work is Ford's Secretary of Trans-
portation, William T. Coleman, Jr. They put "TOP SECRET" classifica-
tion on what the FBI did not classify at all and suppressed it all
from their part of the Report.

It is a big secret but on 6/24/64 the Commission actually had
Nosenko study some of its Oswald files. The day before it held an
executive session. After not being able to get that transcript for
eight years I filed suit on 9/24/75 (C.A.75-1448). Also on 6/24 this
same pair wrote and classified TOP SECRET a memo to "The Commission"
that begins by justifying their not questioning Nosenko, making no
mention of the prior day's events or Nosenko's willingness to testify:

The Commission has asked us to prepare a short memorandum outlining in what respects the information obtained from Nosenko confirms or contradicts information we have from other sources.

Nosenko's testimony to the FBI is the only information we have on what he knows about Lee Harvey Oswald. (Commission Documents No. 434 and 451.) Perhaps more useful information could be gained if we were to question Nosenko directly, but it is unlikely. Nosenko told the representative of the FBI who questioned him that he had given all the information on Oswald he possessed.

They say Nosenko's only important knowledge was that Oswald was not a KGB agent. That he was suspected by the Russians of being an American agent was not important!

There can be no more classic example of Hoover's daring and expertise in his own special brand of "dirty tricks." His unsolicited offer of Nosenko as a witness shifted all possible Commission interest away from Hoover and reports Oswald had worked for him. Hoover put his monkey on the Commission and CIA backs. The Commission saw irreparable destruction of its whole fabrication. The CIA knew Dulles told the Commission the FBI had no agents in Russia (p. 481; WHITEWASH IV, pp. 74-5).

Thereafter nobody ever crossed Hoover or raised any real questions about Oswald's possible FBI connections. Right after Hoover started feeding them the Nosenko material, on 3/4/64, Coleman sent his sidekick Slawson a news clipping reporting appointment of a CIA official to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security. "Bill" asked "Dave" if "the change came about because of the matters we are working on."

"The matters we are working on" included Nosenko.

Eight days later they had that meeting with the CIA at which they accepted what was suppressed in their memo, "the CIA's recommendation" to "await further developments." Rankin, Willens, Coleman, Slawson, Stern and Griffin did not lay down the law to the stonewalling CIA. They did not invoke an unlimited Presidential mandate and demand the information their job required or issue the subpoenas Congress authorized. Not these stout hearts so determined on "disclosure of all the facts." Instead, they wheedled, which invited Helms and the CIA to stonewall.

In Slawson's brave words they "pointed out to the CIA that we had developed materials which might be of help to the CIA in assessing the Russian situation, in particular the testimony of" Marguerite, Robert and Marina Oswald and her business agent.

Even experienced spooks must have had trouble not bursting out in laughter at this! What did Marguerite know "of help to the CIA" from her practical nursing? Or Marina, the just-beginning pharmacist? Robert from his Texas brickyard? James Martin from 15% of selling Marina to whomever and however possible?

Imagine a Presidential Commission trying to bribe tough old intelligence hands with trash like this! It gives a notion of the character of the Commission's "investigation," why the best that can be said of it is that it was a whitewash. And then having the gall to stamp it "TOP SECRET," which means it could start a war!

There were "further developments," a few on Helms and the CIA under him not limited to Watergate. The dirtiest kinds of dirty tricks against Americans. If this Commission had done its work as it was supposed to from what is in its files - holding the highest security classification - it could have lead to exposure of these dirty tricks, like killing Americans in drug experiments, intercepting their mail and planning and pulling foreign assassinations. The leads are there and I have them.

Does one suppose the Russians did not know that one of their top men defected? Or what he could have said? What was of interest to this Commission related to Oswald only, with not one word of it secret from the Russians. Why stamp all this "TOP SECRET?" Only to

keep it secret from the noninvestigation there was

This, of course, provide an "investigation" actuality, not the public of the coverup. More report. It, too, was classmate the truth is the which I have eliminated

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keep it secret from the American people, only to hide the kind of noninvestigation there was of the assassination.

This, of course, is but a partial record. It is enough to provide an "investigations" self-description. Once again it is the actuality, not the public pretense. One of the more disgusting parts of the coverup. More repugnant to any standard of decency and honor is what these characters actually planned to say of it in their Report. It, too, was classified for ten years. This boasting so opposite the truth is the first page of a section headed "DRAFT" from which I have eliminated only two illegible marginal notations:

In its investigation of Oswald's foreign contacts

the Commission placed great reliance upon the Central Intelligence Agency and its information-gathering activities abroad. Also, the Commission received through the Agency information originating with defectors from the Soviet intelligence services on practices and procedures which would be applicable in the Soviet Union to a case like that of Oswald during his stay there.

Some of the information furnished by the Agency, and most of its sources for that information, are of a highly confidential nature. Nevertheless, because it believes that the fullest possible disclosure of all the facts relating to the assassination of President Kennedy is of the highest importance, the Commission has included in this Report all the information, without exception, which it considered in coming to its conclusions, whether such information tended to strengthen or to weaken those conclusions. The only information which was not included in the Report, therefore, was either wholly irrelevant to any of the conclusions reached or was derived from sources which are known to be unreliable or whose reliability cannot be assessed at this time. In the latter case

the information should later be proven to have been

Is it "wholly irrelevant" that the man the Commission intended to describe as the lone, pro-Russian assassin hated them? That they considered he was an American agent and kept him under surveillance? Or, because it is not "included in this Report" it is rather what was not "considered in coming to its conclusions?" Whichever, it defines "the fullest possible disclosure of all the facts relating to the assassination of President Kennedy."

This untold story is part of the past if not the credentials of our first unelected President and a member of his cabinet. If it does not say how we lost and got a President, it still says much.